—The British reluctant to surrender the control of the Northwest—their tampering with the Indian tribes.

The seventh article of the definitive treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain in 1783, provided that "His Britannic Majesty," should, with all convenient speed, "withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States, and from every port, place and harbour within the same," but when demand was made upon General Frederick Haldimand, the British governor of Canada, for the important posts of Niagara, Oswego, Michillimacinac and Detroit, he refused to surrender them up, alleging that he had no explicit orders so to do, and that until he had received such commands, he conceived it to be his duty as a soldier to take no step in that direction. This action of Haldimand was cool and deliberate and received the full and entire approbation of the British cabinet. Tories, and apologists for Great Britain, have written much about a justification for this action, but there is no real justification. Lord Carmarthen, the British secretary of state, afterwards said to John Adams that English creditors had met with unlawful impediments in the collection of their debts, but the real reason why England violated her treaty he did not state. She retained the posts to control the tribes. She looked with covetous eye on the lucrative fur-trade of the northwest territory upon which the commerce of Canada was in great measure dependent, and sooner than resist the entreaties of her merchants and traders, she was willing to embroil a people of her own race and blood, in a series of long and merciless wars with murderous savages. For the fact remains, that if England had promptly surrendered up the posts; had not interfered with our negotiations for peace with the Indian tribes; had refused to encourage any confederacy, and had instructed her commanders to keep their spies and agents out of American territory, the murders on the Ohio, the slaughter of innocents, and the long, costly and bloody campaigns in the Indian country might have been avoided.

Nothing can ever extenuate the conduct of England in keeping in her employ and service such men as Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty. The chief rendezvous of the tribes after the revolution was at Detroit. Here were located a British garrison and a British Indian agency. This agency, while guarding the trade in peltries, also kept its eye on the fleets that descended the Ohio, on the growing settlements of Kentucky, and warned the Indians against American encroachment. In 1778, and while the revolution was in progress, the missionary John Heckewelder, noted the arrival at Goschochking on the Muskingum, of three renegades and fugitives from Pittsburg. They were McKee, Elliott and Girty. McKee and Elliott had both been traders among the Indians and understood their language. All three had deserted the American cause and were flying into the arms of the British. They told the Delawares and Wyandots, "That it was the determination of the American people to kill and destroy the whole Indian race, be they friends or foes, and possess themselves of their country; and that, at this time, while they were embodying themselves for the purpose, they were preparing fine sounding speeches to deceive them, that they might with more safety fall upon and murder them. That now was the time, and the only time, for all nations to rise, and turn out to a man against these intruders, and not even suffer them to cross the Ohio, but fall upon them where they should find them; which if not done without delay, their country would be lost to them forever." The same men were now inculcating the same doctrines at Detroit. They pointed out to the Indians that the Americans were bent on extinguishing all their council fires with the best blood of the nations; that despite all their fair promises and pretensions, the Americans cared nothing for the tribes, but only for their lands. That England by her treaty had not ceded a foot of the Indian territory to the United States. That all the treaties thus far concluded with the tribes by the Americans, were one-sided and unfair, made at the American forts, and at the cannon's mouth.

A powerful figure now arose among the savages of the north. Joseph Brant was a principal chief of the Mohawk tribe of the Six Nations of New York. His sister Molly was the acknowledged wife of the famous British Indian superintendent, Sir William Johnson. In his youth he had been sent by Johnson to Doctor Wheelock's charity school at Lebanon, Connecticut, where he learned to speak and write English and acquired some knowledge of history and literature. In the war of the revolution the Mohawks sided with England, and Brant was given a colonel's commission. He remained after the war a pensioner of the British government, and General Arthur St. Clair is authority for the statement that he received an annual stipend of four hundred pounds sterling.

