 
2. The Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan for May, 1904, published by the Department of Finance, pp. 91–95. 3. Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century (hereafter abbreviated as the 20th Century), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Tokio, 1903, pp. 53–58. 4. Or, 241,891,946 out of 285,971,623 yen. As the term manufacture is expansive, the articles herein included should be enumerated. They are: clothing, chemicals and drugs, metal wares, oil and wax, paper, cotton yarn and fabrics, raw and woven silks, tobacco, and sundries. Teas, grain, marine products and other food-stuffs, and furs, as well as reËxported articles, are excluded. See the Kwampo (Official Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 77, table 7. 5. The crop of rice has increased since 1877 from 26.6 million to about 42,000,000 koku; that of barley, rye, and wheat from 9.6 million to 19 million koku. But the increase has been due more to an improved cultivation than to an extension of acreage. Although the wheat, barley, and rye land has grown from 2.35 million in 1877 to 4.43 million acres in 1901, the rice land has increased from 6,517,000 to only 6,982,000 acres. The crops of hemp and rape are stationary, while those of sugar, cotton, and indigo have largely fallen off. (These figures have been converted from those in the 20th Century, pp. 119 ff. One koku dry is equivalent to 4.9629 bushels.) 6. These figures have been worked out from the Kokumin Shimbun (National News, hereafter abbreviated as the Kokumin) of February 5, 10, and 19, 1904. Also see a table and comment in the Toyo Keizai Shimpo (“Oriental Economist”), for May 5, 1903, pp. 17–19. 7. If sugar is added to the list, the figures will go up to more than 190 million yen, or 60 per cent. of the entire import trade. 8. 289.2 million yen in 1902–3. The Fourth Annual, pp. 4 and 9, and plate 3. Also see the Toyo Keizai Shimpo (“Oriental Economist”) for December 5, 1902, pp. 19–21 and chart. 9. Or, less than 7,000,000 acres of wet fields and less than 6,000,000 of upland fields, the latter including mulberry and tea gardens, besides fields for mugi, beans, and vegetables. Based on the 20th Century, pp. 95 ff. 10. This figure includes, however, all the land inclined at angles less than 15°, so that, from the practical point of view, it may be considered as highly exaggerated. The actual extent of the reclamation of wild land advances at a slow pace outside of the still largely undeveloped island of Hokkaido. See ibid., pp. 95–96, 104. 11. Or, about 23,000,000 acres for nearly 47,000,000 people. If we take only the land under cultivation, on the one hand, and only the farming population, on the other, the ratio still remains the same, for then we have 13,000,000 acres for 28,000,000 people. The aggregate of the capital involved in the agriculture of Japan, including the value of land, buildings, implements, and live stock, is estimated at 7,400,000,000 yen, while the annual crops return about 1,000,000,000 yen. See the 20th Century, pp. 105–106. 12. The annual rainfall of Japan proper averages between 1300 mm. at Awomori and 2040 mm. at Kagoshima. A fairly rich sedimentary formation of soil is found everywhere, owing to the hilly nature of the country and the short and rapid current of the rivers. 13. Wherever possible, the farmer contrives to raise more than one crop on his land in different seasons during the year. In fact, more than 30 per cent. of rice land yields other crops besides rice, at places mugi, indigo, beans, and rape being cultivated on the same piece of land. 14. More than half of the wet fields of the country consist of lots smaller than one-eighth acre, and nearly three fourths are each less than one-quarter acre. The average size of the lots outside of Formosa and Hokkaido is put down as .1 acre for wet fields and .12 acre for upland fields. 15. Compare the report of the U. S. Consul-General Bellows at Yokohama in the U. S. Consular Reports, advance sheets, No. 1757 (September 24, 1903). In addition to the conditions here enumerated, it must be remembered that there exists little or no pasture land in Japan, and that nearly all the labor is done by hand, there being only 1,500,000 horses and 1,300,000 horned animals in the country. See the 20th Century, chapters on agriculture; the Annual, No. III, tables x-xiii; J. J. Rein’s Industries of Japan, English translation, New York, 1889, chapters on agriculture; and H. Dumolard’s Le Japon politique, Économique et social, Paris, 1903, pp. 109–121. 16. The 20th Century, p. 117; Dumolard, pp. 112–113. 17. This ratio includes, however, in the tenant class those farmers who are partly lessees and partly proprietors of small lots. In 1888, the ratio between (1) independent farmers, (2) partly lessees, and (3) entirely lessees, was 147:200:95. Since that time the ratio must have grown in favor of the tenants. See the 20th Century, p. 90. 18. See the U. S. Consular Reports, advance sheets, No. 1529 (December 26, 1902). In 1902 the total debts of the farming classes of Japan were estimated at 400 million yen. Mr. S. Nakayama, in the Toyo Keizai Shimpo (“Oriental Economist”) for July 15, 1902, p. 14. 19. In 1903, Japan’s American trade was much below that of 1902. The latter showed an increase of 362 per cent. over 1890. 20. The actual figures were:—
21. In East Asia are included Korea, China, Hong-kong, British India, French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, Siam, the Philippines, and Russian Eastern Asia. If Hong-kong, an essentially transit-trade port, is excluded, the East Asiatic trade of Japan amounts to 264,476,239 yen, or 43.6 per cent. of the entire foreign trade of Japan. See the Kwampo (Official Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 74, table 4. Of the three great divisions of Japan’s markets, Europe sells her machineries and articles of general consumption, and buys in return such peculiar products of her soil as silks and teas. East Asia, including India and the southern islands, takes coal and manufactured goods in general and furnishes cotton, food-stuffs, and other articles of more direct need than the European goods. America occupies a unique position in regard to Japan, as it combines to a large extent the peculiarities of both Europe and East Asia: it exports to Japan cotton and flour, besides machinery and goods of general consumption, and imports from her, not only raw silk and tea, but also smaller manufactured articles. 22. Oil-cakes are used as manure. As to rice, wheat, and flour, it is unnecessary to say that their importation depends largely upon the conditions of the crop at home. 23. The present author has often met persons who misinterpreted the “open door” to mean the complete throwing open of a country to the ruthless exploitation of the foreigner. The “open door,” it is needless to say, merely negatives a differential treatment in favor of one or more foreign nations at the expense of all the others. It does not necessarily imply a wide opening, but an impartial, even if narrow, opening for all nations. 24. Consult the British Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Nos. 2995 and 2999; the U. S. Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance, January, 1904, pp. 2410–1; the Kokumin, September 19–21, 1901; Minister Kiyoura’s address before the Osaka Chamber of Commerce, February, 1904. 25. The figures were taken from the Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States for February, 1904, p. 3006. 26. From ibid., p. 3006. In 1903, rice imported amounted to 51,960,000 yen in value. The Fourth Annual, p. 77. 27. See the U. S. Monthly Summary, February, 1904, pp. 3006 and 3013. 28. At present, Chinese merchants in Korea compete with the Japanese only at the ports on the western coast, principally in the import trade of silk. The number of the Chinese residents in Korea is one tenth that of the Japanese, or about 4000. 29. The Kokumin, January 30, 1904. 30. Based on the figures in the British Diplomatic and Consular Report: Trade of Corea for the Year 1903, pp. 11–13. 31. Of the 1430 vessels, aggregating 1,104,000 tons, entered at and cleared from Niu-chwang in 1902, the Japanese had 710 vessels and 491,000 tons, the British, 374 vessels and 350,000 tons, the Germans, 88 vessels and 73,000 tons, and so forth.—The Kokumin, April 29, 1904, from the Tai Shin-Kan Boyeki Chosa Hokoku (report on the trade with China and Korea), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Tokio, 1904. The Russians could show only 3 vessels and 1,223 tons, which was below their record for 1901 and less than one half of the average of the five years 1886, 1897, 1898, 1899, and 1901.—The British Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, No. 2999 (on Niu-chwang), p. 9. 32. Ibid., p. 8. 33. The direct import trade of any trading nation at Niu-chwang does not represent the actual amount of the articles imported from the country of that nation, for most of the foreign goods come to Niu-chwang through some other distributing centres in China, such as Hong-kong or Shanghai. The Japanese goods, however, are nearly all carried by Japanese vessels. On the contrary, the American imports, besides jeans, drills, sheetings, kerosenes, and flour, are not specified in the customs returns of Niu-chwang, and consequently their nominal figures are insignificant (7396 l. in 1901 and 4089 l. in 1902), while Hong-kong, through which most of the American goods are imported into Niu-chwang, showed, in 1902, 385,302 l., or 55 per cent. of the entire direct trade. On the other hand, the estimate made by the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington, showing 18,000,000 haikwan taels for the real import of American goods into Niu-chwang, seems to be pretty liberal. See British D. and C. Reports, annual series, No. 2999, p. 8, and the U. S. Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance, January, 1904, p. 2328. 34. See the Tsusho Isan for January 22, 1903, pp. 10–11. 35. See the Toyo Keizai Shimpo (“Oriental Economist”), No. 165 (July 15, 1900), and No. 244 (September 25, 1902). 36. The Kokumin, November 26, 1903. 37. The Annai, pp. 58–61. 38. Mr. Shiga’s letter, in the Kokumin, July 5, 1904. 39. In July, 1903, there were, besides soldiers, 26,705 Japanese in the eight treaty ports and Seul and Ping-yang. To these must be added about 4000 who lived on some islands and places outside of the treaty ports. See the Dobun-kwai Hokoku (Report of the Dobun Association), No. 41, pp. 95–96, and the Tsusho Isan for October 18, 1903, pp. 29–47; April 8, 1904, pp. 28–52. Mr. Yamamoto places the number of the Japanese residents in Korea at 40,000. See his Saishin Chosen Iju Annai (latest guide for emigration to Korea; hereafter abbreviated as the Annai), Tokio, 1904, p. 14. 40. The Annai, pp. 8–9, 19–20. 41. Ibid., p. 81. 42. In July, 1903, of the 26,645 Japanese in Korea, 15,442 were men and 11,263 women. It may be noted, in passing, that, in the case of Manchuria, a great majority of the Japanese women residing there are not the wives of the male settlers, and hence the comparative numbers of men and women there should not lead us to a similar conclusion as to Korea. This part of the problem of Japanese emigration opens up an interesting social question, which it is hardly necessary for us to discuss here. 43. From the legal standpoint, the Japanese had no right, outside of the treaty settlements, to live or buy land. 44. On March 31, 1904, there were about 1,234,000 yen of these notes in circulation against a reserve of 944,000 yen. From the British C. and D. Reports; Trade of Korea for the Year 1903, pp. 7–8. The Russians and their sympathizers at Seul have more than once tried, though unsuccessfully, to induce the Korean Government to suppress the issue of the notes. See pp. 281–284, below. 45. The nickel coins of Korea have been so debased and so much counterfeited that they are at a discount of much more than 100 per cent. 46. The right of building this line was originally granted by the Korean Government to Mr. Morse, an American citizen, in March, 1896, who, however, sold it to a Japanese syndicate in November, 1898, and handed the line over to the latter before it was completed. The whole line was in working order in July, 1899. See p. 286 (Article 3), below. 47. Actual work was begun in August, 1901, but Japan’s want of capital was such that by the first of December, 1903, only thirty-one miles from both ends had been built. In view of the immense economic and strategic importance of the line, the Japanese Government, which had for a certain period of time guaranteed 6 per cent. annual interest on 25,000,000 yen, which was fixed as the minimum capital of the company, now further promoted its work by liberal measures, so as to make it possible for the company to complete the line before the end of the present year. Both the Korean and Japanese Imperial Houses own shares of the company. 48. The line passes through the richest and most populous four provinces of Korea, which comprise nearly seven tenths of all the houses in the Empire, and cover more than five sevenths of the cultivated area of the country, with considerable capacity for future cultivation and improvement. The road also connects places to which the Koreans flock from neighboring regions for the periodical fairs held there. These fairs occur six times each month, held alternately in different places, besides great annual fairs in large cities. Among the thirty-nine stations of this railroad, six will be daily seen holding fairs, for which the traffic of passengers and merchandise through the road will be considerable. It is safe to say that five sevenths of the entire Korean foreign trade belong to the sphere controlled by this line, and also that nearly all of this trade is in reality the fast growing Japan-Korea trade. The effect of the completion of the line upon this trade will be tremendous. See Mr. J. Shinobu’s Kan Hanto (“The Korean Peninsula”), Tokio, 1901. 49. The French have an agreement with the Korean Government regarding a Seul-Fusan railway. The Seul Government is to build it with its own money, and the French to furnish engineers and material. Not a mile of rail has been laid by the impecunious Government, and the present war is rapidly changing the entire situation. A Japanese railway for strategic purposes has already been started from Seul northward. Another line, between Seul and Wonsan (Gensan), will also be built by the Japanese in the near future. 50. It was one of the first propositions from Japan to Russia during the long negotiations between them which have ended in the present war, that Russia should not impede Japan’s possible attempt in the future to extend the Fusan-Seul Railway in the manner above described. See p. 286 (Article 3), below. 51. A promoter of Russian interests in Korea, and to all intents and purposes a semi-official diplomat for Russia, living at Seul and observing the political barometer of the Court at close range. Another person, perhaps less known to the outside world, but far more influential at Court, is a woman, FrÄulein Sonntag, a relative of the wife of the ex-Russian Minister Waeber at Seul. See p. 280, below. 52. The Kokumin, January 15, 1904. 53. From an address by Mr. Suero Kato, of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, who had studied the agriculture of Korea on the ground three times in succession.—Ibid., May 27, 1904. 54. Calculated from the data given in the Kokumin for January 8, 1904. The official census of Korea for 1902 gives a population of 5,782,806, but assuming that there live 145 people per square mile, which is one half the density of the population in China, the Korean population cannot be much below 12,000,000. The official record of the land under cultivation is also untrustworthy for institutional reasons not necessary to mention here. 55. The question of cultivating the waste land in Korea by Japanese enterprise, however, has called forth a very delicate situation which still awaits the most careful solution. The progress of this situation will be a matter of great interest, but it is still too early to discuss it. Cf. the Korea Review for July and August, 1904, and follow its subsequent numbers. 56. See the Tsusho Isan for August 3, 1903, and the Kokumin for January 7, 15, and 16, 1904. 57. The rent is of two kinds: either to be decided anew each year after the harvest, or to deliver to the proprietor 50 per cent. of the crop. It should always be remembered that a large majority of actual cultivators are tenants, the proprietors being limited to a small class of rich men, officers, and nobles. The daily wage of the laborer on the farm averages 20 sen, but it is usually paid in kind, as are debts and repayments in many cases. The standard of life of the Korean farmer is perhaps lower than that of the Japanese, but apparently not less comfortable. The national land tax is said to be mild and largely discarded, but the house tax, special tax, local tax, and the like, bring up the dues of the farmer sometimes to an unendurable extent. The tenant, after paying his rent and other charges, is obliged to sell what little rice is left to him at the earliest opportunity, so that he henceforth becomes a buyer of rice, and consequently has little to buy other articles with, and still less to save, until his spring harvest of wheat comes in. Woe betide him when both the rice and the wheat crops fail! See the Kokumin, January 13 and 14, 1904, and the Tsusho Isan for August 3, 1903, p. 21. 58. An address by Mr. G. Hirose, a competent eye-witness, in the Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 48, November, 1903, pp. 15 ff. Official census, however, gives only 2806 Japanese in Manchuria (December 30, 1903). See the Tsusho Isan for April 13, 1904, pp. 33–38. 59. Mr. Hirose, already mentioned, refers to a Japanese capitalist who started a lumber business in Kirin Province and another who discovered coal deposits near Harbin and began to mine them, both of whom, in spite of the permits they had received from the Chinese authorities by regular process, were driven away arbitrarily under threats of the Russian military. The Dobun-kwai, No. 48, pp. 21–22. 60. The so-called Manchus, the original inhabitants of Manchuria, have migrated to China proper, which they conquered during the seventeenth century. The present inhabitants of Manchuria are immigrant Chinese, whose greater economic capacity has been rapidly developing this immensely rich territory. 