It will be recalled that when Aaron Burr was under suspicion in the Fall of 1806 he made haste to assure his friends in no uncertain language that there was no truth in the rumors.

Senator John Smith of Ohio, who had received the Colonel cordially on his visit to Cincinnati, was among the first to grow alarmed and to make direct inquiry. Burr replied that he was “surprised and hurt” at the unusual tenor of Smith’s letter. He then went on to say: “If there exists any design to separate the Western from the Eastern States, I am totally ignorant of it. I never harbored or expressed any such intention to anyone, nor did any person ever intimate such design to me.”

A month later, in November, Burr addressed a letter to Governor William Henry Harrison, of the Northwest Territory. “Considering the various and extravagant reports which circulate concerning me,” he said, “it may not be unsatisfactory to you to be informed (and to you there can be no better source of information than myself) that I have no wish nor design to attempt a separation of the Union, that I have no connection with any foreign power or government, that I never meditated the introduction of any foreign power or influence into the United States, or any part of its territories, but on the contrary should repel with indignation any proposition or measure having that tendency; in fine, that I have no project or views hostile to the interest, or tranquillity, or union of the United States, or prejudicial to its government; and I pledge to you my honor for the truth of this declaration.”

Within the space of a few days he was assuring Henry Clay that: “I have no design, nor have I taken any measure, to promote a dissolution of the Union or a separation of any one or more States from the residue.... I do not own a musket nor a bayonet, nor any single article of military stores, nor does any person for me by my authority or with my knowledge.”

On top of all that General Andrew Jackson was himself authority for the statement that, in reply to his inquiries, Burr had given “the most sacred pledges that he had not, nor never had, any views inimical or hostile to the United States, and whenever he was charged with the intention of separating the Union the idea of insanity must be ascribed to him.”

Here then from the lips of the accused himself were the most categorical denials of the serious charges that had been brought against him. To the truth of his assertions he pledged his honor as a gentleman. It was a pledge supported by many generations of Burrs and Edwardses representing the purest blood of Puritan New England. Only by hair-splitting with the deliberate intention of misleading could his declarations be otherwise construed.

Since then Burr’s innocence of the crimes of treason and high misdemeanor, so far as his actions within the territory of Virginia were concerned, had been attested by two juries of his peers in a tribunal presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States. The only mark against him that remained unresolved was his commitment by Judge Marshall for possible misdemeanor in the State of Ohio.

In the light of this exoneration the Federalists might well claim that their charge had been sustained: to wit, that Burr was an unoffending man who had been subjected to merciless political persecution at the hands of Thomas Jefferson and his followers. On the basis of the decisions rendered in Richmond future generations might perpetuate that belief.

Some eighty years were to pass before fresh evidence was disclosed touching on the activities of Aaron Burr at the turn of the century. It was on or around the year 1890 that Henry Adams, the historian, gained access to the British and Spanish archives which contained the written reports of their representatives in this country during the administration of Thomas Jefferson. The ministers of these two countries were respectively Anthony Merry and the Marquis de Casa Yrujo.

Anthony Merry came to the United States highly recommended by our Minister to the Court of St. James’s, Rufus King. Merry sought the office and, according to all accounts, was eager to do a good job. Unfortunately for that ambition he arrived at a time when Jefferson’s ingrained antipathy toward England was at its peak. It also was at a time when the President was showing his greatest persistency in applying his theories of equality to the official society of the capital. The unhappy Merry proved to be an ideal subject on which Mr. Jefferson could practice his theories.

The first opportunity came when Mr. Merry went with Secretary of State Madison to present his credentials at the White House. The traditional story is that the President received the emissary from his Majesty King George III in his bedroom slippers. Of course there was no rule against such informality. Mr. Jefferson’s indifference to dress was notorious. No slight may have been intended. Yet the British Minister, wearing the full regalia of his office, was made to look somewhat foolish. He not unnaturally assumed that the author of the Declaration of Independence was being deliberately rude.

That impression gained support soon thereafter when, at his official dinners, the President abolished the rules of precedence and substituted that of “pÊle mÊle,” under which the company marched from the drawing room to the dining room in whatever order they found themselves. The system deprived the British Minister of the place to which he felt entitled.

It so happened that Mrs. Merry was a lady of fiery temper who rejoiced in the clash of battle. She was more eager than her husband to pick up the gantlet Mr. Jefferson had thrown down. The result of all this was a tempest in official circles in Washington which the critics and enemies of the President rejoiced in and did nothing to allay.

