The Republicans triumphed in 1896, but the large vote for Mr. Bryan and his platform and the passions aroused by the campaign made it clear to the far-sighted that, whatever might be the fate of free silver, new social elements had entered American politics. It was fortunate for the conservative interests that the quarrel with Spain came shortly after Mr. McKinley's election, and they were able to employ that ancient political device, "a vigorous foreign policy," to divert the public mind from domestic difficulties. This was particularly acceptable to the populace at the time, for there had been no war for more than thirty years, and, contrary to their assertions on formal occasions, the American people enjoy wars beyond measure, if the plain facts of history are allowed to speak.[43]

Since 1876 there had been no very spectacular foreign affair to fix the attention of the public mind, except the furor worked up over the application of the Monroe Doctrine to Venezuela during President Cleveland's second administration. For a long time that country and Great Britain had been waging a contest over the western boundary of British Guiana; and the United States, on the appeal of Venezuela, had taken a slight interest in the dispute, generally assuming that the merits of the case were on the side of the South American republic. In 1895, it became apparent that Great Britain did not intend to yield any points in the case, and Venezuela began to clamor again for protection, this time with effect. In July of that year, the Secretary of State, Richard Olney, demanded that Great Britain answer whether she was willing to arbitrate the question, and announced that the United States was master in this hemisphere by saying: "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other powers."

This extraordinary document, to put it mildly, failed to arouse the warlike sentiment in England which its language invited, and Lord Salisbury replied for the British government that this startling extension of the Monroe Doctrine was not acceptable in the present controversy and that the arbitration of the question could not be admitted by his country. This moderate reply brought from President Cleveland a message to Congress on December 17, 1895, which created in the United States at least all the outward and visible signs of the preliminaries to a war over the matter. He asked Congress to create a commission to ascertain the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, and then added that it would be the duty of the United States "to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." He declared that he was conscious of the responsibilities which he thus incurred, but intimated that war between Great Britain and the United States, much as it was to be deplored, was not comparable to "a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor." In other words, we were to decide the dispute ourselves and go to war on Great Britain if we found her in possession of lands which in our opinion did not belong to her.

This defiant attitude on the part of President Cleveland, while it aroused a wave of enthusiasm among those sections of the population moved by bold talk about the unimpeachable integrity of the United States and its daring defense of right everywhere, called forth no little criticism in high places. Contrary to expectation, it was not met by bluster on the part of Great Britain, but it was rather deplored there as threatening a breach between the two countries over an insignificant matter. Moreover, when the commission created by Congress set to work on the boundary dispute, the British government courteously replied favorably to a request for assistance in the search for evidence. Finally, Great Britain yielded and agreed to the earlier proposition on the part of the United States that the issue be submitted to arbitration; and this happy outcome of the matter contributed not a little to Mr. Cleveland's reputation as "a sterling representative of the true American spirit." This was not diminished by the later discovery that Great Britain was wholly right in her claims in South America.

The Venezuelan controversy was an echo of the time-honored Monroe Doctrine and was without any deeper economic significance. There were not wanting, however, signs that the United States was prepared economically to accept that type of imperialism that had long been dominant in British politics and had sprung into prominence in Germany, France, and Italy during the generation following the Franco-Prussian War. This newer imperialism does not rest primarily upon a desire for more territory, but rather upon the necessity for markets in which to sell manufactured goods and for opportunities to invest surplus accumulations of capital. It begins in a search for trade, advances to intervention on behalf of the interests involved, thence to protectorates, and finally to annexation. By the inexorable necessity of the present economic system, markets and safe investment opportunities must be found for surplus products and accumulated capital. All the older countries being overstocked and also forced into this new form of international rivalry, the drift is inevitably in the direction of the economically backward countries: Africa, Asia, Mexico, and South America. Economic necessity thus overrides American isolation and drives the United States into world politics.

Although the United States had not neglected the protection of its interests from the days when it thrashed the Barbary pirates, sent Caleb Cushing to demand an open door in China, and dispatched Commodore Perry to batter down Japanese exclusiveness, the relative importance of its world operations was slight until manufacturing and commerce gained their ascendancy over agriculture.

