In 1878 Bulgaria emerged from Turkish rule as a homogeneous, egalitarian peasant society centered in the family and the community. Through the introduction of foreign economic and social ideas and institutions, the society gradually changed during the period between the two world wars. At the time of World War II Bulgaria actually had two social systems: the traditional peasant society, changing but still focused on the family and the community, and a growing urban society that focused on the economy and the state. When the Communists took power in 1944, they set out to destroy the old social order and replace it with one that would reflect communist ideology. The resulting changes have been far reaching and basic. The traditional economic and value base has been destroyed by the elimination of private property. Social distinctions were introduced and magnified where none or few existed. Traditional institutions, such as the church and the family, were weakened; and new institutions, such as mass organizations, were introduced to take their place. Many segments of the population benefited materially from changes that opened new opportunities for education and social advancement; however, the price paid for these benefits was the loss of such important motivating forces as freedom of choice, independence of action, and the right to own income-producing property.

By the early 1970s the rate of change was slowing down, and the society was settling into a discernible pattern. Some aspects of the old social order seem to have survived, providing a continuity between the old and the new. The changes that continue to affect the society are more the result of economic growth than of social engineering.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

The Bulgarian population is homogeneous in both ethnic and religious composition. Approximately 85 percent is Bulgarian, and some 90 percent adheres at least nominally to the Eastern Orthodox faith. The most significant ethnic minorities are the Turks, who number about 700,000, or 8 percent of the population; the Gypsies, estimated at 200,000, or 2.5 percent of the population; and the Macedonians, who also number approximately 200,000. The remainder are Greeks, Romanians, Armenians, and Jews.

The Turkish minority, once considerably more substantial in size, dates back to the centuries of Turkish rule (see ch. 2). A steady emigration of Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey after World War I and the expulsion of some 150,000 in the 1950-51 period reduced their number. Most of the remaining Turks are tobacco growers or artisans, who live in rural areas in the eastern third of the country and along the Danube River. Their traditional peasant conservatism, bolstered by their Islamic faith, has made them less willing to adapt to the contemporary social order than the rest of the population. A majority would like to emigrate to Turkey, but the Bulgarian government has been unwilling to let them go because the country cannot afford such a population loss.

Turkey, for its part, could not absorb the Bulgarian Turks without seriously endangering its own economy and therefore has not encouraged their desires. By agreement between the two governments, about 30,000 close relatives of Turks who left Bulgaria in the 1950-51 period will be allowed to emigrate during the 1970s. The majority of Bulgarian Turks, however, have little hope of leaving in the foreseeable future. In spite of the desire of its members to leave the country, the Turkish minority has posed no serious problem to the Bulgarian government. The government has made an effort to integrate the minority into national life, at the same time preserving its cultural distinctions, which are guaranteed by the constitution.

Gypsies are not considered a national minority by the state, although they consider themselves such. Strongly attached to their nomadic way of life, the Gypsies have been reluctant to settle in a permanent place and to integrate themselves into the national society. They continue to follow their traditional occupations as musicians, tinsmiths, and horsemen.

The existence of a Macedonian minority has been disputed over many decades by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Bulgaria has consistently claimed that Macedonians are ethnically Bulgarians, that their language is a dialect of Bulgarian, and that their land is a part of Bulgaria. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has given legal recognition to a Macedonian nationality by establishing the People's Republic of Macedonia and by designating the Macedonian language one of the official languages of the federal republic (see ch. 2; ch. 10).

The vast majority of Bulgarians have been born into the Bulgarian Orthodox Church ever since the ninth century, when Boris I adopted Christianity for his people. Until World War II a person had no legal existence without a baptismal certificate from the church. In keeping with Eastern Orthodox tradition, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is an independent national church. It is inseparably linked with Bulgarian nationhood in the minds of most Bulgarians because of the role it played in preserving a national consciousness during the centuries of Turkish rule and in spearheading a national revival in the nineteenth century (see ch. 2).

A tradition of religious freedom and tolerance allowed religious minorities to exist without friction. Even during World War II the Jews in Bulgaria suffered little persecution in comparison with those in other parts of Eastern Europe. No census of religious affiliation has been taken since the Communists took power; however, according to various estimates in 1965 there were about 750,000 Muslims; 26,000 Protestants; 32,000 Roman Catholics; and between 3,000 and 7,000 Jews. The Muslim population included most Turks and some 50,000 Pomaks (Bulgarians who converted to Islam during Turkish rule) living in the rugged Rodopi mountain range.