Such was the unfriendly relationship between the President and the Merrys when, in July of 1804, following his duel with Hamilton, Colonel Burr appeared as a refugee in Philadelphia. The Merrys were spending the summer there. It was not long before the Colonel, with his unerring eye for singling out malcontents in the prospect of working them into his plans, made a contact with Merry. In a letter to Lord Harrowby, then the British Foreign Secretary, dated August 4, Merry informed his superior of the details of a visit he had just received from Colonel Williamson, an emissary of Burr, whom he described as the “actual Vice-President of the United States (which situation he is about to resign).” On that point Merry was definitely misinformed.

Burr, said Merry, had made an offer through Colonel Williamson to lend his assistance to his Majesty’s Government in any manner in which they might think fit to employ him, “particularly in endeavoring to effect a separation of the western part of the United States from that which lies between the Atlantic and the mountains.” Burr’s proposition, said Merry, would be fully detailed to Lord Harrowby by Williamson who was to embark for England within a few days.

Merry alluded to Burr’s profligacy of character. He then sketched his existing situation, describing how he was now cast off by both the Democratic and Federalist parties but still preserved connections with some people of influence. He called attention to Burr’s great personal ambition and the spirit of revenge he harbored against the Jefferson administration. These circumstances Merry thought might possibly induce him to exert his talents and activity with fidelity to his employers. That, in substance, was Merry’s first communication with his superiors on the subject of Burr.

In the succeeding months Burr made his trip to the South, then returned to Washington and presided at the trial of Justice Chase before retiring from the Vice-Presidency. Meanwhile his friend Colonel Williamson had journeyed to England where he held conferences with the British ministers trying to get the co-operation of their government in Burr’s plans. Burr’s next contact with Merry was shortly before he set out on his first trip to the West.

About this time there arrived in Washington a delegation from Louisiana to lay their grievances before the Government. Under the treaty by which the territory had been ceded to the United States its people were promised all the rights and privileges of United States citizens. But the United States Government was slow in carrying out its commitments. Here was another discontented group.

To Lord Harrowby on March 29, 1805, Merry directed another letter which he marked “Most secret.” Merry mentioned that Burr had been very intimate with the Louisiana deputies during their visit to Washington. From Burr he learned that the people of that territory seemed determined to make themselves independent of the United States and that the execution of their design was delayed only by the difficulty of obtaining previously an assurance of protection and assistance from some foreign power.

Burr, according to Merry, then alluded to the possibility of the inhabitants of the western parts of the United States joining in this independence movement since Louisiana must always have command over them because of their rivers joining with the Mississippi. Burr as usual threw out hints without definitely committing himself. “It is clear,” commented Merry, “that Mr. Burr (although he has not as yet confided to me the exact nature and extent of his plan) means to endeavor to be the instrument of effecting such a connection.”

Merry went on to quote Burr as saying that for obvious reasons the people of Louisiana would prefer having the protection and assistance of Great Britain to that of France; but that if His Majesty’s Government should not think proper to listen to his overture, application would be made to the Government of France. Burr claimed that the French Government was eager to embrace such an opportunity and that, even while at war with England, it could find means for sending to America the small force that would be needed for the purpose.

As to the military aid from the British that would be required for the enterprise Burr, according to Merry, thought that two or three frigates and the same number of smaller vessels, stationed at the mouth of the Mississippi to prevent its being blockaded by any such force as the United States could send, and to keep open the communications with the sea, was all that would be required.

Then Burr came to the vital matter of cost. Merry said Burr conceived that a “loan” of about £100,000 would be sufficient for the immediate purposes of the enterprise. Burr went even further to suggest a way to prevent any suspicion of His Majesty’s Government being involved in the transaction until the independence of Louisiana had been declared. Such suspicion would be raised if remittances were made from England to the United States or if bills were drawn in this country. Burr knew that a payment of £200,000 was due from the United States to England in the coming July. He proposed that the British Government appropriate part of this sum to his plan. If they would do that, Burr told Merry, he could devise the means to get the money into his possession without its destination being either known or suspected.

Merry gave no intimation of being surprised at this proposal. If the British Government had been as naÏve as its minister in Washington, imagine the change in Burr’s declining fortune on finding himself possessed of the equivalent of approximately $500,000 out of the British Treasury and under conditions that would prevent the British Government from confessing its source or protesting any purpose to which Burr might put it.