The pressure of the newer interests on American foreign policy had already been felt when the demand for the war with Spain came. In 1889, the United States joined with Great Britain and Germany in a protectorate over the Samoan Islands, thus departing, according to Secretary Gresham, from our "traditional and well-established policy of avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relation to objects remote from this hemisphere."[44] Preparations had been made under Harrison's administration for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, after a revolution, largely fomented by American interests there, had overthrown the established government; but this movement was blocked for the time being by President Cleveland, who learned through a special commissioner, sent to investigate the affair, that the upheaval had been due principally to American disgust for the weak and vacillating government of the Queen. It was not until the middle of the Spanish War that Congress, recognizing the importance of the Hawaiian Islands in view of the probable developments resulting from Admiral Dewey's victory in the Philippines, annexed them to the United States by joint resolution on July 6, 1898.[45]

The Spanish War

It required, however, the Spanish War and the acquisition of the insular dependencies to bring imperialism directly into politics as an overshadowing issue and to secure the frank acknowledgment of the new emphasis on world policy which economic interests demanded. It is true that Cuba had long been an object of solicitude on the part of the United States. Before the Civil War, the slave power was anxious to secure its annexation as a state to help offset the growing predominance of the North; and during the ten years' insurrection from 1868 to 1878, when a cruel guerilla warfare made all life and property in Cuba unsafe, intervention was again suggested. But it was not until the renewal of the insurrection in 1895 that American economic interests in Cuba were strong enough to induce interference. Slavery was gone, but capital, still more dominant, had taken its place.

In 1895, Americans had more than fifty million dollars invested in Cuban business, and our commerce with the Island had risen to one hundred millions annually. The effect of the Cuban revolt against Spain was not only to diminish trade, but also to destroy American property. The contest between the rebels and Spanish troops was characterized by extreme cruelty and a total disregard for life and property. Gomez, the leader of the revolt, resorted to the policy made famous by Sherman on his march to the sea. He laid waste the land to starve the Spaniards and compel American interference if possible. By a proclamation of November 6, 1895, he ordered that plantation buildings and railway connections should be destroyed and sugar factories closed everywhere; what he left undone was finished by the Spanish general, Weyler, who concentrated the inhabitants of the rural districts in the centers occupied by the troops. Under such a policy, business was simply paralyzed; and within less than two years Americans had filed against Spain claims amounting to sixteen million dollars for property destroyed in the revolution.

The atrocities connected with the insurrection attracted the sympathy of the American people at once. Sermons were preached against Spanish barbarism; orators demanded that the Cuban people be "succored in their heroic struggle for the rights of men and of citizens"; Mr. Hearst's newspapers appealed daily to the people to compel governmental action at once, and denounced the tedious methods of negotiation, in view of an inevitable war. Cuban juntas formed in American cities raised money and supplied arms for the insurrectionists. All the enormous American property interests at stake in the Island, with their widespread and influential ramifications in the United States, demanded action. The war fever, always quick to be kindled, rose all over the country.

Even amid the exciting campaign of 1896, the Democrats found time to express sympathy with the Cubans, and the Republicans significantly remarked that inasmuch as Spain was "unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens," the good offices of the United States should be tendered with a view to pacification and independence. Perhaps, not unaware of the impending crisis, the Republicans also favored a continued enlargement of the navy to help maintain the "rightful influence" of the United States among the nations of the earth.

President Cleveland, repudiated by his own party and having no desire to "play the game of politics," assumed an attitude of neutrality in the conflict and denied to the Cubans the rights of belligerents. He offered to Spain the good offices of the United States in mediation with the insurgents—a tender which was rejected by Spain with the suggestion that the United States might more vigorously suppress the unlawful assistance which some of its citizens were lending to the revolutionists. Mr. Cleveland's second administration closed without any positive action on the Cuban question.

