Side by side with the idea of arbitration, another pacific idea, already powerful, is pressing forward, and growing into an International Law, namely, the Law of Neutrality.

He is neutral, who neither takes part for, nor against, in a dispute. Neutrality is the impartial position which is not associated with either party. The State is called neutral which neither takes part in a war itself, nor in time of war sides with any of the warring parties.

In ancient times neutrality was not understood as a national right. Neither the Greek nor the Latin language has any word to express the idea. In the days when Roman policy was seeking to drag all the nations of the earth into its net, the Romans saw in other peoples only tributaries who had been subdued by their armies, subject nations who had submitted to the Roman yoke, allies who were compelled to join in their policy of conquest, or lastly enemies, who sooner or later would have to bow before their victorious legions. Neutral States there were none.

The centuries immediately following the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire were filled with constant strife. This continued long before the refining power which exists in the heart of Christianity began to show itself in the foreign relations of States.

The foundations of modern Europe were laid in war.

During the Crusades the whole of our continent was under arms. The struggle against the "infidel" was not simply a contest between one State and another, it was also a contest between Christian Europe and Mohammedan Asia. To be neutral in such a struggle would, according to the judgment of the time, have been equivalent to denying the faith. Within the European States, feudalism exerted no less a hindrance to the embodiment of the principle of neutrality. It would have been thought the gravest crime to loosen the bond of military service which compelled vassals to support with arms the cause of their feudal lords. It was only with the close of the age of feudalism, when Europe began to separate into three or four great monarchies, that neutrality in politics became a means of preserving the balance.

In later times increasing communication and trade have above all contributed to the development of neutral laws. Without the sanction of these, a naval war between two great nations would have made any maritime trade all but impossible. Down to the close of the last century, however, neutral rights were dependent either on national statutes or on special treaties concluded between one State and another. The law only gained certain international importance towards the close of the eighteenth century through the neutral alliances which from time to time were contracted between States.

In the period between 1780 and 1856 the subject gained an entrance by degrees among all maritime nations except England, who, independent of it, and always relying on her own strength, continuously sought to maintain unlimited domination at sea.

In 1854-56 begins, so far as neutrality is concerned, a new era of international law.

From this time the opposition which England raised to the practical application of neutrality in naval war may be regarded as having broken down. On the 30th of March, 1854, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, published a communication, including, amongst other things, that the neutral flag during the then begun (Crimean) war, should be regarded as a protection for all neutral and hostile private property, except contraband of war. The same day the English Government gave forth in the London Gazette a similar declaration, and on April 19th of the same year the Russian Government notified in the Official Gazette of St. Petersburg that Russia would, during that war, act upon the same rules as the Allied powers.

The provisions, which thus the Western powers on one side, and Russia on the other, believed themselves bound to observe towards neutral states, were at the Peace of Paris, 1856, solemnly ratified as International Law in force for all time. The principles which the plenipotentiary signatories of the Peace Treaty of Paris agreed upon in a proclamation of April 16th, 1856, are as follows:—

1. Privateering is and shall be abolished. 2. The neutral flag shall protect property belonging to the enemy, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, may not be seized under the enemy's flag. 4. Blockades in order to be obligatory must be fully effectual; that is, shall be maintained with a strength really sufficient to prevent approach to the enemy's coast.

The Governments which signed the treaty bound themselves also, in this proclamation, to communicate the resolutions to the States which were not called to take part in the Paris Conference, and to invite them to agree in these decisions. All the European States except Spain, and a number of powers outside Europe, declared themselves ready to carry out in practice the entire resolutions of the proclamation.

Many wars since then have shaken Europe; but under all these misfortunes the warring States have not only conscientiously observed the principles laid down in 1856, but they have gone further, in certain points, in applying them, than they by it were bound to do. Thus the Austrian Government issued an order, during the war with France and Sardinia, with respect to maritime national law, in many points far beyond what hostile or neutral powers had any ground for requesting. The Imperial decree not only charged its military and civil officers to follow strictly the injunctions of the proclamation, but Sardinian and French vessels, which lay moored in Austrian waters, were also to be permitted to load freight and proceed to foreign seas, on condition that they took on board no contraband of war or prohibited goods of any description. Immediately on the outbreak of war, the same principles were adopted by France and Sardinia. These States, however, went a step further than Austria, inasmuch as they unreservedly declared that they would not regard coal as a contraband of war.

During the Dano-German War, in 1864, and the war between Austria and Prussia and Italy, in 1866, the international principles of maritime law received a similarly wide interpretation.