61. An official report of the Province of Amur, dated June 22, 1903, denies that the actual cost of construction per verst was, as had been alleged, 150,000 rubles, but 113,183 rubles. The Tsusho Isan for August 8, 1903, p. 46. A ruble is equivalent to about 51.5 cents. In this connection, it is interesting to note in M. Witte’s report to the Czar after the former’s tour in the Far East in 1902, that the Siberian Railway had cost 758,955,907 rubles, but, with the Circum-Baikal section, would cost not less than 1,000,000,000 rubles, excluding the salaries of officers, expenses for soldiers, the Pacific fleet, harbor work, and the like. The Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 42, p. 30. 62. According to the “Past and Present of the Siberian Railway,” compiled in 1903 by the government committee in charge of the railway, as quoted in the Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 51, pp. 58–60. 63. M. Witte’s report of September, 1901, quoted in the Kokumin for October 1, 1904. 64. Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, in the U. S. daily Consular Reports, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), p. 8. 65. The Tsusho Isan, November 25, 1903, pp. 16–18. 66. The U. S. daily Consular Reports, July 30, 1903. 67. See the Shiberiya oyobi Manshu (“Siberia and Manchuria”) Tokio, 1904, compiled by T. Kawakami, special agent of the Foreign Office of Japan, who was sent to Siberia and Northern Manchuria to investigate economic and military conditions there, pp. 94, 119–121, 124, 138. 68. For the relative advantages of the Manchurian Railway and the Amur River, see the U. S. daily Consular Reports, August 5 and October 5, 1903, and January 19, 1904. 69. The Russia-China trade began more than 250 years ago. Before 1860, it was carried wholly on land, and its balance was nearly even. Since 1860, when sea trade from Odessa was opened, the progress of this trade has been slower than the general foreign trade of China, and its balance has been heavily against Russia (6,702,000 against 45,945,000 rubles in 1900). More than half of the Russian imports into China consists of cotton fabrics, and over 80 per cent. of the exports from China to Russia are teas. Russia’s share in the entire foreign trade of China has also fallen from 4.6 per cent. in 1899 to 4.4 per cent. in 1900, 2.6 per cent. in 1901, and 2.3 per cent. in 1902, as compared with the growing share of the trade by Japan amounting to 14.2 per cent., 15.9 per cent., 15.7 per cent., and 18.4 per cent., in those respective years. Of the Russian share of 2.6 per cent. in 1901, Russian Manchuria occupied only 0.6 per cent. See the Tsusho Isan, July 8, 1903, pp. 1–4; T. Yoshida’s Shina Boyeki Jijo (Trade Conditions in China), Tokio, 1902, pp. 128–129, etc. For the gold values of the figures up to 1903, see the British D. and C. Reports, annual series, No. 3280. 70. From Russian official figures quoted in the Tsusho Isan, November 25, 1903. 71. The reader is recommended to the reports of the United States Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, particularly those which appeared in the daily Consular Reports for January 21 and 24, and February 5, 1904 (Nos. 1856, 1858, and 1869). Reference should also be made to the ex-British Consul at Niu-chwang, Alexander Hosie’s Manchuria, London, 1901 (new edition, New York, 1904). The resources of Eastern Manchuria are well described in the Tsusho Isan, October 13, 1903, and those of Northern Manchuria in the Shiberiya oyobi Manshu, Tokio, 1904, compiled by the Foreign Office of Japan, pp. 427–485. 72. The present population of Manchuria is differently estimated between the limits of 6.5 and 15 millions. Probably there are more than 10 millions. Immigration was said to have been progressing rapidly under the Chinese rule. It is noteworthy that Siberia, with a larger area than Manchuria, contains only about 8,000,000 inhabitants. The productive capacity of the Manchurian population must be measured, however, not only by their larger numbers, but also by their far superior economic training. 73. The Tsusho Isan for June 23, 1903, pp. 34–35. Pood = 36.112 lbs.; ruble = 51.5 cents. 74. Under this and other differential measures the commercial importance of Vladivostok is said to be fast passing away. Local merchants made a strong plea of their case before M. Witte when he traveled in the East in 1902, but on his return he reported to the Czar that the interests of the Empire demanded a large sacrifice at Vladivostok for the sake of Dalny. 75. The effect of the new duties levied on tea at other places than Dalny is seen in the following comparative table. The figures for 1902 are taken from the U. S. Monthly Summary for January, 1904, p. 2420, and those for 1903 have been converted from data given in the British D. and C. Reports, Annual Series No. 3280. In 1902, the Russian Empire took 882,893 out of the 1,519,211 piculs of tea exported from China, while in 1903 the corresponding amounts were 1,010,580 out of 1,677,530. The distribution of the imported teas to the Russian Empire, according to the routes, was as follows:—
We presume that most of the teas exported to Russian Manchuria went through Niu-chwang. The table plainly shows an increased importation at Dalny at the expense of all other points. It is not known how much of the 373,842 piculs imported at Dalny and Port Arthur was reshipped to other ports not mentioned here. (Picul = 133? lbs. av.) 76. See the Tsusho Isan, April 18 and August 3, 1903, and the U. S. daily Consular Reports, January 21, 1904 (No. 1856). Reduction apparently had not reached its minimum point. It was unknown whether Dalny handled much of the Manchurian export trade. 77. The Kokumin, March 7, 1903. The ex-Japanese Consul at Niu-chwang, Mr. K. Tanabe, doubts that Dalny will completely displace Niu-chwang as an exporting centre. The latter is geographically the nature outlet for the grain from the Liao Valley, and, in winter, the handling of this product is apt to be done more at Mukden than at Dalny, the latter becoming in that case a mere port of transit. Moreover, mercantile customs differ so much at Niu-chwang and Dalny that it is not possible that the conservative Chinese merchants should readily transfer their business from the one place to the other. See Tanabe’s conversation in the Toyo Keizai Zasshi (“Oriental Economist”), No. 244 (September 25, 1902), p. 16. 78. The central distributing station at Vladivostok has a capacity of 600,000 poods, and the one to be built at Dalny will hold 1,500,000 poods, to which a special tank steamer will bring oil from Batum.—The Tsusho Isan, May 3, 1903. Americans tried to build warehouses at Dalny, but were opposed by Russians. The importation of American kerosenes at Niu-chwang decreased from 3,172,000 gallons ($410,500) in 1901 to 603,000 gallons ($77,000) in 1902, and the decrease was in no small measure due to the Russian competition at Dalny. 79. The Tsusho Isan, October 23, 1903, pp. 1–21; the U. S. daily Consular Reports, May 7, July 16, and August 28, 1903, and February 23, 1904. 80. See Mr. Miller’s reports in the U. S. daily Consular Reports for January 21 and 24, and February 5 and 6, 1904 (Nos. 1856 1858, 1859, and 1870). Mr. James J. Hill, in a recent speech at Minneapolis, said that his great system of transportation, by taking advantage of all conditions, and by carrying full loads both ways, had been able to make a freight rate of forty cents a hundred pounds of flour to the Orient, or one mill per ton-mile. According to him, the effect of the growing exportation of wheat from the Pacific coast to the East seems to have caused an advance in its price at Minneapolis of five to seven cents per bushel. In view of these facts, the possible exclusion of American flour from Manchuria would not be without serious effects, especially if we consider Mr. Hill’s opinion that the success of Mr. Chamberlain’s financial scheme would result in enabling Manitoba to supply all the wheat needed in Great Britain, thus leaving in the United States a large surplus of grain, for which other markets would have to be developed. See the American Review of Reviews for February, 1904. 81. The U. S. daily Consular Reports, February 15, 1904 (No. 877), p. 11. 82. The U. S. daily Consular Reports, January 19, 1904 (No. 1854). Also see ibid., April 4, 1903. 83. British Consul Hosie’s report, the British Parliamentary Papers (“Blue Books”), China, No. 1 (1900), p. 154. 84. See U. S. daily Consular Reports, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), and the Tsusho Isan, October 8, 1903, pp. 42–43. 85. The North American Review for May, 1904, pp. 683–684. 86. For the laborious process of obtaining permits to carry on business only for short terms in these great sites for future cities, see the Tsusho Isan, September 18 (pp. 40–41) and November 23 (pp. 39–40), 1903. At Dalny, however, Russia has welcomed the coÖperation of all nationalities in its development, and has been rather disappointed at their comparative indifference. See Mr. F. Nakasawa’s conversation in the Toyo Keizai Zasshi (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15, 1903), p. 13. The reasons for this modification at Dalny of the customary Russian policy are plain, for the port must be developed as rapidly as possible before the Russians can absolutely control its trade. Thus the importance of Dalny as a trading port brings to conspicuous prominence the universal contradiction of the Russian commercial policy in East Asia. Russia would exclude other trading nations from her possessions in order to control the trade, but is at the same time unable to develop it without either the coÖperation of other people or some unnatural devices. 88. On March 27, 1904, Russia declared that Niu-chwang was under her martial law. This eventuality had been fully expected by Japan. The gravity of the situation, however, may be understood, when we remember that the Russian law of neutrality considers food as among contraband goods, so that the supply of millet, beans, and bean-cakes from Manchuria to Japan was henceforth completely closed, until the Russians evacuated Niu-chwang in July. 89. These concessions were acquired by the Russians in 1896 when the Korean King was still living in the Russian Legation in Seul. About May, 1903, after more than seven years’ inactivity, the Russians began to cut timber on a large scale along the Yalu River, and subsequently made extensive improvements at Yongampu at the mouth of the river. The political features of this event do not concern us here. See pp. 263, 289 ff., 318 ff., below. 90. Kaiserling is a successor to the two other Russians who, one after the other, had been engaged in the whale fishery on the Japan Sea for a long period of time. It was Kaiserling, however, who extended the work, made an agreement with the Korean Government, and was turning the business into an apparently successful enterprise. In 1901, his two vessels caught about eighty whales, which number was in 1902 increased to 300.—The Tsusho Isan, September 28, 1903, p. 34. 91. Mr. J. Sloat Fassett’s article in the American Review of Reviews, for February, 1904, p. 174. In the winter of 1902–3, ice at Dalny was six inches thick.—Mr. F. Nakasawa in the Toyo Keizai Zasshi (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15, 1903), p. 13. 92. It is well known that at several times in history kingdoms have been built which extended over both sides of the present boundaries between Korea and Manchuria. 93. It is noticeable that the Russian diplomatic historian already referred to gives as a reason for the desirability of placing Korea under Russian protection the need of safe-guarding the frontiers of Russian territories adjacent to Korea.—The Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 49, p. 8. 94. The Bay of Masampo, generally so-called, which lies between the Island of Koji and the Korean coast, is said to be deep and broad enough to hold the largest fleet, sheltered from winds from all directions. Several islands with sufficiently wide passages between them form a splendid gate to the bay, while the western extremity of the latter may be walked across, when the tide is low, from the Koji to the coast. As to the Masampo reach or inlet, specifically, which is the head of the gulf, “its entrance, five cables wide, named the Gate, is perfectly free from dangers, and is available for all classes of vessels. On either side are treeless hills, bare in winter, but in summer covered with grass; these hills, near the entrance, slope steeply to the water’s edge. The general depth over the reach is seven fathoms, but it shallows gradually as the town of Masampo is neared, until at one mile from the town the depth is four fathoms.... Anchorage may be had anywhere in Masampo reach, according to draught; a depth of three fathoms being found at half a mile from the town, and six to seven fathoms at two miles below it.”—The Sailing Directions for Japan, Korea, and Adjacent Seas, published by the British Admiralty, London, 1904, pp. 114–115. Masampo is the best but not the only good naval harbor on the southern coast of Korea. 95. In 1861, when some Russian marines landed here and took virtual possession of the islands, Awa Katsu, who was then one of the officers appointed by the Yedo government to study the possibility of organizing military forces after the Western model, succeeded in setting the British Minister against the Russian Minister about the Tsushima affair. Russia was obliged to abandon the islands. See the Katsu Kaishu (a life of Katsu), Tokio, 1899, iii. pp. 57–59. 96. It is interesting to hear that Russian school text-books enumerate Korea and Manchuria among the Russian spheres of influence.—A letter from Tosuisei, dated St. Petersburg, February 13, 1900, in the Kokumin, April 1, 1900. 97. It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which the writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is understood among the people here. A vast majority of people, not excluding recognized writers and speakers on the East, seem to ascribe to Japan certain territorial designs, particularly in Korea. It is not remembered that Japan was the first country to recognize the independence of Korea, the cause of which also cost Japan a war with China. The present war with Russia is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s vital interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly follows that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow her to fall into the hands of another Power. If Korea is really unable to stand on her feet, the solution of the difficulty does not, in Japan’s view, consist in possessing her, but in making her independence real by developing her resources and reorganizing and strengthening her national institutions. It is in this work that Japan’s assistance was offered and accepted. It would be as difficult for any impartial student not to see the need of such assistance as to confuse it with annexation. It would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the task as extremely difficult and dangerously prone to abuse. Further, see pp. 366 ff., below. 98. Russian exports for 1900–2 are classified as follows (1000 rubles as unit):—
It is seen that the exportation of food-stuffs was the largest in value and increasing, while that of manufactured articles was the smallest (2.5 per cent.) and, to say the least, stationary. Imports were as follows:—
The importation of manufactures decreased, but also that of raw material did not increase, while, as shown above, the exportation of manufactures was slight and stationary. Figures have been taken from the Tsusho Isan for November 25, 1903, which drew them from Russian official sources. It is interesting to note the unfavorable conditions of the foreign trade of Russia’s ally, France, in U. S. Consul Atwell’s report in the daily Consular Reports for February 24, 1904 (No. 1884), who quotes from Georges Blondel. 99. See the Supplementary Note to this chapter on pages 61–64. 100. Documents of that time clearly indicate that the discovery of gold in California and the westward expansion of the American nation, as well as the growing prospects of the China trade and the increasing application of steam in navigation, were the motives which prompted the United States Government to open negotiations with Japan in 1853. 101. To-day there seem to be about 84,500 public schools in Russia, of which 40,000 are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education [compared with 30,157 public and private schools in Japan in 1902]. Toward the maintenance of the 40,000 schools, the ministry appropriates only about $2,000,000, or a little over one eighth of the annual cost. The teachers number 172,000 [in Japan, 126,703, in 1902], and pupils and students, 4,568,763 [in Japan in 1902, 5,469,419]. 7,250,000 children of school age are without any education [while in Japan, in 1902, the ratio of attendance to the number of children of school age was 95.80 per cent. for boys and 87.00 per cent. for girls, or, on the average, 91.57 per cent.]. See the U. S. daily Consular Reports for February 8 and March 4, 1902 (Nos. 1871 and 1892), [and the Kwampo, April 8, 1904]. 102. As an evidence for this striking state of things the reader is referred to Dr. E. J. Dillon’s article in the American Review of Reviews for October, 1904, pp. 449–454. The whole subject should be more carefully studied than it seems to have been thus far. 103. “The whole northern part of Asia Minor, according to the treaty between Russia and Turkey, is now placed under such conditions that Russian capitalists have the area open to them, to the exclusion of foreign enterprise. A situation analogous is found in Persia, where the entire northern portion is acknowledged to be under the exclusive economic influence of Russia.”—Consul Greener at Vladivostok, in the U. S. daily Consular Reports, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627). 104. For example, the normal freight per ton from Russia to Eastern Siberia would be about twenty-one rubles, while that from Japan or Shanghai is three or four rubles. If Russian goods were sold to the artificial exclusion of articles exported from nearer countries, the consumer’s burden would be greatly increased. 