Within four months after his inauguration, President McKinley protested strongly to Spain against her policy in Cuba, and during the summer and autumn and winter he conducted a running fire of negotiations with Spain. Congress was impatient for armed intervention and fretted at the tedious methods of diplomacy. Spain shrewdly made counter thrusts to every demand advanced by the United States, but made no outward sign of improvement in the affairs of Cuba, even after the recall of General Weyler. In February, 1898, a private letter, written by De LÔme, the Spanish minister at Washington, showing contempt for Mr. McKinley and some shifty ideas of diplomacy, was acquired by the New York Journal and published. This stirred the country and led to the recall of the minister by his home government. Meanwhile the battleship Maine was sent to Havana, officially to resume friendly relations at Cuban ports, but not without an ulterior regard for the necessity of protecting the lives and property of Americans in jeopardy. The incident of the Spanish minister's letter had hardly been closed before the Maine was blown up and sunk on the evening of February 15, 1898. The death of two officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of the crew was a tragedy which moved the nation beyond measure, and with the cry "Remember the Maine" public opinion was worked up to a point of frenzy.

A commission was appointed at once to inquire into the cause of the disaster, and on March 21 it reported that the Maine had been destroyed by an explosion of a submarine mine which set off some of the ship's magazines. Within a week, negotiations with Spain were resumed, and that country made generous promises to restore peace in the Island and permit a Cuban parliament to be established in the interests of local autonomy. None of Spain's promises were regarded as satisfactory by the administration, and on April 4, General Woodford, the American representative in that country, was instructed to warn the ministry that no effective armistice had been offered the Cubans and that President McKinley would shortly lay the matter before Congress—which meant war. After some delay, during which representatives of the European powers and the Pope were at work in the interests of peace, Spain promised to suspend hostilities, call a Cuban parliament, and restore a reasonable autonomy.

On the day after the receipt of this promise, President McKinley sent his war message to Congress without explaining fully the latest concessions made by Spain. It was claimed by the Spanish government that it had yielded absolutely everything short of independence and that all of the demands of the United States had been met. Some eminent editors and publicists in the United States have since accepted this view of the affair and sharply criticized the President for not making public the full text of Spain's last concession on the day that he sent his war message to Congress. Those who take this view hold that President McKinley believed war to be inevitable and desirable all along, but merely wished to bring public opinion to the breaking point before shifting the responsibility to Congress. The President's defenders, however, claim that no credence could be placed in the good faith of Spain and that the intolerable conditions in Cuba would never have been removed under Spanish administration, no matter what promises might have been made.

In his war message of April 11, 1898, Mr. McKinley brought under review the conditions in Cuba and the history of the controversy, coming to the conclusion that the dictates of humanity, the necessity of protecting American lives and property in Cuba, and the chronic disorders in the Island warranted armed intervention. Congress responded by an overwhelming vote on April 19, in favor of a resolution declaring that Cuba should be free, that Spain's withdrawal should be demanded, and the President be authorized to use the military and naval forces of the country to carry the decree into effect. In the enthusiasm of the hour, Congress also specifically disclaimed any intention of exercising "sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof." Thus war was declared on the anniversary of the battle of Lexington.

In the armed conflict which followed, the most striking and effective operations were on the sea. In anticipation of the war, Commodore Dewey, in command of the Asiatic station, had been instructed as early as February to keep his squadron at Hongkong, coaled, and ready, in event of a declaration of hostilities, to begin offensive operations in the Philippine Islands. The battleship Oregon, then off the coast of Washington, was ordered to make the long voyage around the Horn, which has now become famous in the annals of the sea. At the outbreak of the war, Rear Admiral Sampson, in charge of the main squadron at Key West, was instructed to blockade important stretches of the coast of Cuba and to keep watch for the arrival of the Spanish fleet, under Admiral Cervera, which was then on the high seas, presumably bound for Cuba.

The first naval blow was struck by Admiral Dewey, who had left Chinese waters on receiving news of the declaration of war and had reached Manila Bay on the evening of April 30. Early the following morning he opened fire on the inferior Spanish fleet under the guns of CavitÉ and Manila, and within a few hours he had destroyed the enemy's ships, killed nearly four hundred men, and silenced the shore batteries without sustaining the loss of a single man or suffering any injuries to his own ships worthy of mention. News of this extraordinary exploit reached the United States by way of Hongkong on May 6, and the hero of the day was, by popular acclaim, placed among the immortals of our naval history.

