No account of the recent campaign could be in any way complete if it did not include some mention of the valuable assistance rendered to the Sirdar and the Anglo-Egyptian forces by the gunboats and the Friendlies. I have thought it better to keep this portion of the narrative distinct from the rest, and to mould the present chapter more or less into the form of a diary.

The Sirdar's fleet at the end of the campaign consisted of the following gunboats:—Sultan, Sheikh, Melik, Fatteh, Nasr, Hafir, Tamai, Metemmeh, and Abu Klea. In addition to these were the old unarmed El Tahra and, up to 25th August, the gunboat Zaphir.

The navigation of the Nile was full of difficulty. The river charts were bad or non-existent, and no reis, or native captain, could really be trusted to keep his boat in the deep channels with any certainty. Still, it must be remembered that the bed of the Nile is continually changing its position, and what are deep holes one year may be turned by next year's flood into shallow pools. On the whole, it is astonishing that the river service was not frequently overtaken by disaster. The engines on a boat like the Tamai were always on the verge of dissolution, the current was terrific, and all the vessels—gunboats, barges, and ghyassas—were loaded down to the water's edge. The barges, on which the troops were packed together with barely room to turn themselves, were especially liable to accident, as they were exceedingly top-heavy and loosely constructed. I remember seeing a gunboat gently collide with one of these barges as it lay, fortunately without any crew, off the bank at Wad Hamed. The whole structure collapsed at once; the top platform fell off, and in less than two minutes the remains of the barge and all its cargo that would float were drifting rapidly down the Nile.

One gunboat alone, the Zaphir, was overtaken by serious disaster. It happened as follows: On 23rd August the Zaphir left the Atbara at 4 p.m. The officers on board consisted of General Rundle, Prince Christian Victor, Lieutenant Micklem, R.E., Major Dodd, R.A.M.C., and, in command of the vessel, Commander Keppel, R.N. In the ghyassas, which were lashed to the gunboat, were packed "details" of various native battalions. All went well for two nights, although on the 23rd the Zaphir tied up to the bank in the midst of a violent storm of wind which suddenly swept over the river from the desert. At 4.45 p.m. on the 25th of August the officers were sitting on the upper deck taking tea, when Mr. Poole, the engineer, suddenly asked Commander Keppel to come below at once. Prince Christian meanwhile walked forward, and noticed that the ship lay very low in the water, so much so, in fact, that the rapid current was washing over the bows. As he walked back to General Rundle, Commander Keppel rushed up from the lower deck and informed the assembled officers that water had found its way into the hold, and the gunboat might go down any moment; meanwhile, he had ordered the engineer to make for the shore at full speed. On the receipt of this startling information the officers walked to the side of the vessel, and as they did so, the Zaphir, which was floundering in a clumsy fashion towards the bank, suddenly gave a heavy lurch to starboard, and seemed on the point of "turning turtle." A general exodus of natives followed; servants, sailors, and "Gyppy" soldiers sprang out of the nooks and crannies in which they hide themselves on board, and, leaping into the stream, swam easily to the shore. At the same instant General Rundle, Major Dodd, and Lieutenant Micklem jumped from the deck on to the ghyassas at the side. The Zaphir, however, righted herself again, but as the fires had been put out by the inrush of water, she drifted slightly and began to settle down. An attempt to get a rope from the ship to the shore failed. Prince Christian then jumped upon a ghyassa, and lastly, just as the gunboat sank within thirty yards of the bank, Commander Keppel followed his example. Most fortunately, someone had the presence of mind to cut the ghyassas adrift, otherwise they would certainly have been dragged down with the vessel as she foundered. On the return journey from Omdurman I noticed that part of the funnel was still out of the water, and a twelve-pounder gun projected from the stern battery a couple of feet above the stream. The whole party bivouacked on shore that night in rather a destitute condition. Nobody seemed to know how the leak was caused, but from the time the inrush of water was noticed, at 5.40, only eleven minutes elapsed before the vessel sank. A few stores had been saved, and off these the shipwrecked officers made a meal. Everyone by good luck had managed to land in his helmet, but otherwise the clothing of the party was rather nondescript. Prince Christian, for example, had nothing left except a pair of trousers and a canvas shirt. Next morning the natives dived about the wreck and fished out some odds and ends of clothing and baggage. At midday on the 26th, Major Drage, D.S.O., happened to pass up the river in the El Tahra, and conveyed the Zaphir's crew to Rojan Island, where Commander Keppel transferred his flag to the Sultan, accompanied by Prince Christian and Major Dodd.

