Philippine ethnologists generally agree to the hypothesis that the Negritos, a race of little blacks, remnants of which now inhabit mountain regions of many of the larger islands, were the original inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago. They advance the hypothesis that these little blacks were driven by Malay immigrants from their former homes in the fertile plains to the mountains; and that these first Malay invaders were driven from the lowlands into the mountain regions by succeeding immigrations of Malays superior to them in organization and weapons.1 By and by, no one cares to hazard how long afterward, the Spaniards came. They christianized the lowlanders, except the Mohammedan populations of Mindanao and Sulu. But at the time of the American occupation the mountaineer descendants of the first immigration, for the most part, had not received the spiritual ministrations of Her Most Catholic Majesty’s missionaries, on account of the inaccessible character of their habitat. True, garrisons and missions had been established in a few localities among them; but owing to the scattered character of the population, the independent spirit of the people, their natural conservatism, and the lack of tact and consideration on the part of the Spanish officials and missionaries, practically no progress had been made in christianizing or civilizing them.

The great majority of the non-Mohammedan, non-Christian Malays inhabit the island of Luzon. The Luzon non-Christian tribes and their estimated numbers are: Apayaos, 16,000; Benguet Igorots, 25,000; Bontoc Igorots, 50,000; Wild Gaddanes, 4000; Ifugaos, 120,000; Ilongots, 6000; Kalingas, 60,000; Tingianes, 30,000; Lepanto Igorots, 35,000; total, nearly a quarter million. All these tribes inhabit the mountain ranges of the northern third of the island.

The habitat of the Ifugaos is situated in about the center of the area inhabited by the non-Christian tribes. In point of travel-time, as we say in the Philippines, for one equipped with the usual amount of baggage, Ifugao-land is about as far from Manila as New York from Constantinople. To the northeast are the Wild Gaddan, to the north the Bontoc Igorot, to the northwest, west, and southwest the Lepanto and Benguet Igorots; to the east, across the wide uninhabited river basin of the Cagayan, are the Ilongots. This geographic isolation has tended to keep the Ifugao culture relatively pure and uninfluenced by contact with the outside world. Two or three military posts were fitfully maintained in Ifugao by the Spaniards during the last half century of their sovereignty; but the lives of the natives were little affected thereby.

Ifugao men wear clouts and Ifugao women loin cloths, or short skirts, reaching from the waist to the knees. Wherever they go the men carry spears. Both sexes ornament their persons with gold ornaments, beads, agates, mother of pearl, brass ornaments, and so forth. Ifugao houses, while small, are substantially built, of excellent materials, and endure through many generations.

It may safely be said that the Ifugaos have constructed the most extensive and the most admirable terraces for rice culture to be found anywhere in the world. The Japanese terraces, which excite the admiration of tens of thousands of tourists every year, are not to be compared with them. On these steep mountains that rise from sea-level to heights of six to eight thousand feet—mountains as steep probably as any in the world—there have been carved out, with wooden spades and wooden crowbars, terraces that run like the crude but picturesque “stairsteps” of a race of giants, from the bases almost to the summits. Some of these terrace walls are fifty feet high. More than half are walled with stone. Water to flood these terraces is retained by a little rim of earth at the outer margin. The soil is turned in preparation for planting with a wooden spade. No mountain is too steep to be terraced, if it affords an unfailing supply of water for irrigation. The Ifugao, too, makes clearings on his mountains in which he plants sweet potatoes, and numerous less important vegetables. Without his knowing it, he bases his agriculture on scientific principles (to an extent that astounds the white man) and he tends his crops so skillfully and artistically that he probably has no peer as a mountain husbandman.

Of political organization the Ifugao has nothing—not even a suggestion. Notwithstanding, he has a well-developed system of laws. This absolute lack of political government has brought it about that the Ifugao is a consummate diplomat. After an eight years’ residence among them, I am convinced that the Ifugaos got along very well in the days before a foreign government was established among them. Through countless generations the Ifugao who has survived and prospered has been the one who has carried his point, indeed, but has carried it without involving himself in serious trouble with his fellows.

The Ifugao’s religion is a mixture of an exceedingly complex polytheism, ancestor worship, and a mythology that is used as an instrument of magic. His religion seems to be far more highly developed than that of the other non-Christian tribes.

Attempts made by Spain to colonize the Ifugao in the lowlands invariably met with failure. The Ifugao is a hillman, and loves his hills. He is of an independent nature and cannot stand confinement. A great many prisoners jailed by American officials have courted death rather than endure incarceration.

While there are well defined tribal divisions that mark off the various mountain-Malay populations of northern Luzon, the cultures of all of the tribes are basically similar. Numerous parallelisms, too, are found with the lowland Filipinos, even now, in features of daily life, religion, taboo, law, and marital relation. The dialects of all the tribes inhabiting the islands are branches of the great family of Malay languages—languages spoken over more than half the circumference of the globe. The linguistic differences that exist between the mountain and the lowland tribes seem to be not much greater than the linguistic differences between the various mountain tribes themselves.

