The general plan of the work was outlined by the chairman of the Commission on Fisheries and Game, who has given attention to such details as checking up scientific data, editing, revising, and confirming results, reports, etc. The work has been under the direct charge and personal supervision of the biologist to the commission, Mr. D. L. Belding. The able services of Prof. J. L. Kellogg of Williams College were early enlisted, and many valuable results which we are able to offer are the direct outcome of the practical application of the minute details discovered by Professor Kellogg in his careful study and original investigations of the anatomy and life histories of the lamellibranch mollusks.

Of the other workers who, under the direction of Mr. Belding, have contributed directly, special mention should be made of Mr. J. R. Stevenson of Williams College, W. G. Vinal of Harvard University, F. C. Lane of Boston University, A. A. Perkins of Ipswich and C. L. Savery of Marion. Those who have for a briefer time been identified with the work are R. L. Buffum, W. H. Gates and K. B. Coulter of Williams College, and Anson Handy of Harvard University.

In addition to the results here given, much valuable knowledge has been acquired, particularly upon the life histories of the scallop and of the quahaug, and the practical application of this knowledge to the pursuit of sea farming. It is hoped that the commission will later be enabled to publish these results.

The present report is limited to a statement of the condition of the shellfish in each section of our coast, and to consideration of practical methods for securing increased opportunities for food and livelihood by better utilization of naturally productive lands under water. Since the chief purpose of legislative action under which this work was undertaken was to ascertain how the best economic results could be secured, we have thought it wise to embody the results of our investigation in a plan which is suggested as a basis for appropriate legislation for making possible a suitable system of shellfish cultivation similar to that which already exists in Rhode Island, Connecticut and many other coast States, and which has been carried on for more than two thousand years on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

The following tentative outlines are offered, and it is intended to subject each topic to an unprejudiced examination and discussion:—

A Proposed System of Culture for the Tidal Flats and Waters of Massachusetts.

The Purpose.—The proposed system of shellfish culture aims to develop the latent wealth of the tidal waters, to increase the output of tidal flats already productive, and to make possible the reclamation of large portions of the waste shore areas of our Commonwealth. It is further designed to foster dependent and allied industries; to extend the shellfish market, both wholesale and retail; to multiply opportunities for the transient visitors and shore cottagers to fish for clams and quahaugs for family use, and to ensure fishermen a reliable source of bait supply; to increase the earnings of the shore fishermen, and to furnish work to thousands of unemployed; to increase the value of shore property; to add to the taxable property of the shore towns and cities of the State; to secure to all the citizens of the State a proper return from an unutilized State asset; to furnish the consuming public with a greater quantity of sea food of guaranteed purity; and in every way, both in the utilization of present and in the creation of new resources to build up and develop the fast-declining shellfish industries of the Commonwealth.

Private v. Public Ownership of Tidal Flats.—The first difficulty confronting this proposed system is the too frequently accepted fallacy that all lands between the tide marks now are and should be held in common by the inhabitants of the shore communities, to the exclusion of citizens from other sections of the State,—an assumption which is directly contrary to the more ancient law, supported by decisions of the highest courts, that the right of taking shellfish is a public right, freely open to any inhabitant of the State. Such unwarranted assumption of exclusive rights in the shellfisheries by individuals, corporations or towns sacrifices the rights of the majority. The disastrous effect of this policy is plainly demonstrated in the history of the rise and decline of the shellfisheries of Massachusetts.

Secondly, this fallacious assumption is contrary to the fundamental principles of all economic doctrines. It may be safely affirmed that the individual ownership of property has proved not only a success but even is a necessary condition of progress, and has in fact at length become the foundation of all society. It inevitably follows that if the system is justifiable in the case of farm lands it is equally justifiable in the case of the tidal flats, for the same principle is involved in each. It is therefore fair to assume that if private ownership of farm land has proved to be for the best interests of human progress, so private ownership of the tidal flats will also be a benefit to the public.

It is not our purpose to discuss the underlying principle involved in private ownership of property,—it is simply our purpose to call attention to two facts: (1) if individual control of real estate is just, private ownership of tidal flats and waters is likewise just; (2) that individual control of such areas is the only practical system yet devised capable of checking the alarming decline in the shellfisheries and of developing them to a normal state of productiveness, and rendering unnecessary an annually increasing mass of restrictive legislation.

