TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE NOTICE OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT.
TO THE YOUTH OF FRANCE
Of course these proportions are merely given for the sake of illustration. I. NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL ORGANIZATION II. WANTS, EFFORTS, SATISFACTIONS III. WANTS OF MAN IV. EXCHANGE V. OF VALUE It is a proof that where this competition does not exist the proportionality ceases. In that case we discover no relation between divers kinds of labour and their remuneration. The absence of competition may result from the nature of things or from human perversity. If it arises from the nature of things, we shall see a very small amount of labour give rise to great value, and no one have reason to complain. Such is the case of the man who finds a diamond. Such is the case of Rubini, of Malibran, of Taglioni, of a fashionable tailor, of the proprietor of the Clos-Vougeot, etc., etc. Circumstances have put them in possession of rare means of rendering service; they have no rivals, and exact a high price. The service being, from its very nature, of excessive rarity, shows that it is not essential to the well-being and progress of mankind. It is an object of luxury, of vanity, which wealthy people are enabled to procure. Is it not natural that a man, before indulging in such satisfactions, should wait until he finds himself in a situation to provide for wants which are more imperious and more reasonable? If competition is absent in consequence of some human intervention, the same effects are produced, but with this enormous difference, that they have been produced where they ought not. In that case we see a comparatively small amount of labour give rise to great value; but how? By forcibly interdicting that competition the effect of which is to proportion remuneration to services. Then, just as Rubini might say to a dilettante. “You must pay me handsomely, or I don’t sing this evening,”—presuming on being able to render a service which no one else can render,—in the same way a butcher, a baker, a landlord, a banker, may say, “I must have an extravagant price, or you shall have none of my corn, my bread, my meat, my gold; and I have adopted precautions, I shall employ force, to prevent you being able to provide yourself elsewhere, and to make sure that no one shall render you services analogous to mine.” People who assimilate artificial to what they call natural monopolies, because they have this in common, that they enhance the value of labour, such people, I say, are both blind and superficial. Artificial monopoly is nothing else than spoliation. It produces evils which, apart from it, did not exist. It inflicts privations on a considerable portion of society, frequently as regards commodities of primary necessity. Moreover, it gives rise to irritation, hatreds, reprisals,—all the fruits of injustice. Natural advantages do no harm to mankind. At most we can say that they merely exhibit pre-existent evils, imputable to no one. It may be regretted, perhaps, that tokay is not as cheap and as abundant as vin ordinaire. But that is not a social evil; it is one imposed on us by nature. Between natural and artificial monopolies, then, there is this essential difference: The one is the effect of scarcity, pre-existent and inevitable. The other is the effect of a scarcity which is factitious and unnatural. In the first case, it is not the absence of competition which creates the scarcity; it is the scarcity which explains the absence of competition. Society would be puerile were it to complain and torment itself because there is in the world only one Jenny Lind, one Clos-Vougeot, one Regent. In the second case it is very different. It is not on account of a providential scarcity that competition becomes impossible, but because force has repressed and put down competition that there is created among men a scarcity which ought not to have existed.—(Note extracted from MSS. left by the Author.) Accumulation is a circumstance of no account in Political Economy. Let the satisfaction be immediate or delayed, let it be adjourned or follow instantly on the effort,—in what respect does this change the nature of things? I choose to make a sacrifice to enjoy the pleasure of hearing a fine voice. I go to the theatre, and pay for my entertainment—the satisfaction is immediate. I devote my money to the purchase of a basket of strawberries, and I can delay my satisfaction till to-morrow—that is all. It may be said that the strawberries constitute wealth, because I can exchange them. True. Whilst the effort has been made and the satisfaction is delayed, wealth subsists. It is satisfaction which destroys wealth. When the strawberries been eaten the satisfaction will be on a level with that which I derived from hearing Alboni. Service received—service rendered—this is political economy.