While celebrating the victory off Manila, the government was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the Spanish fleet in American waters which were being carefully patrolled. In spite of the precautions of Admiral Sampson, Cervera was able to slip into the harbor of Santiago on May 19, where he was immediately blockaded by the American naval forces. An attempt was made to stop up the mouth of the harbor by sending Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson to sink a collier at the narrow entrance, but this spectacular move, carried out under a galling fire, failed to accomplish the purpose of the projectors, and Hobson and his men fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

The time had now come for bringing the land forces into coÖperation with the navy for a combined attack on Santiago, and on June 14 a large body of troops, principally regulars, embarked from Tampa, where men and supplies had been concentrating for weeks. The management of the army was in every respect inferior to the administration of the navy. Secretary Alger, of the War Department, was a politician of the old school, who could not allow efficiency to interfere with the "proper" distribution of patronage; and as a result of his dilatory methods (to put it mildly) and the general unpreparedness of the army, the camp at Tampa was grossly mismanaged. Sanitary conveniences were indescribably bad, supply contractors sold decayed meat and wretched food to the government, heavy winter clothing was furnished to men about to fight in the summer time in a tropical climate, and, to cap the climax of blundering, inadequate provisions were made for landing the troops when they reached Cuba on June 22.

The forces dispatched to Cuba were placed under the command of General Shafter, but owing to his illness the fighting was principally carried on under Generals Lawton and Wheeler. The most serious conflicts in the land campaign occurred at El Caney and San Juan Hill, both strategic points near Santiago. At the second of these places the famous "Rough Riders" under Colonel Roosevelt distinguished themselves by a charge up the hill under heavy fire and by being the first to reach the enemy's intrenchments. In spite of several engagements, in which the fortunes of the day were generally on the side of the Americans, sickness among the soldiers and lack of supplies caused General Shafter to cable, on July 3, that without additional support he could not undertake a successful storming of Santiago.

At this critical juncture, the naval forces once more distinguished themselves, and made further bloody fighting on land unnecessary, by destroying Cervera's fleet which attempted to make its escape from the Santiago harbor on the morning of July 3. The American ships were then in charge of Commodore Schley, for Admiral Sampson had left watch early that morning for a conference with General Shafter; and the sailors acquitted themselves with the same skill that marked Dewey's victory at Manila. Within less than four hours' fighting all the Spanish ships were destroyed or captured with a loss of about six hundred killed and wounded, while the Americans sustained a loss of only one man killed and one wounded. This victory, of course, marked the doom of Santiago, although it did not surrender formally until July 17, after two days' bombardment by the American ships.

The fall of Santiago ended military operations in Cuba, and General Miles, who had come to the front in time to assist General Shafter in arranging the terms of the surrender of Santiago, proceeded at once to Porto Rico. He was rapidly gaining possession of that Island in an almost bloodless campaign when news came of the signing of the peace protocol on August 12. Unfortunately it required longer to convey the information to the Philippines that the war was at an end, and on the day after the signature of the protocol, that is, August 13, General Merritt and Admiral Dewey carried Manila by storm.

As early as July 26, 1898, the Spanish government approached President McKinley through M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, and asked for a preliminary statement of the terms on which the war could be brought to a close. After some skirmishing, in which Spain reluctantly yielded to the American ultimatum, a peace protocol was signed on August 12, to the effect that Cuba should be independent, Porto Rico ceded to the United States, and Manila occupied pending the final negotiations, which were opened at Paris by special commissioners on October 1.

When the commissioners met according to arrangements, the government of the United States apparently had not come to a conclusion as to the final disposition of the Philippines. The administration was anxious not to go too far in advance of public opinion, at least so far as official pronunciamento was concerned, although powerful commercial interests were busy impressing the public mind with the advantages to be derived from the retention of the distant Pacific Islands. In his instructions to the peace commissioners, on the eve of their departure, Mr. McKinley, while denying that there had originally been any intention of conquest in the Pacific, declared that the march of events had imposed new duties upon us, and added: "Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade." While stating that the possession of territory was less important than an "open door" for trade purposes, he concluded by instructing the commissioners that the United States could not "accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the Island of Luzon."The peace commissioners were divided among themselves as to the policy to be pursued with regard to the Philippines; but in the latter part of October they received definite instructions from the Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay, that the cession of Luzon alone could not be justified "on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds," and that the entire archipelago must be surrendered by Spain. The Spanish commissioners protested vigorously against this demand, on the theory that it was outside of the terms of the peace protocol, but they were forced to yield, receiving as a sort of consolation prize the payment of twenty million dollars in compensation for the loss.