The Present System.—The present system of controlling the shellfisheries is based on the communal ownership of the tidal flats. Ownership by the Commonwealth has degenerated into a system of town control, whereby every coast community has entire jurisdiction over its shellfisheries, to the practical exclusion of citizens of all other towns. Thus at the present time the mollusk fisheries of Massachusetts are divided into a number of separate and disorganized units, which are incapable of working together for the best interests of the towns or of the public. This communistic system is distinctly unsound, and is in direct opposition to the principles of social and economic development. The man who advocates keeping farm lands untilled and in common, for the sake of the few wild blackberries they might produce, would be considered mentally unbalanced; but it is precisely this system which holds sway over our relatively richer sea gardens. With no thought of seed time, but only of harvest, the fertile tidal flats are yearly divested of their fast-decreasing output by reckless and ruthless exploitation, and valuable territories when once exhausted are allowed to become barren. All hopes for the morrow are sacrificed to the clamorous demands of the present. The more the supply decreases, the more insistent becomes the demand; and the greater the demand, the more relentless grows the campaign of spoliation. The entire shore front of the Commonwealth is scoured and combed by irresponsible aliens and by exemplars of the "submerged tenth" who are now but despoilers, but who if opportunity were present might become cultivators of the flats rather than devastators. The thoughtful fisherman, who would control the industry in a measure, is under present conditions overruled by his selfish or short-sighted fellow workers, and is of necessity forced to join their ranks by the clinching argument that if the shellfisheries are to be ruined anyway, he might as well have his share as long as they last. The theory of public ownership of shellfisheries has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The necessity for some radical change in the present system is becoming more and more apparent, and a system of private control, with certain modifications, is the logical result.

Need of Reform.—The shellfish supply of Massachusetts is steadily declining. So extensive is this decline that it is unnecessary to mention the abundant proofs of almost complete exhaustion in certain localities and of failing output in others. While the apparent cause of this decrease is overfishing and unsystematic digging, the real cause can be readily traced to the present defective system of town control, which has made possible, through inefficiency and neglect, the deplorable condition of this important industry. Unless the decline is at once checked, within a very few years our valuable shellfisheries will be exhausted to the point of commercial extinction. The legislation of former years, essentially restrictive and prohibitory in character, has unfortunately been constructed on a false economic basis. Its aim has been to protect these industries by restricting the demand rather than by increasing the supply. What the future requires is not merely protective or restrictive legislation, but rather constructive laws for developing the shellfisheries. The system of shellfish culture here presented appears to be the only practical method for improving the condition of these industries in such a way as to protect all vested interests of both private and public rights, and at the same time to make possible adequate utilization of the natural productive capacity.

In brief, the proposed system of shellfish culture is based upon a system of leases to individuals. These leases should be divided into two classes: (1) those covering the territory between the tide lines, and consisting of small areas, from 1 to 2 acres; (2) the territory below low-water mark, comprised of two classes of grants, which differ only in size and distance from the shore,—the smaller (a), from 1 to 5 acres, to include the shore waters, small bays and inlets, and the larger (b), of unrestricted size, to be given in the deeper and more exposed waters. The owners of all grants shall be permitted to plant and grow all species of shellfish, and shall have exclusive control of the fisheries area covered by such lease. The large and more exposed grants, which cannot be economically worked without considerable capital, should be available for companies; while the smaller holdings, for which but small capital is required, are restricted to the use of the individual shore fishermen. For the tidal flats and shore waters but one-half of the whole territory in any one township shall be leased, the other half still remaining public property.

Success of this System.—The system of private control by leased grants is by no means a new and untried theory. In actual operation for many years in this and other States, in spite of lack of protection and other drawbacks which would be eliminated from a perfected system, it has proved an unqualified success. The rapid depletion and even extermination of the native oyster beds necessitated legislative consideration, and for years the oyster industry above and below low-water mark in this and other States has been dealt with by a similar system. The plan here suggested would be but a direct extension of a well-tested principle towards the cultivation of other species of mollusks. The financial value to the fishermen of such a step has been proved beyond all question in this State during the past three years by the demonstrations of the Massachusetts department of fisheries and game. These experiments have proved that tidal flats, with small outlay of capital and labor, will yield, acre for acre, a far more valuable harvest than any upland garden.