—(Note from MSS. left by the Author.) VI. WEALTH VII. CAPITAL VIII. PROPERTY—COMMUNITY IX. LANDED PROPERTY Land in its natural state, and without cultivation, is capable of producing grass for the food of cattle, and other products capable of rendering service to man. Suppose, for example, that the agriculture of a country has reached the least productive corn-land, which yields a return of £120 for each £100 of capital employed in its cultivation, and that much of the remaining land is incapable of cultivation,—a tract of moorland, or rough pasture, for instance, like some parts of the Highlands of Scotland. Whether such land will or will not yield a rent must depend on whether the return, in sheep, cattle, copsewood, or other produce, after replacing the capital employed, exceeds or falls short of 20 per cent. Suppose that a person possessed of a capital equal to £100, instead of applying that capital to the cultivation of the least productive corn-land, with a return equal to £120, employs his £100 in purchasing, tending, and bringing to market 100 sheep,—if the annual produce and increase of his flock, over and above his necessary outgoings, amounts only to 10 per cent. on his capital, of course he will find the rearing of sheep unprofitable, and give up the trade. He can in that case pay no rent, for his return is not equal to even the ordinary profits. But if the increase of his flock, over and above his outgoings, amounts to 30 per cent. on the capital employed, then the land to which we refer will yield a rent equal to 10 per cent. on that capital. Whether this shall be the rent of 10, of 50, or 100, or 1000 acres of land, depends entirely on how much land is required to feed 100 sheep; the greater the extent of land, the less will be the rent of each acre; it may be a pound, or a shilling, or a penny an acre; still every acre, and every part of every acre, will yield a rent. Nor does the question of rent or no rent depend on the amount of the capital employed; for if a capital of £100 employed on 10,000 acres of land yields a clear return of £130 when profits are at 20 per cent., the surplus £10 clearly constitutes rent. Rent depends on the ratio of the product to the capital employed, and if that product, or its value, exceed the capital, or its value, by more than the ordinary rate of profits, a rent, greater or less in amount, according to the value of the capital and the extent of surface over which that capital is spread, will be yielded by every inch of land capable of giving nourishment to a blade of grass. On a searching analysis of rent, then, we always find a residuum which cannot be resolved into the remuneration of anterior labour or capital; and as the value of land in its natural and uncultivated state depends on the amount of this residuum, or rent, if that value is to be brought within the limits of Bastiat’s theory, we must apply to it the same principle which he applied (Chap. V., pp. 139-141 ante) to the case of a diamond found by accident, and resolve it, not into service rendered by undergoing labour, or making an effort, for another, but into service rendered by saving another from undergoing the labour or making the effort for himself. Bastiat seems to have felt this as he approached the conclusion of the present chapter. (See post, p. 282.) In this part of his work, Bastiat, in his desire to refute the fallacies of the Socialists and Communists on the subject of property, seems to have gone beyond the proper domain of Political Economy; for in strictness it is not the business of that science to vindicate the institution of property, or to explain its origin. It is enough for the Economist that property exists, and all that he is concerned to do is to explain the laws which regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth.—Translator. X. COMPETITION XI. PRODUCER—CONSUMER XII. THE TWO APHORISMS XIII. RENT 1. Two fields, the one cultivated, A, the other uncultivated, B, being supposed of identical quality, the amount of labour formerly devoted to the clearance of A is assumed as the necessary measure of the amount of labour required for the clearance of B. We may even say that, on account of our now superior knowledge of agriculture, of our implements, of our improved means of communication, etc., a less amount of labour would now be necessary to bring B into cultivation than was formerly required in the case of A. If land had value in itself, A would be worth all that it cost to bring it into culture, plus something additional for its natural productive powers; that is to say, much more than the sum now required to bring B into the same state. Now it is just the reverse. The field A is worth less since we buy it rather than bring B into cultivation. In purchasing A, then, we pay nothing for the natural productive powers, since the price does not even compensate the original cost of bringing it into cultivation. 2. If the field A produces 1000 measures of corn, the field B when cultivated must be supposed to produce the same quantity. The reason why A was formerly cultivated was, that formerly 1000 measures of corn amply remunerated all the labour required both for its original clearance and its annual cultivation. The reason why B is not cultivated is, that now 1000 measures of corn would not remunerate the same amount of labour, or even a less amount, as we have just before remarked. And what does this show? Evidently that the value of human labour has risen in relation to corn; that a day’s labour is worth more wages estimated in corn. In other words, corn is obtained with less effort, and is exchanged for a less amount of labour; and the theory of the progressive dearness of the means of subsistence is erroneous.