The final treaty, as signed on December 10, 1898, embodied the following terms: the independence of Cuba, the cession of Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States, the cancellation of the claims of the citizens of the two countries against each other, the United States undertaking to settle the claims of its citizens against Spain, the payment of twenty million dollars for the Philippines by the United States, and the determination of the civil and political status of the inhabitants of the ceded territories by Congress.

When the treaty of peace was published, the contest over the retention of the Philippines took on new bitterness—at least in public speeches and editorials. The contentions on both sides were so vehement that it was almost impossible to secure any frank discussion of the main issue: "Does the United States want a foothold in the Pacific in order to secure the trade of the Philippines and afford American capital an opportunity to develop the dormant natural resources, and in order also to have a station from which to give American trade and capital a better chance in the awakening Orient?" Democrats demanded self-government for the Philippines, "in recognition of the principles of the immortal Declaration of Independence." Republicans talked in lofty strains about "the mysterious hand of Providence which laid this burden upon the Anglo-Saxon race."

The proposal to retain the Philippines, in fact, gave the southern statesmen just the opportunity they had long wanted to taunt the Republicans with insincerity on the race question. "Republican leaders," said Senator Tillman, "do not longer dare to call into question the justice or necessity of limiting negro suffrage in the South." And on another occasion he exclaimed in querulous accents: "I want to call your attention to the remarkable change that has come over the spirit of the dream of the Republicans. Your slogans of the past—brotherhood of man and fatherhood of God—have gone glimmering down through the ages. The brotherhood of man exists no longer." To such assertions, Republicans of the old school, like Senator Hoar, opposed to imperialism, replied sadly, "The statements of Mr. Tillman have never been challenged and never can be." But Republicans of the new school, unvexed by charges of inconsistency, replied that high talk about the rights of man and of self-government came with poor grace from southern Democrats who had disfranchised millions of negroes that were just as capable of self-government as the bulk of the natives in the Philippines.

Senator Vest, on December 6, introduced in the Senate a resolution to the effect "that under the Constitution of the United States, no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies." He was ably supported by Senator Hoar, from Massachusetts, who took his stand upon the proposition that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." On the other side, Senator O. H. Platt, of Connecticut, expounded the gospel of manifest destiny: "Every expansion of our territory has been in accordance with the irresistible law of growth. We could no more resist the successive expansions by which we have grown to be the strongest nation on earth than a tree can resist its growth. The history of territorial expansion is the history of our nation's progress and glory. It is a matter to be proud of, not to lament. We should rejoice that Providence has given us the opportunity to extend our influence, our institutions, and our civilization into regions hitherto closed to us, rather than contrive how we can thwart its designs."

At length on February 6, 1899, the treaty was ratified by the Senate, but it must not be assumed that all of the Senators who voted for the ratification of the treaty favored embarking upon a policy of "imperialism." Indeed, at the time of the approval of the treaty, a resolution was passed by the Senate to the effect that the policy to be adopted in the Philippines was still an open question; but the outbreak of an insurrection there led to an immediate employment of military rule in the Islands and criticism was silenced by the cry that our national honor was at stake.The revolt against American dominion might have been foreseen, for the conduct of Generals Anderson and Merritt at Manila had invited trouble. For a long time before the War, native Filipinos had openly resisted Spanish rule, and particularly the dominance of the monks and priests, who held an enormous amount of land and managed civil as well as ecclesiastical affairs. Just before the outbreak of the Spanish War, there had been a revolt under the leadership of Aguinaldo which had been brought to an end by the promise to pay a large sum to the revolutionary leaders and to introduce extensive administrative reforms. The promises, however, had not been carried out, and Admiral Dewey had invited the coÖperation of Aguinaldo and his insurgents in the attack on Manila. When the land assault was made on the city, in August, Aguinaldo joined with a large insurgent army under the banner of the Filipino republic which had been proclaimed in July, but he was compelled to take a subordinate position, and received scant respect from the American commanders, who gave him to understand that he had no status in the war or the settlement of the terms of capitulation.