On the day before the loss of the Zaphir, the "Irregulars" or "Friendlies" had assembled at Wad Hamed. This motley corps was composed of detachments from the following tribes:—Gaalin, Ababdeh, Shukriyeh, Batahin, Bishariyeh, Mersalamieh, Gimiab, and a few Hassaniyeh. All these tribes have for thirteen years been bitterly hostile to the English and Egyptians, but, thanks to the impolitic conduct of the Khalifa and the cruel devastation practised by his generals, many of his adherents amongst these Arab tribes have been alienated from the Mahdi's successor, and now look forward to an era of peace and security under a settled government. By far the most useful and important section of these Friendlies was furnished by the Gaalin, a brave and warlike tribe, who fought gallantly against the British at Abu Klea, Abu Kru, and Gubat in January 1885. In July 1897 Khalifa's army under the brutal Mahmoud—who was captured at the Atbara, and is now imprisoned at Wady Halfa—suddenly, on their march northwards, attacked the Gaalin, and butchered a large number of them at Metemmeh. Ever since this treacherous massacre a deadly feud had existed between this tribe and the Khalifa's government.

As a fighting force the Irregulars, numbering about two thousand five hundred, presented a rather quaint appearance. They were armed with every imaginable weapon. Some had rifles, others were equipped with old flint and steel muskets, elephant guns, ancient muzzle-loading pistols, spears, swords, and daggers. Their methods of locomotion were almost as varied as their accoutrements. Some were mounted on horses, some marched on foot, others ambled along on camels, mules, and donkeys. About twelve hundred Remingtons were supplied at Wad Hamed for distribution amongst the tribes in proportion to their numbers, and it was a proud day for many of these picturesque ruffians when they secured one of these rifles. The possession of guns always seems to exercise a peculiar fascination over semi-barbarous peoples. A friend and myself once bestowed three ancient Snider carbines, rubbed bright with Monkey Brand Soap, upon a small Arabian potentate, who was delighted with the present and had the rifles carried after him by three almost naked courtiers wherever he went. We took good care not to give the monarch any cartridges, but his attendants did not seem to mind the absence of ammunition. What they liked was to swagger about with the Sniders, and use them as a sort of glorified walking-stick with the muzzle stuck into the ground.

For the command of this extraordinary army the Sirdar had selected Major Stuart-Wortley, whose military ability and almost unique experience of Sudan campaigns marked him out as the proper man for the work of impressing some order and discipline upon the rough and turbulent material of the Friendly Contingents. Lieutenant Wood also accompanied the force as staff officer.

The Gaalin and the other Friendlies crossed over from Wad Hamed, and were ordered to proceed along the river parallel to the advance of the Anglo-Egyptian forces on the opposite bank. The various tribal contingents marched separately under their own sheikhs, and presented a most picturesque appearance across the river as their white-clad columns moved in and out of the green bushes. They first came into touch with the enemy on 29th August, when the village of Gaali was found to be occupied by a small detachment of Jehadieh infantry and Dervish cavalry. These were speedily routed by the Friendlies, who attacked the small force before them in fine style, and captured ten prisoners.

On 31st August three gunboats—the Sultan, Melik, and Fatteh—were ordered to advance up the river from Seg-et-taib and shell the advance post held by the Dervishes on the Kerreri ridge. Before midday the gunboats took up a position opposite Kerreri village, and proceeded to enfilade the Dervish camp on the hill. Some splendid practice was made, and great confusion was produced by the twelve-pounder shells as they burst in rapid succession amongst the enemy, who could be seen rushing about, collecting their property and striking their tents. The camp was soon rendered untenable by our fire, and as the Dervishes fled over the plain towards Omdurman, they were followed by shells from the gunboats, which knocked over about a dozen cavalry.