The Mohawks had been terribly shattered and broken by the revolution, but they still retained that ascendency among the tribes that resulted from their former bravery and prowess. In the mind of Brant there now dawned the grand scheme of forming a confederacy of all the northwestern tribes to oppose the advance of the American settlements. The first arbitrary assumptions of the continental congress gave him a great leverage. They had assumed to exercise an unlimited power of disposal over the Indian lands. The surveyors of the government were advancing west of the Pennsylvania line and staking off the first ranges. Now was the opportune time to fan the flame of savage jealousy, and stand with united front against the foe.

It is probable that Brant took part in the grand council held at Coshocton in 1785, and reported to Captain John Doughty by Alexander McCormick. The account of McCormick relates that there "were present the chiefs of many nations," and that "the object of this council was to unite themselves against the white people." There was an excited activity on the part of McKee, Elliott, Caldwell and Girty and they were endeavoring to keep the tribes away from the American treaties. The newspapers of London in speaking of Brant's arrival in England in the latter part of the same year, gave accounts of his lately having presided over a "grand congress of confederate chiefs of the Indian nations in America," and said that Brant had been appointed to the chief command in the war which the Indians meditated against the United States.

In the month of December, 1785, the distinguished warrior arrived at the British capital. In an age of less duplicity his coming might have excited some feeling of compassion. He had journeyed three thousand miles across the seas, to see what the great English king could do to restore the broken fortunes of his people. The beautiful valley of the Mohawk was theirs no longer. Their ancient castles and villages had been destroyed, or were in the hands of strangers. All had been lost in the service of the great "father" across the waters. What would that "father" now do for his ruined and sorrowing children? He reminded Lord Sidney of the colonial department, that in every war of England with her enemies the Iroquois had fought on her side; that they were struck with astonishment at hearing that they had been entirely forgotten in the treaty of peace, and that they could not believe it possible that they could be so neglected by a nation whom they had served with so much zeal and fidelity. The Americans were surveying the lands north of the Ohio, and Brant now desired to know whether the tribes were still to be regarded as "His Majesty's faithful allies" and whether they were to have that support and countenance such as old and true friends might expect. In other words, the blunt savage wanted to know whether England would now support the Indian tribes in beginning hostilities against the United States.

The conduct of the British was characteristic. The lands in controversy had just been ceded by solemn treaty to the new republic. To openly espouse the cause of Brant was to declare war. A little finesse must be resorted to in order to evade the leading question, and at the same time hold the tribes. They therefore wined and dined the American chief, and presented him to the king and queen, but promised him nothing. Lord Sidney rained platitudes. He said the king was always ready to attend to the future welfare of the tribes, and upon every occasion wherein their happiness might be concerned he was ready to give further testimony of his royal favor. He hoped that they might remain united and that their measures might be conducted with temper and moderation. In the meantime, the arts of diplomacy must be employed. The barbarian chief must be bribed with a pension, and covertly used as a tool and instrument of British design.

The great chief then and afterwards entertained misgivings, but he proceeded to play the dupe. In November and December, 1786, he was back in America, and a great council of the northwestern tribes was convened at the Huron village, near the mouth of the Detroit river. Present were the Five Nations, the Hurons or Wyandots, the Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Potawatomi, Miamis, and some scattering bands of the Cherokees. A letter was here formulated and addressed to the congress of the United States, which at once marks Joseph Brant and the British agents back of him as the originators of the idea that all the Indian lands were held in common by all the tribes, and that no single tribe had the right to alienate. In answer to the treaties of Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh, they alleged that congress had hitherto managed everything in their own way, and had kindled council fires where they thought proper; that they had insisted on holding separate treaties with distinct tribes, and had entirely neglected the Indian plan of a general conference. They held it to be "indispensably necessary" that any cession of Indian lands should be made in the most public manner, "and by the united voice of the confederacy;" all partial treaties were void and of no effect. They urged a full meeting and treaty with all the tribes; warned the United States to keep their surveyors and other people from crossing the Ohio, and closed with these words: "Brothers: It shall not be our fault if the plans which we have suggested to you should not be carried into execution. In that case the event will be very precarious, and if farther ruptures ensue, we hope to be able to exculpate ourselves and shall most assuredly, with our united force, be obliged to defend those rights and privileges which have been transmitted to us by our ancestors; and if we should be thereby reduced to misfortune, the world will pity us when they think of the amicable proposals which we now make to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood. These are our thoughts and firm resolves, and we earnestly desire that you transmit to us, as soon as possible, your answer, be it what it may."