105. Count Cassini, the present Russian Ambassador at Washington, wrote, in the North American Review for May, 1904: “... But let us suppose for argument’s sake that Russia, triumphant in this war, finds herself dominant in Manchuria. Japan, her enemy, could look for no favors; she could not expect to find encouragement for the importation of her manufactures” (p. 688). 106. Continuing, the Count stated: “But Manchuria would require many things that Russia could not supply, or supply at figures reasonable enough to create a market. In Russia, agriculture is, comparatively speaking, more important than manufacturing, and those goods which are made in my country are not such as Manchuria would need. Russia, too, would be obliged to use the railway with its high freight tariffs....”—Ibid. 107. One can seldom find a more outspoken confession of a diplomacy consisting of a series of deliberate falsehoods than the chapters on the Russian relations with China, Korea, and Japan, in a diplomatic history by a Russian writer, as translated in the Dobun-kwai Hokoku, Nos. 45, 46, 48, 49, and 50 (August, September, November, and December, 1903, and January, 1904). 108. The Russian diplomatic historian to whom frequent reference has been made frankly says that the feebleness and internal disorder of China are welcome conditions for the expansion of Russian influence in the Far East, and that it would be the height of folly to displace the weak China with a colonial possession of a European power.—The Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 48, p. 36. 110. The Shiberiya oyobi Manshu, pp. 221–223. 111. The Shiberiya oyobi Manshu, pp. 223–225, 490–495. 112. The Tsusho Isan, July 8, 1903, p. 4. 113. The New York Evening Post, January 20, 1903. 114. The U. S. daily Consular Reports, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627). 115. The U. S. daily Consular Reports, February 24, 1904 (No. 1884). 116. The North American Review, May, 1904, p. 688. 117. See the negotiations of 1852, 1859, and 1862, and the treaties of 1855 and 1867, between Russia and Japan, regarding the Kuriles and Sakhalien. The To-A Kwankei Tokushu Joyaku Isan (a collection of special treaties relating to Eastern Asia, compiled by the To-A Dobun-kivai, Tokio, 1904. Cloth, 4o, xiv + xii + 812 + 70; hereafter abbreviated as Tokushu Joyaku), pp. 1–8. This work, which is in Japanese and Chinese, is by far the most complete collection of the treaties and conventions concluded between Japan, China, and Korea, and other Powers. It also contains historical notes explaining the origin and nature of many important agreements. 118. Treaty of Aigun, May 16, 1858, Article I.—Ibid., pp. 200–202 (Chinese); W. F. Mayers’s Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers, 3d edition, Shanghai, 1901, p. 100 (French). 119. Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860, Article I.—Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 202–203 (Japanese); Mayers, p. 105 (French). 121. See Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 5–14. See a Russian view of these affairs in the Dobun-kwai, No. 50 (January, 1904), pp. 25–30. See also Z. Nakamura, Chishima Karafuto Shinryaku-shi (history of Russian aggression in the Kuriles and Sakhalien), Tokio, 1904. 122. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 78–79, 719. 123. See, for instance, the London Times, November 7, 1894, p. 5. 124. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 79–80. 125. For the text of this treaty, see the Treaties and Conventions between the Empire of Japan and Other Powers, compiled by the Foreign Office, Tokio, 1899, pp. 377 ff.; Mayers, pp. 181–184; U. S. 54th Congress, 1st Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 200–203; etc. 126. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 43–45, 80. 127. The London Times, April 22, 1895, p. 5. 128. The London Times, April 22, 1895, p. 5. 129. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 81–82. 130. The German note, which was accompanied by a Romanized translation into Japanese, is said to have contained a statement to the effect that Japan was weak, Germany was powerful, and Japan would surely be defeated in case she should go to war with Germany. This peculiar sentence was, at the protest of the Japanese Foreign Office, expunged from the note.—Tokushu Joyaku, p. 86 131. To the last moment Russia, it is said, persisted in advising China to postpone the ratification. 132. The London Times, May 3, 1895, p. 5; M. de Blowitz’s correspondence, dated Paris, May 2. 133. The declaration made in November, 1903, by a person intimately associated with Marquis Ito, who was the Premier during the war.—The Kokumin Shimbun, November 10, 1903. 134. Germany is said to have undertaken, when her note was presented, to guarantee a monetary consideration from China. By the treaty between Japan and China, concluded on September 22, the sum was fixed at 30,000,000 taels. 135. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 81–87. As has been said, the diplomatic correspondence of the day has not been published by any of the Powers concerned. The information briefly given in the text has been culled from, besides Tokushu Joyaku, the leading articles of the Tokio Nichi-Nichi Shimbun (Tokio Daily News), a semi-official organ of the Japanese Government at the time, as quoted in the Nisshin Sen Shi (history of the Japan-China war, Tokio, 1894–5, 8 vols.), vol. viii. pp. 141–171. These articles give a minute and careful account of the diplomacy of the day, and may largely be relied upon as authentic. 136. It will be remembered that Japan had in 1894 revised her treaties with the Powers, and thereby freed herself from the yoke of consular jurisdiction and placed the foreign residents within her domain under the jurisdiction of her own law, and also largely restored her tariff autonomy. 137. The position which the military and naval expenditures have occupied in the finance of the Japanese Government since the war of 1894–5 may be gathered from the following table (unit, 1000 yen; yen = 49.8 cents):—
138. To take only a few tangible instances, Japan’s national budget grew more than three-fold during the ten years before 1903, her foreign trade in 1903 was 263% as large as it was in 1894, her private companies increased from less than 3000 in 1894 to 8600 in 1902, with a corresponding growth of their authorized capital from less than 200 million to 1,226.7 million yen, and her population itself has increased perhaps by 12%. A decisive development has also taken place in both the internal politics and the international relations of Japan. 139. An attempt has been universally made during the present war to explain the apparent contempt of death of the Japanese soldier as due to his low estimate of human life, or else to his fatalistic view of the world. It may be seriously doubted whether these explanations are tenable. At least it may be said that in no other case would the sons of Japan so fearlessly and cheerfully face death. It is impossible to discover in them a less fear of death than in other nations. Life is dear, but it is sacrificed to a cause which is considered higher than life. It was the primary lesson in the education of the samurai to choose death when it saved honor and when life was selfish. This view of life has now been transferred from the narrow sphere of the individual person or fief to the large field of the entire nation, whose cause, it is believed, represents the best postulates of human progress. It would, perhaps, be legitimate to criticise the incidental abuse of this feeling, or to question whether the same loyalty might not be transferred to a still higher region than the state, but the subject must first be understood by the critic. 140. See our Introduction. 141. Actual account on October 31, 1903. 142. Settled accounts. 143. Estimates in the budget. All based on the Fourth Annual. 144. See Henri Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860–1902 (3 vols.), vol. iii (Paris, 1902), pp. 305–306. The loan contract, dated June 24, 1895, appears in Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 660–667. 145. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 667–668. 146. Cf. Art. 15 of the contract. 147. The other half, £16,000,000, was supplied by some British and German subjects by the contract of March 11, 1896, at 5% interest, and repayable in thirty-six years. Another £16,000,000 loan was later supplied by the same parties.—Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 668–673. 148. 5,000,000 taels were, however, as will be seen below, used for another purpose. 149. The contract dated August 25, 1896.—Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 640–641. 150. According to a Peking correspondent to the Kokumin (May 30, 1904), the Chinese Government had been paying the stipulated 4% interest for this sum to the French creditors, but the Bank had never repaid the interest to China. Moreover, the Niu-chwang branch of the Bank, since the Russians occupied the port in August, 1900, had been receiving the returns of the Chinese maritime customs there, which finally amounted to about 5,000,000 taels. Neither the principal nor the interest of this sum had been paid by the Bank to the Chinese Government. 151. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 642–660. 152. Tokushu Joyaku, p. 231. 153. The Japanese text appears in ibid., pp. 231–234. 154. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 234–236. A French translation is found in Cordier, Histoire, vol. iii. pp. 343–347. 155. The British Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1898), Dispatch No. 14, pp. 5–6. Cf. China, No. 2 (1899), No. 2, in which M. Pavloff claims to have secured in December, 1897, a repetition of this pledge. 156. See China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 28–29, modified Article 12. Sir Ernest Satow, however, denied that any such agreement existed. See China, No. 2 (1904), No. 30, March 19, 1901. 157. See China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 13, 38, 26, 43, 111, 113, 115, 117, 121; China, No. 2 (1899), Nos. 2, 9, 10, 52, 65; China, No. 1 (1900), No. 321. 158. China, No. 2 (1899), No. 138. 159. China, No. 1 (1900), No. 148. 160. Ibid., pp. 112, 116, 120, 132, 160, 180, 214–215. 161. China, No. 1 (1898), Dispatch No. 37, pp. 12–13, Goschen to Salisbury. 162. China, No. 1 (1896), p. 6, Conversation on October 18, 1897. 163. See Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 274–275. 164. See Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 274–275. 165. The Times, March 20, 1901, p. 5. This evidence, however, cannot for a moment be considered equivalent to the others which have been cited. Not only is it silent about the contents of the agreements, but also the “assent” of the Prince may be due to some misunderstanding. In the same article, Dr. Morrison goes on to say: “I have reason to believe that the original Russian draft promised China protection only against Japan, but was modified at the request of the Chinese to include protection against aggression by all foreign Powers. China invoked its provisions after Germany seized Kiao-chau, but Russia turned a deaf ear.” This statement is again as vague as the reported text of the treaty of alliance of 1896. It is to be regretted that the writer did not explicitly state his “reason.” 166. The North American Review for May, 1904, p. 683. 167. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 495–498 (a Japanese translation). The present writer is also in possession of the Chinese text. He is not aware that its European translation has ever been published. Its contents are found in Alexander Hosie, Manchuria, pp. 43–44. 168. The Manchurian provinces are called “the Chinese Eastern Three Provinces,” and hence the name of this railway and of the Company. It is essential to keep this line in mind apart from the Chinese Northern railway system referred to on pages 156–157. 169. “Of her own volition,” as Cassini added. See the North American Review for May, 1904, p. 683. 170. According to Art. 12, these 5,000,000 taels were to be returned to the Chinese Government as soon as the line was in running order. It will be remembered that the government was responsible for the contribution of an equal amount of money to the capital of the Russo-Chinese Bank. It is probable that the money has been transferred from the Company to the Bank, so as to make it pay two bills, the one after the other. It has already been reported that the money was originally paid out of the Russo-French loan of 1895. If this report is true, the whole arrangement may be characterized as extremely clever on the part of Russia. Cf. p. 84, note 4, above. 171. Confirmed by the Czar on December 4/16, presented to the Ruling Senate on December 8/20, and finally published in the Bulletins des Lois on December 11/23, 1896. See an English translation of their text in the British Parliamentary Papers, Russia, No. 1 (1898), and China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 57–61; a Japanese translation in Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 495–500. At the further extension of the railway by the agreement of March 27, 1898, supplementary statutes were promulgated on February 5, 1899. See ibid., pp. 516–520. 172. Articles 10–16. 173. Page 32, above. 174. The Chinese Minister to St. Petersburg at that time was appointed the first president. 175. Articles 18–27; Agreement, Article 1. 176. Article 8. Compare Art. 5 of the Agreement, which contains merely the former part of this arrangement, i. e., the protection of the railway and its appurtenances by the Chinese Government. 177. The Agreement, Art. 12; the Statutes, Art. 2. 178. The Agreement, Art. 10; the Statutes, Art. 3. 180. Herr von Richthofen, now the Foreign Minister of Germany, and the greatest authority on Chinese geology, wrote an article in the Kolonialzeitung of January 6, 1898, describing the mineral resources of the province, and concluding that the Power which possessed Kiao-chau would control the coal supply in northern Chinese waters. See China, No. 1 (1898), p. 21. The same authority had shown years ago the advantageous position of Kiao-chau. It will also be remembered that during the Chinese-Japanese war, war-vessels of several Powers were temporarily anchored here, so that the superb position of the port was familiar to every one. 181. “Considering that there has never been any disagreement existing between China and Germany, and that the German Government came to the assistance of China in securing the evacuation of the Liao-tung Peninsula by the Japanese for which she has never been recompensed; and further, as England, France, and Russia have taken maritime ports in the East, and as Germany has no port as a rendezvous for her vessels and for a coaling station, her position is not equal to the other great Powers.”—The Tsung-li YamÊn’s memorial to the Throne, translated in Mr. Denby’s dispatch of March 9, 1898 (U. S. 55th Congress, 3d Session, House Documents, vol. i, p. 189). The same sentiment may have prompted the Tsung-li YamÊn to make the offers stated in the text. 182. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 25. 183. U. S. 55th Congress, 3d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 189. 184. China, No. 1 (1899), p. 67. 185. Tokushu Joyaku, p. 355. 186. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 3. 187. Ibid. 188. Ibid., No. 2. Cf. House Documents, op. cit., pp. 187–189, a memorial of the YamÊn to the Throne. 189. The lease was later fixed for ninety-nine years. The leased territory covers about 540 square kilometres (208.4 square miles), including about 80,000 inhabitants. 190. Das Staatsarchiv, Band 61, No. 11518. 191. Meyers, pp. 281–282; China, No. 1 (1899), No. 65; Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 359–360, 363–365. 192. For the extraordinary proceedings of the German Minister in his dealings with the Chinese Government, see China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 5, 6, 17, 20, 34, 35, 40, 53, 70, 73, and 113. Also see Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 355–357. 193. See China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 39, 49, 74. It is interesting to observe that when, in order to restore the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, which had been disturbed by the lease of Port Arthur by Russia, England demanded the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, she took pains to explain to Germany that her acquisition of the port, the meaning of which was purely military, would in no way interfere with the German interests in Shan-tung, and that there would be no attempt to make railway connections with Wei-hai-Wei. An interesting diplomatic correspondence followed this explanation, which it is hardly necessary to describe. What is emphasized here is that England, in negotiating the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, largely reciprocated the cordiality Germany had shown in her occupation of Kiao-chau. See China, No. 1 (1899), Nos. 2, 8, 9, 10, and 31. 194. China, No. 1 (1898), p. 20. 195. Ibid., p. 14, No. 39. Sir Claude MacDonald had already written to the Tsung-li YamÊn, on December 10: “I have the honor to inform your Highnesses and your Excellencies that I have received telegraphic instructions from Her Majesty’s Government to address the YamÊn with regard to the concession in Shan-tung which it is reported that the German Government has asked from China. I am directed to state that Her Majesty’s Government will demand equality of treatment for British subjects according to the treaty rights possessed by Great Britain, and that Her Majesty’s Government will require compensation on any points in respect to which those rights may be disregarded.”—Ibid., p. 28, inclosure in No. 70. 196. See China, No. 1 (1899), p. 240, No. 322; China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 12–13, 35, 146–147, 106, 233, and 241–244. 197. It is unnecessary to recount the painful negotiations in 1898–9 concerning the Tien-tsin-Ching-kiang railway concession, in which the German claim in Shan-tung was strongly presented, and had to be recognized to a large extent by the British Government. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 14, 16, 17–18, 33, 118, 121, 175, 180. 