—Editor. MONEY CREDIT XIV. WAGES XV. SAVING XVII. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SERVICES Unquestionably; but society gains in return the service which is rendered to it—security, for example. Moreover, Say returns to the correct doctrine almost immediately afterwards, when he says,—“To levy a tax is to do a wrong to society—a wrong which is compensated by no advantage, when no service is rendered to society in exchange.”—Ibid. Here, again, the subsequent qualification corrects the too absolute judgment previously pronounced. The doctrine that services are exchanged for services, simplifies much both the problem and its solution. The reader will understand that it is not as bearing on military affairs that I cite this experiment. I refer to it as calculated to illustrate a radical difference between public and private service, between official regulations and liberty. Would it be better for the State to take from us our means of support, and undertake to feed us, or to leave us both our means of support and the care of feeding ourselves? The same question may be asked with reference to all our wants. On the subjects of the six chapters intended to follow this, under the titles of Taxation, Machinery, Free Trade, Intermediaries, Raw Materials, and Luxury, we refer the reader, 1st, to the Discours sur l’ImpÔt des Boissons, inserted in the second edition of the pamphlet, IncompatibilitÉs Parlementaires; 2dly, to the pamphlet entitled Ce qu’on voit et Ce qu’on ne voit pas; 3dly, to the Sophismes Économiques. XVIII. DISTURBING CAUSES XIX. WAR XX. RESPONSIBILITY We acknowledge, indeed, that man may err; yes, by the whole interval which separates a truth realized and established from one which is merely guessed at or suspected. But since man’s nature is to seek, his destiny is to find. Truth, be it observed, has harmonious relations, necessary affinities, not only with the constitution of the understanding and the instincts of the heart, but also with the whole physical and moral conditions of our existence; so that even when we fail to grasp it as absolute truth, even when it fails to recommend itself to our innate sympathies as just, or to our ideal aspirations as beautiful, it, nevertheless, at length contrives to find acceptance in its practical and unobjectionable aspect as useful. Liberty, we know, may lead to evil. But evil has itself its mission. Assuredly God has not thrown it across our path as a stumbling-block. He has placed it, as it were, on each side of that path as a warning,—as a means of keeping us in the right road, or bringing us back to it. Man’s will and inclinations, like inert molecules, have their law of gravitation. But, whilst things inanimate obey blindly their pre-existent and inevitable tendencies, in the case of beings indued with free will, the force of attraction and repulsion does not precede action; it springs from the voluntary determination which it seems to be waiting for, it is developed by the very act itself, and it reacts for or against the agent, by a progressive exertion of co-operation or resistance, which we term recompense or chastisement, pleasure or pain. If the direction of the will coincides with that of the general laws, if the act is good, happiness is the result. If it takes an opposite direction, if it is bad, something opposes or repels it; error gives rise to suffering, which is its remedy and its end. Thus, Evil is constantly opposed by Evil, and Good as constantly gives rise to Good. And we venture to say that, when seen from a higher point of view, the errors of free will are limited to certain oscillations, of a determinate extent, around a superior and necessary orbit; all persistent resistance, which would force this limit, tending only to destroy itself, without at all succeeding in disturbing the order of the sphere in which it moves. This reactive force of co-operation or repulsion, which, by means of recompense and suffering, governs the orbit, at once voluntary and necessary, of the human race, this law of gravitation of free beings (of which Evil is only a necessary part) is distinguished by the terms Responsibility and Solidarity; the one brings back upon the individual; the other reflects and sends back on the social body the good or bad consequences of the act; the one applies to man as a solitary and self-governing individual; the other envelops him in an inevitable community of good and evil as a partial element, a dependent member, of a collective and imperishable being—man. Responsibility is the sanction of individual liberty, the foundation of the rights of man. Solidarity is the evidence of his social subordination, and his principle of duty. . .. [A leaf of Bastiat’s MS. being awanting, I hope to be pardoned for thus endeavouring to continue the idea of this religious introduction.]