Religious freedom is guaranteed by the constitution, but churches are subject to strict governmental control. Formal religious education is restricted to the training of priests. Children, however, continue to be instructed in the rudiments of faith and ritual by their families. Despite government efforts to secularize the milestones in the life cycle, a large percentage of Bulgarians continue to regard the priest as an essential officiant at baptisms, weddings, and funerals. Churchgoing and the strict fasts prescribed by the Eastern Orthodox church have not been carefully observed by most Bulgarians since the 1930s; nevertheless, the people often exhibit strong religious feelings tempered by traditional beliefs in the powers of nature, the evil eye, and other forces. A survey conducted by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in the mid-1960s classified 35.5 percent of those surveyed as religious and 64.4 percent as nonreligious. The criteria used to determine whether a person was religious or not was either a verbal expression of religious conviction or regular attendance at church services and regular prayer.

THE FAMILY

Until the time of World War I Bulgarian society was frequently characterized as familistic, that is, personal interests and prerogatives of an individual were subordinated to the values and demands of the family. The family was the focal unit in society; it was the chief training ground for the young and played the leading part in molding the individual into the accepted pattern. The family was the center of economic life also, particularly for the peasants, who lived relatively self-sufficient lives. Relations with other social units and institutions were carried out through the family rather than by the individual. An individual had no standing in society apart from that of his family, and individual behavior and prestige reflected on the family as a whole. Individualism, therefore, was discouraged by constant pressure from the family to conform to custom and tradition.

The traditional family was patriarchal and strongly authoritarian. It reflected many features characteristic of the zadruga, the extended family that formed the basis of social organization of the South Slavs, including the Bulgarians, until its gradual decline in the late nineteenth century. A zadruga consisted of the male offspring of the same parents and perhaps grandparents, with their wives and children, living together and jointly owning and working the ancestral lands. The group was ruled by the elected head, usually the oldest and most capable male, who was responsible for directing the work, for settling disputes, and generally for providing for the well-being of the zadruga as a whole and for each of its members.

By law and by custom, even after the passing of the zadruga as a social institution, authority over all matters concerning the family rested with the father. In the village married sons with their wives and children and unmarried children all tended to live under the father's roof until his death, at which time the oldest son took over the family homestead, and the others built their own houses nearby. The authority of the patriarch rested, in no small measure, on his ownership and control of the means of livelihood of the family. Sons submitted to their father's will in order to inherit their fair shares of the patrimony.

Close family relations were maintained not only with blood relatives but with relatives by marriage and with godparents. The bond between two families also related by marriage was as close, formally, as the bond with blood relatives; it included not only the parents of the married couple but also the brothers and sisters. For that reason parents took great interest in their children's choice of mates. Similarly, the bond between godparents and the family of the godchild was considered as close as that of blood kin. The strong relationship between the two families was developed partly because the same family usually provided the godparents for another family for generations. Reciprocity of godparenthood, however, was not allowed because a family tie was established with the first christening. Members of families who were related through godparenthood or through marriage could not marry because that would have been tantamount to incest.

Age and sex determined the individual's role within the family and his relations with other members. Men occupied a superior position, and women were expected to show deference to their husbands and to older male relatives. A frequently cited image of Bulgaria at that time was the man riding a horse or donkey empty-handed while his wife walked behind carrying a heavy load. The position and influence of the wife, however, was far greater than this image implies. Few husbands made decisions or took action affecting the family without prior consultation with their wives.

Age was respected because it represented the accumulation of wisdom and experience. This greater wisdom and experience also gave the older members of the family authority over the younger ones. Children were highly valued as tokens of successful marriages and as economic assets, but they were not fussed over. Although they were expected to take their places as active members of the family at a relatively early age by performing light household tasks, running errands, and tending animals, they were also given considerable freedom to play. Until they reached maturity, children were expected to do what they were told by their parents or by other adults without question.

This traditional family system provided for great stability. Each member knew his place in society and knew what was expected of him, and he generally felt secure and satisfied.

The gradual industrialization and urbanization that took place between the two world wars slowly introduced changes into the traditional family system—at first among the urban population and eventually among the peasantry. Most notable among the changes was the shift toward the nuclear family unit and the disappearance of the extended family household. This reduced the authority of the father over his adult children, who now formed an independent economic and social unit. It also gave greater freedom to young people in choosing their mates and, thereby, in their relations with each other. Within the nuclear family the relationship between husband and wife became a more egalitarian one. Relations between parents and children also became less authoritarian, although the father's relations to his children continued to be rather formal.