198. Cf. China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 1 and 15. China seems to have requested Russia to advise Germany to reconsider her action. Later, Russia is said to have reported that she had failed to change the mind of the Kaiser. 199. Count Muravieff’s remark to Sir N. O’Conor, the British ChargÉ at St. Petersburg, on March 28, 1898.—China, No. 1 (1898), No. 125. 200. Kiao-chau was occupied on November 17, three Russian war-vessels came to Port Arthur on December 18, 1897; the German-Chinese Agreement was concluded on March 5, the formal demand by Russia was presented about the 7th, and granted on the 27th of the same month, 1898. 201. Ibid., pp. 42–43, Nos. 95, 96, 98, 100. It is interesting to note that, on February 4, 1902, when negotiations were in progress between Russia and China, the former supporting large exclusive demands made by the Russo-Chinese Bank in Manchuria, M. Lessar, the Russian Minister, said that his Government was merely asking for privileges similar to those of Germany in Shan-tung.—U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 274. 202. China, No. 1 (1898), p. 9, No. 231. 203. The statement made by Count Muravieff, on December 22, 1897, at his diplomatic reception, and reported by Mr. W. E. Goschen.—China, No. 1 (1898), pp. 12–13, No. 37. 204. See Ibid., Nos. 26, 43, 62. At the same time, M. Pavloff, the Russian ChargÉ at Peking, demanded the dismissal of Mr. Kinder, British chief engineer of the Northern Railway.—Ibid., No. 38; cf. Nos. 111, 115, 117. 205. M. Pavloff’s own story to Sir Claude MacDonald, on March 17, 1898.—China, No. 2 (1899), No. 2. 206. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 26. 207. Ibid., Nos. 30, 32, 43, 46. Some of the other terms were: (1) the maritime and native customs, salt tax, and likin, as security; (2) a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yang-tsze valley; (3) a guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yang-tsze valley to any other Power; (4) the opening of some other ports; (5) the pledge that so long as the British trade with China was larger than the trade of any other nation, the inspector-general of customs should always be an Englishman; (6) a freer internal navigation; etc. These terms seem to have been framed so as to protect British interests in China strictly within the scope of the most-favored-nation principle. The demand for the opening of Talien-wan and Nanning strongly prejudiced England against Russia and France, while the Burma-Yang-tsze Railway was unpleasing to France, and the non-alienation of the river valley was sometimes regarded by Russia as a counterpart of her own claims beyond the Great Wall. The whole story of the loan negotiation, as well as that of the Northern Railway extension loan, is highly interesting and important in the recent history of China, but we are here concerned with the bearing of the first loan on the development of the Manchurian question. 208. It is highly interesting to note that during the latter part of 1903, when Russian aggression in Manchuria and on the northern frontier of Korea was feared, the American and Japanese Governments, with the moral support of the British, made successful efforts to open Mukden, Tatung-kao, and An-tung to foreign trade. This proposition had met a strong Russian opposition, which also delayed, till after the outbreak of the present war, the opening of Wiju on the Korean border. 209. China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 51, 57. 210. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 59. 211. Ibid., Nos. 72, 76, 123, etc. 212. The most-favored-nation clause is referred to, which—sometimes in general and sometimes in specific terms, and sometimes reciprocal and conditional, but nearly always unilateral and unconditional—is inserted in the treaty of China with each Power. See Mayers, op. cit. 213. A dispute arose later between the Russian and British Governments on this word “any” (tout). The latter interpreted it to mean any port secured by Russia in China, while the former claimed that the Czar’s Government had never promised to open Port Arthur to foreign trade.—March 13, 1898; China, No. 1 (1898), pp. 47–48, No. 114. 214. Ibid., No. 76. 215. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 83. 217. Compare the Russian reply to Secretary Hay’s note of September, 1899, pp. 135–138, below. 218. On January 17.—China, No. 1 (1898), No. 56. Cf. No. 62. 219. Ibid., Nos. 65, 69, 75, 78, 79. 220. In his speech before the House of Lords on February 8. See ibid., Nos. 82, 83, 87; the Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 53, pp. 40–41. 221. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 54. 222. Ibid., No. 59. 223. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 85. 224. Ibid., No. 88. 225. Ibid., Nos. 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103. 226. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 95 (Salisbury to MacDonald). 227. The Russian Government soon had occasion to gauge the strength of the British protest, for, on March 8, Sir N. O’Conor made a striking statement to Count Muravieff, as will be seen in the following report (ibid., No. 108, O’Conor to Salisbury): “I alluded, as no doubt his Excellency was aware, to the junction of the Burmese and Chinese railway systems. This demand became at once still more necessary and reasonable if greater privileges of the same kind were accorded to Russia in the Liao-tung Peninsula, as they had apparently already been accorded in Manchuria. Count Muravieff did not, however, respond to these remarks beyond saying that he supposed the Burma-Chinese line would, in this case, descend to the valley of the Yang-tsze.” The Count’s remark may be considered a sufficient reply, when it is seen in connection with another remark he made a few moments earlier. When Sir N. O’Conor alluded to the objectionable features of leasing Port Arthur, the Foreign Minister reminded him that British interests were principally represented in the neighborhood of the Yang-tsze. Russia would evade the British protest by turning England’s attention to her own sphere, in which Russia had little interest, and would not object to a British repetition there of Russia’s conduct in Manchuria. Muravieff must have thought that O’Conor, by his reference to the Burmese Railway, now voluntarily threw himself into his net. Russia later succeeded in inducing England to conclude the Anglo-Russian railway declaration of April 28, 1899, delimiting in a negative manner the railway spheres of the two Powers in China, Russia pledging not to seek concessions and not to obstruct those of the British in the Yang-tsze valley, and England pledging similarly in regard to Russian concessions beyond the Great Wall. (See China, No. 2 (1899), No. 138.) The Russian Government naturally considered the conclusion of this agreement as a diplomatic victory over the British, and seemed to have interpreted its terms as implying that all the territory beyond the Great Wall was the Russian sphere, not only of railway concessions, but also of general interests and influence. Already in May of the same year, M. Pavloff renewed his demand at Peking for the concession of a Russian railway to be built directly to the Chinese capital, thus even overreaching the limit set in the British agreement of less than a fortnight previous. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 112, 116, 120, 129, 132–133, 214–215. 228. China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 101, 105, 108, 110, 114, 120, 149. 229. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 104. 230. Ibid., No. 114. 231. Ibid., No. 120. 232. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 138. The Marquess did not refer to a matter of enormous importance, that the proposed railways would connect the immense land and sea forces of Russia, which he emphasized. 233. China, No. 1 (1900), Nos. 123 and 133. 234. “I cannot say that my efforts were successful.... I was unable to induce his Excellency to modify his views.”—Ibid., Nos. 125 and 132. 235. Ibid., No. 126. 236. China, No. 1 (1900), No. 129. 237. Ibid., No. 138. 238. Ibid., Nos. 134, 136, and 137. 239. Cf. ibid., Nos. 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 149, and 151. 240. Ibid., No. 144. The agreement was signed at Peking on July 1. See Treaty Series, No. 14, 1898. 241. “Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur by the YamÊn to Russia. It is therefore necessary to obtain,” etc.—Salisbury to MacDonald, March 25; China, No. 1 (1898), No. 129. Cf. also China, No. 1 (1899), No. 2. It should be said, in justice to Great Britain, that at first, when the Chinese Government intimated toward the end of February that they would lease Wei-hai-Wei to her if she would accept it, Lord Salisbury considered such an offer premature, for his Government “aimed at discouraging any alienation of Chinese territory.”—Ibid., Nos. 90 and 91. 242. Two other instances may here be cited to further illustrate the policy of the British Government during this critical period of time. (1) Soon after the appearance of Russian war-vessels at Port Arthur, Admiral Buller, of the China station of the British navy, arrived at Chemulpo with seven ships, on December 29, and ordered the “ImmortalitÉ” and “Iphigenia” to proceed to Port Arthur. The former was, on January 10, ordered to leave for Chefu. The presence of the British boats created “a bad impression” on Russia, which requested England to avoid dangers of conflict in the Russian “sphere of influence.” The British Government explained that the ships had been sent by the Admiral without instruction from the Admiralty, and would soon leave, “in ordinary course of cruising.” It was added, at the same time, that British ships had a perfect right to proceed to Port Arthur. It was reported at one time that the two boats had been ordered away from Port Arthur under protest from Russia.—Ibid., Nos. 31, 48, 52, 63, 66, 68. (2) On March 8, Sir Claude MacDonald was informed by the Tsung-li YamÊn that the only reason given by M. Pavloff for the demand of the lease of the two ports was to “assist in protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers.” Probably England and Japan were meant, and the YamÊn was fully alive to the absurdity of this pretext, but was unable to resist the Russian demands. It therefore begged earnestly that the British Government would assist it by giving a formal assurance to the Russian Government that England had no designs on Manchuria. It does not seem to have been thought necessary by the British Government to give such an assurance. See ibid., Nos. 100 and 109. 243. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 114 (O’Conor to Salisbury, March 13). 244. Ibid., No. 29. 245. “The Japanese Government,” said Baron Nishi, Foreign Minister of Japan, confidentially, to Sir Ernest Satow, about March 20, “had been anxious that China should be able to maintain her position at Wei-hai-Wei, but if she found it impossible to do so, Japan would have no objection to its being held by a Power disposed to assist in maintaining the independence of China.”—China, No. 1 (1899), No. 35. Cf. also Nos. 49, 79, 81, 107, etc. 246. Ibid., Nos. 85, 112, 118, 231, 238. Russia had undertaken to request Japan to promise that China would secure Wei-hai-Wei after the Japanese evacuation, but Japan declined to make such a pledge.—Ibid., No. 30. In April, 1902, the control of Wei-hai-Wei was transferred from the Admiralty to the Colonial Office. The mouth of the harbor is so large that it would require an enormous expenditure and large forces to fortify and defend it adequately. At the time when England leased the port, she was hardly inclined to let financial considerations thwart her effort to restore her prestige so abruptly foreshadowed by that of Russia. In 1902, however, the lately concluded Anglo-Japanese agreement of alliance rendered the fortification of Wei-hai-Wei no longer necessary. See Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 172–173. 247. China, No. 1 (1899), pp. 127–129, No. 187, dated Peking, April 29. Regarding this prÉcis, Sir Claude says: “It bears every sign of foreign authorship, and the original cannot have been drafted by a Chinese. I have no doubt that the document correctly represents the sense of the original agreement, for it fully corresponds with what I have been able to learn of the contents of the latter.” M. Cordier also relies on this prÉcis in his Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, vol. iii. pp. 362–364. 248. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 244–245. This Chinese text naturally clears up some points which are obscure in the prÉcis. 249. See China, No. 1 (1899), p. 188, No. 273. Also Cordier, Histoire, vol. iii. pp. 365–366. A Japanese version obtained from the Foreign Office at Tokio appears in Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 246–247. The Special Agreement was supplemented by another Agreement concluded on April 25 (o. s.), 1899. 250. The boundary of the leased territory began with the northern side of A-tang Bay (Port Adams), on the west coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and passed through and included the A-tang Mountains, ending near Pi-tse-wo, and including the adjacent waters and isles. The northern limit of the neutral ground started at the mouth of the Kai-chow River, passed north of Yuyen-ch’Êng and along the Ta-yang River, and ended at and included its mouth. 251. See the Czar’s telegraphic message to the Chinese Emperor, on March 15/27; and his Imperial orders of March 17/29 and July 30/August 11. China, No. 1 (1899), pp. 20–21, 1–2, and 262–263. 252. Meaning, presumably, east of Shan-hai-kwan. 253. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 292–293, 304–311, and 335. Also the Tsusho Isan (Japanese Consular Reports), April 28, 1904, pp. 33–46. 254. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 262–263. 255. China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 308–311. 256. Conditions at Dalny since its foundation are minutely described by M. Suzuki, agent of the Japanese Foreign Office in the Tsusho Isan for April 23 (pp. 39–49), 28 (pp. 32–46), May 3 (pp. 37–49), 8 (pp. 42–55), 12 (pp. 36–42), and 18 (pp. 33–37), 1904. 257. China, No. 2 (1900), No. 1. 258. Ibid., Nos. 2, 3, 4, and inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, in No. 5. 259. The italics in the quotations are the author’s. 260. China, No. 2 (1900), inclosure 6 in No. 5. 261. Ibid., No. 5, White to Salisbury, March 30, 1900. 262. Cf. ibid., No. 6. 263. It may reasonably be said that the meaning of the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, in regard to Japan’s claim upon the Liao-tung Peninsula may be gathered, in a retroactive way, from Russia’s conduct in Manchuria since 1896. At any rate, M. Pavloff declared, in October, 1897, that “the Russian Government intended that the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.”—China, No. 1 (1898), p. 6. This declaration throws light not only on the trans-Manchurian railway concessions and the lease of ports, but also on Russia’s action respecting the Northern Railway extension and the consequent Anglo-Russian agreement of April, 1899. In May, 1898, there were already 200 Russian soldiers in Kirin, and in December, 2000 in Port Arthur and Talien-wan, while many Cossacks guarded railway construction, and many barracks were being hurriedly built, so that there were sufficient indications even before 1900 that Russia regarded Manchuria as her sphere of influence. 264. May 29.—China, No. 3 (1900), No. 5. 265. Cf. China, No. 4 (1900), No. 1 (June 5). 266. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 94; No. 4 (1900), No. 1 (June 8). 267. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 219 (June 16–26). 268. Ibid., No. 133; No. 4 (1900), No. 2 (evening, June 13). 269. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 122 (June 13). 270. Ibid., Nos. 132, 148, 157, and 186 (June 17). 271. Ibid., No. 157. 272. Ibid., No. 159. It is true that some of these events had not been known to Muravieff, but enough news had reached him to show the extreme gravity of the situation. 273. Ibid., No. 149 (June 16). 274. Ibid., No. 159. Also see Nos. 43, 45, 48, 65, 58, 114, 120, all indicating the optimistic view of the Count. 275. Cf. ibid., No. 120 (June 13). 276. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 149 (June 16). In the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor’s appeal for a friendly intervention, it was stated that “the efforts of Russia had but one object in view, namely, to assist in the reËstablishment of order and tranquillity in the Chinese Empire, and, inspired by their traditional friendship for China, the Imperial Government have decided to render to the Chinese Government every assistance with a view to repressing the present troubles.” From the Russian Official Gazette, as reported by Sir Charles Scott on August 2, 1900; China, No. 1 (1901), No. 105. It is noteworthy that Russia had raised objections to sending large forces from Japan to the relief of Peking, one reason being that she supposed they would be commissioned, not only to rescue the Legations, but also to suppress rebellion and restore peace in Peking and Tientsin.—Ibid., No. 29. 277. Ibid., No. 175. A writer of diplomatic history of Russia, himself a Russian, considers that the anti-foreign uprising was owing to the conduct of other Powers [presumably in sending Christian missionaries], in which Russia had never participated; and that, therefore, it was purely accidental that she took part in the Boxer campaign. See the To-A Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 48, pp. 35–36. 278. Tokushu Joyaku, p. 258. It is said that M. Witte was at the time opposed to sending so large forces into Manchuria. 279. The Kokumin, March 8, 1901. 280. But how soon before the order of mobilization is unknown. Writing on June 29 from St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Scott said that the Russian Government was alarmed by some news received on that day of the serious disturbances which had occurred near the Manchurian Railway, and it was rumored that the Boxers were attacking and destroying the line north of Mukden, and had cut off telegraphic communications with Vladivostok. “The Chinese Legation [at St. Petersburg] is much alarmed by this report,” continued the British Ambassador, “as they had been seriously warned that the slightest movement against the safety of the Russian line would be followed by an instant and forcible action by Russia.”