Two special orders were issued by Lord Chelmsford's command in regard to this most melancholy affair. The first, dated Pietermaritzburg, June 5, was signed by General Clifford:—"The Inspector-General of Lines of Communication and Base has received from his Excellency the Lieut.-General Commanding official confirmation of the calamity which has befallen the forces under his command, by the death, on duty in the field, of the late gallant young soldier, the Prince Imperial Louis Napoleon, who, having, in his military training, been lately associated with the British Army, came out to this country to take part in the Zulu campaign. The General feels that he is carrying out the wishes of his Excellency the Lieut.-General Commanding now in Zululand, by thus recording the feelings of deep sorrow and sympathy, experienced by every officer and man whose duty keeps him at his post in the colony with the loss thus sustained."

The second order was issued by Major Butler to the troops at Durban, and expressed the feeling and sympathy of all the columns:—"In following the coffin which holds the body of the late Prince Imperial of France, and paying to his ashes the final tribute of sorrow and honour, the troops of the garrison will remember that he was the last inheritor of a mighty name and great military renown; secondly, that he was the son of England's firm allies in dangerous days; and, thirdly, that he was the sole child of a widowed Empress, now left throneless and childless in exile upon English shores, deepening the profound sorrow and solemn reverence to those memories. The troops will also remember that the Prince Imperial of France fell fighting as a British soldier."

On the 28th of May the second column or division quitted the camp at Landsman's Drift, and proceeded to Kopje Allein, which is near the Blood river, being about a mile to the north-east of it, at a point as near as possible to the junction of that stream with the Buffalo. The position of the camp there was all that could be desired, and the character of the country was much more favourable than most of the previously selected camps, inasmuch as no enemy could approach without being seen for several miles. At Kopje Allein there was a further concentration, and several reinforcements were received, the consequence being that the whole force amounted to 2500 British infantry, 1100 British cavalry, 300 Artillery, 100 Engineers, 66 Colonial Horse, 1300 Native Infantry, and in all, with Military Train and Hospital Staff, making 5700 men. It was found impossible, for sanitary reasons, to form one undivided column, and much as General Newdigate objected to straggling, the exigencies of war compelled him to send his forces off in detachments. The King's Dragoon Guards marched on Monday, the 26th, and these were followed by Harness's Battery and a large convoy of stores on the following day, Tuesday, the 27th. On the Wednesday the headquarter staff took the road, accompanied by the 17th Lancers, Le Grice's Field Battery, the field-hospital, and the 24th Regiment. They took with them fifteen days' supplies, and to accomplish this General Newdigate wisely cut everything down to the lowest possible limit, sixteen men being allotted to each tent, and one tent only to six officers. Tents were really superfluous; for the climate is simply magnificent, and no man out on a shooting expedition would dream of carrying about with him such extra luxury as a bell-tent. Of course the climate of this portion of Zululand being semi-tropical, the usual precautions to be used in tropical lands must be used here. The climate and diseases which prevail along the line, from the Tugela, by which Crealock was advancing, are thus alluded to by Dr. Jones, district surgeon, one of the most experienced authorities upon the subject. He says that at a distance of fifteen miles from the sea the fever is not more prevalent than in the interior; that the high ground is comparatively safe in his district, and that the type of fever is mild, the attack lasting usually from five to twenty days. It begins about February, and is always at its worst in March, continuing more or less till the end of May, and appearing to be more or less influenced by the current of the north-east wind, which would, of course, carry the miasma of the St. Lucia swamps in this direction. Dr. Dalzell, an equally good authority as Dr. Jones, says that the high lands here are remarkably healthy. The same holds good of the tract known as Oham's country, situated in the valley of the Black Umvolosi river. It is evident that the fever of this country has been greatly exaggerated, and that it is merely intensified in localities which are within reach of the poisonous malaria borne upon the wind. General Newdigate and General Crealock both gave orders, that when the troops had to bivouac, they were never on any account to pass the night either on a very low or on a very wet situation, on account of fever, or on the hill-tops, on account of thunderstorms. The position of the Zulu kraals should invariably be noted, and a lesson taken from them in regard to choice of camp; while the neighbourhood of a river that has been lately flooded should, if possible, be always avoided. It is possible that a white man settling here for good would sooner or later be attacked by fever, but white men do not settle here, while a rapid march through the country appears to injure no one. Dysentery and rheumatism troubled the troops but little, and cases of sunstroke were rare. Sickness had prevailed certainly to a considerable extent in some corps; but it was, as a rule, confined to the young soldiers, unseasoned and of weak physique, who had been lately sent out from England. The cause of our failures—and there were several of a palpable nature—are not to be found in want of generalship, want of organization, or want of transport. They were due undoubtedly to the sending out of raw, sickly, unseasoned, and untutored boys, who, being the sweepings of half the regiments in her Majesty's service, could not possibly have any feeling of communion, or traditional sympathy, with the corps into which, before a formidable enemy, they found themselves pitchforked. Most of the battalions out there had to draw their reinforcements not from its reserve battalion or depÔt at home, as was the case in former years, but from the army at large, and some battalions arrived on the shores of Africa so drenched and diluted with outsiders, that they had the appearance of a mongrel pack, unused to discipline and useless in the field. That the destruction of the regimental system by Lord Cardwell has been the original cause of several of our reverses, surprises, and humiliations, there can be little hesitation in saying. The men at Isandhlwana were not well handled, it must be admitted; but it has since leaked out that many of them would not rally round their officers, but attempted safety in flight. Dozens of the men, sergeants and other non-commissioned officers, have since declared they did not even know the names of their company officers, or those of their right or left-hand man.