During the North American Civil War important questions came up, which more or less affected the principle of neutrality. The question, which became one of the greatest importance, arose in respect of the injury which the commerce and navigation of the Union suffered during the war from various privateers which were built in England on the Southerners' account.

The Alabama Question took its name from the privateer which went out from Liverpool and occasioned the greatest devastation while the war lasted. Although the executive of the Union at Washington duly directed the attention of the English Government to the fact that allowing the pirate to leave the English port would be equivalent to a breach of the peace, yet the Government took no measures to prevent the vessel leaving. The American Government, who with reason regarded this omission as a violation of the laws of neutrality, claimed from England full compensation for the property which had been destroyed in the course of the civil war by the Southern privateer which came from an English port. I have previously given more particularly the constitution and functions of the Court of Arbitration appointed to settle the threatening dispute which arose on this occasion. The arbitration award had to be adjudicated in accordance with the three following fundamental principles of international law:—

A neutral Government is bound:—

1. To guard assiduously against any vessel being armed or equipped in its ports, which there is reason to believe would be employed for warlike purposes against a peaceful power, and with equal assiduity to prevent any vessel designed for privateering, or other hostility, from leaving the domain of the neutral State:

2. Not to allow any belligerent power to make use of its ports or harbours as the basis of its operations, or for strengthening or repairing its military strength, or for enlisting:

3. To use every care within its ports and harbours and over all persons within its domain, to prevent any violation of the obligations named.

The contracting parties to this treaty agreed to hold themselves responsible for the future, and to bring them before the notice of other Maritime powers, with the recommendation that they also should enter into them.

The historical facts here produced show that the mutual interest nations have in the inviolability of the seas has effectually contributed to the development of an accepted international law.

When the necessity of making the principles of neutrality binding at sea was once understood, it was not long before the value of adopting them on land became apparent.

In the documents, for instance, by which Belgium, Switzerland and Luxemburg are neutralized, it is distinctly stated that the permanent neutrality of these States is in full accord with the true interests of European policy.

According to the actual modern law of nations, there is a permanent neutrality guaranteed by international deeds of law and treaties, and one occasionally resting upon free decisions.[14]

As instances of permanent and guaranteed neutrality, we have: The Neutralization of Switzerland. Ever since the unhappy Italian war in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Swiss Confederation has endeavoured to assure to the country the security which neutrality gives.

This neutrality was recognised and guaranteed by the great European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (art. 84 and 92), and later was further solemnly confirmed by a special act of the powers at Paris, Nov. 20th of the same year, in which it was stated:

"The powers declare ... by a permanent act that the permanent neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as well as its independence of foreign influence, accords with the true interests of European policy."[15]

The Neutralization of Belgium. In virtue of the Treaty of London, Nov. 15th, 1831 (art. vii.), further confirmed by the powers April 19th, 1839, a permanent neutrality was awarded to Belgium.

This country, which for centuries had served as a battle-ground for foreign powers, especially for France and Germany, was hereby secured against such dangers, and at the same time the field for European warfare was materially narrowed.

Article vii. of the London protocol runs thus: "Belgium shall, within the boundaries established in art. i. and iv., form an independent State. The kingdom is bound to observe the same neutrality towards all States."[16]

During the Franco-German war 1870-1, the neutralization of Belgium was threatened with violation by France, and further guarantees were given in new protocols arranged by England.

The Neutralization of the Archduchy of Luxemburg resulted from the London protocol of May 11th, 1867.

As an evidence of the power and importance in our day of entering into agreements of neutrality, the following may be adduced:—

During the Franco-German war, 1870-1, the Prussian Government complained to the guaranteeing powers of conduct at variance with neutrality on the part of Luxemburg, and threatened no longer to respect the neutrality of the Archduchy. (Despatch of Prince Bismarck, Dec. 3rd, 1870.)

In consequence of this, Count Beust, the Austrian chancellor, in an opinion given Dec. 22nd of the same year, remarked, that upon the ground of the principle of European guarantee, it belonged to the powers who had signed the document of neutralization, to inquire into and to settle whether a violation had taken place on the part of the neutral State, and not to one of the belligerent powers.[17]

Besides the States named, a permanent neutrality has been secured to the Ionian Islands according to the treaties of London, 1863-64; and also to the Samoan Islands, in virtue of the agreement between England, Germany, and the United States of North America, whereby, amongst other things, it was settled that in case of any difference of opinion arising; an appeal should be made to arbitration; and that a supreme tribunal should be created with a supreme judge, whom the King of Sweden and Norway has been empowered to name.