—China, No. 3 (1900), No. 240. 281. The Kokumin, March 8, 1901, etc. 282. China, No. 1 (1901), No. 47. 283. There were other cases reported of the slaughter of noncombatants. The aggregate of those people killed was said to have reached 25,000. See Tokushu Joyaku, p. 261, which gives a list of these cases in detail. 284. The Kokumin, March 8, 1901, etc. 285. See the reports of the British Consuls Hosie and Fulford and the American Consul Miller, in China, No. 5 (1900), p. 47; No. 2 (1904), pp. 29–33, etc.; and the 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 147–158. At one time the relations between the American sailors and citizens and the Russian authorities were wrought up to a high tension, and Mr. Miller used so strong language in his correspondence with the latter that he had to be warned by Minister Conger of Peking and Assistant Secretary Pierce at Washington. 286. See Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 258–262. 287. Count Lamsdorff said on November 22, 1903, to Mr. Kurino, Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, that “Russia once took possession of Manchuria by right of conquest....” The Kwampo, March 24, 1904, supplement, p. 8. 288. The circular note addressed to the Powers on June 3/16, China, No. 3 (1900), No. 49; the letter to the Chinese Government on June 11/24, China, No. 2 (1904), p. 18; the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor, China, No. 1 (1901), No. 105, etc. The Emperor had sent a specially worded personal message to each of the heads of the French, German, Russian, British, American, and Japanese nations, once about July 19 and again on October 14, that is, before and after the capture of Peking by the allied forces. In each case the Emperor made a special appeal to the person addressed, and begged him to take the initiative in coming to China’s assistance in solving the situation. The various replies are highly instructive. It seems that the Czar supposed that he had alone been singled out by the Chinese Empire for the first special plea, and answered accordingly. See China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 1, 51, 56, 61, 78, 79, 105, 113, 252; China, No. 5 (1901), Nos. 5, 24, 72, 108, 134, 174, 197; China, No. 2 (1904), p. 18; 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 293–296. 289. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 149. 290. These principles, says Lord Salisbury, on July 15, “have never been accepted by Her Majesty’s Government, nor have we as yet discussed with other powers the circumstances to which those principles might possibly apply.”—China, No. 1 (1901), No. 44. Secretary Hay thought that the Russian ChargÉ’s oral communication was “not explicit enough” to enable him to comment upon the so-called fundamental principles of Russia.—Ibid., No. 114. Later, about July 30, Mr. Hay replied to Russia by referring to his own circular note of July 3, and said that he deemed it “premature to forecast the means of bringing about those results [i. e., the restoration of order and responsible government in China].”—Ibid., No. 140. It is particularly remarkable that two of the Powers most interested in the principles proposed by Russia should be so conservative when the question was propounded by that Power. 291. China, No. 2 (1904), pp. 1 and 18. It is interesting to compare these “fundamental principles” of Russia with the principles laid down in Secretary Hay’s circular telegraph addressed to the Powers on July 3, or probably some days before the Russian note: “... The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore,” it said, “to act concurrently with the other Powers, first, in opening up communication with Peking and securing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disorders. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety, and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”—The 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 299. It will be observed that the American note is not only probably earlier in date, but also much wider in scope, than the Russian propositions, for the former contains the open door principle, among others, which receives no reference in the latter. It should be remembered, however, that the American note was not a proposition to the other Powers. 292. China, No. 1 (1901), No. 256. 293. Statements of similar import occur in the Official Messenger of August 13, in the instructions given on October 25 by Count Lamsdorff to the Russian Representatives abroad, and those on December 28 by General Kuropatkin to the governors-general of the Amur and Kwan-tung Provinces. See Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 259–260. 294. Cf. China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 267, 300, 314, 315. Also see the most interesting Russian document, quoted in China, No. 2 (1904), p. 20. One of its passages reads as follows: “It must not be forgotten that an attack on the ancient traditions of the Chinese and on the prestige of their Government might be attended by the most disastrous consequences; all the more so that the international troops cannot occupy indefinitely the capital of a country of 400,000,000 inhabitants, whose right to live at home as they please can hardly be questioned.” 295. China, No. 1 (1901), No. 306. Also see No. 313. On August 19 and 21, Li Hung-chang wired to Wu Ting-fang to urge upon the United States Government that, inasmuch as the declared purpose of the allies to relieve the Legations had now been accomplished, they should suspend hostilities, withdraw their troops, and appoint envoys to negotiate with China. See ibid., No. 239, and the 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 197, 288–290. We may naturally infer either that Li sent similar telegrams to Russia, or that Russia had consulted Li before the circular was sent to the Powers, the general tenor of thought is so alike in the telegrams and in the circular. 296. Russia herself was conscious of the fact that others attributed to her the motive of ingratiating herself with China at a critical moment by taking, separately from the other Powers, an action favorable to China. See China, No. 2 (1904), pp. 19–20. 297. See China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 275 (Austria); 280, 322, 328, (France); 309 (Italy); 281, 293, 305, 317, 318, 321, 327, 335, 378, 383 (England); 307; No. 5 (1901), Nos. 110, 124, 127 (Japan); No. 1 (1901), Nos. 270, 315; 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. ii. pp. 304–305, 378–379, 205 (the United States). As a matter of fact, the Boxers still roamed about Peking, and the Chinese Court, which had fled to Ta-yuen, was still under the control of Prince Tuan and his associates. A hasty withdrawal of troops from Peking would have been disastrous in its effect upon the foreigners and native Christians. 298. See China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 356 (Russian proposition); 371, 395, 401 (England); 398 (Italy); No. 5 (1901), No. 128, (Japan); House Documents, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382. 299. China, No. 1 (1901), No. 375. 300. China, No. 7 (1901), Nos. 21, 76, 81, 84, 86, 95, 103, 149, 153, 154, 174, 187, 189. 301. Ibid., Nos. 1 and 7. 302. Ibid., Nos. 2, 7, 9. 303. China, No. 7 (1901), Nos. 11, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 30, 35, 36, 57, 60, 103. 304. Ibid., Nos. 24, 27, 37, 38, 43, 50, 54, 55, 66, 68. 305. Ibid., Nos. 39, 77. 306. Ibid., 40, 78. 307. The British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 1, 1900. 308. On November 1, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British ChargÉ at St. Petersburg in unusually outspoken language, as follows: “In the event of the Russians making any complaint of our having concluded the Anglo-German Agreement without previously consulting them, you should dwell on the fact that the conduct and language of Russian officers in the Far East, in respect to the Chinese railway from Niu-chwang to Peking, and the way in which the property of British subjects on that railway has been dealt with by the Russian military authorities, has caused much perplexity to Her Majesty’s Government. The Russian Government have given us many satisfactory assurances with respect to their intentions in these matters, but the little attention paid to the avowed policy of the Russian Government by officers on the spot has deterred us from fuller communication.”—China, No. 7 (1901), No. 45. 309. See, for instance, the explanation offered in Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 384–386. 310. China, No. 5 (1901), Nos. 4 and 7, inclosure 2. 311. Ibid., Nos. 6, 8, and 9. 312. The 56th Congress, 2d Session, Home Documents, vol. i. p. 355. 313. The italics are the author’s. 314. China, No. 5 (1900), No. 5. 315. Also see the debate in the House of Lords, on August 6, 1901, between Earl Spencer and the Marquess of Lansdowne. The Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, vol. 98, pp. 1351–1365. 316. At the House of Lords, on August 6, 1901. The Japanese Government, also, in its reply to a question of a member of the National Diet, interpreted the Agreement to apply to the whole of the Chinese Empire.—Tokushu Joyaku, p. 389. 317. At the Reichstag on March 15, 1901.—The London Times, August 6, 1901, p. 7. He is also said to have declared to the Russian Representative at Berlin that Manchuria was outside of the sphere of German commercial rights, and consequently had no relation with the Anglo-German Agreement. It was reported even that Manchuria was originally mentioned specifically in the British draft of the Agreement, but the word was struck out at the request of Germany, and the more abstract phrase, “spheres of influence,” was used therefor.—Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 388–389. 318. The Court had fled toward Ta-yuen-Fu before the allied troops reached Peking, and thence started toward Si-ngan-Fu, the capital of many a historic dynasty, on October 1. 319. Russia had early advocated accepting Li as plenipotentiary, while other Powers were still skeptical of the nature of his credentials. See China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 254, 356, 368, 371, 398, 401; China, No. 5 (1901), Nos. 5, 31, 111, 112, 128, 216; U. S. 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382. It was not till September 20 that Li entered Peking. Prince Ching had arrived there September 3. The appointment of the Prince as a plenipotentiary is said to have been partly due to Japanese influence. 320. Documents diplomatiques: Chine, 1899–1900, No. 327 (p. 174). Also see China, No. 5 (1901), pp. 5, 46, 53–54. 321. China, No. 5 (1901), No. 17. 322. For the Japanese amendments, see ibid., Nos. 60, 151, 178. 323. Russia openly declared in her Messager Officiel of March 24 (April 6), 1901, that the Russian views regarding the settlement of the trouble in North China, as distinguished from Manchuria, had “served the French Government as a basis for the elaboration” of the latter’s propositions.—China, No. 2 (1904), pp. 20–21. 324. November 5.—China, No. 5 (1901), No. 117. 325. November 28.—Ibid., Nos. 178 and 198. 326. China, No. 2 (1904), p. 21. 327. Ibid., p. 20. 328. Russia allowed the question of the indemnity in Manchuria to be dealt with at the general conferences at Peking together with the indemnity respecting North China. In the matter of the punishment of guilty local officials, from the discussion of which Russia abruptly withdrew herself, the representatives of the other Powers included Manchuria in their consideration. 329. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 5 (January 4, 1901). Sir Charles Scott, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported on January 5, that it appeared to be generally believed there that “some provisional agreement, such as that indicated, had been concluded by Russia with the local authorities in Manchuria, and that she might eventually acquire by treaty the right to finish building the railway line through Manchuria to Port Arthur, and to protect it herself, the rights of the Russo-Chinese Company being transferred to the Russian Government.”—Ibid., No. 4. 330. The London Times, January 3, 1901, p. 3. In this and other reports Dr. Morrison seems to have translated from Chinese texts. 331. The Russian Official Messenger of April 6, 1901, stated that “temporary agreements in writing (modus vivendi) respecting the reËstablishment of the local civil administration in the three Provinces of Manchuria were, before all else, concluded between the Russian military authorities and the Chinese tsian-tsiouns [Generals] of the three Provinces.”—China, No. 2 (1904), p. 22. 332. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 5 (January 4). 333. The Tartar General TsÊng-chi was degraded for this offense, but Russia succeeded in reinstating him.—The Times, February 20, 1901, p. 5. 334. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 8. 335. Ibid., No. 13 (February 13). 336. The opinion of the German Government was that China “should not conclude with any Power individual treaties of a territorial or financial character before they can estimate their obligations toward all the Powers as a whole, and before the compliance with such obligations is accepted.”—Ibid., Nos. 12, 13. 337. Ibid., No. 19 (February 19). What action the remaining Powers took is not shown in the Blue Books. Austria-Hungary and Italy are said to have also protested. 338. China, No. 2 (1901). 339. China, No. 2 (1901). 340. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 6. 341. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 6. 342. The Times, February 20, 1901, p. 5. 343. Ibid. “The Chinese argue,” added Dr. Morrison, “that Russia, having no interests south of the Great Wall, no missionaries, no trade, and no troops, can reasonably expect in return benevolent treatment from China in any agreement proposed outside the Great Wall, especially as Russia is in military occupation.... Russia appears determined to profit by the condition to which China is reduced by the action of the other Powers, just as she profited by obtaining the Primorsk Province after the war of 1860, and Port Arthur and Talien-wan subsequent to the war of 1895.” 344. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 14. Cf. ibid., Nos. 25 and 42. 345. The Times, February 28, 1901, p. 5. 347. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 42. Other versions are similar in substance to this one, which was forwarded by Sir Ernest Satow. 348. See China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 16, 17, 32, 35. 349. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 30. 350. Ibid., No. 18 (March 1). 351. Ibid., No. 15 (February 28). 352. Ibid., No. 16. 353. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 21 (March 4). 354. Ibid., No. 31. 355. Ibid., No. 24. 356. Ibid., Nos. 22 and 23 (March 5). 357. Ibid., No. 28. 358. China, No. 6 (1901), Nos. 61 (January 30), and 119 (February 20). 359. Cf., e. g., ibid., No. 62. 360. From the Official Messenger of St. Petersburg of April 5, 1901; China, No. 2 (1904), p. 22. 361. China, No. 6 (1901), No. 135. 362. Ibid., No. 176. It may be remembered that Japan had even a stronger reason than Russia to abstain from all the unpleasant questions connected with the missionaries, but it is needless to say that, in her joint action with other Powers in the matter of the official punishment and other questions, she regarded missionaries and other foreigners alike as subjects with certain inviolable rights. 363. Dr. Morrison wrote from Peking on March 3: “To render China more willing speedily to sign the convention, M. de Giers has informed Li Hung-chang that Russia will not participate in the demand for the execution of ten provincial officials guilty of inhuman murders of white men, whose death justice demands. Thus the murdered English men, women, and children may be described as England’s contribution toward securing to Russia the advantages derived from this convention.”—The London Times, March 4, 1901, p. 5. 364. China, No. 6 (1901), No. 234. 365. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 28, 29, 42. 366. Ibid., Nos. 28, 30. Later confirmed by the Chinese officials. See No. 33. 367. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 32. 368. Ibid., No. 33. 369. Probably ibid., No. 31. 370. This telegram has not appeared in the Blue Books. 371. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 35. 372. Ibid., No. 6. 373. Ibid., No. 20. 374. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 26. 375. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 39. 376. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 34. 377. The Kokumin, April 6, 1901. 378. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 37, pp. 17–23. 379. The Kokumin, May 19, 1901. 380. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 40. In No. 42 (August 21), Sir Ernest gives, in three parallel columns, the original terms proposed by Russia in February, the alterations of March, and the proposals now made in August. The last two are nearly identical. 381. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 41 (August 16). 382. See Mayers, pp. 283–318; or the Blue Book, Treaty Series, No. 17, 1902; Final Protocol between the Foreign Powers and China for the Resumption of Friendly Relations. 383. Tokushu Joyaku, p. 266. 384. See the summary of Li’s highly interesting letter of September 30, which has just appeared in the London Times for October 12, 1904, p. 6. 385. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 266–267; The Kokumin, November 2, pp. 23, 30, 190–191. 386. The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 272. 387. The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 271. Compare a version in Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 266–267. 388. The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 272. 389. The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 273–274. 390. Ibid., pp. 273–274 (Conger to Hay). 391. The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 926–928. 392. The italics in the quotation are the author’s. 393. Observe how powerfully Russia applies this argument. On February 4, M. Lessar said that Russia was merely asking privileges in Manchuria similar to those granted to Germany in Shan-tung.