This system has the further element of success by being based on individual effort, in contrast to the present communal regulation of shellfisheries. In all business individual initiative and effort furnish the keynote of success, and the future wellfare of the shellfisheries depends upon the application of this principle.

Nature cannot without the aid and co-operation of man repair the ill-advised, untimely and exhaustive inroads made in her resources. This is shown in the thousands of acres of good farm lands made unproductive by unwise treatment, and by the wasteful destruction of our forests. It is as strikingly shown in the decline of our shellfisheries. The fisherman exhausts the wealth of the flats by destroying both young and adults, and returns nothing. The result is decrease and ultimate extermination. The farmer prepares his land carefully and intelligently, plants his seed and in due time reaps a harvest. If the fisherman could have similar rights over the tidal areas, he could with far less labor and capital and with far greater certainty year by year reap a continuous harvest at all seasons. The success of the leasing system in other States, notably Louisiana, Rhode Island and others, is definite and conspicuous.

The Obstacles to this Proposed System.—Before the proposed system of titles to shellfish ground can be put in actual operation, it is absolutely necessary to have all rights and special privileges pertaining to shore areas revested in State control by repeal of certain laws. In this centralization of authority four main factors must be carefully considered: (1) communal rights to fisheries in tidal areas, as in the colonial beach law of 1641-47; (2) the theory, practice and results of town supervision and control; (3) the rights of riparian owners; (4) the rights of the fishermen and of all other inhabitants of the State. So important are all four that it is necessary to discuss each in turn.

(1) Communal Fishery Rights of the Public.—The fundamental principle upon which the shellfish laws of the State are founded is the so-called beach or free fishing right of the public. While in other States shore property extends only to mean high water, in Massachusetts, Maine and Virginia, the earliest States to enact colonial laws, the riparian property holders own to mean low-water mark. But by specific exception and according to further provisions of this same ancient law the right of fishing (which includes the shellfisheries) below high-water mark is free to any inhabitant of the Commonwealth. The act reads as follows:—

It is necessary that some change be made in this law, which at present offers no protection to the planters. Its repeal is by no means necessary, as the matter can be adjusted by merely adding "except for the taking of mollusks from the areas set apart and leased for the cultivation of mollusks."

(2) Results of Town Administration of Mollusk Fisheries.—All authority to control mollusk privileges was originally vested in the State. The towns, as the ancient statutes will show, derived this authority from the higher State authority, developed their systems of local regulations or by-laws only with the State permission, and even now they enjoy the fruits of these concessions solely with the active consent of the Legislature. Thus the State has ever been, and is at present, the source of town control. The towns have no rights of supervision and control over shellfisheries except as derived from the General Court. The State gave them this authority in the beginning. It follows, therefore, that the Legislature can withdraw this delegated authority at any time when it is convinced that it is for the benefit of the State so to do. To those few who are directly profiting at the expense of the many, this resumption of authority by the State may seem at first sight a high-handed proceeding, but a brief survey of the facts will prove it to be justly warranted and eminently desirable. The present system of town control has had a sufficient trial. It is in its very essentials an un-business-like proceeding. A large number of towns acting in this matter as disorganized units working independently of one another could not in the nature of things evolve any co-ordinated and unified system which would be to the advantage of all. The problems involved are too complicated, requiring both broad and special knowledge, which cannot be acquired in a short term of experience. Lastly, the temptations of local politics have been found to be too insistent to guarantee completely fair allotment of valuable privileges.