As may be imagined, Aguinaldo was in no happy frame of mind when the news came in January, 1899, that the United States had assumed sovereignty over the islands; but it is not clear that some satisfactory adjustment might not have been made then, if the United States had been willing to accept a sort of protectorate and allow the revolutionaries to establish a local government of their own. However, little or nothing was done to reach a peaceful adjustment, and on February 4, some Filipino soldiers were shot by American troops for refusing to obey an order to halt, on approaching the American lines. This untoward incident precipitated the conflict which began with some serious regular fighting and dwindled into a vexatious guerilla warfare, lasting three years and costing the United States heavily in men and money. Inhuman atrocities were committed on both sides, resembling in brutality the cruel deeds which had marked frontier warfare with the Indians. Reports of these gruesome barbarities reached the United States and aroused the most severe criticism of the administration, not only from the opponents of imperialism, but also from those supporters of the policy, who imagined that it could be carried out with rose water.

The acquisition of the insular dependencies raised again the old problem as to the power of Congress over territories, which had been so extensively debated during the slavery conflict. The question now took the form: "Does the Constitution restrict Congress in the government of the Islands as if they were physically and politically a part of the United States, and particularly, do the limitations in behalf of private rights, freedom of press, trial by jury, and the like, embodied in the first ten Amendments, control the power of Congress?" Strict constitutionalists answered this question in the affirmative without hesitation, citing the long line of constitutional decisions which had repeatedly affirmed the doctrine that Congress is limited everywhere, even in the territories by the Amendments providing for the protection of personal and property rights; but practical politicians, supporting the McKinley administration, frankly asserted that the Constitution and laws of the United States did not of their own force apply in the territories and could not apply until Congress had expressly extended them to the insular possessions.

The abstract question was given concrete form in several decisions by the Supreme Court, known as "the Insular Cases." The question was speedily raised whether importers of commodities from Porto Rico should be compelled to pay the duties prescribed by the Dingley act, and the Court answered in the case of De Lima v. Bidwell in 1901 that the Island was "domestic" within the meaning of the tariff act and that the duties could not be collected. In the course of his remarks, the Justice, who wrote the opinion, said that territory was either domestic or foreign, and that the Constitution did not recognize any halfway position. Four Justices dissented, however; and American interests, fearing this new competition, had dissented in advance,—so vigorously, in fact, that Congress during the previous year had passed the Foraker act imposing a tariff on goods coming into the United States from Porto Rico and vice versa.

This concession to the protected interests placed the Supreme Court in a dilemma. If Porto Rico was domestic territory,—a part of the United States,—was not the Foraker act a violation of the constitutional provision that duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States? This question was judicially answered by the Court in the case of Downes v. Bidwell, decided on May 27, 1901, which upheld the Foraker act on grounds so various that the only real point made by the Court was that the law was constitutional. None of the four justices who concurred with Justice Brown in the opinion agreed with his reasoning, and the four judges, who dissented entirely from the decision and the opinion, vigorously denied that there could be any territory under the flag of the United States which was not subject to the limitations of the Constitution.

In other cases involving freedom of the press in the Philippines and trial by jury in the Hawaiian Islands, the Supreme Court upheld the doctrine that Congress, in legislating for the new dependencies, was not bound by all those constitutional limitations which had been hitherto applied in the continental territories of the United States. The upshot of all these insular decisions is that the Constitution may be divided into two parts, "fundamental" and "formal"; that only the fundamental parts control the Federal authorities in the government of the dependencies; and that the Supreme Court will decide, from time to time as specific cases arise, what parts of the Federal Constitution are "fundamental" and what parts are merely "formal." In two cases, the Court has gone so far as to hold that indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury with unanimous verdict are not "fundamental" parts of the Constitution, "but merely concern a method of procedure." In other words, the practical necessities of governing subject races of different origins and legal traditions forced that eminent tribunal to resort to painful reasoning in an effort not to hamper unduly the power of Congress by constitutional limitations.