—The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 274. Russia, if she would, could with a certain amount of impunity inquire of Great Britain and other Powers how it was that they allowed Germany to acquire her apparently exclusive rights in Shan-tung, and now objected to Russia’s following her example only on a larger scale. 394. The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 929. 395. Ibid., pp. 277–279. 396. I. e., the draft of March limited the period of evacuation to one year, instead of a year and a half, as in the convention of April. 397. The reader will remember the cordial exchange of views between the two Powers when Wei-hai-Wei was leased to Great Britain in 1898. There occurred in the East several affairs of minor importance in which the British and Japanese authorities acted with mutual good-will; e. g., the arrangement for a British concession at Niu-chwang in 1899. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 215–218. 398. See the British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 3 (1900), Nos. 146, 121, 129, 134, 141, 155, 169–171, 180–181, 188–189, 191, 193, 203, 210, 216, 238, 241, 212, 217, 224, 236, 246–247, 252, 260, 265–267; China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 122–124, 42, 4, 18, 23, 29, 32 (July 13, 1900), 41, 52, 57, 38. 399. Mr. Kato, Foreign Minister at Tokio at the time, remarked later that even in matters about which the two Powers had not exchanged their views, their Representatives at Peking acted in such mutual sympathy that it was suspected that a secret understanding must have existed between them.—Tokushu Joyaku, p. 411. 400. In this connection it was thought not improbable that Germany herself might have informally suggested the feasibility of a triple alliance between herself and Great Britain and Japan in the same line as the Anglo-German Agreement, which Japan had joined as a signatory. In his speech before the Reichstag, however, Herr von BÜlow declared, on March 3, that Germany was not the father of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. At any rate, the German suggestion, if there was one, never materialized, but gave place to another and still more important form of agreement in which the world-politics of the versatile Kaiser played no part. 401. The position which one of the elder statesmen out of office, Marquis Ito, occupied in this diplomatic evolution, has been a subject of much speculation. He was not only on his tour in America and Europe when the Agreement was concluded, but also had made efforts at St. Petersburg to come to an entente with Russia. From this, it has even been charged that he was opposed to an Agreement with Great Britain. It now appears, however, that he had discussed the latter question with Premier Katsura before he sailed for Europe, and that he proceeded to St. Petersburg with a full authorization from the Government to exchange views with Count Lamsdorff regarding Korea. In the mean time, the Cabinet continued its negotiations with Great Britain. Each must have kept the other well informed of the progress of the respective negotiations, with this important difference, however, that Marquis Ito apparently entertained the view, which the Cabinet respected without accepting, that a British alliance would be, not less desirable, but more difficult of realization, than a Russian agreement concerning Korea. Unexpectedly to the Marquis, his effort did not materialize as well as he had hoped, while, on the other hand, it seemed as if his significant presence in Russia had hastened the hands of the jealous British Foreign Office, which now put its seal upon the terms as agreed upon with rather unexpected readiness. 402. The writer is indebted to the Kokumin Shimbun for many important suggestions regarding the negotiations between the two Powers which resulted in the conclusion of the Agreement. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 407–411, gives a brief explanatory view of the conditions under which the Agreement was concluded. 403. The British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 3, 1902: Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan relative to China and Korea, signed at London, January 30, 1902. 404. The British Parliamentary Papers: Japan, No. 1 (1902), Dispatch to His Majesty’s Minister at Tokio, forwarding Agreement between Great Britain and Japan, of January 30, 1902. 405. Observe the clearness of this statement. This idea is only implied in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It is remarkable that an explicit statement of this nature should come, as it did, from the Powers from which it would have been less expected than from their rivals. 406. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 50. The so-called triple alliance of Europe was renewed in May, with a declaration that it, together with the Russo-French alliance, maintained peace. The latter, as is shown here, had extended itself from Europe to the Far East, owing largely to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The growing solidarity of the world’s international politics may in some degree be discerned here. 407. The Evening Post, March 20, 1902; Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 415–416. 408. The Kokumin, March 23, 1902. 409. See, for instance, MinistÈre des Affaires ÉtrangÈres, Documents Diplomatiques: Chine, 1894–8, No. 19 (p. 12); No. 36 (p. 29); No. 37 (p. 30); No. 61 (pp. 45–46); No. 65 (p. 49). 410. During the peace negotiations at Peking after the Boxer war, Russia and France coÖperated as closely as did Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. 412. It was said with a great deal of probability that the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement had had a reassuring effect upon Prince Ching in his struggle to refuse Russian demands. 413. The following is the French text, which is considered as the standard in the interpretation of the Convention (China, No. 2 (1904), No. 54, inclosure):— “Sa MajestÉ l’Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies et Sa MajestÉ l’Empereur de Chine, dans le but de rÉtablir et de consolider les relations de bon voisinage rompues par le soulÈvement qui a eu lieu en 1900 dans le CÉleste Empire, ont nommÉ pour leurs PlÉnipotentiaires, À l’effet d’Établir un accord sur certaines questions concernant la Mandchourie:— “Les susdits PlÉnipotentiaires, munis de pleins pouvoirs, qui ont ÉtÉ trouvÉs suffisants, sont convenus des stipulations suivantes:— “Article 1. Sa MajestÉ ImpÉriale l’Empereur de Toutes les Russies, dÉsireux de donner une nouvelle preuve de son amour de la paix et de ses sentiments d’amitiÉ envers Sa MajestÉ l’Empereur de Chine, malgrÉ que ce soit de diffÉrents points de la Mandchourie situÉs sur la frontiÈre que les premiÈres attacques contre la population paisible Russe aient ÉtÉ faites, consent au rÉtablissement de l’autoritÉ du Gouvernement Chinois dans la province prÉcitÉe, qui reste une partie intÉgrale de l’Empire de Chine et restitue au Gouvernement Chinois le droit d’y exercer les pouvoirs gouvernementaux et administratifs, comme avant son occupation par les troupes Russes. “Article 2. En prenant possession des pouvoirs gouvernementaux et administratifs de la Mandchourie, le Gouvernement Chinois confirme, aussi bien par rapport aux termes que par rapport À tous les autres Articles, l’engagement d’observer strictement les stipulations du contract conclu avec la Banque Russo-Chinoise le 27 AoÛt, 1896, et assume, conformÉment À l’Article 5 du dit contrat, l’obligation de protÉger par tous les moyens le chemin de fer et son personnel, et s’oblige Également de sauvegarder la sÉcuritÉ en Mandchourie de tous les sujets Russes en gÉnÉral qui s’y trouvent et des enterprises fondÉes par eux. “Le Gouvernement Russe, en vue de cette obligation assumÉe par le Gouvernement de Sa MajestÉ l’Empereur de Chine, consent de son cÔtÉ dans le cas oÙ il n’y aura pas de troubles, et si la maniÈre d’agir des autres Puissances n’y mettra pas obstacle, À retirer graduellement toutes ses troupes de la Mandchourie de maniÈre À:— “(a.) Évacuer dans le courant de six mois aprÈs la signature de la Convention les troupes Russes de la partie sud-ouest de la Province de Moukden jusqu’au fleuve Liao-ho, en remettant les chemins de fer À la Chine; “(b.) Évacuer dans le courant des six mois suivants les troupes ImpÉriales Russes de la partie restante de la Province de Moukden et de la Province de Kirin; et “(c.) Retirer dans le courant des six mois suivants le reste des troupes ImpÉriales Russes qui se trouvent dans la Province de Hei-Lung-Kiang. “Article 3. En vue de la nÉcessitÉ de conjurer À l’avenir la repetition des troubles de 1900, dans lesquels les troupes Chinoises cantonnÉes dans les provinces limitrophes À la Russie ont pris part, le Gouvernement Russe et le Gouvernement Chinois se chargeront d’ordonner aux autoritÉs militaires Russes et aux dzian-dziuns de s’entendre en vue de fixer le nombre et de dÉterminer les lieux de cantonnement des troupes Chinoises en Mandchourie tant que les troupes Russes n’auront pas ÉtÉ retirÉes; le Gouvernement Chinois s’engage en outre À ne pas former d’autres troupes en sus du nombre determinÉ de cette maniÈre par les autoritÉs militaires Russes et les dzian-dziuns, et lequel doit Être suffisant pour exterminer les brigands et pacifier le pays. “AprÈs l’Évacuation complÈte des troupes Russes, le Gouvernement Chinois aura le droit de procÉder À l’examen du nombre des troupes se trouvant en Mandchourie et sujettes À Être augmentÉes ou diminuÉes, en informant À temps le Gouvernement ImpÉrial; car il va de soi que le maintien de troupes dans la province prÉcitÉe en nombre superflu mÈnerait inÉvitablement À l’augmentation des forces militaires Russes dans les districts voisins, et provoquerait ainsi un accroissement de dÉpenses militaires, au grand dÉsavantage des deux États. “Pour le service de police et le maintien de l’ordre intÉrieur dans cette rÉgion, en dehors du territoire cÉdÉ À la SociÉtÉ du Chemin de Fer Chinois de l’Est, il sera formÉ, auprÈs des Gouverneurs locaux—, dzian-dziuns, une gendarmerie Chinoise À pied et À cheval composÉe exclusivement de sujets de Sa MajestÉ l’Empereur de Chine. “Article 4. Le Gouvernement Russe consent À restituer À leurs propriÉtaires les lignes ferrÉes de Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting, occupÉes et protÉgÉes par les troupes Russes depuis la fin du mois de Septembre, 1900. En vue de cela, le Gouvernement de Sa MajestÉ l’Empereur de Chine s’engage:— “1. Que dans le cas ou il serait nÉcessaire d’assurer la sÉcuritÉ des lignes ferrÉes prÉcitÉes, le Gouvernement Chinois s’en chargera lui-mÊme et n’invitera aucune autre Puissance À entreprendre ou À participer À la dÉfense, construction, ou exploitation de ces lignes, et ne permettra pas aux Puissances ÉtrangÈres d’occuper le territoire restituÉ par la Russie. “2. Que les lignes ferrÉes susmentionnÉes seront achevÉes et exploitÉes sur les bases prÉcises tant de l’Arrangement entre la Russie et l’Angleterre en date du 16 Avril, 1899, que du contrat conclu le 28 Septembre, 1898, avec une Compagnie particuliÈre relativement À un emprunt pour la construction des lignes prÉcitÉes, et, en outre, en observant les obligations assumÉes par cette Compagnie, c’est-À-dire, de ne pas prendre possession de la ligne Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting ni d’en disposer de quelque faÇon que ce soit. “3. Que si par la suite il sera procÉdÉ À la continuation des lignes ferrÉes dans le sud de la Mandchourie ou À la construction d’embranchements vers elles, aussi bien qu’À la construction d’un pont À Yinkow ou au transfert du terminus du chemin de fer de Shanhaikwan qui s’y trouve, ce sera fait aprÈs une entente prÉamable entre les Gouvernements de Russie et de Chine. “4. Vu que les dÉpenses faites par la Russie pour le rÉtablissement et l’exploitation des lignes ferrÉes restituÉes de Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting n’ont pas ÉtÉ comprises dans la somme totale de l’indemnitÉ, elles lui seront remboursÉes par le Gouvernement Chinois. Les deux Gouvernements s’entendront sur le montant des sommes À rembourser. “Les dispositions de tous les TraitÉs antÉrieurs entre la Russie et la Chine, non modifiÉes par la prÉsente Convention, restent en pleine vigueur. “La prÉsente Convention aura force lÉgale À dater du jour de la signature de ses exemplaires par les PlÉnipotentiaires, de l’un et de l’autre Empire. “L’Échange des ratifications aura lieu À Saint-PÉtersbourg dans le dÉlai de trois mois À compter du jour de la signature de la Convention. “En foi de quoi les PlÉnipotentiaires respectifs des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes ont signÉ et scellÉ de leurs sceaux deux exemplaires de la prÉsente Convention, en langues Russe, Chinoise, et FranÇaise. Des trois textes, dÛment confrontÉs et trouvÉs concordants, le texte FranÇais fera foi pour l’interprÉtation de la prÉsente convention. “Faite en double expÉdition À PÉkin, le ..., correspondant au....” 414. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 51, inclosure. 415. Glance over the comparative terms, shown in parallel columns, of the Russian demands of February, the amendments of March, 1901, and the present Agreement. Ibid., No. 42, inclosure. 416. See China, No. 2 (1904), No. 55. 417. Mr. Eitaro Tsurouka, who has personally visited several of the chiefs of the banditti, gives an extremely interesting account of their origin, their relations to the Chinese authorities and Russian officers, and the history of their affairs down to the end of 1903.—The To-A Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 53 (April, 1904), pp. 1–14. Cf. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 130, inclosure. 418. About August, 1901, the British Consul at Niu-chwang, Mr. A. Hosie, reported that the force then at the disposal of the Tartar General of the Sheng-king Province was limited by the Russian authorities to 6500 men, which meant that over 10,000 men possessing firearms had been let loose. The Chinese police force was insufficient to back the authority of the Governor-General, and constant military expeditions by the Russians were consequently rendered necessary.—China, No. 2 (1904), p. 33. Also see the British Consular Report on Niu-chwang for 1901, pp. 3–4. 419. Early in March, 1903, Prince Ching negotiated with M. Lessar about the number of Chinese troops that should occupy the country after the withdrawal of the Russians. “The Chinese Government were proposing to send 18,000 men, whilst the Russian Legation considered that 12,000 men would be sufficient.”—China, No. 2 (1904), No. 84 (Townley to Lansdowne). 420. China, No. 2 (1904), p. 38, already quoted in p. 225, above. 421. Ibid., No. 53 (Lamsdorff’s statement to Scott, on April 23). 422. Ibid., No. 55 (April 15). 423. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 52 (Lansdowne to Scott, April 30). This conversation had ensued from M. de Staal’s visit to Lord Lansdowne, the purpose of which was, on the part of the Russian Ambassador, to explain to the British Foreign Minister the unreasonableness of the popular allegation that Russia had, in concluding the Agreement of April 8, surrendered to the diplomatic pressure exerted by Great Britain. 424. Russia, No. 2 (1904), p. 6. Already quoted in p. 98, above. 425. Cf. the last clause of Article 3. 426. China, No. 5 (1901), No. 23. 427. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 63, September 9, 1902 (Hosie to Satow). 428. Telegraph from Miandonha [?], May 18, 1904. In the Evening Post of a few days later. 429. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 65, inclosure 2. 430. Ibid., No. 66, inclosure. 431. The To-A Dobun-kwai Hokoku, No. 38 (January, 1903), pp. 105–106. 432. E. g., 400 men from (probably) Shan-hai-kwan, June 24.—China, No. 2 (1904), No. 58, inclosure. Also some from Liao-yang, in August.—Ibid., No. 61, inclosure. 433. E. g., from Kin-chou-Fu early in September.—Ibid., No. 62, inclosure. 434. Cf. Dr. Morrison’s articles in The Times, January 3 (p. 8) and 14 (p. 5), 1903. 435. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 56, inclosure (Hosie to Satow). 436. Ibid., No. 63, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, September 9). 437. Cf. ibid., No. 61, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, August 21), which says: “I have the honor to report that a considerable town, to consist of some 300 cottages, of which about 100 have already been built, is in course of construction on both sides of the Russian railway to the immediate northwest of the city of Liao-yang Chou. These cottages, which when completed will occupy a large piece of land bought from the Chinese proprietors by the Railway Company, are intended for the residence of railway employees and of the artisans who will be engaged at the cleaning and repairing shops to be established at this important depot. “While this foreign town is growing outside, the Chinese Government buildings inside the city of Liao-yang are being rapidly evacuated, in many cases the only vestige of the Russian occupation being a solitary sentry keeping guard over the property. Russian troops are also being withdrawn from Liao-yang and conveyed by rail to Port Arthur.” A more direct testimony came from the Russian diplomats, probably M. Lessar himself, who, even so late as at the beginning of September, 1903, or a month before the end of the stipulated period for the complete evacuation of Manchuria, intimated to Prince Ching that the reason for the delay of the actual evacuation was “that the barracks for the railway guards were not ready.”—China, No. 2 (1904), No. 156. 438. The Novoe Vremya itself declared toward the end of the year 1902 that, contrary to the popular notion that Russia was evacuating Manchuria, she was just beginning to consolidate her influence in that region. As regards the number of the Russian troops left in Manchuria after the first period of evacuation, we have the following authoritative statement by Count Cassini, Russian Ambassador to the United States: “Faithfully adhering to the terms of her treaty with China respecting Manchuria, she [Russia] had withdrawn the major portion of her troops from that province until between 60,000 and 70,000 only remained.”