The changes in family life and in the role of the family in society that began to take place between the two world wars accelerated during World War II in keeping with the rapid rate of economic change. The greatest assault on the traditional system, however, came in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s when the new communist government set out to revamp Bulgarian society. The already dying patriarchal system was dealt its final blow with the elimination of inheritance through nationalization of industry and commerce and collectivization of agriculture. After the patrimony had been eliminated, a major incentive for submission to the patriarch had disappeared.

Another factor that contributed to the end of the patriarchal family and to the end of parental authoritarianism was the government's appeal to youth's desire for independence. Young people are taught to believe that they are the foundation of the new Bulgaria and that their elders' traditional ways are outmoded and should be discarded. In this way a generation gap has been created, and youths wanting to escape parental influence can count on the state for support. Their escape has been facilitated through the expansion of educational facilities, the expansion of employment opportunities resulting from economic and bureaucratic expansion, and by the many youth organizations and youth activities—all of which enable young people to spend much time away from home and act independently of their parents.

The role of women, which had begun to change in the 1930s, was greatly altered under the influence of ideology and of economic realities. In social doctrine and law, women are considered equal to men and are continually urged to demand their rights in the home and in the community. They have also gained considerable independence of movement through the expanded employment opportunities available to them in a developing economy. In 1968, 80 percent of employable women worked outside the home. A large percentage of them worked because of the necessity to supplement the family income rather than through choice; nevertheless, the fact that they do work outside the home has altered the pattern of family life and the relationships of family members. Working mothers must leave their young children in state-operated nurseries or with relatives and thereby relinquish much of their influence in molding the children into adults. Evidence indicates that few mothers like to leave young children in nurseries, preferring to leave them in the care of trusted relatives or friends. Fathers appear to be playing a greater role in the raising of children than they did in the traditional family.

Housekeeping is still considered to be entirely or predominantly the responsibility of women, whether they work or not. The working woman spends much time every day after work standing in line at food markets and other stores, buying the daily necessities. Household appliances and convenience foods are scarce luxuries; therefore, housekeeping is a time-consuming and tiring activity. Even peasant women must take care of their households and children after putting in the required hours in cooperative labor, whereas formerly they could fit their field work in and around their other responsibilities.

As a consequence of these changes, the traditional roles of family members have been altered. The dominance of the head of the family has given way to a greater distribution of decisionmaking and a greater independence on the part of other family members. As family members spend less time together, the emphasis in daily life is shifted from the family to the outside world. Persons come to be looked at more as individuals than as members of a certain family. Individuality and personal achievement become as important as family background in determining the status of an individual and his nuclear family. Similarly, individual action or personal status no longer reflects on the larger family.

In the eyes of the state, marriage is a secular matter governed by civil law. Religious ceremonies are permitted but must be preceded by a civil marriage. The minimum age for marriage without parental consent or special permission from the local authorities is eighteen for both men and women. The urban marriage rate in the 1960s was considerably higher than the rural one, reflecting the higher percentage of young people living in urban centers. Men generally marry between twenty and thirty years of age, and women, between fifteen and twenty-five. The law assigns equal rights and obligations to both partners in a marriage. Divorce is relatively easy to obtain and no longer carries the social stigma of former times; the divorce rate in the early 1970s was average for Eastern Europe.

Despite changing patterns of family life, most observers find that the cohesive force of the extended family continues to be a factor in contemporary society. In many cases the cohesiveness is perpetuated or even strengthened by modern phenomena, such as the chronic housing shortage and the need for grandparents or other relatives to care for the children of working mothers. The housing shortage has revived the traditional system of several generations of a family sharing the same roof. The pressures of change and the burdens of daily life hold families together, and the traditional sense of family loyalty also seems to survive. Members of such extended families assist each other in finding employment, in gaining admission to special schools, or in obtaining scarce items of food or clothing.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Before World War II Bulgaria had a basically egalitarian peasant society with a simple social structure. A rural-urban division was more significant than class distinctions, which were just beginning to emerge. The Bulgarian nobility of the Middle Ages had been destroyed under Turkish rule and was not restored with the return to monarchy; the small middle class of merchants, industrialists, bureaucrats, and professionals had come into existence since independence in 1878 and lacked tradition; an urban working class was just emerging. Few Bulgarians were more than one or two generations removed from their peasant ancestors, which gave most people a common background.

