When we recall that even before 1900 Russia desired to control the railway enterprises, not only in Manchuria, but also on the right side of the Liao River, it is not altogether strange that, simultaneously with the occupation of Manchuria, the northern Chinese line was seized by her troops. This action, however, did not stop at the Great Wall. Had it not been for the protest of Great Britain, the Russians would have seized the entire line from Niu-chwang up to Peking. During the latter part of June, they captured the Tientsin depot, burned the office, destroyed the safe and the documents it contained, and seized land, some tracts of which had been owned by British subjects.^[300] On July 8, the Northern Railway was seized and the British engineer, C. W. Kinder, and his staff were turned out,^[301] and, in spite of the dissent of the British and American commanders, the Admirals of the allied Powers voted on July 16 that the Russians should manage the railway.^[302] In August, the Russians claimed also the line between Tong-ku and Shanhai-Kwan, on the one hand, and the one between Tientsin and Peking, on the other, thus completing the control of the entire connection.^[303] British protests were in a measure waived by the new Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces, Count von Waldersee, who early in October assigned the repair of the section up to Yang-tsun to the Russians.^[304] About this time, fifty miles of railway material belonging to a British firm were seized at Niu-chwang by the Russians,^[305] followed by the seizure of the collieries at Tong-shan and Lin-si hitherto operated by the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.^[306] Other incidents followed, greatly to the annoyance of those whose interests had been invested in the works. It was at this juncture that, on October 16, 1900, an Agreement was signed between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, upholding the principle of the open door in China (Article 1), disclaiming territorial designs upon China on the part of the contracting Powers (Article 2), and supplemented by the following (Article 3), embodying the well-known principle of the balance of power at China’s expense: “In case of another Power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages, the two contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China.”^[307] This is the notorious Anglo-German Agreement, the fate of which has been an object of much ridicule among writers upon Chinese affairs of recent years. The diplomacy which had resulted in the conclusion of this Agreement has not been made known to the public, but as to the circumstances which had caused the two Powers to negotiate, it may safely be inferred that; so far as the British side was concerned, the Russian conduct in North China was a potent factor.^[308] As to the deeper causes on both sides for the extraordinary rapprochement, it is easy to speculate upon but unsafe to asseverate them.^[309] The Agreement further stated that other interested Powers should be invited to accept the principles recorded in it (Article 4). It is interesting to see how this peculiar combination of the principles of (1) the open door, (2) the integrity of China, and (3) a balance between the Powers on the Chinese ground, was viewed by the other Powers. Japan joined the Agreement on October 29, as a signatory, but not as an adhering State.^[310] France, Austria, and Italy recognized as identical with their own all of the principles proposed,^[311] while the United States did likewise with the first two, but expressed itself unconcerned with the third.^[312] As for Russia, she seized this opportunity to indulge her diplomatic sarcasm. She declared that, from her point of view, the Agreement “did not perceptibly modify the situation in China,” and the second principle perfectly corresponded with Russia’s intentions, as “she was the first to lay down the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire as a fundamental principle of her policy in China.” Her reply to the first principle was delicately expressed, as follows: It “can be favorably entertained by Russia, as this stipulation does not infringe in any way the status quo established in China by existing treaties.”^[313] In other words, the open door may or may not apply to other places not yet covered by the existing treaties and still open to whatever development might take place. The evil genius of the third Article of the Anglo-German Agreement was not less skillfully answered by Russia: “The Imperial Government, while referring to its Circular of the 12th (25th) August, can only renew the declaration that such an infringement [by another Power] would oblige Russia to modify her attitude according to circumstances.”^[314] From these words, it was plain that outside of the two contracting Powers, the Agreement could not exercise great influence, and least upon Russia, which declined to observe any new feature in the instrument. The virtue of the Agreement was, moreover, seriously impaired by the insincerity of one of its parties, and by the consequent difference of views between themselves. The document was openly talked about in Germany as the Yang-tsze Agreement, it being meant that Great Britain thereby pledged herself to abstain from annexing the Yang-tsze Provinces, hitherto considered, much to the jealousy of Germany, as a British sphere of interest.^[315] More momentous was the question whether the Agreement included in its scope, not only the eighteen Provinces, but also Manchuria. The answer would, of course, depend upon whether both parties would consider, under the provision of the third Article, that they alike possessed “their own interests” to protect in Manchuria. Seen in this light, it is not strange that, in the opinion of Lord Lansdowne, the “Agreement most unquestionably extended to Manchuria, which is part of the Chinese Empire,”^[316] while, from Count von BÜlow’s point of view, “The Anglo-German Agreement had no reference to Manchuria.” “I can imagine nothing,” he added, “which we can regard with more indifference” than Manchuria.^[317] Evidently Germany had entered into the Agreement with different motives from those of Great Britain, and perhaps also with less zeal, if zeal there was.