Another instance of the evil effects of Lord Cardwell's system may be given. The 91st recruits in past days were the envy of all recruiting-sergeants, and so particular was the colonel, backed up by the surgeon of the corps, that a young fellow must have had chest, constitution, and stamina—qualities unfortunately not now insisted upon—before he could pass the sacred portals of the 91st barrack. Few regiments, however, have suffered from the present system more than, or so much as, this corps. On receiving its orders for Zululand, it could not muster 200 men, so denuded was the regiment of rank and file by the drafts it had previously given. The consequence was that to make up the 900 men which was supposed to be its fighting strength, volunteers and drafts had to be obtained from half the regiments at home, and the facings of the 91st on parade, until the master tailor had put matters a little straight, represented almost all the colours of the rainbow, while the men, drawn from all parts, neither knew one another nor the officers set over them.

Rumours of negotiations for peace, and the granting of an armistice, which were being circulated about this time, arose from the following facts:—In the middle of May Zulu messengers, of some position, but not of the highest rank, had presented themselves to General Crealock, with a desire to know what terms would be granted to Cetywayo in case of his wishing to come to terms of peace. The General, finding they had no authority or commission from the king, sent them away, but believing from their statements that they were sincere, and knowing at the same time that Setewango, one of the king's most influential indunas, and Samapo and Panato, the indunas who commanded against Pearson at Ekowe, were in the neighbourhood of Ginghilovo, let Setewango know that he would not object to see him. Setewango admitted that he had no commission or authority direct from the king, but added, at the same time, that many of the chiefs were sick of fighting, as they considered the English too strong. General Crealock then said he had no power to treat, but that Lord Chelmsford had, and if Cetywayo were first seen by Setewango something might be arranged. After this Setewango went to Ulundi, and after great difficulty he and the indunas persuaded the king to allow them to visit Lord Chelmsford, at whose camp they arrived early in June, having first presented themselves to General Wood. Lord Chelmsford saw these men three times, when they were distinctly told that before any negotiations could be entered into, as an evidence of the King's sincerity the whole of the spoil taken at Isandhlwana, especially the two captured 7-pounders, must be restored. With these guns were to be sent accredited ambassadors and hostages of the highest rank. These Zulu messengers seemed much awed and impressed with the appearance of the camp, and particularly with Marshall's cavalry, and they left on the 6th instant. They had not long departed when much of their story was corroborated by Tongabena and Lampunda, two well-known friendly Zulu spies, who had just arrived from Ulundi, where they assured us there were few warriors, the men having declined to assemble. Dabulamanzi, whose death has been so often reported, was still there, and a large number of women, children, stores, and cattle. Umbelini was really dead, having been three times severely wounded, and was hit mortally in the back through the blade-bone as he was escaping on horseback.