The rural-urban differentiation was socially significant in that it formed what amounted to two social systems with differing values, controls, and institutions. The rural society focused on the family and the community; its outlook was parochial. The urban society focused on commerce, industry, and government; its outlook was national and often international, and it was subject to continuous influences from abroad. The two systems, however, were closely interrelated because most urban dwellers had their roots in the village and because both the economy and the government depended heavily on the peasant as a supporter and as a client.

The narrower focus of rural society provided few opportunities for choice, and custom over the years set a pattern that was accepted as a matter of course. Social standing depended to a large extent on how well an individual performed within the established pattern, and the gradations were very slight. The wider focus of urban society, on the other hand, offered far greater opportunity for choice and freedom of action. This made for greater differentiation between individuals than was possible in the village.

The greater freedom and the opportunity for economic and social advancement offered by the urban society were most noticeable in the social contrast between the urban worker and his peasant relatives. Although most workers had a very low standard of living, they considered themselves emancipated from the restrictions of rural society and, therefore, better off. When they returned to the village to visit relatives, they were looked up to as persons who had enlarged their horizons and bettered their lot in life.

The social contrast between the educated urban intelligentsia—white-collar workers and professionals with a secondary or a higher education—and the peasant was even greater. Some members of the intelligentsia maintained a romanticized attachment to their village origins, but most of them tried to build up their own status by disparaging the rural population. Even the village schoolteacher and rural physician were seen as unsophisticated country bumpkins, although they had the same education as their city counterparts.

The urban intelligentsia saw itself and was seen by others as the top group in society, just below the royal family, which occupied the apex of the social pyramid. The top level of the intelligentsia, that is, the leaders in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, became a small entourage surrounding the king and thereby gained additional prestige and power. The economic position of most of the intelligentsia, however, was very precarious because there was an oversupply of graduates for whom government employment was virtually the only outlet. Those who had an official position held on to it against all odds. Others, who could not find employment appropriate to their presumed qualifications, sat around cafÉs waiting for openings rather than returning to their home villages to put their education to use there.

The peasant, for his part, was distrustful of the city and of city ways. He did not feel inferior—even to the intelligentsia whose education he greatly admired. The peasant took pride in his land, in his self-sufficiency, and in his adherence to custom and tradition. He was conscious of belonging to the large mass of peasantry that shared his point of view, his way of life, and his strong sense of tradition. Differences in wealth and economic independence were recognized among peasant families but did not affect their relationships, which were basically egalitarian.

The village, town, and city in pre-World War II Bulgaria each had its somewhat different social structure. Village structure distinguished between peasants, artisans, and intelligentsia. Innkeepers and storekeepers were sometimes identified with the artisans but more frequently with the peasants because they were usually peasants who had sold their land to engage in commerce. Artisans, on the other hand, underwent special training to prepare them for their calling. These special skills and the fact that artisans did not have to toil long hours in the sun or rain put them in a higher social category than peasants. The elite group was the village intelligentsia—the teacher, doctor, priest, mayor, and other officials who had more than an elementary education. Their prestige derived from their education, and their power derived from their positions. Through their ties to the wider world, the village intelligentsia bridged the gap between rural and urban societies.

The social structure of towns distinguished between artisans, merchants, and intelligentsia. In the preindustrial Bulgaria of the 1930s, the artisans and peasants together formed the backbone of the economy. The guild system of progression from apprentice to masterworkman still prevailed and fostered social distinctions among the artisan group. Merchants occupied a higher rung on the social ladder than did artisans, primarily because they did no manual work to earn a living. The distinction, however, was not great, and members of the two groups generally associated with each other. The elite group in town, as in the village, was the intelligentsia. Because towns were usually government administrative centers and, often, garrison posts, the intelligentsia was often quite numerous. It included all the white-collar workers, professionals, and army officers. The town intelligentsia was a self-contained group whose members mostly associated only with each other. Within the group, however, distinction was made on the basis of education and rank in the government hierarchy.

The city social structure resembled that of the towns but had additional strata reflecting the wider range of economic activity found in the city. The most economically and socially disadvantaged were the workers, including industrial and domestic workers. Just above them were petty government employees, such as janitors, messengers, and railroad men, whose standard of living was extremely low but who could look forward to a secure old age with a government pension and who took pride in being civil servants. Above these lowest groups were the artisans, shopkeepers and merchants, and the intelligentsia, as in the social structure of towns. A few industrialists ranked among the highest because of their economic power, but even they paid respect to university professors for their intellect and to higher government officials for the status and power connected with their offices.

