The force thus gathered at Landsman's Drift was now quite ready for an immediate advance. It was therefore determined to push on this column (2nd) at once. Accordingly, on the 27th May the troops were formed up in line of contiguous quarter-columns by eight a.m., and after the General and his staff had ridden down the ranks, making a minute and detailed inspection, the various columns moved off by fours in succession from the right precisely at nine a.m. Newdigate's Division, which led the way, consisted of the 21st Fusiliers, the 94th Foot, the 58th Foot, and the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, together with a wing of the King's Dragoon Guards, a wing of the 17th Lancers, a battalion of Native Contingent, two batteries of Royal Artillery, and a company of Engineers. The crossing of the Buffalo at Landsman's Drift was commenced at half-past nine, and the rear had crossed by two o'clock. The exact distance to Kopje Allein as the crow flies is said to be ten miles, but the route taken was somewhat circuitous, so as, for the sake of the waggons, to avoid many bad places, swamps, morasses, and mud-holes, which abound in this part of the country. The country between the Blood river and the Buffalo is tolerably well supplied with water, comparatively open, but singularly treeless in its character, though there were patches here and there along the road, and the district seemed well adapted for cattle posts and grazing purposes. Indeed there could be seen a number of large deserted kraals and homesteads, which had once evidently been the depÔts of pastoral wealth and prosperity. These sites of industry had suffered a hard and rough usage in the terrible necessities of war. These depredations were largely caused by the foraging parties in search of fuel, the great want in all our camps. Supplies, indeed, on more than one occasion, were brought even as far as from the northern slopes of the Durnberg, a distance of twenty miles. Most of the best information in regard to the topographical features of this portion of the campaign was furnished by the very excellent reports drawn up by Colonel Buller, Lord William Beresford, and, above all, the Prince Imperial, whose pen and pencil gave a vivid and life-like idea of the physical characteristics of this line of advance.

On the 16th instant Colonel Buller's second patrol returned at noon to General Wood's camp at the Wolf's kraal, and had been so successful in its reconnoitring operations that its officers were able to report that no large bodies of Zulus were within twenty miles of the Blood river, or, indeed, anywhere between the White Umvolosi and the Buffalo river. The same evening on which the patrol started it bivouacked at Kopje Allein, and, indeed, it was owing to the excellent reports made by Buller and his staff that the place was chosen as one of the links in the line of advance. A few Zulus there were, it is true, hovering about in the distance, and attempts were made by feigned attacks and feigned retreats to lure the troops into ambush, but Buller was far too old a soldier to be taken in by such wiles. When the men had got steadily on the summit of the hill they were exploring, the Zulu skirmishers disappeared into some of the caves surrounding Sirayo's old kraal, and nothing but some huts full of mealies could be found. The patrol that night slept on the slopes of the Ingutu mountains, and the following morning scouted in a southerly direction in rear of the Ingwe range, as far as the White Umvolosi, showing in a tolerably plain manner that the country about there was quite denuded of its population, at least between the Buffalo river and the White Umvolosi, while to the eastward and the northward of the latter river there were plenty of Zulus and cattle, but no large or important bodies were assembled north of the Isandaka range.

The Prince Imperial had won all hearts during these three days in the saddle and night bivouac, and was seen to have considerably improved in health since his last visit to the camp.