One general advantage which neutralization affords is the simplification with respect to foreign policy thereby obtained.

The attitude of a neutralized State can be reckoned on beforehand by all parties.

In proportion to its military importance and position, a neutral country constitutes in many ways a security to all the powers.

It is in close connection with neutralization that in these days an ever-growing need is becoming apparent to localize wars as much as possible; that is, to confine them to those who begin them.

As a result of the extraordinarily rapid development of world-wide trade and intercourse, and the consequent community of interests, a war between two States necessarily occasions more or less derangement to the rest.

In this increasing solidarity lies the surest guarantee that neutrality will be respected.

We may already be justified in drawing the conclusion that the security of neutral States will continually increase.

Supported upon these foundations of history and of international law, a discussion was raised on the neutralization of Sweden, in the First Chamber by Major C.A. AdelskÖld, and by myself in the Second, in the hope thereby not only to oppose the King's bill for the extension of the war department, but also especially to open the way for a profitable solution of the tough, old, threadbare question of Defence.[18]

Before this resolution was brought into the Riksdag, I had read it to seventy members of the Riksdag, who unanimously accepted it, as did also, later on, in the main, a majority of the [Norwegian] Storting. [19]And as soon as the purport of the resolution became generally known through the press, there came in from popular meetings all over Sweden numerous congratulatory addresses to Major AdelskÖld and myself.

But from its very commencement the proposition met with an unconquerable opposition from those in power.

With great unanimity efforts were made in this quarter to depreciate the value and the historical importance of the principle of neutrality. All possible means were used with this object, to touch the tenderest fibres of the national feelings. It would be a disgrace to us, it was said, to employ any other than military power in asserting our primeval freedom. We should thereby break off from our glorious history, and draw a black line over its brilliant warlike reminiscences. There were certainly neutral countries to be found, but their neutrality was not the result of their own desire, but proceeded from the great powers themselves. Should we then, they say further, be the first people to take such a step? Would it not be equivalent to begging peace of our neighbour, and declaring ourselves incapable before the whole world? The sensible thing would be to further develop and strengthen our army. The resolution was called a political demonstration of indigence; a disgusting nihilist plot, and so on. One member of the Riksdag proposed that it should be consigned to a committee charged with arranging for sending beasts abroad. Scoffs came thick as hail; and when it became known that the mover in the Second Chamber was its author, the really guilty one, he was branded as a universal traitor,—just as the year before, when he raised a peaceable question about extended liberty of conscience.

In my defence of the resolution in the Riksdag, I sought to anticipate all objections to it which were worthy of notice.[20]

Amongst these I give special attention to the following five:—

With regard to the first objection, viz., that the powers would not enter upon Sweden's neutralization, it appears to me that circumstances of great weight imply the contrary.

We may be quite sure that the powers will first and foremost consult their own interests. Scandinavia may be certainly regarded as specially valuable as a base of military operations to any of the great Baltic and Western States. But it would be quite a matter of consideration, whether these powers would not gain more by the reciprocal security of being all alike cut off from this base, than by the doubtful advantage of being possibly able to reckon upon Scandinavia as an ally.

A neutralized Scandinavia would be a Switzerland among the seas; a breakwater in the way between England and France on the one side, and Russia and Germany on the other. In case of a war between these great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to get the powers along the coasts of the Sound and the Belts, upon its side. And how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody.

So the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. It may therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent neutrality of the powers along the coast. Here, according to my view, lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms and Denmark.

My reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of Scandinavia is, that I am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same view as the Swedish. With respect to the general interests of European peace, the neutralization of Scandinavia would be more important than that of Switzerland and Belgium, because the interests of the great powers are greater and more equally balanced around the Scandinavian North than around those two small continental States.

We have old friends in the Western powers; we have gained a new friend in united Germany and by the neutralization of Scandinavia we shall not only make friendship with Russia, but Denmark will gain that of Germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to Denmark with respect to North Sleswick, seeing that it need no longer fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance with a powerful enemy of Germany.

But it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be advanced by the neutralization of Scandinavia.