Brant's whole scheme of a confederacy among savage tribes was, of course, wild and chimerical. The same savage hate and jealousy which was now directed toward the Americans, would, at the first favorable moment, break out in fiery strifes and dissensions in the Indian camp, and consume any alliance that might be formed. To imagine that the Miami and the Cherokee, the Shawnee and the Delaware, the Iroquois and Wyandot, after centuries of war and bloodshed, could be suddenly brought together in any efficient league or combination, that would withstand the test of time, was vain and foolish. The history of the Indian tribes in America from the days of the Jesuit fathers down to the day of Brant, had shown first one tribe and then another in the ascendency. Never at any time had there been peace and concord. Even within the councils of the same tribe, contentions frequently arose between sachems and chiefs. It is well known that in his later days the Little Turtle was almost universally despised by the other Miami chieftains. A deadly hatred existed between the Cornplanter and Joseph Brant. Tecumseh and Winamac were enemies. Governor Arthur St. Clair, writing to the President of the United States, on May 2, 1789, reported that a jealousy subsisted between the tribes that attended the treaty at Fort Harmar; that they did not consider themselves as one people and that it would not be difficult, if circumstances required it, "to set them at deadly variance."Equally pretentious was Brant's claim of a common ownership of the Indian lands. The Iroquois themselves had never recognized any such doctrine. In October, 1768, at the English treaty of Fort Stanwix, they had sold to the British government by bargain and sale, a great strip of country south of the Ohio river, and had fixed the line of that stream as the boundary between themselves and the English. At that time they claimed to be the absolute owners of the lands ceded, to the exclusion of all other tribes. At the treaty of Fort Wayne, in 1809, between the United States and the northwestern tribes, the Miamis claimed the absolute fee in all the lands along the Wabash, and refused to cede any territory until a concession to that effect was made by William Henry Harrison. In the instructions of Congress, of date October 26th, 1787, to General Arthur St. Clair, relative to the negotiation of a treaty in the northern department, which were the same instructions governing the negotiations at Fort Harmar in January 1789, specific directions were given to defeat all confederations and combinations among the tribes, for congress clearly saw the British hand behind Brant's proposed league, and knew how futile it was to recognize any such savage alliance.

The British officials were well aware of the shortcomings of Brant's league, but they hailed its advent with delight. If the tribes could be collected together under the shadow of the British forts, and freely plied by the British agents, they could be kept hostile to the American vanguard. If the government of the United States could not acquire a foothold north of the Ohio, the British forts were safe, and the trade in peltries secure. The result of this policy was of course foreseen. It meant war between the United States and the Indian tribes. But in the meantime England would hold the fur-trade. Thus in cold blood and with deliberation did the British rulers pave the way to the coming hostilities.

In November, 1786, Sir Guy Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, arrived at Quebec. Like most of the royal officers of that day he looked with disdain upon the new republic of the United States. It was evident that the old confederation could not be held together much longer. There was constant strife and jealousy between the states. In Massachusetts Shays' rebellion was in progress, which seemed at times to threaten the existence of the commonwealth itself. The courts were occluded, and the administration of justice held in contempt. In the west, the people of Kentucky were embittered toward the states of the Atlantic seaboard. Their prosperity in great measure depended upon the open navigation of the Mississippi, and a free market at New Orleans. Spain had denied them both, and in the eyes of the Kentuckians congress seemed disposed to let Spain have her own way.