Many things lead us to believe that the culture of the Ifugaos is very old. We have to do with a people who possess both as individuals and collectively a most remarkable memory. Ifugao rich men lend to considerable numbers of clients and others every year during the “hungry time”—to these, varying numbers of bundles of rice, to this one a skein of yarn, to that one a pig, and to another again a chicken. All these bargains and their amounts and their varying terms, our wealthy Ifugao remembers, unaided by any system of writing or other artificial means. Many Ifugaos know their ancestors back to the tenth or even the fourteenth generation, and, in addition, the brothers and sisters of these ancestors. If we consider the racial or tribal memory of these people, we find a mythology fully as voluminous as that of the Greeks. But the Ifugaos have no recollections of having ever migrated. Unless they have lived for many centuries in their present habitat, it seems certain that they would have retained at least in mythical form the memory of their migration.

Another consideration that is significant lies in a comparison of the rate of rice-field building in these peaceful times, when such work is not hindered but instead vigorously stimulated by the government, with the amount of such work accomplished by past generations. One who stands on some jutting spur of the mountain-side in Asin, Sapao, or Benaue can scarcely help being impressed with the feeling that he is looking upon a work of tens of centuries. Any calculation must be based on vague and hazardous figures of course, but, without having any theories to prove, and making due allowance for increased rate of building during peaceful times and for the pressure of the needs of increased population, from a comparison of the estimated area of voluntary rice-field building with the areas already constructed, I come to the conclusion that the Ifugaos must have lived in their present habitat for at least two thousand years, and I believe that these figures are too small.

The Ifugaos have no form of writing: there is, consequently, no written law. They have no form of political government: there is, therefore, no constitutional or statutory law. Inasmuch as they have no courts or judges, there is no law based on judicial decisions.

Ifugao law has two sources of origin: taboo (which is essentially religious) and custom. The customary law is the more important from the greater frequency of its application.

1. Relation of taboo to law.—The Ifugao word for taboo is paniyu. The root, which appears under the varying forms iyu, iho, iyao, and ihao, means in general “evil” or “bad.” The prefix pan denotes instrumentality or manner. The word paniyu means both by derivation and in use, “bad way of doing,” or “evil way.” By far the greater number of taboos have their origin in magic. A very large number of them concern the individual, or those closely related to him by blood ties, and for this reason have no place in a discussion of law. Thus a pregnant woman may not wear a string of beads, since the beads form a closed circle and so have a magic tendency to close her body and cause difficult childbirth. This, however, is not a matter that concerns anybody else, and so could be of no interest at law. It is taboo for brothers to defecate near each other, but only they are harmed thereby, and the matter is consequently not of legal interest.

The breaking of a taboo that concerns the person or possessions of an individual of another family is a crime. The following instances will illustrate:

If asked, Ifugaos say that it is taboo to steal; to burn or destroy the property of another; to insult, or ruin the good name of another; to cause the death or injury of another by sorcery or witchcraft; in short, to commit any of those acts which among most peoples constitute a crime.

The word taboo as understood among ourselves, and as most often used among the Ifugaos, denotes a thing rather arbitrarily forbidden. It seems likely that moral laws—from which most criminal laws are an outgrowth—originate thus: the social conscience, learning that some act is antisocial, prohibits it (often in conjunction with religion) or some feature of it, or some semblance of it, arbitrarily, harshly, and sometimes unreasonably. Thus the first taboo set forth above has the semblance of being aimed against interruption in the business or serious occupation of another, or against his worship. The mere passing near a rice field when it is being harvested or the mere entrance into a village during the period of ceremonial idleness are arbitrarily seized upon as acts constituting such interruptions. The second taboo arose from the purpose of the social consciousness to prevent marriage or sexual intercourse between near kin.3 It is most sweeping and unreasonable in its prohibitions. A third person may make no remark in the presence of kin of the opposite sex as to the fit of the girl’s clothing; as to her beauty; nor may he refer to her lover, nor play the lover’s harp. Many ordinary things must be called by other than their ordinary names. Even the aged priests who officiate at a birth feast must refer in their prayers to the foetus about to be born as “the friend” and to the placenta as “his blanket.” A great number of things are forbidden in the presence of kindred of opposite sex that would not shock even the most prudish of our own people. The third taboo seems to be aimed against the bandying or the taking in vain of the name of the dead.

It would seem that a primitive society, once it has decided a thing to be wrong, swings like a pendulum to the very opposite extreme, adds taboo upon taboo, and hedges with taboo most illogically. With the ardor of the neophyte, it goes to the other limit, becoming squeamish in the extreme of all that can in the remotest conception be connected with the forbidden thing.4

Ultimately reason and logic tend to triumph and eliminate the illogical, impertinent and immaterial taboos, remove the prohibitions contained in the useful taboos from their pedestal of magic, and set them upon a firmer base of intelligence, or at least practical empiricism.

A small part of Ifugao law consists even yet of taboos that are arbitrary and, except in essence, unreasonable. But the greater part has advanced far beyond this stage and is on a firm and reasonable basis of justice. Much of it originated from taboo—even yet the taboos are remembered and frequently applied to acts that constitute crimes among ourselves—but the immaterial and arbitrary taboos have been eliminated. Although the Ifugaos say that adultery and theft and arson are tabooed, nevertheless their attitude of mind is not the same as that toward things that are merely tabooed. It is the attitude of the human mind toward things that are prohibited by law and by conscience.