—R. F. XXI. SOLIDARITY Moreover, the whole scope of this work on the Harmonies, the concordance of interests, and the grand maxims, “The prosperity of each is the prosperity of all—the prosperity of all is the prosperity of each,” etc., the accord between property and community, the services of capital, extension of the domain of the gratuitous, etc., are all developments in a utilitarian point of view of the very title of this chapter—Solidarity.—Note of the Editor. XXII. SOCIAL MOTIVE FORCE XXV. RELATIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH MORALS, WITH POLITICS, WITH LEGISLATION The line which separates the field of Political Economy from the wider domains of Morals, Politics, and Legislation is perhaps by no writer more accurately marked than by Mr Senior in the admirable introduction to his article “Political Economy” in the Encyclop. Metropolitana. “The questions, to what extent and under what circumstances the possession of wealth is, on the whole, beneficial or injurious to its possessor, or to the society of which he is a member? what distribution of wealth is most desirable in each different state of society? and what are the means by which any given country can facilitate such a distribution?—all these are questions of great interest and difficulty, but no more form part of the science of Political Economy, in the sense in which we use that term, than Navigation forms part of the science of Astronomy. The principles supplied by Political Economy are indeed necessary elements in their solution, but they are not the only or even the most important elements. The writer who pursues such investigations is, in fact, engaged on the great science of Legislation; a science which requires a knowledge of the general principles supplied by Political Economy, but differs from it essentially in its subject, its premises, and its conclusions. The subject of legislation is not wealth, but human welfare. Its premises are drawn from an infinite variety of phenomena, supported by evidence of every degree of strength, and authorizing conclusions deserving every degree of assent, from perfect confidence to bare suspicion. And its expounder is enabled, and even required, not merely to state certain general facts, but to urge the adoption or rejection of actual measures or trains of action. “On the other hand, the subject treated by the Political Economist, using that term in the limited sense in which we apply it, is not happiness, but wealth; his premises consist of a very few general propositions, the result of observation or consciousness, and scarcely requiring proof or even formal statement, which almost every man, as soon as he hears them, admits as familiar to his thoughts, or at least as included in his previous knowledge; and his inferences are nearly as general, and, if he has reasoned correctly, as certain as his premises. Those which relate to the nature and the production of wealth are universally true; and though those which relate to the distribution of wealth are liable to be affected by the peculiar institutions of particular countries, in the cases, for instance, of slavery, legal monopolies, or poor laws, the natural state of things can be laid down as the general rule, and the anomalies produced by particular disturbing causes can be afterwards accounted for. But his conclusions, whatever be their generality and their truth, do not authorize him in adding a single syllable of advice. That privilege belongs to the writer or the statesman who has considered all the causes which may promote or impede the general welfare of those whom he addresses, not to the theorist who has considered only one, though among the most important, of those causes. The business of a Political Economist is neither to recommend nor to dissuade, but to state general principles which it is fatal to neglect, but neither advisable nor perhaps practicable to use as the sole, or even the principal, guides in the actual conduct of affairs. In the meantime, the duty of each individual writer is clear. Employed as he is upon a science in which error, or even ignorance, may be productive of such intense and such extensive mischief, he is bound, like a juryman, to give deliverance true according to the evidence, and to allow neither sympathy with indigence nor disgust at profusion or at avarice, neither reverence for existing institutions nor detestation of existing abuses—neither love of popularity nor of paradox, nor of system, to deter him from stating what he believes to be the facts, or from drawing from those facts what appear to him to be the legitimate conclusions. To decide in each case how far these conclusions are to be acted on belongs to the art of government, an art to which Political Economy is only one of many subservient sciences, which involves the consideration of motives, of which the desire for wealth is only one among many, and aims at objects to which the possession of wealth is only a subordinate means.”—Translator. |