Shortly after this interview Burr set out for the West. It will be recalled that some careless talk, which gave rise to rumors, alarmed Daniel Clark in New Orleans and caused him to sound a warning to Burr through General Wilkinson. Merry, who by this time imagined that he was a party to the intrigue, also heard the rumors and expressed his anxiety in a letter to Lord Mulgrave who had succeeded Harrowby in the ministry of William Pitt. He wrote: “... I learn that that gentleman [Burr] has commenced his plans in the Western country, and apparently with much success, although it would seem that he or some of his agents have either been indiscreet in their communication, or have been betrayed by some person in whom they considered that they had reason to confide, for the object of his journey has now begun to be noted in the public prints, where it is said that a convention is to be called immediately from the States bordering on the Ohio and the Mississippi for the purpose of forming a separate government.”

There was a more favorable interpretation of the leak which Merry thought worth mentioning. “It is, however, possible,” he said, “that the business may be so advanced as, from the nature of it, to render any further secrecy impossible.” Merry concluded by noting that Burr had been received everywhere with the most marked attention.

When Burr returned from his western trip in November he lost no time in calling on the British Minister. Merry faithfully reported their conversation to Lord Mulgrave in a letter dated November 25. Burr, according to Merry, opened the conversation by stating that he had supposed the British Government disposed to give him assistance. However, continued Burr, the information he had received on this head was not sufficiently explicit to warrant his sending a confidential person to London to make the necessary communication as he had promised to do. He had therefore to content himself by speaking through Merry.

His disappointment at the hesitation of the British Government, Burr told Merry, had given him the deepest concern because his journey through the western country and Louisiana as far as New Orleans, not to speak of a visit to a part of West Florida, had been attended with so much more success than he had even looked for. Everything, he said, was completely prepared in every quarter for the execution of his plan. Therefore he had been induced to enter into an agreement with his associates and friends to return to them in March to commence operations. Again Burr refrained from entering into details with Merry. He thought enough had been said to start the project and that the rest of the arrangements could be made through authorized persons he recommended to accompany the British ships. These would cruise off the mouth of the Mississippi, commencing April 10 at the latest and continuing there until the commanding officer should receive information from him or from Daniel Clark that Louisiana had declared itself independent.

Burr, according to Merry, suggested that his former estimate of naval strength needed to be increased by a number of smaller vessels since he had learned on good authority that East and West Florida and other parts of the Spanish dominions on the North American continent were impatient for independence. Therefore the increased British force and whatever he himself could provide would be required for this additional task.

Burr mentioned no names in his conversation with Merry, contenting himself with presenting his plans in broad outline. “Throughout the Western country,” Merry quoted him as reporting, “persons of the greatest property and influence had engaged themselves to contribute very largely towards the expense of the enterprise; at New Orleans he represented the inhabitants to be so firmly resolved upon separating themselves from their union with the United States, and every way to be so completely prepared, that he was sure the revolution there would be accomplished without a drop of blood being shed....”

Merry concluded with Burr’s reference to Wilkinson’s army: “... the American force in that country (should it not, as he had good reason to believe, enlist with him) not being sufficiently strong to make any opposition.” It was accordingly settled that the revolution would begin at the end of the coming March or the beginning of April, provided always that the British Government should “consent to lend their assistance toward it, and the answer, together with the pecuniary aid which would be wanted, arrived in time to enable him to set out the beginning of March.”

To spur the British Government to action Burr once more threatened them with the prospect of the people of Louisiana turning to France. Then he presented another impelling argument for British help in the enterprise though at the expense of his own loyalty to his native land.

“He observed,” reported Merry, “what I readily conceived may happen, that when once Louisiana and the Western country become independent, the Eastern States will separate themselves immediately from the Southern; and that thus the power which is now risen up with so much rapidity in the western hemisphere will, by such a division, be rendered at once informidable....”

Despite Burr’s pleading and Merry’s indorsement, the British Government remained apathetic. The last hope of assistance from that quarter vanished when in January, 1806, William Pitt died and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Charles James Fox, an avowed friend of the United States.

Burr, however, had more than one string to his bow. If he could not wring money from the British he might still try his luck with the Spaniards. The most convenient victim was Yrujo, the Spanish Minister. Yrujo had married a daughter of Thomas McKean, signer of the Declaration of Independence and at the moment Governor of Pennsylvania. He was well informed as to what was going on in the United States. As early as the summer of 1805, when Burr was in the West and the rumors were beginning to fly, he reported to Cevallos, Spanish Minister of State: “The supposed expedition against Mexico is ridiculous and chimerical in the present state of things; but I am not unaware that Burr, in order to get moneys from the English Minister or from England, has made to him some proposition, in which he is to play the leading role.”