2. Scope of customary law.—The customary law embraces that which pertains to property, inheritance, water rights, and to a great extent, family law and procedure. There is a certain amount of variation in customs and taboos throughout Ifugao land. This accounts to a certain extent, perhaps, for the reserved behavior of visitors to a district distant from their own. Visitors are afraid of unwittingly breaking some taboo. In general, however, it may be said that laws are very nearly uniform throughout the Ifugao country.

3. Connection of law and religion.—Religion and law appear conjointly in (a) transferals of family property; (b) ordeals; (c) certain taboos; (d) payments of the larger fines; (e) peace-making. The Ifugaos state that a large part of their customary law and procedure was given them by Lidum, their great teacher, a deity of the Skyworld, and an uncle of their hero-ancestor, Balitok.

4. General principles of the Ifugao legal system.—Its personal character. Society does not punish injuries to itself except as the censure of public opinion is a punishment. This follows naturally from the fact that there is no organized society. It is only when an injury committed by a person or family falls on another person or family that the injury is punished formally.

Collective responsibility. Not only the individual who commits an act but his kin, in proportion to the nearness of their kinship, are responsible for the act. Their responsibility is slightly less than his. This applies not only to crimes but to debts and civil injuries.

Collective procedure. Legal procedure is by and between families; therefore a family should be “strong to demand and strong to resist demands.” A member of an Ifugao family assists in the punishment of offenders against any other member of his family, and resists the punishment of members of his family by other families. A number of circumstances affect the ardor with which he enters into procedures in which a relative is concerned and the extent to which he will go into them. Among these are: (a) the nearness or remoteness of his relationship to the relative concerned in the action; (b) relationship to the other principal in the action; (c) the loyalty to the family group of the relative principally concerned in the procedure and the extent to which this relative discharges his duty to it; (d) evidence in the case bearing on the correctness of the relative’s position in the controversy.

A corollary of the above principle. Since legal procedure is between families, and never between individuals, nor between a family and an individual, crimes of brother or sister against brother or sister go unpunished. The family of the two individuals is identical. A family cannot proceed against itself. But in the case of incest between a father and a daughter the father might be punished by the girl’s mother’s family on the ground that he had committed a crime against a member of that family. It is true that just as great an injury would have been committed against the family of the father, since the relationship of the daughter to that family is the same as to her mother’s family. But the father, the perpetrator of the crime, being a nearer relative of his own family than his daughter, his family certainly would not take active steps against him. Were the crime a less disgraceful one, the father’s kin would probably contest his penalty.

The family unity must at all hazards be preserved. Clemency is shown the remoter kin in order to secure their loyalty to the family group. A large unified family group is in the ideal position of being “strong to demand and strong to resist demands.” The family is the only thing of the nature of an organization that the Ifugao has, and he cherishes it accordingly.

Collective recipiency of punishment. Just as the family group is collectively responsible for the delinquencies of its members, but in less degree than the delinquent himself, so may punishment be meted out to individuals of the group other than the actual culprit, although naturally it is preferred to punish the actual culprit; and so may debts or indemnities be collected from them. But only those individuals that are of the nearest degree of kinship may be held responsible; cousins may not legally be punished if there be brothers or sisters.

Ifugao law is very personal in its character. For the different classes of society there are in the Mampolia-Kababuyan area five grades of fines in punishment of a given crime, four in the Hapao-Hunduan area, and three in the Kiangan area.

Might is right to a very great extent in the administration of justice. For a given crime, one family, on account of superior war footing, or superior diplomacy, or on account of being better bluffers, will be able to exact much more severe penalties than another. Especially is Ifugao administration of justice likely to be unfair when persons of different classes are parties to a controversy. I doubt very much, however, whether this characteristic of Ifugao administration of justice be more pronounced than it is in our own.

5. Stage of development of Ifugao law.—Reasons have already been given for believing the Ifugao’s culture to be very old. His legal system must also be old. Yet it is in the first stage of the development of law. It is, however, an example of a very well developed first-stage legal system. It ranks fairly with Hebrew law, or even with the Mohammedan law of a century ago. R. R. Cherry in his lectures on the Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Communities demonstrates these stages of legal development: First, a stage of simple retaliation—“an eve for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life.” Second, a stage in which vengeance may be bought off “either by the individual who has inflicted the injury or by his tribe.” Third, a stage in which the tribe or its chiefs or elders intervene to fix penalty-payments and to pronounce sentence of outlawry on those who refuse to pay proper fines. Fourth, a stage in which offenses come to be clearly recognized as crimes against the peace and welfare of the king or the state.

No Ifugao would dream of taking a payment for the deliberate or intentional murder of a kinsman. He would be universally condemned if he did so. However, he would usually accept a payment for an accidental taking of life. There is still, however, an element of doubt as to whether even in such a case payment would be accepted. For nearly all other offenses payments are accepted in extenuation. Ifugao law, then, may be said to be in the latter part of the first stage of legal development.