Under all these circumstances, which appeared to be so inauspicious for the American government, Dorchester determined to keep a most diligent eye on the situation. Spain had the nominal control, at least, of the lands west of the Mississippi. She had designs on the western territory of the United States, and was about to open up an intrigue with James Wilkinson and other treasonable conspirators in Kentucky, who had in mind a separation from the eastern states. To hold the posts within the American territory, was to be on the ground and ready to act, either in the event of a dissolution of the old confederation, or in case of an attempt on the part of Spain to seize any portion of the western country. Added to all this was the imperative necessity, as Dorchester looked at it, of maintaining a "game preserve" for the western tribes. If the Americans advanced, the Indian hunting grounds were endangered, and this would result in lessening the profits of the English merchants.

Brant was impatient, but Dorchester, like Lord Sidney, proceeded cautiously. On March 22, 1787, Sir John Johnson, the British Indian superintendent wrote to Brant, expressing his happiness that things had turned out prosperously in the Indian country, and saying that he hoped that the chief's measures might have the effect of preventing the Americans from encroaching on the Indian lands. "I hope," he writes, "in all your decisions you will conduct yourselves with prudence and moderation, having always an eye to the friendship that has so long subsisted between you and the King's subjects, upon whom you alone can and ought to depend. You have no reason to fear any breach of promise on the part of the King. Is he not every year giving you fresh proofs of his friendship? What greater could you expect than is now about to be performed, by giving an ample compensation for your losses, which is yet withheld from us, his subjects? Do not suffer bad men or evil advisors to lead you astray; everything that is reasonable and consistent with the friendship that ought to be preserved between us, will be done for you all. Do not suffer an idea to hold a place in your mind, that it will be for your interests to sit still and see the Americans attempt the posts. It is for your sakes chiefly, if not entirely that we hold them. If you become indifferent about them, they may perhaps be given up; what security would you then have? You would be left at the mercy of a people whose blood calls aloud for revenge." On May 29th of the same year, Major Matthews of the English army, who had been assigned to the command of the king's forces at Detroit, communicated with Brant from Fort Niagara, expressing the views of Dorchester as follows: "In the future his Lordship wishes them (the Indians) to act as is best for their interests; he cannot begin a war with the Americans, because some of their people encroach and make depredations upon parts of the Indian country; but they must see it is his Lordship's intention to defend the posts; and while these are preserved, the Indians must find great security therefrom, and consequently the Americans greater difficulty in taking possession of their lands; but should they once become masters of the posts, they will surround the Indians, and accomplish their purposes with little trouble. From a consideration of all which, it therefore remains with the Indians to decide what is most for their own interests, and to let his Lordship know their determination, that he may take measures accordingly; but, whatever their resolution is, it should be taken as by one and the same people, by which means they will be respected and become strong; but if they divide, and act one part against the other, they will become weak, and help to destroy each other. This, my dear Joseph, is the substance of what his Lordship desired me to tell you, and I request that you will give his sentiments that mature consideration which their justice, generosity, and desire to promote the welfare and happiness of the Indians, must appear to all the world to merit." Thus did this noble lord, while refraining from making an open and a manly declaration of war, secretly and clandestinely set on these savages; appealing on the one hand to their fear of American encroachment, and urging on the other the security the tribes must feel from the British retention of the frontier posts. In the meantime, he bided that moment, when the weakness of the states or their mutual dissensions would enable him to come out in the open and seize that territory which the king had lately lost. One is reminded of the remarks that Tecumseh made to Governor William Henry Harrison in 1810. "He said he knew the latter (i. e., the English) were always urging the Indians to war for their advantage, and not to benefit his countrymen; and here he clapped his hands, and imitated a person who halloos at a dog, to set him to fight with another."