On June 5th, Marshall had a very exciting little brush with the Zulus not far from Wood's camp on the Nondonini river. In this affair poor young Frith, a capital soldier, a good adjutant, and a general favourite, was unfortunately killed. He was sitting on his horse receiving an order from Colonel Drury-Lowe, when a Martini-Henry bullet struck him, probably to the heart, as he never spoke. The patrol was brought about by information brought into Wood's camp by the ubiquitous and indefatigable Buller, who had been out on the previous day and discovered the whereabouts of a large Zulu force. The gallant 17th and the smart King's Dragoon Guards were delighted to see themselves in orders on the afternoon of the 4th, that they were to parade at four a.m. under General Marshall, who was also to take with him Shepstone's Basutos and Bettington's cavalry. It was not yet sunrise when they arrived at Wood's camp on the Nondonini, and then found that Buller, anxious to draw first blood, had already started in the night to scour the country and report what he could discover of the enemy. After partaking of some excellent coffee, a little beltong, and some well-made and well-baked bread done in Wood's field-ovens, they were again in the saddle, taking a course towards the south-east, till the summit of a wild ridge overlooking a deep kloof was reached. In the plain below was a pretty little river, and near its bank a number of Kaffir huts all blazing, having been fired early by Buller and his men, who could be seen slowly retiring before a number of Zulus, who were keeping up a hot fire upon them, as well as from both sides of the valley. The order was given to advance, and Buller soon came on to meet them, making his report that he had been attacked by these Zulus as soon as he attempted to fire the kraal. Frith was the only casualty, and the order was then given by General Marshall to retire firing by alternate squadrons. As the Zulus were posted in clefts and caves of the ridges on either side, it was impossible to get at them, and so the troops were brought steadily off without further loss.

Lord Chelmsford had intended having a large depÔt formed on a portion of the Ibabanango range; but owing to one of the principal staff officers losing not only his own way, but his head, his lordship was compelled to change the venue, and form the principal depÔt upon the Upoko river, not far from the spot where the Prince met his fate. This was called Fort Newdigate, and was held by four companies of infantry, and a detachment or two of cavalry to keep up communication with a still more advanced depÔt afterwards formed at Umsenguini, near the source of the Upoko, where the main road from Utrecht and the Transvaal forms a junction with that leading through Rorke's Drift and Isandhlwana.

How arduous were the duties of the cavalry in convoying large trains of supplies from the bases to the front through the enemy's country may be surmised, when it is borne in mind that Lord Chelmsford had to feed 7000 whites, 2000 natives, 350 English draught-horses, 850 saddle-horses, 2000 colonial horses and mules, and 10,634 oxen. From these figures also may be formed an estimate of the work thrown upon the Commissariat.

In previous wars out in South Africa blame has been, and not unjustly, thrown upon the Commissariat for the manner in which stores have been wasted and frittered away while the troops have been without rations. But in this war it would be impossible to cite any such instance of want of management, as the troops were invariably well fed and cared for. Want of success, therefore, could in no case be attributed to want of supply. Great praise is due to Commissary-General Strickland for the excellent manner in which all his plans were laid and executed. Another instance of good work may be given. On the 4th instant Lord Chelmsford had occasion to send a sudden order to Commissary-General Brownrigg for the immediate furnishing and delivery of rations equal to six weeks' supply for 9000 Europeans, 2500 natives, 1200 English horses, and 3000 cattle, and all these were sent in by the 10th.

On June 10th Sir Evelyn Wood's column received a valuable addition to its force; viz. 450 men of the 80th Regiment, all old and seasoned campaigners in South Africa, together with four splendid Gatling guns. On the same day a report was made that Zulus had been seen near the Inyezani, and on the following morning a patrol was sent out, consisting of twenty Mounted Infantry, thirty Mounted Basutos, and fifty Light Horse, under the command of Captain Brown, who had with him Lord William Beresford, and Captains Cochrane, D'Arcy, and Berry. A reconnaissance for fully twenty miles from the camp was made, and the patrol returned about six the same evening, having made several sketches and surveys of the country, but without seeing any Zulus.