In the course of the last ten years world-wide traffic has made an unheard-of growth and connecting links between nations have been formed in many regions. As an example of the effect of these we may mention that even thirty years ago the normal freightage for corn was 50-60 shillings sterling per ton, from the Black Sea to North Europe; but the freightage from California and Australia to Europe, now, hardly exceeds the half. A European war would exercise a paralyzing effect here. Every one who has any conception of the influence of the price of corn on, to speak broadly, the whole civilization of modern times, will easily understand this.

Before the century closes this development will have woven a net of common interest all over our continent, and necessarily called forth such a sensitiveness in the corporate body of Europe, that, for example, an injury in the foot of Italy may be said to cause pain right up to Norway.

The merchant fleet of Norway, alone, is indeed the third in rank of all the merchant fleets of the world. As is well known, the united kingdoms take an advanced place in the carrying trade by sea. According to what was told me by a distinguished merchant, the transport trade undertaken by Norwegian and Swedish ships between foreign countries is five times greater than that between home and foreign lands. Consequently, as the keen competition between steam and sailing vessels increases, the only country which can dispense with the service of our sailing vessels is England, the great power upon which we may reckon always as an ally. Most of the remaining countries, on the other hand, require our merchant fleet.

Since, now, we could not of course defend our merchant service in a war, and other and greater nations may be jeopardized as much as we, it may be assumed that they would be willing, through the neutralization of Scandinavia, to secure its fleet against the eventualities of war.

If we add such interests as affect trade and credit, civilization and humanity, to the political interests, it appears that we may plead on grounds of strong probability that the great powers would be willing to guarantee our neutrality.

According to the second objection, the country would gain no security from a guaranteed neutrality, even if, contrary to expectation, such could be obtained.

Perfect safety cannot be attained here on earth by any system. This is as true for nations as for individuals but I believe that a neutrality thus guaranteed would be a strong protection to our national independence, whilst in a not inconsiderable degree it would contribute to the preservation of peace, and gradually help to lessen the military burdens of all lands; consequently, and in the first place, of our own.

Treaties, it is said, are broken as easily as they are made. Even if it be true that this has occurred, it does not necessarily follow that it must continue to occur. New factors may come in making it more difficult to break engagements that have been entered into.

Experience shows that righteous laws have been transgressed, but no one would aver that they are therefore unnecessary. As the moral power of the law makes it possible to diminish the police force, so also treaties of neutrality make it possible to diminish the military forces.

Besides, our opponents ought to bring forward evidence that the rights of States at present neutralized have been violated. That they have been threatened is true, and it would have been a wonder if this had not happened under the lawless condition which has obtained among nations.

The idea of neutrality has, nevertheless, as I have tried to show by many examples, little by little developed into a valid principle of justice; and the growth continues. The neutralization of Scandinavia would bring it a great step forward, to the blessing both of ourselves and of other nations.

According to objections 3 and 4, a guaranteed neutrality would diminish our independence without contributing to lessen our burdens for defence.

The truth is, that international law as at present constituted does not permit another power to interfere under any pretext with the internal concerns of a neutral state, and therefore not with anything which affects its system of defence or its measures for preserving its neutrality. With these the neutral State, and it only, can deal.

As a proof of this being so, Luxemburg was neutralized in 1867 upon condition that the strong fortress bearing that name should be demolished. But this circumstance, imperative for the general peace of Europe, shows on the other hand that guaranteeing powers do not willingly impose upon a State any serious duty of fortifying itself in order to defend its rights. Nevertheless the powers found it needful to make a supplementary clause to the protocol by which the congress concluded the neutrality of Luxemburg, whereby it was emphasized, as a matter of course, that the article respecting the destruction of the fortress of Luxemburg did not imply any sort of limitation of the right of the neutral State to maintain, or, if it chose, to improve its own works of defence. Belgium did indeed construct the great fortresses around Antwerp long after the country was neutralized.

In reference to what one and another has said about the value of the subject, nothing is needed beyond the fact that neutral rights have, even in its present position, been respected in all essentials. That a neutral power must abstain from mixing itself up with the policy of other powers cannot imply a greater limitation of its right to self-regulation than that a guaranteeing power shall abstain from attacking a neutralized State or from making military alliance with it. There is certainly a limitation for both parties, as far as is necessary for adopting an intelligent union between States,—a limitation of physical force and of love of war.

The neutral State has not to submit to any guardianship beyond what any man must do and does, when he subjects his passions to the control of a moral purpose.