Pursuant to the instructions of the continental congress heretofore referred to, Governor Arthur St. Clair, in the year 1788, opened up a correspondence with the tribes of the northwest in order to bring them to a treaty. The government, though suffering from a paucity of funds, had determined to enter into engagements looking to the fair and equitable purchase of the Indian lands. It was plainly to be seen that unless an accommodation could be arrived at with the tribes that the government either had to abandon the territory north of the Ohio, or levy war. This they were reluctant to do. The treasury was practically empty and the people poor. The country had practically no standing army, nor was there the means to raise one. In fact, the new constitution had not as yet been ratified by an adequate number of states, and the first president of the United States had not been elected. Again, something must be done, if possible, to relieve the sufferings of the western people. They were loudly complaining of the inattention and neglect of the government, and if they were left entirely without support in fighting their way to the Spanish markets at New Orleans, and in repelling the constant attacks of the Indian raiders urged on by British agents, grave doubts might justly be entertained of their continued loyalty. In fact, during the month of November, in this same year of 1788, the infamous Dr. John Connolly, arrived at Louisville. He came as a direct agent of Lord Dorchester, seeking to undermine the allegiance of the Kentuckians to their government, and offering them arms and ammunition with which to attack the Spaniards. This inglorious mission ended in Connolly's disgraceful and cowardly flight.

In their efforts to negotiate a fair compact, the United States had some reason to anticipate a friendly disposition on the part of the Delawares and Wyandots. Large numbers of the latter tribe had been won over to the principles of Christianity and were inclined towards peace, but the Miamis of the Wabash, the Shawnees and the Kickapoos were hostile. At Miamitown were the Little Turtle and Le Gris; close by, were the Shawnees under Blue Jacket; all were under the influence of the Girtys, George and Simon, and all had been engaged in the Indian raids. The Miami confederates at Eel River, Ouiatenon and Tippecanoe all looked to the head men at Miamitown for inspiration. Miamitown was in turn connected with the British agency at Detroit. The confederates of the Three Fires, the Ottawas or Tawas, the Chippewas and Potawatomi, otherwise known as the "Lake Tribes," were also under the influence of the British. On July 5th, 1788, General Arthur St. Clair, writing to the Secretary of War from Pittsburg, said that the western tribes, meaning those under the influence of the Miami chiefs, had been so successful in their depredations on the Ohio river, their settlements were so distant and "their country so difficult," that they imagined themselves to be perfectly safe, and that as they were able by these incursions "to gratify at once their passions of avarice and revenge, and their desire for spirituous liquors, every boat carrying more or less of that commodity, few of them may be expected to attend; nor are they much to be depended on should they attend generally." He further remarked: "Our settlements are extending themselves so fast on every quarter where they can be extended; our pretensions to the country they inhabit have been made known to them in so unequivocal a manner, and the consequences are so certain and so dreadful to them, that there is little probability of there ever being any cordiality between us. The idea of being ultimately obliged to abandon their country rankles in their minds, and our British neighbors, at the same time that they deny the cession of the country made by them, suffer them not to forget for a moment the claim that is founded upon it."

The first attempt of the government in 1788, to form a treaty ended in disaster. In order to mollify the tribes, it was proposed to hold the negotiations at the falls of the Muskingum river, in what the Indians were pleased to term "their own country" and "beyond the guns of any fort." General Josiah Harrnar was instructed to erect a council house there, and appropriate buildings in which to house the goods to be distributed among the Indians. On the night of July 12th, some Ottawas and Chippewas attacked the sentries and attempted to steal the goods they were guarding. Two soldiers were killed and two wounded. Friendly Delawares who arrived identified an Indian who was slain in the fight, as an Ottawa. It was learned that both the Chippewas and Ottawas were opposed to a treaty, "and in favor of war, unless the whites would agree to the Ohio as a boundary line." Who set on these wild tribes from the north may well be imagined. General St. Clair now determined to hold the treaty at Fort Harmar at the mouth of the Muskingum, and sent a message to the tribes now collecting on the Detroit river, to that effect.