The Legislature has not only acted unwisely in allowing the towns in this respect thus to mismanage their affairs, but it has not fulfilled its duty to the Commonwealth as a whole. The Legislature has unwittingly delegated valuable sources of wealth and revenue, the fruits of which should have been enjoyed at least in some degree, directly or indirectly, by all citizens of the Commonwealth alike as well as by those of the coast towns. Many of the coast cities and towns have dealt with this opportunity very unwisely, and few have developed or even maintained unimpaired this extremely valuable asset of the State. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that such important sources of wealth as the shellfisheries are not the property of the coast towns alone; they are the property of the whole Commonwealth, and the whole Commonwealth should share in these benefits. In allowing these valuable resources to be mismanaged and dissipated by the shore towns, the Legislature has done a great injury to all the inland communities, and, indeed, even to those very coast towns for whose benefit such legislation was enacted. The Legislature was not justified, in the first place, in granting jurisdiction over these important industries belonging equally to the whole Commonwealth and to the coast towns. It was but an experiment. Inasmuch as these towns have grossly mismanaged the trust placed in them, the Legislature is doubly under the obligation to take advantage of the knowledge gained by this experimental delegation of the State authority to cities and towns. The completely obvious obligation of the Legislature is to remove what is either tacitly or frankly acknowledged by many city and town authorities to be an impossible burden upon the city or town, and to restore to State officers the general administrative control and supervision of the public rights in the shellfisheries.

(3) Riparian Ownership does not include Exclusive Fishing Rights.—The third objection is that in the assumption of State control is involved the much-discussed and vaguely understood question of riparian ownership. To make plain the conditions relative to the fisheries, including the shellfisheries on the tidal flats, it should be borne in mind that in only four States, Virginia and Maryland, Massachusetts and Maine, does the title of the riparian owner extend to low-water mark, but in these States the right of fishing, fowling and boating are specifically mentioned as not included in the title. Under the existing laws owners of seashore property in Massachusetts possess certain rights (though perhaps not in all cases clearly defined) over the tidal areas within 100 rods of the mean high-water mark. As the proposed system of shellfish grants deals with this territory between high and low water marks, it is necessary to see in what manner, if any, the rights at present possessed by riparian owners would be impaired by the leasing of certain rights of fishing. While the riparian owner has in a measure authority over the territory which borders his upland, there are certain specific limitations to this authority. He does not have exclusive rights of hunting, boating and fishing between the tide lines on his own property, but participates in these rights equally with every citizen of this Commonwealth. The courts have distinctly held that shellfish are fish, and that a man may fish—i.e., dig clams—on the tidal flats adjoining the shore without the consent of the riparian owner.

(4) Rights of the Fishermen and of All Citizens.—The fishermen as a class are best located to benefit most from an opportunity to lease exclusive fishing rights, whether they chance to be riparian owners or not, though every other citizen of this Commonwealth who so desired would not be excluded from an opportunity to secure a similar lease. The personnel of the fisher class has vastly changed in the past decade. There are to-day two distinct types: The permanent resident, usually native born, bound to a definite locality by ties of home and kin and of long association,—a most useful type of citizen. Contrasted with this is the other, a more rapidly increasing class,—foreign born, unnaturalized, nomadic, a humble soldier of fortune, a hanger-on in the outskirts of urban civilization, eking out an existence by selling or eating the shellfish from the public fishing grounds. Too ignorant to appreciate the importance of sanitary precaution, the alien clammer haunts the proscribed territory polluted by sewage, and does much to keep the dangerous typhoid germ in active circulation in the community.

The public mollusk fisheries only foster such types of non-producers, and prevent them from becoming desirable citizens. The best class of fishermen and citizens has no advantage over the worst, but is practically compelled to engage in the same sort of petty buccaneering and wilfully destructive digging, in order to prevent that portion and privilege of fishing which the law says shall belong to every householder and freeman of the Commonwealth from being appropriated by these humble freebooters, who are at once the annoyance, the terror and the despair of cottagers and shore dwellers.

All these conditions would be almost completely corrected by the lease of the flats to individuals, thus removing from the fishermen stultifying competition and compelling these irresponsible wandering aliens to acquire definite location. But most particularly a system of leasing would permit each person to profit according to his industry, perseverance, thrift and foresight.

The Grants.—As previously stated, the grants should be made into two divisions: (1) including suitable areas between the high and low water marks; (2) territory below mean low-water mark. The privilege of planting and growing all shellfish should be given for both classes of grants. Class 1 would be primarily for the planting of clams, with additional rights over oysters and quahaugs; class 2 would be primarily for the planting of quahaugs and oysters, with possible rights over clams and scallops.

