Source.—Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651. P. 108.

But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificial Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificial Chains, called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears. These Bonds, in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty, of breaking them.

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws prÆtermitted, men have the Liberty of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if we take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporal Liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they do, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we take Liberty for an exemption from Laws, it is no less absurd for men to demand, as they do, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject lieth therefore only in those things which, in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath prÆtermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Sovereign Power of life and death is either abolished or limited. For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Sovereign Representative can do to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every subject is author of every act the Sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death by the command of the Sovereign Power; and yet neither do the other wrong: As when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth had Liberty to do the action, for which he is neverthelesse without injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Sovereign Prince, that putteth to death an innocent subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equity, (as was the killing of Uriah by David;) yet it was not an injury to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself. And yet to God, because David was God's Subject; and prohibited all iniquity by the law of Nature. Which distinction David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To Thee only have I sinned.