The machinations of the British agents at Detroit in the summer and autumn of 1788, while involved in some degree of mystery, seem to have been about as follows: Lord Dorchester was apprehensive that the Americans contemplated the taking of the posts and thereby uprooting the British influence. In order to avoid such action, it might be the safer policy to make certain concessions and advise the Indians to give up a small portion of the territory north of the Ohio, rather than to bring on an armed conflict. But all the tribes must be kept together, if possible, and under the direction of the authorities at Detroit. No single tribe must be allowed to negotiate a separate treaty, for that might result in the cultivation of friendly relations with the United States, and if one tribe could be brought under the American influence, this might ultimately lead to the disintegration of the British power over all. Therefore it was resolved that before any negotiations were entered into with General St. Clair, that another grand council of the northwestern tribes should be held in the valley of the Miami of the Lake, or Maumee, and that to that council should be summoned the principal sachems and warriors of all the tribes. Alexander McKee, the British Indian agent, was to be there, and Joseph Brant, and all action taken was to be under their supervision and control.

On July 14th, General Richard Butler wrote to General St. Clair that about eighty chiefs were present at the Detroit river, awaiting the arrival of Brant. On August the 10th that chieftain reached Detroit, but instead of meeting with unanimity of counsel, he found that the Wyandots were for "a private and separate meeting with the Americans to settle matters for themselves," while the warlike Miamis were against any peace at all and in favor of open hostilities. After five weeks of waiting and cajolery, Brant got them all together in the Miami valley, and the council started to deliberate. The Hurons, Chippewas, Ottawas, Potawatomi and Delawares stood with Brant, and in favor of surrendering up a small portion of their country, rather than of entering headlong into a destructive war. The Potawatomi, Ottawas and Chippewas were far to the north and were probably indifferent; the Wyandots and Delawares were sincerely for peace. But insuperable objections were now offered by the Miamis, Kickapoos and the Shawnees. Horse stealing was their "best harvest," and the plundering of the boats they would not forego. In vain did the Wyandots urge a treaty. They presented the Miamis with a large string of wampum, but this was refused. They then laid it on the shoulder of a principal Miami chieftain, but he turned to one side and let it fall on the ground without making any answer. In the end the Wyandots withdrew and the council broke up in confusion. It was plain that if any agreement was entered into with the American government that it would not be through any concerted action on the part of the tribes. Tribal jealousy and savage hate rendered that impossible.

It has been related that when Brant perceived that his confederacy was a failure, and that he could not secure united action, that he said "that if five of the Six Nations had sold themselves to the devil, otherwise the Yankees, that he did not intend that the fierce Miamis, Shawnees and Kickapoos should do so." However this may be, it is evident that from the time of the breaking up of the Indian council on the Miami, that Brant and the British agents did all that lay within their power to frustrate the American negotiations with the Wyandots and Delawares at Fort Harmar. According to reports reaching the ears of General St. Clair, stories were placed in circulation among the tribes that in case they attended the treaty, that the Americans would kill them all, either by putting poison in the spirits, or by inoculating the blankets that would be presented to them, with the dreaded smallpox. Brant, after coming within sixty miles of the fort, turned back to Detroit, taking all the Mohawks with him, and urging back the oncoming tribes of the Shawnees and Miamis. "It is notorious," says President Washington, in a letter to governor Clinton, of New York on December 1st, 1790, "that he (Brant) used all the art and influence of which he was possessed to prevent any treaty being held; and that, except in a small degree, General St. Clair aimed at no more land by the treaty of Muskingum than had been ceded by the preceding treaties."

Thus did the British government, through its duly authorized agents, its governor and army officers, retain the posts belonging to the new republic, encourage the tribes in their depredations, and defeat the pacific intentions of the American people, and all from the sordid motives of gain. On April 30th, 1789, when George Washington was inaugurated as the first President, every savage chieftain along the Wabash, or dwelling at the forks of the Maumee, was engaged in active warfare against the people of the United States, largely through the instrumentality of the British officials.