Having thus early divined Burr’s purpose of extracting money from the British he should not have been surprised when, six months later, he found himself the object of financial solicitation. Burr did not personally approach Yrujo. He sent as his emissary his old friend Jonathan Dayton, the ex-Senator from New Jersey. The visit took place in Philadelphia where Dayton was already present and to which Burr repaired after his last apparently futile appeal to Merry. Dayton, according to Yrujo’s report to Cevallos, explained that the reason of his visit was that he had information, known only to three persons in the country, which he thought would be worth thirty or forty thousand dollars to the Spanish Government. When Yrujo encouraged him to proceed Dayton disclosed the story of Burr’s secret conferences with Merry. It included the plan for taking the Floridas and for effecting the separation and independence of the western states. The Floridas, said Dayton, were to be associated with the new federated state, and for her share in bringing it about England was to receive a preference in matters of commerce and navigation. The plan, he continued, had obtained the approval of the British Minister who had recommended it to his Government. Dayton added that on his trip to the West Burr had found the people of that section not only disposed toward independence but also anxious to make an expedition against the kingdom of Mexico. The proposal, said Dayton, had been well received by the British Cabinet.

In his previous letter to Cevallos, Yrujo had spoken of Burr’s proposed expedition into Mexico as chimerical. Surely nothing was more chimerical than his present plan to help pay for it by frightening the Spaniards into giving him money for warning him of what was going to happen to them. General Jackson and other prominent westerners who were enthusiastic over such an expedition and had hailed Burr as the leader no doubt would have been astonished had they known that he was thus divulging his plans to the Spaniards in the hope of getting money from them.

But in this instance Yrujo was not so easily fooled. He did not believe that the British Government had fallen for the plan as Dayton asserted. Yrujo reasoned that, had they done so, Burr and Dayton would not now be coming to him. He was quite aware that Dayton, while pretending to betray the plot, had actually been sent by Burr.

Yrujo did not commit himself. He dismissed the ex-Senator courteously, promising to talk to him again. Burr and Dayton appear to have realized that they had overplayed their hand. A few days later Dayton paid a return visit. This time he confessed that Burr’s plan had not been received with enthusiasm by the British ministry.

Dayton now unfolded another. It was that a certain number of men were to be introduced into the city of Washington, in disguise and well armed. At a signal from Burr they were to seize the President, Vice-President, and the President of the Senate, thus securing the heads of government. Next they were to take the public money which was on deposit in the banks in Washington and Georgetown and possess themselves of the arsenal on the eastern branch of the Potomac and also the Navy Yard. The vessels would be burned except two or three which were ready for service. Burr, according to Dayton, hoped to paralyze the opposition and make favorable agreements with the individual states. But, failing this, he would board the vessels in the Navy Yard with his followers and sail for New Orleans and there proclaim the emancipation of Louisiana and the western states.

In reporting the interview to his Government, Yrujo observed that for one who did not know the country it would appear almost insane, “... but I confess, for my part, that in view of all the circumstances it seems to me easy to execute, although it will irritate the Atlantic States.... It is beyond question that there exists in this country an infinite number of adventurers, without property, full of ambition, and ready to unite at once under the standard of a revolution which promises to better their lot. Equally certain it is that Burr and his friends, without discovering their true object, have succeeded in getting the good-will of these men, and inspiring the greatest confidence among them in favor of Burr.”

After what Merry imagined to be valiant service for his own country in abetting the dissolution of the Union, the end of his mission to the United States was distressing. His correspondence, intended for Pitt’s ministers, was read by Fox who wrote to Merry accepting his resignation. It did no good for Merry to protest that he had not offered his resignation. But even while he waited for his successor to arrive he sent off one final dispatch warning that if Britain refused to support Burr’s enterprise recourse would be had to France, and that even without the help of any foreign power Burr proposed to go ahead.

From the foregoing evidence various conclusions may be drawn. Apologists for Burr might question the accuracy of the reports sent to their governments by Merry and Yrujo. It is hard to believe they would have made them up.

Or, Burr’s proposals may be accepted, as Merry at least accepted them, at their face value. If so, and had he gone on with his plans, a substantial charge of treason could be laid against Burr.

Still another conclusion would be to accept Burr’s own protest of innocence and to assume that the propositions he made to the British and Spanish governments were dishonest and insincere, merely designed to wring money from them for services which he never intended to perform.

Whichever conclusion is accepted, had the reports of Merry and Yrujo been made public at the time of the trials, one wonders whether in October, 1807, Aaron Burr would have walked out of the Circuit Court for the Fifth District of Virginia a free man.