From the notes and sketches made by the officers above named the following data may be adduced:—The key of the road from the Utrecht to the Ulundi country is undoubtedly the Inhlazatye mountain, and, although this road runs along a narrow ledge with a precipice on the one side and with huge boulders on the other, interspersed with thorns and bush, yet still it is actually the most direct line of advance upon Ulundi. This Inhlazatye mountain covers a vast extent of country, has an immense quantity of thorn-bush over it, is very broken and steep, but undoubtedly can be turned by an invading force from the north either to the east or to the west, probably the latter, where little bush worth mentioning would have to be passed through. The most commanding and open positions are upon the highlands to the south of the White Umvolosi and Umtatoosi rivers, girdling the new capital, Ulundi. These are the Emtonjaneni hills (which are called Magnibonium on most maps), near the White Umvolosi, and the Tyoe and Entumeni heights in rear of the Umtatoosi, all healthy positions, well watered, and with abundant grass and wood. From the Emtonjaneni hills, explored by Colonel Buller, who estimates them at 200 feet high, the circle of royal kraals on the farther side of the White Umvolosi can be seen; three roads lead to the rear into the colony, the upper, central, and lower. The Ekowe, Entumeni, and Ungoga ranges, from 1500 to 2000 feet above the sea level, dominate the valley of the Umtatoosi. Healthy positions suitable for cavalry encampments may be found on these heights, well wooded and watered, with excellent grass and roads leading to the rear into the colony; and here Marshall's cavalry kept open our communications and effectually severed connexion between the Zulu's right and left impis. These central and coast lines, which are joined by a cross-road, both follow the course of the Umtatoosi.

During the march, and whenever the country would admit of such formation, the leading corps halted, and the extended line of march was curtailed by the succeeding regiment forming upon its left; waggons came up in a sort of deployment into line, and certain simple movements were practised which would be carried out in case of sudden attack. Lord Chelmsford invariably made a great point of concentrating his waggons whenever the slightest opportunity offered. General Newdigate and General Wood between them had 900 waggons, and it may easily be imagined what a column 450 of these would make. Allowing 30 yards to each—and that is not much, there being 16 or 18 oxen to each load—each column of baggage alone is 15 miles long, but to this distance must be added 5 yards interval, and this gives 18 miles to defend. Of course, the forage for the large cavalry force made one of the greatest strains upon the commissariat, and all had to be sacrificed to this necessity. This column and Crealock's were in this respect not upon a par, as it had to provide for not less than 2000 horses, each receiving 12 lb. of corn daily; which gave a total of 24,000 lb. daily, or 3000 lb. per waggon load, or 6 waggons daily to supply them. At this rate, therefore, it required 120 waggons to carry the oats for the cavalry alone. All Lord Chelmsford's and the staff horses were, however, placed upon half rations.

Ibabanango, which Lord Chelmsford had selected as an advanced depÔt for the united forces of his column and that of Wood, is again situated about midway between this place (Kopje Allein) and the king's kraal at Ulundi. The troops in this camp consisted of a company of Engineers, the cavalry brigade, two batteries of Royal Artillery, four line battalions, and 800 natives. The encampment was rather extensive, but this upon sanitary grounds and the best medical advice. The battalions were encamped as at open order, front as in line, with a depth of 116 yards, which is unusual, for half the above frontage is the usual encampment, and 30 yards were left between each of the four battalions. Each regiment of cavalry usually occupies 172 yards of front and 130 yards of depth, but its camp can be condensed to 120 yards of front by crossing heel-ropes, and this, for defensive reasons, was the plan adopted by General Marshall. This could not be done with Cape or Indian remounts, as entire horses would fight if so close to each other; but English horses are so accustomed to this proximity that it was found they throve better when allowed companionship. To each battery of artillery was allowed a frontage of 133 yards, with a depth of 114 yards, or 70 yards front at close order, while from centre to centre of the tents 10 paces were allotted. The kitchens were simple enough, being nothing more than a trench to catch the wind and hold the usual pattern of Flanders or Torrens kettle—the former, weighing 8½ lbs., holding twelve quarts, and cooking for eight men, while the latter weighs 3½ lbs., holds six quarts, and cooks for five men. Whenever the ground was too wet for a trench, two parallel sod walls answered the same purpose, and two trenches, 10 feet long, 9 inches broad, and 12 inches deep were allowed for a company of 120 men. The medical arrangements were as elaborate as could be made consistent with the limited means of transport, but what was deficient in quantity was made up in excellence of detail. Medical officers and stretcher-bearers usually moved in front of the camp, and the temporary hospital was always placed in the least exposed position near at hand, while the field-hospitals were always in rear. One medical officer was allotted to each battalion of infantry, regiment of cavalry, or battery of artillery—more could not be spared. One bearer company and two field-hospitals were allotted to each division. This bearer company included 206 men, part natives, 101 mules or horses, and 30 waggons. The field-hospitals had each 75 men, 52 mules, and 10 waggons, while each field-hospital had equipment for 200 sick. Fortunately the health of the troops was exceptionally good.