In the settlement which followed the Spanish War, three general problems were presented. In the first place, our relations to Cuba required definition. It is true that in the declaration of war on Spain Congress had disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the Island to its people"; but American economic interests in the Island were too great to admit of the actual fulfillment of this promise. Consequently, Cuba was forced to accept, as a part of her constitution, several provisions, known as the Platt amendment, adopted by the Congress of the United States on March 2, 1901, restricting her relations with foreign countries, limiting her debt-creating power, securing the right of the United States to intervene whenever necessary to protect life and property, and reserving to the United States the right to acquire coaling stations at certain points on the Island to be agreed upon.

Under the constitution, to which the Platt reservations on behalf of the United States were attached, the Cubans held a general election in December, 1901, choosing a president and legislature; and in the spring of the following year American troops were withdrawn, leaving the administration in the hands of the natives. It was not long, however, before domestic difficulties began to disturb the peace of the Island, and in the summer of 1906 it was reported that the government of President Palma was about to be overthrown by an insurrection. Under the circumstances, Palma resigned, and the Cuban congress was unable to secure a quorum for the transaction of business. After due warning, President Roosevelt intervened, under the provisions of the Platt amendment, and instituted a temporary government supported by American troops. American occupation of the Island continued for a few months, but finally the soldiers were withdrawn and native government was once more put on trial.

The second problem was presented by Porto Rico, where military rule was put into force after the occupation in 1898. At length, on May 1, 1900, an "organic act," instituting civil government in that Island, was approved by the President. This law did not confer citizenship on the Porto Ricans, but assured them of the protection of the United States. It set up a government embracing a governor, appointed by the President and Senate of the United States, six executive secretaries appointed in the same manner as the governor, and a legislature of two houses—one composed of the six secretaries and five other persons selected by the President and Senate, acting as the upper house, and a lower house elected by popular vote. Under this act, the practice of appointing Americans to the chief executive offices took the final control of legislative matters out of the hands of the natives, leaving them only an initiatory power. This produced a friction between the appointive and elective branches of the government, which became so troublesome that the dispute had to be carried to Washington in 1909, and Congress enacted a measure providing that, in case the lower house of the Porto Rican legislature refused to pass the budget, the financial arrangements of the previous year should continue.

The problem of governing the Philippines was infinitely more complicated than that of governing Porto Rico, because the archipelago embraced more than three thousand islands and about thirty different tribes and dialects. The evolution of American control there falls into three stages. At first, they were governed by the President of the United States under his military authority. In 1901, a civil commission, with Mr. W. H. Taft at the head, took over the civil administration of all the pacified provinces. In 1902, Congress passed an "organic act" for the Islands, providing that, after their pacification, a legislative assembly should be erected. At length, in 1907, this assembly was duly instituted, and the government now consists of the governor, a commission appointed by the President and Senate, and a legislature composed of the commission and a lower house of representatives elected by popular vote.

Important as are the problems of governing dependencies, they are not the sole or even the most significant aspects of imperialism. The possession of territories gives a larger control over the development of their trade and resources; but capital and enterprise seeking an outlet flow to those countries where the advantages offered are the greatest, no matter whoever may exercise political dominion there. The acquisition of the Philippines was simply an episode in the development of American commercial interests in the Orient.

It was those interests which led the United States to send Caleb Cushing to China in 1844 to negotiate a treaty with that country securing for Americans rights of trade in the ports which had recently been blown open by British guns in the famous "Opium War." It was those interests which induced the United States government to send Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853 and led to the opening of that nation—long closed to the outside world—to American trade and enterprise. After 1844 in China, and 1854 in Japan, American trade steadily increased, and American capital seeking investments soon began to flow into Chinese business and railway undertakings. Although the United States did not attempt to follow the example of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany in seizing Chinese territory, it did obtain a sufficient economic interest in that Empire to warrant the employment of American soldiers in coÖperation with Russian, English, French, Japanese, and other contingents at the time of the Boxer insurrection at Peking in the summer of 1900.