On 1st September some excellent work was done by an effective co-operation between the gunboats and the Friendlies. At 5.30 a.m. the Sultan, Sheikh, Melik, Fatteh, and Nasr steamed up the right bank of the river and met Major Stuart-Wortley. It was arranged that the gunboats should steam on ahead and shell the villages and forts from the river, while the Friendlies advanced along the bank. At 9.30 the vessels engaged and utterly destroyed a fort to the south of Halfayah. The villages of Hejra el Sharg and Halfayah were next shelled, and as a body of Dervish cavalry emerged into the open ground, some forty or fifty of them were knocked over by shrapnel.

On land, meanwhile, the Irregulars had not been idle. Notwithstanding the shells of the gunboats, several of the villages south of Halfayah were found to be held in considerable force by the enemy. Major Stuart-Wortley drew up his men for the attack, but an unexpected hitch occurred, as the Mersalamieh and Gimiab contingents posted in front did not seem at all disposed to advance against the Dervishes, who were waiting for them behind the shelter of numerous mud-houses. Instead of rushing to the attack, they suddenly halted and danced a "fantasia" instead! Major Stuart-Wortley did not waste time over these faint-hearted warriors, but brought up his trusty Gaalin, who, supported by the other tribes, gallantly attacked house after house, and routed the enemy, killing a large number, including Isa Zachnieh, a cousin of the Khalifa, and losing themselves over sixty killed and wounded.

The Gaalin made very little use of their rifles in the desperate fighting which practically cleared the right bank of the Dervishes. They loaded their guns and fired them into the air, calling upon Allah to direct the course of the bullets! Then throwing their Remingtons on one side, they gripped their broad-bladed spears, and used them so effectively that after the fight the Dervish casualties stood at three hundred and fifty killed, wounded none! At one moment Major Stuart-Wortley and Lieutenant Wood were in great danger. A troop of Baggara horsemen suddenly charged down upon the spot where they were standing, and the Ababdeh Arabs who were with the two officers, instead of waiting for the cavalry, simply turned tail and fled. Immediately after this fighting round Halfayah, two hundred and fifty Shukriyeh Friendlies were dispatched up the Blue Nile in pursuit of the Dervishes who had fled.

By 11.30 on the 1st, the fighting on the right bank was to all intents and purposes over. Five hundred Gaalin and one hundred and seventy-five British infantry, made up of details from the Guards, Rifle Brigade, Highlanders, etc., were embarked on the five gunboats. The original plan had been to land Stuart-Wortley's levies on Tuti Island, but this was abandoned owing to the close proximity of the Omdurman forts—a fact not disclosed on the Intelligence maps—and the presence on the island of a large force of Dervishes.

Meanwhile Major Elmslie's battery of howitzers had taken up a position on the bank opposite the centre of Omdurman, and at 1.30 opened fire on the Mahdi's tomb, at a range of three thousand one hundred and fifty yards. The two first shells missed their mark, but played havoc with the neighbouring buildings; the third wrecked the apex of the dome, and carried away the gilded ornaments which surmounted it. Later on three other shells crashed into the structure, tearing enormous holes in the stonework, and utterly destroying the whole of the interior. Subsequently the howitzers abandoned their artillery practice on tombs and their violation of the dead, and engaged in the more satisfactory demolition of the Omdurman ramparts. Vast breaches were torn in the big wall which ran along the river, and many of the principal buildings were utterly destroyed.

At 2 p.m. the gunboats, with the Sultan leading, advanced farther up the stream in order to shell the forts of Omdurman. As they steamed slowly up past the city, the boats were met by a heavy shell fire, and occasional volleys from Dervish riflemen. The enemy's shells burst all round the boats, but they only succeeded in scoring two hits the whole day, one of which splintered some woodwork on a barge, while the other struck an iron mantlet at an angle and glanced harmlessly off into the water. At such short range the Dervish gunners ought most certainly to have made better practice, but the fact is, that the aim of our quick-firing guns was so marvellously accurate that it was almost impossible for the enemy to work their artillery. Thanks very largely to the skill of two Royal Marine sergeants, our fire silenced one battery after another. In some cases actually two shells out of three penetrated the embrasures of the forts, dismounting the guns inside, and doing terrible execution amongst the Dervish gunners.

While the twelve-pounder guns were demolishing the forts, the Maxims were turned with deadly effect on the Dervishes who were running about the banks. As two more forts in Khartum—one at the juncture of the Blue and White Nile, the other close to Gordon's palace—continued to fire upon us, the gunboats steamed past the ruined city, and speedily converted these last defences of the enemy into mere heaps of rubbish. At 5 p.m. the Friendlies were disembarked on the right bank, where they remained with the howitzer battery and the British detachment under Captain Ferguson of the Northumberland Fusiliers. The five gunboats then returned and took up a position off El Genuaia opposite to the zeriba.