Instead of an advance from Rorke's Drift, it was now determined to take a line from Kopje Allein to Blood river, across the more northern spurs of the Ingutu hills, and endeavour to ultimately strike the road laid down in the maps, between the Alarm and the Isipizi hills. This route was to be taken by General Wood's flying column in advance, and General Newdigate's division, of which actually it was intended to form an integral portion. The former consisted of the 13th and 90th Regiments of Light Infantry and five companies of the 80th Regiment, all of them in splendid and hard-working condition, and devoted to their brilliant leader. Wood's cavalry consisted of 900 mounted men belonging to various corps, and commanded by the Rupert of South Africa, Redvers Buller, whose men were ready to follow him anywhere, and die for him to a man, after his splendid self-devotion at Zlobani and elsewhere. Wood, who made friends wherever he moved, had some valuable allies in Oham's people, who, hating the tyranny of Cetywayo, were invaluable as scouts and spies to the flying columns. The arrangements for the line of advance were as follows:—Wood's flying column was to keep in advance of Newdigate's division by about five miles, while in front of the former a veil of cavalry was to keep in advance about ten miles, connected by intervening files. Each morning orderlies were to report whether the front and rear were perfectly clear, nor was an advance to be made until such was known. In case of any enemy attacking Wood, the latter was to be at once supported by Marshall, who could circle round and take the Zulus in the rear, a principle of strategy they strongly object to. Crealock, with the aid of the naval authorities, was at the same time to push forward from Fort Chelmsford, and, if the landing at Port Durnford was reported practicable, force the Umvolosi and operate in conjunction with the 2nd column from his base at Port Durnford.

Lord Chelmsford had long seen that the best method to obviate the almost overwhelming difficulties of transport would be to form some seaport on the Zulu coast. Delagoa Bay was at first selected; but considerable difficulty was found in arranging with the Portuguese Government as to our landing a force in the neighbourhood, and that scheme was consequently abandoned. It then became evident that if a seaport, or even ever so small a landing-place could be provided at the mouth of the Umlalasi, it would be at once the nearest and best base of operations for any force moving from the Tugela upon Ulundi or Cetywayo's other stronghold.

Furthermore, as far back as December, 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone wrote to Sir Bartle Frere, informing his Excellency that two gentlemen—Mr. E. Rathbone and Mr. H. W. Taylor—wished to call attention to the fact that, from personal observations they had made, they were satisfied that a practicable landing-place on the Zulu coast could be found. These gentlemen, it is true, as Sir Theophilus pointed out, differed as to the precise spot on the coast, but both agreed that it was near the Tugela mouth, and but a very few miles intervene between the one place described and the other. This discovery was made twenty-seven years ago, in the year 1852, and, so far from being kept a secret, was published for general information in the Natal Mercury.

H.M. gunboat "Forester" was accordingly despatched to thoroughly explore this part of the coast; no less than three minute and careful surveys were made, and finally, on May 26th, she returned with the welcome intelligence that a fine lagoon existed close to the mouth of the Umlalasi, with a sheltered outlet, and that, from the soundings taken for five miles on either side of the river, there was no actual obstacle to a landing being practicable at all tides and all seasons.

There was, however, at the mouth of the river, a bar on which the surf broke heavily; and in bad weather experience proved on more than one occasion that this formed an impassable barrier even to the most determined attempts to make a landing.

This spot was christened Port Durnford, and steps were immediately taken to form there a fort and depÔt of supplies for the 1st column, in command of which was General Crealock.