Meanwhile grumblers and incompetent critics had kept so incessantly bringing all sorts of reckless charges against Lord Chelmsford, of incapacity as a soldier, that the home government thought it wise to give way, and accordingly, to please the vulgus profanum, recalled Sir Garnet Wolseley from Cyprus, and appointed him Governor of South Africa, High Commissioner in Natal and the Transvaal, and Commander-in-chief of her Majesty's forces in Africa, thus superseding Lord Chelmsford. This news reached the troops actively employed against the Zulus about the middle of June, and was received with considerable dissatisfaction by both officers and men. It seemed to them unfair that their General should be superseded just as a final advance was being made, and just as he was about to reap the fruits of all his anxiety and labour. He had at that time on the way to Ulundi a perfectly-equipped force of 9364 Imperial Infantry, 3957 Colonial Infantry, 1190 Imperial Cavalry, 1877 Colonial Cavalry, 775 Artillery, with a proportionate number of guns (36), and 385 Royal Engineers. Generals Crealock and Newdigate had received full instructions with regard to the concentration and movement of this force, and all the organization had been planned and carried out under the personal supervision of Lord Chelmsford, who had worked night and day to get matters to a state of efficiency. It seemed, therefore, rather hard and disheartening that the new General, who had had none of the anxiety or the toil, should appear as the Deus ex machina upon the scene, and reap all the credit and glory of the campaign.

A great deal of rubbish was talked about the inhumanity of burning down kraals, and accusations of shooting down women and children were not unfrequently brought against the troops. Now most people in England do not know that there are three distinct species of kraals. The king's or royal kraals, the military kraals—i.e., the respective barracks or official homes of the different corps—and, finally, the tribal and domestic kraal, a sort of village of cabins, built together for convenience and safety. Now, Lord Chelmsford and all his lieutenants were too good soldiers to allow England's honour to be disgraced by wanton cruelty or barbarous conduct even in fighting a barbarous enemy. Military kraals, being the fortified depÔts of the king's troops, their mustering rendezvous and rallying-points, were attacked and destroyed without compunction, as they represented the arsenals and strongholds of the enemy. The king's royal kraals, on the other hand, were the places where Cetywayo got together cattle, mealies, and other commissariat supplies, wherewith to tempt or reward his warriors. These were destroyed as a matter of course, as one would capture a convoy or destroy a hostile magazine.

It has been stated on apparently good authority that the destruction of a royal or military kraal was considered by the Zulus as scarcely any loss, and that the rebuilding of such was a matter of the greatest ease. This is a totally erroneous view, as all the kraals belonging to Cetywayo and his great chiefs which had been destroyed were most formidable as regards defence, and must have taken great time and trouble to construct. All these kraals of the kings, princes, and principal chiefs are protected with high wooden stockades, pierced here and there with low entrances, large enough to admit only one person at a time. The isigodhlo, or inner enclosure, where the chief huts are situated, is guarded by zigzags of the same description of stockade work very strongly put together. There are altogether about forty military villages or kraals scattered through the country, of from 400 to 3000 huts each, in which for a portion of the year the troops are quartered, averaging 2000 men in each. There are, however, other military kraals not fortified, and used only as barracks. These consist of a dry stake and wattle fence, generally oval in form and about five feet high. Inside this fence are the huts of the men in single, double, or treble rows, according to the size of the kraal, while inside the huts is another fence similar to the one outside, and the central space is invariably the cattle-pen. The king's kraal at Ulundi (afterwards destroyed) was 800 yards in diameter, and had a normal garrison of 5000 men. The Umhlabatini plains, upon which it was situated, are fifteen by twenty miles in extent, and completely shut in by hills studded with thick bush. The White Umvolosi runs through this plain, in which were also established the other kraals forming the headquarters of regiments. These, too, were subsequently destroyed. Here in these kraals the principal regiments were wont to assemble annually at the great national military festival held in honour of the king, which is now a tradition of the past. Some years ago, when Cetywayo was full of ambition in regard to his military power, and anxious in every manner to consolidate it, he had a new magazine or depÔt of arms built at the junction of the Black and White Umvolosi rivers. This magazine and kraal is called Amanzekanze, and is surrounded by a dense bush. The Amanzekanze kraal had, up to this time, held the reputation of being impregnable, and its approaches, it was said, were so difficult that they could only be forced at immense loss. The name of the kraal, Amanzekanze, translated is "Let the enemy come now."