—The North American Review for May, 1904, pp. 682–683. It is not clear whether this number included the Russian soldiers stationed outside of the Chinese quarters. 440. China, No. 2 (1904), pp. 38 and 42. 441. Ibid., Nos. 72, 74, 75, 111, 112. 442. Ibid., Nos. 131, 132. 443. Ibid., Nos. 70, 122, 130, 131. 444. The Kokumin, May 30, 1904; a Peking correspondence. Also see China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 44, 46–48, 69, 73, 96, 99, 102, 105, 124. 445. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 57, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, November 7, 1902). Also No. 106 (Townley to Lansdowne, May 5, 1903). 446. Ibid., No. 128 (Hosie, June 22, 1903). 447. Ibid., No. 116 (April 8). 448. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 75 (April 15); 113 (May 14). 449. For the Manchurian side, see p. 227, above. The timber concession on the Korean side will be taken up in a later section. 450. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 75, 115, 128. 451. Ibid., Nos. 115, 129. 452. Pp. 289 ff., 318 ff., below. 455. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 130, inclosure (May 4, 1903). 456. Ibid., No. 71 (April 14). 457. Ibid., No. 122. 458. Ibid., No. 130, inclosure (May 4). 459. Ibid. 460. Ibid., No. 137, inclosure (Consul Fulford at Niu-chwang, May 19). 461. Ibid., No. 156 (Satow to Lansdowne, September 10). 462. The author has been informed from a reliable source that the ChargÉ’s note containing those demands was dated April 5, 1903. 463. Again the revelation must have emanated from the Chinese official circle. M. Lessar is said to have, about June 4, bitterly complained at the Peking Foreign Office of their breach of faith, and requested that there should be appointed two special Chinese negotiators, who should be entirely responsible for the secrecy of the matter. 464. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 81 (Townley to Lansdowne, April 24). 465. Ibid., No. 127. 466. Ibid., No. 94. Also see Nos. 77, 78, 81, 82, 86. 467. The Kokumin. 468. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 78, 81, 127. 469. Perhaps on April 21. 470. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 79 and 80 (April 23). 471. Ibid., Nos. 81, 82 (April 24). 472. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 83, 85 (April 26 and 27). Cf. No. 82. 473. Ibid., No. 89 (April 28). It does not appear that this instruction was carried out, for when Count Lamsdorff gave to the American Ambassador a positive denial of the truth of the current reports, the British Ambassador deemed it unnecessary to repeat the inquiry. See ibid., No. 91 (April 29). 474. Ibid., No. 90, Lansdowne to Herbert (April 28). 475. Namely, M. PlanÇon. The same M. PlanÇon stated the next day to Prince Ching that the delay in the evacuation was due to the military party in Russia.—China, No. 2 (1904), No. 95. The statements of the two diplomats are not necessarily contradictory to each other. 476. For the interview between MacCormick and Lamsdorff, see ibid., Nos. 91, 92, 103. 477. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 95. 478. Ibid., No. 98. 479. Ibid., Nos. 110 (May 8); 114 (May 19); 117 (May 23). 480. Ibid., No. 114 (May 19). 481. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 117. 482. Ibid., No. 119. 483. Ibid., Nos. 119, 120. 484. Ibid., No. 120 (June 4). 485. See Chapter V., above. 486. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 121. 487. Ibid., Nos. 117, 121. 488. Ibid., No. 123. 489. Cf. ibid., No. 125. 490. Ibid., No. 123, and the Japanese press. 491. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 126. 492. Cf. Dobun-kwai, No. 49, p. 7. 493. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 731–732. 494. Ibid., p. 740. 495. G. Takeda, Kinji Kyokuto Gwaiko Shi (recent history of diplomacy in the Far East, Tokio, 1904), pp. 22–23. 496. G. Takeda, pp. 25–30; Y. Hamada, Nichi-Ro Gwaiko Junen Shi (ten years of Japanese-Russian diplomacy, Tokio, 1904), p. 47. Also see the Korea Review, July (pp. 331–336) and August (pp. 369–371), 1904. 497. G. Takeda, pp. 30–32. 498. Ibid., pp. 33–34; Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 740–741. See also the Korea Review, August, 1904, pp. 377–378. 499. The contract dated August 28, 1896 (o. s.).—Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 781–791. 500. The contract of April 22, 1896.—Ibid., pp. 772–775. 501. G. Takeda, p. 45. 502. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 740–741. 503. It is said that Marquis Ito himself had a mind to represent Japan at the coronation, but the mission was finally intrusted to the Field Marshal. It will be remembered that China sent Li Hung-chang for this occasion. 504. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 742–744; the Kaitei Joyaku Isan, pp. 601–602; the Treaties and Conventions between the Empire of Japan and other Powers, p. 393. 505. See the same references as are given in the preceding note, pp. 740–742, 596–600, and 391, respectively. 506. Some of them were strongly pro-Russian. 507. These gendarmes had never been withdrawn before the present war broke out. The Koreans frequently tried to cut the telegraph line. 508. Japanese soldiers in Korea before the present war were stationed to the fullest extent stipulated in this Article. Owing to the small number of the Russian residents in Korea, the Russian Government never stationed as many soldiers in Korea as did the Japanese. 509. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 714–717. 510. G. Takeda, pp. 50–51. 512. G. Takeda, pp. 45–47. 513. Ibid., pp. 48–50. 514. G. Takeda, pp. 53–54, and Jumpei Shinobu, Kan Hanto (the Korean peninsula), pp. 505–512. 515. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 744–745; the Kaitei Joyaku Isan, p. 603; the Treaties and Conventions, p. 394 (French text). 516. The sovereign of Korea, formerly King (wang), assumed the title Emperor (Hwang-ti), on October 12, 1897, for, in the Chinese language, the wang may be a tributary prince, but the ti is the master of an independent state. 517. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 747–751. See also The Times, August 30, 1899. 518. The Kokumin, October 10, 1899. 519. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 751–752. 520. Ibid., pp. 752–753. 521. The Kokumin, April 1, and 3, 1900. 522. The Kokumin, May 25, 1900, and May 21, 1901. 523. Tokushu Joyaku, p. 751. 524. The Kokumin, May 21 and November 1, 1901. The final agreement between Hayashi and the Korean Foreign Minister was signed on May 17, 1902, and published in the Kwampo. 525. The Kokumin, March 20, 1901, and August 7, 1902. 526. Ibid., May 5 and 10, 1901. 527. The Kokumin, April 23, 24, May 3, June 9, 1901. 528. Ibid., May 18, 1901; January 19, February 1, correspondence dated April 2, 1902. 529. Ibid., October 22, November 17, 1902. 530. Ibid., January 27, 1903. 531. From a statement made by an intimate friend of Marquis Ito, who, in October, 1900, succeeded Yamagata in the premiership. See the Kokumin, November 10, 1903. 532. From 1900 till May, 1903. 533. A Government can seldom afford so many foreign councilors and commissioners as were found in Korea. Besides these and several other Russians, there were in Seul, Mr. Masuo Kato, a Japanese adviser, Mr. Sands, the once influential American adviser, several French engineers, and a Belgian councilor to the ministry of internal affairs. 534. The Kokumin, Seul correspondence, dated August 7, 1902. 535. The Kokumin, Seul correspondence, dated June 3, 1899; November 30, 1902. 536. Ibid., Seul correspondence, dated December 23, 1902. 538. The Kokumin, telegrams, March 11, 26, 27, April 11, 1903. 539. Ibid., correspondence, February 2, 5, 9, 16, 18, March 4, 1903. 540. The contract is found in Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 800–806. Also see the U. S. 56th Congress, 1st Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 484–488. 541. (1) Along the coast near Cape Tikhmeneff, Ulsan Bay, Kiong-sang Province; (2) on the island of Ching-po, Ham-kiung Province; and (3) at Chang-shing, Kang-wan Province. 542. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 799–800. 543. Ibid., pp. 731–732 (August 8, 1884, o. s.). 544. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 772–775, April 22, 1896. 545. The Kokumin, Seul correspondence, dated April 8, 1902. 546. Ibid., telegram, May 8, correspondence, May 11, 1902; telegram, March 28, and correspondence, April 16, 1903. 547. Tokushu Joyaku, p. 722. 548. Ibid., pp. 761–764. 549. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 765–768. This contract includes certain interesting provisions, which the reader may compare with those of the Manchurian railways. There occur two exclusive measures, that none but Koreans and Japanese may hold shares of the railway capital (Article 15), and that no other foreigners shall reside within lands assigned for the depots (Article 5). The work should be begun within three years after the signature of the contract, and be completed within ten years hence (Article 10). After fifteen years of operation, the Korean Government might purchase the entire line, and, if unable to do so, the purchase would be postponed by periods of ten years (Article 12). As soon as the Korean finances should admit, the railway might be made a common work between the Koreans and Japanese (Article 13). The laborers and the timber employed in the construction should as far as possible be obtained in Korea (Article 6). The lands assigned for the line and its depots shall belong to the company only so long as it operates the road, and the Korean Government should furnish no other lands to the company (Articles 3 and 8). It should be added that the Japanese Government guaranteed a six per cent. interest for the capital of the company. For further details of the Seul-Chemulpo and Fusan-Seul Railways, see p. 24, and notes, above. 550. For the contract, see Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 770–772. 551. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 768–770; the Kokumin, September 7, 1901. 552. The Kokumin, July 4, 1902. 553. It is said that the Russian Representative obtained a promise from the Korean Government to grant to no other foreigners the right of either the construction or the mortgage of this railway.—The Kokumin, December 10, 1903. It now matters little whether this report was true or not, since the Korean Government abrogated on May 18, 1904, all the agreements it had concluded with the Russians. 554. The Kokumin, February 18, 1903; the Dobun-kwai, No. 41, pp. 91–93. 555. The Kokumin, August 4, 1903. 556. See, e. g., pp. 10–30. 557. Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 781–791. 558. It is said that the time-limit was extended, on January 1, 1901, for twenty years. See Tokushu Joyaku, p. 783. 559. The company agreed to pay to the Korean Imperial House, through the Russo-Chinese Bank, a royalty amounting to one fourth of the annual profit. The company was to furnish all the capital, and was exempt from all kinds of taxes and dues (Articles 10, 11, 14). 560. The Kokumin, correspondence, April 18, 1903; Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 781–782. 561. Toward the end of May, 1903, simultaneously with their activity on the Yalu, the Russian soldiers began again to cut trees at Mu-san. 562. Cf. Article 2 of the contract. 563. The Kokumin, correspondence, July 27, 1903. Lower down the stream, at Tatung-kao, the amount sometimes reached the annual value of 7,000,000 taels. 564. See an address by Eitaro Tsuruoka, who has recently traveled in Manchuria and is acquainted with several of the leaders of the bandits. The Dobun-kwai, No. 53 (April, 1904), pp. 1–14. 565. The Kokumin, April 23, 1903. The capital of the syndicate was reported to be 5,000,000 rubles, of which 2,000,000 were said to have been furnished by the Russian Government.—Ibid., correspondence, June 19, 1903. This rumor was not authenticated. It is safe to say, however, that Baron Gunzburg’s connection with the syndicate was largely nominal. The present writer is not in a position to explain the relation of the notorious M. Bezobrazoff to the timber work on the Yalu. 566. The Kokumin, telegram, May 8 and 9, 1903. 567. Principally Mt. Paik-ma. 568. The Kokumin, telegram, June 11, correspondence, June 19, 1903. When Japanese soldiers reached Yong-am-po soon after the beginning of the present war, they found there a large warehouse, and fifteen large brick and twenty or more smaller buildings. Rails had been laid between the sea and the warehouse, which was also connected with the Yalu by a new canal. A fort had also been left standing, but the guns had been taken away. 569. Ibid., telegram, May 8 and 9, 1900. Cf. the British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 115, 116, 128, 129, 131, 134. 570. The Kokumin, telegram, May 9, 1903. 571. Ibid., telegram, May 22 and 25, 1903. 572. The Kokumin, telegram, May 16. 573. Ibid., correspondence, May 20. 574. Ibid., telegram, June 13. 575. Ibid., telegram, June 17. 576. Ibid., June 16. 577. Ibid., telegram, June 6. 578. The Kokumin, correspondence, June 19. 580. Viscount Katsura, Premier; Baron Komura, Foreign Minister; and Messrs. Terauchi and Yamamoto, Ministers, respectively, of the Army and Navy. 581. Marquises Ito and Yamagata, and Counts Matsukata, InoÜÉ and Oyama. 582. The Japanese dailies. 583. The Nichi-Ro Kosho ni kwan su ru Ofuku (diplomatic correspondence respecting the negotiations between Japan and Russia), dispatch No. 1. This correspondence (hereafter abbreviated as N.-R.) was presented by the Japanese Government to the Houses of the Imperial Diet, respectively, on March 23 and 26, and published in the Kwampo (Official Gazette) of March 24 and 27, 1904. It contains fifty-one dispatches, all telegraphic, covering the period of more than six months between the opening of the negotiations and the severance of all diplomatic relations between the two Powers, namely, between July 28, 1903, and February 6, 1904. An authoritative English translation of this correspondence has been issued from Washington, probably by members of the Japanese Legation there. In the quotations from the correspondence that appear in these pages, the language of the translation—accurate as it is—has been largely changed, in order to make it coincide as closely as possible with the literal meaning of the original. 584. N.-R., No. 2. 585. It is singular that even Count Lamsdorff should thus participate in the characteristic plaint of the Russians that they are an object of unjust machinations of other nations. 586. N.-R., No. 3, received at Tokio on August 6. 587. These men were, according to Article 2 of the Statutes of September 30, “the Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, of Foreign Affairs, and of War, the head of the Ministry of Marine, and such persons as His Majesty the Emperor may find it expedient to summon, either to sit permanently on the committee, or to take part temporarily at its meetings. The Viceroy of the Far East, being, by his duties, a member of the committee, shall be present at the meetings when he is in St. Petersburg.” 588. The British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1904), No. 144. 589. Ibid., No. 155. 590. After the opening of hostilities in February of the present year, the Russian Foreign Office made a statement of Russia’s case, in which it was said that, when the Japanese Government proposed in August, 1903, to open the negotiations, “Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in coÖperation with the Russian Minister at Tokio....” See p. 327, note 9, below. 591. N.-R., No. 6. 592. Evidently the reference is to the three Russo-Japanese agreements concerning Korea concluded in 1896 and 1898. 593. N.-R., No. 3, originally dated Tokio, August 6. 594. N.-R., No. 7. 595. The British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 100 and 109. 596. N.-R., Nos. 8, 11. 597. N.-R., Nos. 10, 11. 598. Ibid., No. 14, September 7. 599. N.-R., No. 17. 600. The Russian Government explained later, in the note delivered on January 6, 1904, that the creation of a neutral zone was “for the very purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government had likewise in view, namely, ‘to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstandings in the future;’ a similar zone, for example, existed between the Russian and British possessions in Central Asia.”—N.-R., No. 38. It is easy to see, however, that neutralization is merely common appropriation in a negative form, and might, like cases of the latter, as in Primorsk and Sakhalien, result in absorption by one of the two Powers between which the territory was neutralized. 601. N.-R., No. 20. 602. Before August 13, when he was appointed Viceroy of the Far East, Alexieff was as yet Governor-General of the Kwan-tung region. 603. The Japanese dailies. 604. The italics in the quotation are the author’s. 605. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 133 (Lansdowne to Scott). 607. It is highly interesting that at this moment, when the Russian Government was, on the one hand, negotiating with Japan, and, on the other, proposing new demands upon China, the Russian Ambassador at London intimated the desire of his Government to come to an agreement with Great Britain regarding their interest in China. It appears that Russia wished Great Britain to declare Manchuria as outside of her sphere of interest, in return for a similar declaration by Russia regarding the Yang-tsze valley. Lord Lansdowne’s reply was characteristic. “I repeated,” he wrote to Sir C. Scott, “that we should be glad to arrive at one [i. e., an agreement with Russia], but that it must, of course, include the Manchurian question. We could, however, of course not come to terms unless we were fully informed as to the intentions of the Russian Government [in Manchuria]. Count Benckendorff again asked me whether, if we were satisfied upon this point, we should be likely to assist in bringing about an arrangement between the Russian and Chinese Governments. I said that we should certainly make no secret of our concurrence, if we were thoroughly satisfied. Meanwhile, however, I was afraid that our attitude must remain observant and critical.”—China, No. 2 (1904), No. 142 (August 12). Cf. No. 139. The Russian Government could not have forgotten that Great Britain had agreed with Japan, on January 30, 1902, that neither of the two Powers should come to a separate understanding with another Power regarding China or Korea without a full and frank discussion between themselves. 608. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 147, 148, 149, 156. 609. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 150. 610. Ibid., Nos. 149, 151, 153, 160. 611. Ibid., Nos. 147 and 156. 612. Ibid., Nos. 150 and 160. 614. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 159. 616. The Kokumin, Seul telegrams, July 6, 10, 17 (1903). 617. Ibid., July 23, 27; August 2, 8, 18. 618. Ibid., July 27, etc. 619. Ibid., August 12, 14, 23 (cf. July 17, etc.). 620. The Kokumin, August 10, September 2, etc. 621. The opening of Wiju was once granted by the Foreign Office, but the Emperor refused to sanction it.—Ibid., November 21. This is another illustration of the peculiar circumstances at Seul, that there exist two political centres, the Government and the Court. (The opening of neither Wiju nor Yong-am-po had been effected before the outbreak of the present war.) 622. The Kokumin, August 29. 623. Ibid., August 27, 29. 624. Ibid., September 29. 625. About 2¾ by 5¾ miles.—Ibid., November 1. Late in December, a report reached the Korean Government from the frontier that the Russians had forbidden all but their countrymen to enter into the Russian territory at Yong-am-po.—Ibid., December 23. 626. Many stories have been told of M. Pavloff’s influence over the venal politicians of Seul. Of these, two are given below, which are not verifiable, but certainly interesting. Yi Keun-thaik is said to have told the Emperor, late in December, 1903, that the following assurance had been given by the Russian Representative: if the Korean refusal to open Wiju and Yong-am-po to foreign trade should result in the mobilization of Japanese forces, Russia would also dispatch troops against them; in 1894, Korea erred when she relied on China, but Russia was not a China, and might implicitly be relied upon.—The Kokumin, telegram, December 25. One day, it is said, M. Pavloff remarked in the presence of the Korean Emperor and his attendants: “The Koreans often rely upon Japan, or else are afraid of her, but where in the world is Japan?” Then he scanned a map through a pocket magnifier, and said: “Oh, I find a tiny country called Japan in a corner of the Pacific Ocean. My Russian Empire is the greatest country on the globe, spreading over two continents. If Korea relies upon our Empire, she will be as safe as in navigating a sea in a colossal vessel. Should Japan object to it, our Russia would only have to do thus.” Here, placing a few matches on his palm, he blew them off.—The Kyoiku Jiron. 627. In the latter half of 1900, for example. 628. Korean neutrality is said to have been telegraphed to the Korean Representatives abroad through the French channel. It was not until some time after the other Powers had received the declaration that it reached Japan. Russia, it will be remembered, told the world that Japan infringed the neutrality of Korea when the former’s warships had an encounter with the “Variag” and “Korietz” at Chemulpo. See pp. 355 ff., below. 629. N.-R., Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21. 630. The Japanese dailies. 631. N.-R., No. 22. 632. In Article 3 of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898, and in Article 2 of the Russian counter-note of October 3. 633. See the same Article of the counter-note. 634. Article 8. 635. Article 2. 636. Articles 4 and 8. 637. Article 7. 638. Article 9. 639. Article 3, made necessary from the past experience in Korea. 640. Article 5. 641. Article 6. 642. Observe the following passage from the explanatory note issued by the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg on February 9, 1904:— “Last year, the Tokio Cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of the Pacific, submitted to the Imperial Government a proposal for a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in coÖperation with the Russian Minister at Tokio, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese Government. Although the exchange of views with the Tokio Cabinet on this subject was of a friendly character, Japanese social circles and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a warlike ferment among the Japanese, and to drive the Government into an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof, the Tokio Cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the negotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make the country ready for war.” (The italics are the author’s.) 643. N.-R., Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33. 644. The second reply was as follows:— “1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. “2. Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interest in Korea, and of the right of Japan to assist Korea with advice tending to improve her civil administration. “3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to oppose the development of the industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea, nor the adoption of measures for the protection of those interests. “4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Korea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the purpose of suppressing insurrections or disorders liable to create international complications. “5. Mutual engagement not to make use of any part of the Korean territory for strategical purposes, and not to undertake on the Korean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits. “6. Mutual engagement to consider the territory of Korea to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone, within the limits of which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops. “7. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean and Eastern Chinese Railways, when those railways shall have been extended to the Yalu. “8. Abrogation of all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Korea.”—N.-R., No. 34. 645. N.-R., No. 35. 646. Is it probable that Baron Rosen consulted Viceroy Alexieff by telegraph before he did Count Lamsdorff? 647. N.-R., No. 36. 648. Ibid., No. 38. 649. The Russian counter-note was as follows:— “Having no objection to the amendments to Article 2 of the Russian counter-proposals as proposed by the Imperial Japanese Government, the Russian Government considers it necessary:— “1. To maintain the original wording of Article 5, which had already been agreed to by the Imperial Japanese Government, that is to say, ‘mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, not to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits.’ [The Japanese Government had, as was pointed out by Baron Komura in the dispatch No. 39, never agreed to the first half of Article 5.] “2. To maintain Article 6 concerning a neutral zone (this for the very purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government has likewise in view, that is to say, to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstanding in the future; a similar zone, for example, exists between the Russian and British possessions in Central Asia). “In case the above conditions are agreed to, the Russian Government would be prepared to include in the projected agreement an article of the following tenor:— “‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and her littoral as being outside her sphere of interests, whilst Russia, within the limits of that province, will not impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements.’”—N.-R., No. 38. 650. See British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1902), Nos. 133, 136, 139, 142. 651. His statements to the journalists on February 10 and at the Lower House on February 23. 652. It is interesting to note that the Russian Representatives abroad declared to the Powers about the same time as the third counter-note was delivered at Tokio, that Russia “had no intention whatever of placing any obstacle in the way of the continued enjoyment by foreign Powers of the rights acquired by them [in Manchuria] in virtue of the treaties now in force.” The exclusion of foreign settlements was not mentioned, but, judging from the counter-note of January 6, was implied. When Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, handed the memorandum on January 8 to Lord Lansdowne, the latter made characteristically blunt remarks, as will be seen from the following dispatch from him to Sir C. Scott: “... I could not help regretting that Russia should have found it impossible to take even a single step in pursuance of the policy which she has thus prescribed for herself [regarding the evacuation of Manchuria]. I trusted that his Excellency would forgive me for telling him frankly that, in this country, people were looking for some concrete evidence of Russia’s intention to make good her promises. An announcement, for example, that Niu-chwang was to be evacuated at an early date would certainly have a reassuring effect. So far as I was aware, there was no local difficulty in the way.”—China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 162, 163. 653. The text is found in the Monthly Summary of the Commerce and Finance of the U. S. for January, 1904. 654. In the press and the Kwampo of January 20. 656. See the Kwampo for February 1 (p. 5), 5 (pp. 110–114), 18 (p. 243), 20 (pp. 280–281); Mr. E. H. Vickers’s letter to the New York Evening Post, March 1; Mr. Soyeda’s address, in the Kokumin, February 6; ibid., on the fisheries. 657. According to the estimate of the Japanese Government, Russia increased her forces in the Far East between April 8, 1903, and the outbreak of the war, by 19 war-vessels aggregating 82,415 tons, and 40,000 soldiers, besides 200,000 more who were about to be sent. See pp. 352–354, below. 658. The Japanese dailies. 659. N.-R., No. 39. 660. Ibid., Nos. 40 (January 23), 42 (January 26), 44 (January 28), 46 (January 30). On January 26, Baron Komura again instructed Mr. Kurino to remind Count Lamsdorff that “in the opinion of the Imperial Japanese Government, a further prolongation of the present state of things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it was their earnest hope that they would be honored with an early reply, and that they wished to know at what time they might expect to receive the reply.”—No. 42. The probable nature of the forthcoming reply was also inquired into, without success, even so late as January 30. 661. No. 47. It is unnecessary to point out the various excuses Count Lamsdorff presented for the delay. One of them was particularly significant, that is, that the opinions of Viceroy Alexieff and of the Cabinet Ministers at St. Petersburg had to be harmonized.—Ibid. 662. Mr. Kurino telegraphed to Baron Komura at 5.05 A. M., February 5:— “In compliance with the request of Count Lamsdorff, I went to see him at 8 P. M., February 4. He told me that the substance of the Russian answer had just been telegraphed to Viceroy Alexieff, to be transmitted by him to Minister Rosen. The Viceroy might happen to introduce some changes so as to meet local circumstances; but in all probability, there would be no such changes. The Count then stated, as his own opinion, that:— “‘Russia desired the principle of the independence and integrity of Korea, and, at the same time, considered the free passage of the Korean Straits necessary. Though Russia was willing to make every possible concession, she did not desire to see Korea utilized for strategic purposes against Russia. He also believed it profitable, for the consolidation of good relations with Japan, to establish by common accord a buffer region between confines of direct influence and action of the two Powers in the Far East.’ “The above was expressed by the Count entirely as his personal opinion, and, though I cannot be positive, I think that the substance of the Russian reply must probably be the same.”—N.-R., No. 50. Cf. p. 350, below. It should be noted that this note from Mr. Kurino reached Tokio at 5.15 P. M., or three hours and a quarter after the Japanese notes severing relations had been sent. Count Cassini, in the following striking sentence, includes, among the contents of the last Russian reply, a point which was not in the least mentioned in Count Lamsdorff’s personal opinion expressed to Mr. Kurino. M. Cassini says: “... However, in another effort to bring the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion, my country did all that dignity would permit, and offered to give assurances again that the sovereignty of the Emperor of China in Manchuria would be recognized.”—The North American Review for May, 1904, p. 686. 663. From the reply of the Japanese Government to the Russian charge that Japan had broken peace and taken Russia by surprise. See pp. 352–353, below. It should not be forgotten, at the same time, that Japan had all the while been taking precautionary measures in the most careful and exhaustive manner, not only in military and naval affairs, but also in other matters connected therewith. The difference between the Russian and Japanese attitude may thus be stated: Russia apparently played the three-fold game of employing sharp diplomacy at Seul and Peking, of strengthening her control over Manchuria and the Korean frontier, and of endeavoring at once to intimidate Japan by vast warlike measures, and to evade her overtures till she might be compelled to acquiesce in the situation to be at length perfected by Russia; Japan expressed her wishes in straightforward language, and relied upon her negotiations with Russia, which she, in spite of extremely trying circumstances, conducted with the utmost cordiality and patience, but at the same time prepared for any emergency in which the unconciliating attitude of Russia might probably result. It will perhaps be always regretted by many that the control of Russian diplomacy throughout the negotiations rested in the hands of those who seemed to fail to grasp the exact state of Japan’s mind in this greatest crisis of her national existence. 664. N.-R., No. 48. 665. Ibid., No. 49. 666. Mr. Kurino left St. Petersburg on the 10th, and the next day saw the departure of Baron Rosen from Tokio. It was generally believed that the former had once sincerely desired that a satisfactory agreement between Russia and Japan should be effected. As for Baron Rosen, every one surmised that the respected gentleman was little responsible for the conduct of Russian diplomacy, of which he was regarded as an unfortunate agent. From a personal point of view, the sudden departure of both from their posts had something tragic about it, and Baron Rosen’s situation was deeply sympathized with by the Japanese people. 667. From the English translation in the London Times, February 11, 1904, p. 3. 668. The rescript appeared in the Kwampo, February 10, 1904, extra. An authoritative English translation, which has been slightly altered in our text in order to bring it nearer to the original language, was published in the London Times, February 12, 1904, p. 3. 669. The London Times, February 19, 1904, p. 3. 670. The reports from Mr. Kurino do not agree with this statement of Russia. According to the former, it was on January 26, not the 25th, that Count Lamsdorff referred to the conference to be held on the 28th. The date February 2 in this connection does not appear till we reach Mr. Kurino’s dispatch of January 28. Moreover, on January 30, the Count told him that he could not tell him the exact date when the Russian reply would be sent. See N.-R., Nos. 43, 45, 47. 671. This is evidently an error. The Count spoke to Mr. Kurino, at 8 p. m., February 4, about the probable contents of the reply purely as the former’s personal opinion. It was not an official statement of the exact contents of the reply.—N.-R., No. 50. See p. 340, above. 672. This statement is incorrect and misleading. Referring to the text of the Japanese note (pp. 342–344, above), it will be seen that it did not say that the Japanese Government would break off the negotiations because Russia had been evading a reply to the Japanese proposals. A reference was made to the prolonged delays of Russia before giving replies, but the note did not state that the delays were the only reason, still less that the delay of “a” reply—i. e., the last reply—was the ground, for the rupture of negotiations. 673. See a vigorous statement of this charge made by Count Cassini in the North American Review for May, 1904, pp. 681–682. 674. The London Times, February 22, 1904, p. 5. 675. Translated from the statement published in the Japanese press on March 3, 1904. Professor Sakuye Takahashi enumerated in the Kokumin (February 27–29, 1904) some of the modern European wars in which declarations of war did not precede the opening of hostilities. He mentioned twelve such cases between 1715 and 1863, besides ten cases between 1700 and 1853 in which Russia was on the offensive. For these latter instances, he refers to Colonel J. P. Maurice’s Hostilities without Declaration of War, pp. 12, 16, 22, 34, 38, 49, 50, 55, 64. 677. The London Times, February 24, 1904, p. 7, and other papers. 678. The diplomatic correspondence in connection with this affair has been published, in the Kwampo, February 15, 1904, pp. 275–276, which supports the literal truth of the statement contained in this paragraph. 679. The Kokumin (March 9). The above has been taken from an authoritative English translation, which was published in the London Times (March 9), p. 5. 680. The Kwampo, February 19 (1904), p. 387. 681. Ex-Secretary of War Elihu Root’s speech at the Republican Convention at Chicago, June 21, 1904. 682. The Kwampo, February 19 (1904), pp. 387–388. 683. Ibid., p. 388. 684. Ibid., February 27 (1904), pp. 586–587. 685. See the three Russo-Japanese agreements regarding Korea, concluded in 1896 and 1898, pp. 263 ff., above. 686. Chapter XVII. 687. See the virulent opposition of certain reactionaries of Korea against the railroad, shipping, and other economic enterprises of the Japanese in the peninsula, as expressed in a circular letter issued by them in June, 1904, and published in the Dobun-kwai, No. 56 (July, 1904), pp. 57–62. Here, as everywhere, the student should carefully observe the nature of the opposition, its agents, and their motives. Cf. the latest issues of the Korea Review, edited by Mr. H. B. Hulbert, Seul. Electrotyped and printed by H. O. Houghton & Co. Cambridge, Mass., U. S. 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