Seeing that a guaranteeing State has no right to interfere in our internal concerns, not even in anything we think good for our defence, we shall always be free to keep up a military force, large or small. But a neutralized State is obliged to disarm the troops of other belligerent powers that may overstep its frontiers, just as of course, under the lawless condition which war is and which it entails, it has, according to its ability, to protect its boundaries with arms. But if this duty cannot exempt Switzerland and Belgium from proportionately large war burdens in time of peace, this would not at all in the same degree affect the neutralization of the Scandinavian peninsula, since there could never be a question of disarming troops which had overstepped its boundaries, but only of preventing the war-ships of a belligerent power from entering Norwegian or Swedish seas, a thing which, under the protection of a guaranteed neutrality, could not take place.

Respecting the fifth objection, which declares that the proposition is untimely, I do not hesitate to express my opinion that just now, during the truce which prevails, is the time to bring it forward. The need of a settled peace increases everywhere, and it is therefore probable that a proposition to the great powers respecting a guaranteed neutrality for the united kingdoms would meet with general sympathy in Europe.

On these and many other grounds I sought to maintain my proposition.

It was opposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Hochschild, amongst others, who declared that he could not possibly support it. He informed us that the whole of his colleagues in the Government took the same view of the subject as himself. He desired that the bill as well as the contingent appointment of a committee should be thrown out totally and entirely.

As the minister in this way has made the matter into a cabinet question, there could not well, under the present conditions, be any question of the adoption of the bill.

In spite of this, however, the request of the Foreign Minister was not complied with, seeing the Second Chamber adopted an amendment after fifty-three members had voted for the acceptance of the original bill.

By the amendment which was adopted, the Chamber did not accept the grounds of the committee's opinion—which the Foreign Secretary approved—but, in the hope that the Government would spontaneously carry out the chief object of the bill, accepted for the present the report of the committee that no address be sent to the King on the subject.

By reason of this result in the Second Chamber no action was taken in the First on the matter.[21]

During the debate in the Second Chamber, April 28, the Foreign Secretary remarked that I must have overlooked the fact that the European powers had, ever since 1814, looked upon the two kingdoms of the Scandinavian peninsula as a political unity in questions relating to peace and war; why otherwise should I propose from the first that the sister kingdom should have the opportunity of expressing itself on a matter which concerned Norway equally with Sweden. This objection was without foundation.

During the drawn debate, March 3, I had already taken occasion to point out that it would not be seemly for one moving a resolution in the Swedish Riksdag to act as spokesman for Norway at the same time expressing my confidence that the Storting would meet us in a friendly manner, if the Riksdag approved the bill with respect to Sweden.[22]

That the neutralization ought to include not only Norway, but Denmark too, seems to be obvious.

A highly esteemed jurist, Count L. Kamarowsky, professor of law at the University of Moscow, puts it as a matter of great importance in the interests of the world's peace that international seas and coasts should be neutralized.[23] This particularly affects Denmark in connection with the other two Scandinavian States. Such a neutralization, he says, will lead to a disarmament in the Sound and Belts. These great traffic-ways would then be accessible for the merchant and war vessels of all nations. They must not be fortified, but the freedom of navigation would be watched over by an international committee.

At the Conference at Berlin in 1885, where fifteen States were represented, just principles were adopted for the navigation of the Congo and the Niger. Free navigation and commerce on these rivers was secured to the flags of all nations. The same principle was likewise extended to their tributaries and lakes, together with canals and railroads which might in the future be constructed to get past the unnavigable portions of the Congo and Niger. Not even in time of war may the freedom of communication and commerce be interrupted. The transport of contraband of war alone is forbidden. An international commission takes care that all these international agreements are kept in force. This authority, composed of delegates from each of the States which took part in the Berlin Conference, is independent of the local authorities in Congo-land.

Now, every free people has naturally an independent right to arrange its own affairs as it chooses, upon condition that it grants the same right to every other State.

In consequence of this principle in international law, neutralization is applied in very varied ways according to the very varying conditions of those who have the benefit of it, and altogether in harmony with their wishes. Thus, for example, neutralization when it concerns a territory, consists not only in forbidding any warlike operation in the domain thus rendered inviolate, but involves a similar prohibition with respect to any marching or countermarching of armies, or smaller detachments, even of single officers or soldiers.

A canal or a strait may be so neutralized, on the other hand, that all warlike operations are forbidden in it, but nevertheless it is open for passage through, yet upon condition that no belligerent has a right, in passing through, to land upon the shores of the neutralized region.

This is the kind of neutralization which appears applicable to the Scandinavian seas.