Coming now to the farming and domestic kraals, it may without fear of contradiction be asserted, after minute and careful inquiries, that no single instance can be adduced in which her Majesty's troops ever attacked or molested such unless first attacked and fired upon.

A few words must here be said concerning the helioscope, which on more than one occasion played a prominent part in this war.

One of the great features of the occupation of Port Durnford was the establishment of mirror-signals from the "kop" at Port Durnford, and at the post on the Inyezani down to the mouth of the Umlalasi. The use of mirrors as a means of communication had been so fully demonstrated in Afghanistan, that it seemed astonishing that army officers at Natal were supremely ignorant of, and, indeed, indifferent to, the system. When it is remembered that by this simple process it was found possible to flash intelligence and words of sympathy and kindness to the half-famished garrison at Ekowe, and that by means of this admirable invention, many important items of intelligence were from time to time instantaneously and surely communicated from one part of the British force to another, which through the position of the enemy it was only possible to send by messengers, who were compelled to take the most circuitous routes, thus causing great delay and sometimes even failing to reach their destination at all, the value of this simple yet grand discovery cannot be too highly considered.

Its importance in some respects may indeed be declared to be in advance of the electric telegraph, for that necessitates apparatus of delicate mechanism and a friendly, or at least non-hostile territory, over which the messages are sent. A predatory or hostile tribe may at any time sever the line of telegraphic wire, and cut all communications between neighbouring columns who are anxious to make their whereabouts and intentions known; but this cannot be done to the mirror system, where with no more apparatus than a small hand-glass telegraphy is established which no mortal agency can interrupt. No invention, no discovery can surpass in value this mode of silent yet eloquent communication, and only the interruption of the sun's beams by clouds or fogs can interfere with the transmission by signals, noiselessly, and in a manner almost imperceptible to all save the two interlocutors, who may be distant ten, twenty, thirty, or even forty miles.

At Gibraltar messages are by this process constantly sent across the Straits; and in Australia, Mauritius, Singapore, and even Canada, the invention has obtained for its discoverer the greatest reputation and kudos.

Some four years ago Lieutenant Parrott, of the Volunteer Engineer Corps of New South Wales, conducted a series of very successful operations in mirror telegraphy, using discs, about six inches in diameter, of polished metal covered with glass. At first the distance separating the two mirrors was from six to ten miles, but eventually the system was tested from the Kumagong mountain, about 2000 feet above the sea level, to the lighthouse at the entrance to Port Jackson, 400 feet above sea level, a direct distance of nearly forty miles. Now, when we consider that the only apparatus required is a small hand-mirror, and that no skill beyond the faculty of reflecting the sun's beam in the required direction, and of flashing "dots" and "signals" by means of a simple turn of the wrist, in the same way as the Morse telegraph is presented by flag-signals, are necessary, we must allow the vast importance of this discovery to the soldier and the sailor, more especially in savage or uncivilized warfare. Of course the whole method is dependent on the presence of sunshine, and, fortunately, Natal is seldom without this great boon. In South Africa the sun's beams are more constant than in almost any other clime, and they may be counted and depended upon during the major portion of the dry season. It is not unworthy of notice that a system of sun-signalling, not dissimilar to that established between Port Durnford and General Crealock's column, has been known and practised for some considerable time among the Nez PercÉs Indians of North America. Mr. F. C. Browne, of Sydney, Australia, however, gives a still more remarkable method of signalling, and states that successful feats have also been accomplished by moonlight for distances of from four to six miles. He considers, and doubtless he is correct, that it would be quite possible to supplement this sun-and-moon telegraphy on very dark nights by an analogous system of alternately obscuring and displaying at longer or shorter intervals a powerfully reflected light.

Lately at Portsmouth some highly successful experiments in night-signalling have been made by casting the electric and other powerful lights upon columns of steam; a method evidently suggested by the helioscope and use of reflecting mirrors.