When the Communists took power in 1944 they set out to destroy the old social system and replace it with one based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. The period of so-called socialist reconstruction that followed resulted in a general leveling of social strata through the demotion of formerly privileged groups and the promotion of formerly underprivileged groups. Persons of peasant or worker origin received preferential treatment in the allocation of housing and of other necessities of life that were in short supply, in the appointment to jobs, and in access to higher education. At the same time persons of middle-class or upper class background were deprived of their housing, removed from key jobs, and denied educational opportunities for their children through a discriminatory quota system at secondary and higher schools. A policy of equalization of incomes made little distinction between different levels of education or skill, thus eliminating material rewards as a basis for social stratification. The small political and economic elite that had developed from the peasant society before 1944 was decimated and replaced by a group of party stalwarts, most of them from lower class or middle-class background, who rose rapidly to the top positions of administrative and political power and became the new ruling elite. Membership in the Bulgarian Communist Party and complete loyalty to the leadership were the main criteria for occupying any position of responsibility.

The peasants appreciated some of the material benefits granted by the new government, such as educational opportunities for their children and expanded industrial employment that offered new outlets for underemployed rural youth. As a whole, however, the peasantry bitterly resented being grouped with workers in the ideological frame of reference of the new leaders. To the peasant, landless workers who lacked tradition and security occupied a lower social position than he, and he saw this grouping together as a debasement of his own status. The blow to his pride and to his traditional position in society was complete when collectivization deprived him of his precious land. Were it not for the private farm plot, which allows the peasant to continue on a very small scale his cherished way of life and thereby perpetuate his values, the cooperative peasant would be little more than an agricultural worker.

In the restructured Bulgarian society the peasantry, encompassing roughly 30 percent of the population, forms the bottom of the social pyramid. Although it derives some benefits from the educational, health, and welfare services instituted by the government, the peasantry is the forgotten and most disadvantaged segment of the population. Peasants continue to work hard and long for very meager rewards, and they no longer have the pride and satisfaction of owning their own land and of being independent.

The next social stratum, the industrial working class, has been the object of much glorification by the regime and has benefited most by the social measures passed since 1944. In terms of their standard of living and their social status, workers occupy the lowest level of urban society; however, the educational benefits available to them and the growing job market offer prospects for betterment and advancement. The group has grown more rapidly than any other social class as a result of the crash industrialization program and constitute between 40 and 50 percent of the population, as compared to about 29 percent in the mid-1950s. Most members of the working class are peasants who have left the village to find a better life in the growing cities and towns. Some workers are members of the former middle or upper classes who have been demoted by the new social order. Many members of the small prewar working class were propelled upward out of the working class into managerial and administrative positions of industry.

Within the working class differentiation is made according to education and skill, which is reflected in income and prestige. Skilled workers are still in relatively short supply; therefore, they command considerably higher wages and are likely to receive special housing and other privileges and inducements from employers. The higher standard of living that these material advantages can provide and the higher level of education required to be skilled workers enhance their prestige in relation to the semiskilled and unskilled workers. Workers in certain industries, such as mining and heavy industry, are favored regardless of their level of skill. They benefit from the special status assigned to these industries in the overall economic plan.

The middle level of contemporary society encompasses all persons in nonmanual occupations who are not members of the ruling elite. It includes administrators, managers, professionals, technicians, and all categories of white-collar personnel. Next to the working class, this has been the fastest growing social group. As a result, most of its members are relatively young, and their social origins represent the entire spectrum of precommunist society. Within the middle class further differentiation is made in terms of income and prestige between persons in the upper levels of management and the professions, who have a higher education and those in the lower levels of technical and white-collar employment, who have only a secondary education. The group as a whole probably constitutes almost 20 percent of the population. The relative size of the upper and lower levels was not known, although the lower level was probably larger.

At the top of the social pyramid is the small ruling elite composed of the top leadership of the party, government, security forces, mass organizations, and the various branches of the economy. The ruling elite also includes members of the cultural and intellectual elite who, by virtue of their political loyalty and willingness to serve the regime, share in the privileges usually reserved to the top leadership. By lending their talents to the party cause, however, these individuals often lose some of the prestige and deference traditionally enjoyed by the intellectual elite. The main criterion for membership in the ruling elite is power derived from approved ideological orientation and political manipulation. Most members come from peasant or worker families and are veterans of the communist movement of the interwar period. Membership in the ruling elite is accompanied by considerable insecurity because it is highly dependent on political loyalty and correct interpretation of ideology. A change in official policy can deprive a member of his status and of all his privileges.