The policy of the United States at the time won no little praise from the Chinese government. Having no territorial ambitions in the Empire, the administration at Washington, through Mr. John Hay, Secretary of State, was able to announce that the United States favored an "open door" for trade and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. "The policy of the Government of the United States," said Mr. Hay to the Powers, in the summer of 1900, "is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire." This friendly word, which was much appreciated by China, was later supplemented by the generous action of the United States government in returning to that country a large sum of money which had been collected as an indemnity for the injury to American rights in the Boxer uprising, and was discovered to be an overcharge due to excessive American claims.

While thus developing American interests in the Orient, the United States government was much embarrassed by the legislation of some of the western states against Orientals. Chinese and Japanese laborers were excluded from the country by law or agreements, but in spite of this fact there were large numbers of Orientals on the coast. This was resented by many whites, particularly trade unionists with whom the cheap labor came into competition, and from time to time laws were enacted by state legislatures that were alleged to violate the rights which the United States had guaranteed to the Chinese or Japanese by treaties with their respective countries.

Such a dispute occurred a few years ago over an attempt to exclude Japanese children from the regular public schools in San Francisco, and again in 1912 in connection with a law of California relative to the acquisition of lands by aliens—the naturalization of Orientals being forbidden by Federal law. These legal disputes arose from the fact that the Federal government has the power to make treaties with foreign countries relative to matters which are entirely within the control of state legislatures. The discriminations against the Orientals, coupled with the pressure of American interests in the Far East and the presence of American dominion in the Philippines, caused no little friction between certain sections of the United States and of Japan; and there were some who began, shortly after the Spanish War, to speak of the "impending conflict" in the Orient.

The Campaign of 1900

It was inevitable that the new issues, raised by the Spanish War, the acquisition of the insular possessions, and the insurrection against American rule in the Philippines, should find their way almost immediately into national politics. By the logic of their situation, the Republicans were compelled to defend their imperialist policy, although it was distasteful to many of the old leaders; and at their national convention, at Philadelphia in June, 1900, they renominated President McKinley by acclamation, justified their methods in the dependencies, approved the new commercial advances in the Orient, advocated government aid to the merchant marine, and commended the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands. The trust plank, couched in vague and uncertain terms, was, interestingly enough, drafted by Mr. Hanna, who appropriately levied the campaign collections for his party in Wall Street.[46] Mr. Roosevelt, then governor of New York, was nominated for Vice President, although he had refused to agree to accept the office. The desire of Senator Platt, the Republican "boss" in New York, to put him out of the state threw the "machine" in his favor, and this, combined with enthusiasm for him in the West, gave him every vote in the convention save his own. Under the circumstances he was forced to accept the nomination.

The Democrats took up the challenge on "imperialism"; but Mr. Bryan was determined not to allow the silver question to sink into an early grave, and he accordingly forced the adoption of a free silver plank, as the price of his accepting the nomination. The platform was strong in its denunciation of Republican "imperialist" policy, in general and in detail. It favored promising the Filipinos stable government, independence, and, finally, protection from outside interference. It was also more positive on the trust question, and it advocated an increase in the powers of the interstate commerce commission, enabling it "to protect individuals and communities from discriminations and the people from unjust and unfair transportation rates." An effort was made to placate the conservative section of the party by offering the nomination to the Vice Presidency to David B. Hill, of New York, and on his refusal of the honor it was given to Adlai Stevenson, who had held that office during Cleveland's second administration.

Although many Republicans supported Mr. Bryan on account of their dislike of imperialism and its works, the result of the campaign was a second victory for Mr. McKinley, even greater than that of 1896. He received a larger popular vote and Mr. Bryan a smaller vote than in that year. Of the 447 electors, Mr. McKinley received 292. This happy outcome he naturally regarded as a vindication of his policies, and he was evidently turning toward the future with renewed confidence (as his Buffalo speech on reciprocity indicated) when on September 6, 1901, he was shot by an anarchist at the Buffalo exposition and died eight days later.

Mr. Roosevelt immediately took the oath of office, and promised to continue "absolutely unbroken" the policy of his predecessor.

FOOTNOTES:

[43] J. B. Moore, Four Phases of American Development, p. 195.