The grants should be leased for a limited period of years, with the privilege of renewal provided the owner had fulfilled the stipulated requirements of the lease. In order, however, that these leases should not degenerate into deeds, to be handed down from father to son, it might be necessary to assign a maximum time limit during which a man might remain in control of any particular lease. This would be merely fair play to all concerned, for it would not be just to allow one man to monopolize a particularly fine piece of property, while his equally deserving neighbor had land of far less productive value. In connection with this clause should follow some provisions for payment of the value of improvements. Should there be more than one claimant for lease of any particular area, some principle of selection, such as priority of application, highest bid, etc., should be established.

That there may be no holding of grants for purposes other than those stipulated in the agreement, there should be a certain cultural standard of excellence to be decided upon relative to the use made of the granted areas. A clause of this kind is necessary in order to keep the system in a proper state of efficiency, and to insure the development of the shellfish industries.

All taxes on the capital invested in these grants and taxes upon the income should go to the town in which the leasehold is situated. In addition, there should be a just and equable revenue assessed by the State on every grant, as rent for the same. This rent should be apportioned according to a fixed scale in determining the relative values of the grants, and should be paid annually, under penalty of forfeiture. The revenue might be divided into two parts: one part to go to the State department having the control of the shellfisheries, for the maintenance of a survey, control and protection of property on leased areas, and other work; the second part to go to the town treasury of the community in which the grant is located, to be expended under the direction and control of responsible State officials in restocking barren flats and otherwise developing the shellfish upon its unleased territory which is open for free public use.

Grants to be Nontransferable.—These grants, while designed for the use of all citizens of the Commonwealth, should be made especially available for the poor man with little capital. In order to assure the poor man of the enjoyment of his privilege, it is necessary to guard against the possibility of undue monopolization. Leases must, therefore, be strictly nontransferable. Neither should areas be rented to another individual under any consideration whatever. Every grant must be for the benefit of its individual owner. He should be at liberty to hire laborers to assist him in working his grant, but not to transfer it in any way. Any attempt on his part to do so should not only immediately result in the forfeiture of his grant, but should also subject him to a heavy penalty.

Survey.—In order to guard against confusion and to maintain an orderly system, an accurate survey of all granted areas should be made. The ranges of every grant should be determined and recorded. The plots should be numbered and properly staked or buoyed, and a record of the same, giving the name of the owner, yearly rental and value, should be kept on file at the proper town and State offices. The same system which is now in operation in the oyster industry of other States should be applied to all the mollusk fisheries of Massachusetts.

Administration.—The department of the State government under whose jurisdiction this system of leases may come should be indued with full authority, properly defined, to supervise the grants, furnish them with adequate protection by the employment of State or town police, oversee the survey, allot the grants, and to exercise such other powers as may be necessary to develop the system, remedy its defects and strengthen its efficiency.

Protection of Property and of the Rights granted by the Lease.—No system of shellfish grants is possible without absolute protection. The lessee must be permitted to cultivate his grant free from outside interference, and thus, with reasonably good fortune, he can enjoy the fruits of his labors. This protection, which is the greatest and most vital need of the entire system, and the foundation upon which depends its whole success, must be insured by proper legislation rigorously enforced, and accompanied by severe penalties.

Leasing of the Grants.—Every citizen of the Commonwealth is entitled to participate in this system, but for obvious reasons an inhabitant of any coast town should be given first choice of grants within the boundary of his particular town. The first grants might be given by allotment, but after the system had become well established, they could be issued in the order of their application.

Water Pollution.—The sanitary condition of the marketed shellfish taken from contaminated waters is not only at present to some extent endangering the public health, but is placing an undeserved stigma upon a most reputable and valuable source of food supply for the public. The public should demand laws closing, after proper scientific investigation, these polluted areas, and conferring the power to thoroughly enforce such laws. The danger arising from contamination should be reduced to a minimum by prescribing some definite regulations for transferring shellfish from these polluted waters to places free from contamination, where the shellfish may in brief season be rendered fit for the market.

It should be unlawful to use any brand, label or other device for designation, intended to give the impression that certain oysters offered for sale were grown at specified places, e.g., Cotuit, Wellfleet, Wareham, etc., unless such oysters were actually planted, grown or cultivated within the towns or waters designated, for a period of at least three months immediately previous to the date of marketing. Furthermore, there should be appointed proper inspectors, whose duties would be to guarantee by certificates, labels and stamps the purity of shellfish placed upon the market, and likewise have the power of enforcing severe penalties on violators.