Since the end of World War II, Bulgarian society has been extremely mobile. Industrialization and socialization of the economy have created thousands of new blue- and white-collar jobs. The attendant increase in educational opportunities has made it possible for individuals to gain the skill and background required to fill these jobs and, thereby, move up the social ladder. This mobility has been aided by the government's determined effort to reshuffle society by improving the social status and opportunities of the formerly underprivileged groups and by denying them to the formerly privileged ones. Because education has traditionally been the main determinant of status, social mobility has been directed by the state through strict control over educational opportunities. Preference in admission to higher education has been given to children of peasants and workers, children of long-standing party members and children of persons killed in the resistance against the Germans in World War II (see ch. 6). The political orientation of the student himself and his membership in mass organizations such as the youth union are also important factors in determining his admission to an institution of higher learning.

In the late 1960s there was some evidence that social mobility was slowing down and that the society was beginning to stabilize into self-perpetuating social groups. With the slowing of economic growth the number of job openings in the higher levels has been reduced, and the intelligentsia can satisfy from its own ranks most of the demand for professional and managerial personnel. The social mix of students in higher education in the late 1960s was far from representative of the population as a whole—only about 39 percent of the students were from peasant or worker families, although these groups constituted about 78 percent of the population. In spite of all their admission advantages, children of lower income families have not been able to compete effectively with those of higher income background. Given education as a main channel of mobility, disadvantage in educational opportunities means lower possibility for social advancement. Political loyalty, however, can still override all other considerations and propel a person up the social ladder. Membership in the party, therefore, continues to afford considerable advantage.

OTHER SOCIAL GROUPS

Bulgarians are not by nature joiners. Formal organizations were of little significance in national life before the 1940s. Although a wide variety of groups existed, mostly in the towns and cities, membership was generally small and was based on strictly utilitarian considerations. Individuals joined to derive the benefits provided by the organization, such as easy credit, professional standing, use of libraries and other cultural facilities, or use of sports facilities. Few members were actively involved in the operation or the activities of the organizations to which they belonged.

Banding together for a common purpose, however, was far from alien to Bulgarian culture; but social organizations and informal groupings that emerged from such banding together usually were based on kinship or on close personal ties. The most important formal traditional organization was the zadruga (see The Family, this ch.). In a less formal vein, wool-cording and spinning bees were important features of rural social life before collectivization. In fact, many agricultural activities, such as hoeing and harvesting, were undertaken by groups of friends and relatives who joined together to take turns working on each other's land. This joining together for the accomplishment of necessary tasks served an important social, as well as economic, function. While working together in such groups, individuals exchanged ideas, passed on information and, thereby, either reinforced each other's traditional values and mores or helped develop new ones.

The cooperative farm of contemporary Bulgaria tries to derive the same economic advantages from cooperation as did the traditional work groups. The traditional groups, however, were based on a voluntary joining together of friends and relatives, whereas the grouping on the cooperative farm is forced and impersonal. The spirit of reciprocity, which was so important in the former work groups, has also been lost on the cooperative farm, where the peasant works land that, in his eyes, does not belong to him but to an impersonal entity.

In keeping with communist practice, the government and the Bulgarian Communist Party have introduced a network of mass organizations designed to serve specific interest groups. Most prominent among them are the trade unions, the youth organizations, the women's organizations, and other member organizations of the Fatherland Front (see ch. 9). Some, such as sports clubs, discussion groups, and cultural clubs of various kinds, are organized on community or enterprise bases. Intended to cater to specific interests of individuals, these groups attempt to attract a large percentage of the population into formal organizations that can be used to promote desired norms and values or undertake specific activities. Major emphasis is placed on collectivism, that is, working together as a group rather than as individuals. Structurally, the organizations are usually divided into small groups that are intended to act as focal social units. These units engage the attention and loyalty of an individual and then act on his behalf in relation to other social units or larger institutions, much as the family did in traditional Bulgarian society. The political purpose of the mass organizations, however, makes them unattractive to most Bulgarians who have never had much interest in organizational activities. As a result, membership in most has been far below desired levels. As was the case with earlier organizations, Bulgarians join them in order to derive the benefits that they afford. Membership in a youth organization or in a trade union, for instance, is often required to gain admission to a school or to obtain a job.