To Commodore Sullivan, Major Barrow, and the captain of H.M.S. "Forester" principally belong the honours of the discovery; and while the sailors worked heartily seaward and along the dangerous and difficult coast, Barrow and his riders found out all the roads which led to the point selected. It had been arranged that General Crealock, with the advanced guard of the 1st division should move down the Umlalasi to a point carefully surveyed by Barrow, and which was subsequently, in compliment to the gallant young prince, called Fort Napoleon. Thence he was to proceed to Port Durnford, to meet the "Forester."

Hitherto the advance had been slow; but when it is remembered that forts were constructed at every strategic point of defence—at the Amatikula, the Inyezani (respectively Forts Chelmsford and Crealock), and the whole of the road between this place and the Tugela had been put into working order by fatigue parties and Engineers, it is clear there was no real ground for complaint of the delay. Every stream had been bridged, either with pontoons, casks, or trestles, and trees had been cut down, rocks and boulders blown up, as well as gradients eased and facilities for transport carried out. Forts Pearson, Tenedos, Chelmsford, Crealock, and Napoleon were garrisoned by the less robust men of the column. Six companies of the 88th, with the headquarters, held Fort Chelmsford, while a wing of the 99th performed the same office at Fort Crealock. The regular communications along this line of advanced forts were placed in charge of one of the best men out there, namely, Colonel Hugh Rowlands, 41st Regiment, whose eye for country, tact, and temper with the natives and incessant vigilance eminently qualified him for such a responsibility.

At this time the force of the 1st division stood as follows:—General Crealock, Brigadiers Bray and Rowlands; two batteries of artillery and one ammunition column; Royal Engineers, 30th company and C troop; infantry, six battalions, viz.:—the Buffs, 57th, 60th, 88th, 91st, and 99th Regiments, two squadrons of mounted infantry, the Natal Horse, the native scouts; as pretty and compact a little division as any moderately ambitious general could wish to command, and it speaks well for the chief's admirable temper under difficulties that, chafed as he now was, and tied as it were by the leg, by want of transport, he kept working incessantly without a murmur at the forts, bridges, fords, roads, and other requisites.

In accordance with the above-mentioned arrangement, General Crealock, Commodore Richards, and Lord Gifford set forth on the 25th June for Port Durnford, taking with them the advance-guard of the 1st division.

At first the road was over a level and sandy plain, with numerous small granite hills in different directions, and although there was not much vegetation for the first two or three miles of the road, it opened on to a more picturesque-looking champaign country, where the soil appeared teeming with fertility, and the air was balmy and pure. The country here, however, is arid and parched during the dry season, but in the rains, which last from November till May, it is well watered, and large crops of maize are grown, which by the end of June are usually ripened and fit for cutting. Large crops of malama are also grown, and it is upon the stalks of this that the cattle are mostly fed in the drought, when they appear in good condition, notwithstanding its seeming want of nutriment.

Here a halt was made; vedettes were placed, and a meal was partaken of. Then, after half an hour's rest, they again pushed on, and soon came to an undulating and extremely romantic-looking valley, shut in on either side by some huge granite hills. Ascending the highest of these, they looked down upon the Indian Ocean, Port Durnford, and the "Forester," standing off about a mile from the shore, and evidently on the look-out. From this point to the outlet of the Umlalazi the country was fairly open, and the landscape fertile and partly cultivated. The only obstacle to progress was a rocky and rather narrow ridge, through which, however, ran a fairly open kloof, with a small and tributary stream winding its way to the Umlalazi. Here was the road, and another two hours saw them through the kloof without question or attack, and they cantered along the grassy slopes to the bright and shingly beach, upon which a couple of boat's crews, despatched when they were first sighted, were occupied in preparing a very excellent dinner of ship's rations for the tired and hungry men.

General Crealock highly approved of the position, and a fort and other works were at once traced out, thus rendering complete the cordon of posts that had been drawn all round the south of Zululand, right from the sea to the left attack (or 2nd column), and through which it was impossible for Cetywayo to force a way, and which rendered his capture or submission a mere question of time.