One question which for a long time came up constantly at the congresses of Peace Societies, was the Neutralization of the Suez Canal, until it became at last solved in practice. After tedious negotiations, this burning question was settled by an agreement between England and France in the treaty of October 24, 1887, which was later entered into by the other powers interested and that important channel of communication became at all times inviolate.[24]

Upon the programme of the friends of peace questions have long been mooted respecting the neutralization of Elsass-Lothringen, and of the Balkan States, together with that of the Danube, Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, Dardanelles, and their European coasts; whereupon should follow the rendering inviolate of Constantinople; as also of the Baltic, and as a result of this, the neutralization of the Scandinavian kingdoms.

In connection with the neutralization of the Sound has arisen the still newer question of the non-German region north of the North Sea Canal, now in course of construction, between the mouth of the Elbe and the naval port of Kiel.

By constituting Elsass-Lothringen into an independent neutral State, a division would be made between France and Germany, and these great powers would be separated by a huge wall of neutral States which would also narrow in an essential degree the European battle-field.

The same result is hoped for from a confederacy of neutral States on the Balkan, with respect to the relations between Russia and Austria, as well as with respect to the whole of Europe.

The Sound is one of the most important arteries of the world's commerce. About one hundred vessels of all nations pass daily through this strait, but only about ten (on the average, however, certainly larger ships) pass through the Suez Canal, which in the interests of the world's trade has become neutral.

It can be nothing but a gain to Europe that the entrances both into the Baltic and the Black Sea should be rendered inviolate.

In an address upon the importance of the Sound to the North, given to the National Economic Society, Mr. Bajer pointed out that so long as the Sound and its coasts were not rendered inviolate, military devastations will be carried on in and around the strait by belligerent powers; also that the facts that the Sound is not Danish only, but Swedish also, and that Sweden has a common foreign policy with Norway, make it probable that it may the sooner be understood to be for the European interest that all three northern kingdoms should be simultaneously neutralized, and not one of them only.[25]

In consequence of Mr. Bajer's indefatigable zeal for the united co-operation of the northern kingdoms in the cause of peace, this idea has gained many influential adherents in foreign countries also; and on his proposition, two international congresses, Geneva, Sept. 16th, 1883, and Berne, Aug. 6th, 1884, unanimously accepted the following resolution, which in its general meaning was adopted by the First Northern peace Meeting at Gotenberg, Aug. 19th, 1885:—

Considering that,—

1. The geographical position of the three northern States, is such, that they might, with a larger military and commercial naval power than they now possess, hold the keys of the Baltic:

2. Whilst the very weakness of these States probably removes all danger of their using the advantages of this position against Europe, the same weakness may one day expose them, either by force or fraud, to be plundered by their powerful neighbours:

3. The inviolability of the three northern States, and their independence of every foreign influence, is in the true interest of all Europe, and their neutralization would tend to the general order.

4. Their independence, which is indeed a common right of all nations, can only be secured to the northern nations by their neutralization.

5. This neutralization ought to have for its object and legal effect:

Firstly, To place beyond all danger of war all those portions of land and sea which belong to Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

Secondly, To secure at all times, even during war, to all merchant and war-ships, whatever flag they carry, whether that of a belligerent or not, full liberty to run into the Baltic from the North Sea, or vice versÂ, whether sailing singly or in fleets.

On these accounts the meeting declares,—

That Denmark, Sweden and Norway ought to be neutralized, and that this neutralization ought to include:—

1. With respect to the mainland and islands of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, that all parts of this territory shall be at all times entirely neutral.

2. With respect to the Sound and the Little Belt, that in time of war, ships belonging to any belligerent power shall be forbidden to show themselves in these seas; which, on the other hand, shall be always open for merchant craft, even those belonging to belligerent powers, as well as for war-ships belonging to neutrals.

3. With respect to the Great Belt, that this strait shall always be open for merchant and war-ships of every flag, including belligerents, whether singly or in fleets; but that these ships shall be entirely forbidden to undertake any inimical action on the coasts of the above-named strait, or in its seas, within a distance exceeding the maximum range of its artillery before sailing in or sailing out, or indeed any attack, seizure, privateering, blockade, embargo, etc., or any other warlike action whatever.

The meeting expressed its desire to see an international congress arrange and conclude a treaty which should be open for all European nations to enter into and sign, which should establish on the above-named basis, under the guarantee of the signatory powers, the neutrality of the northern States, together with the creation of a really solid tribunal of arbitration, which, as the highest court of appeal, should solve all difficulties that might arise with respect to the said treaty.