During the battle on the morning of 2nd September, the gunboats were posted at both ends of the zeriba, and made themselves extremely useful. As was mentioned above, the fire of these boats lying off Kerreri village practically saved the Camel Corps from annihilation. Throughout the rest of the fight, too, a galling shell fire was kept up on the Dervish forces advancing from the north-west and, more especially, from the south, over the sandy ridge between Surgham and the Nile.

Meanwhile the howitzer battery had again opened fire at daybreak, and continued its work of destruction amongst the buildings of Omdurman. The effect of the Lyddite shells was so terrible that the Khalifa seems to have abandoned his plan of falling back behind the walls of his capital. This was a most fortunate thing, so far as we were concerned, for if, after the fearful slaughter of his troops in the first half of the engagement, the Khalifa had retreated with ten or fifteen thousand men inside the tortuous streets and crowded houses of Omdurman, we should have had the utmost difficulty in driving the enemy out, and could not, in all probability, have occupied Omdurman on the evening of the 2nd. House-to-house fighting is always a costly and dangerous business, and had it taken place, the prophetic estimate popularly attributed to the Sirdar of "one thousand casualties before Khartum is ours," might well have been realised in fact. As it was, the Dervishes prepared to take their chance in the open desert, rather than await our onset under a continual fire of fifty-pounder shells which burst amid sheets of flame and clouds of dust, and sent huge fragments for hundreds of yards, wrecking every obstacle in their path.

When the battle was over, the gunboats steamed up side by side with the general advance, and were met at Omdurman by a hot rifle fire from Dervishes concealed in the houses along the margin of the river. The streets leading to the southern exit of the town were by this time crowded with a mass of fugitives. In addition to mounted Baggaras and Dervish infantry, a mob of inhabitants—men, women, and children, dragging after them camels, horses, and donkeys laden with goods and chattels—all this confused stream of human beings and animals was pressing madly forward in panic-stricken flight. Orders were given to fire upon the fugitives, and as the artillerymen on the gunboats, from their raised position, could see well over the walls, a deadly fire was opened upon the crowded thoroughfares. One street especially, which led down to the river, was swept by a frightful hail of Maxim bullets, which mowed the poor wretches down in scores.

After taking part in the battle and the subsequent destruction of fugitives, the gunboats proceeded, on the night of the 2nd, about one hundred miles farther up the river, and returned to Omdurman on 5th September with the report that they had seen no more Dervishes.

During the fighting off Omdurman on the 1st, two of the Khalifa's gunboats were destroyed. There was a pathetic interest attached to old vessels like the Bordein and Ismailia, as they had formed a part of Gordon's little fleet in the old days of thirteen years ago! The Bordein had been despatched northwards by Gordon, but, like the Abbas, had been wrecked. She struck on a rock in the Shabluka Cataract, on 30th January 1885, and foundered, but was subsequently raised by the Dervishes. When our gunners came within sight of the vessel, voices were raised to save the old boat for Gordon's sake. "Don't let us fire on the poor old Bordein!" But there is little room for sentiment or loving-kindness amid the exigencies of warfare, and under our fire the Bordein was headed for the shore, and sank as she reached it.

A still worse fate overtook the Ismailia. In some way or other she fouled one of the mines laid down by the Khalifa's engineers in midstream; the mine exploded, and the Ismailia, literally hoist by its own petard, was blown out of the water. Two other mines had also been laid in the channel, near the right bank opposite Omdurman. The ropes connecting these with the shore were afterwards found inside the ruined forts, but all our attempts to explode them were futile. The Dervish steamer which was subsequently captured by the Sirdar on his way to Fashoda was, I believe, the solitary survivor of Gordon's ill-starred flotilla. The Talawahiyah had been sunk off Rojan Island, on 29th January 1885, and was never recovered. The Abbas, which set out from Khartum with Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power on board,—the one last desperate attempt to reopen communications with the North,—was wrecked at Hebbeh, between Abu Hamed and Kirbekan, and now lies there, keel uppermost.