V
MACHIAVELISMToC
Mendacity and Faithlessness.
(Before the War.)
362. A stock of inherited conceptions of integrity and morality is a necessity for government.—H. v. Treitschke, P., Vol. i., p. 317.
363. When one really meditates a war, one must say no word about it; one must envelop one's designs in a profound mystery; then, suddenly and without warning, one leaps like a thief in the night—as the Japanese destroyers leapt upon the unsuspecting Port Arthur, as Frederick II. threw himself upon Silesia.[35]—A. Wirth, U.A.P., p. 36.
364. The brilliant Florentine was the first to infuse into politics the great idea that the State is Power. The consequences of this thought are far-reaching. It is the truth, and those who dare not face it had better leave politics alone.—H. v. Treitschke, P., Vol. i., p. 85.
365. As real might can alone guarantee the endurance of peace and security, and as war is the best test of real might, war contains the promise of future peace. But it must if possible [womÖglich] be a righteous and honourable war, something in the nature of a war of defence.—J. Burckhardt, W.B., p. 164.
366. It was Machiavelli who first laid down the maxim that when the State's salvation is at stake there must be no enquiry into the purity of the means employed; only let the State be secured and no one will condemn them.—H. v. Treitschke, P., Vol. i., p. 83.
367. The relations between two States must often be termed a latent war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning and deception, just as war itself does.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 49.
368. The statesman has no right to warm his hands with smug self-laudation at the smoking ruins of his Fatherland, and comfort himself by saying, "I have never lied"; this is the monkish type of virtue.—H. v. Treitschke, P., Vol i., p. 104.
369. Belligerent States are always and exclusively in a pure state of nature, in which there cannot possibly be any question or right [or law].—E. v. Hartmann, quoted by Ein Deutscher, W.K.B.M., p. 12.
370. How markedly Bismarck's grand frankness in large matters stands out amidst all his craft in single instances.[36]—H. v. Treitschke, P., Vol. i., p. 90.
371. Let it be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.... But we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France, nor Russia, nor England need to attack in order to further their interests.... If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, that both these States would feel themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 280.
372. When an unconscientious speculator is telling lies upon the Stock Exchange he is thinking only of his own profit, but when a diplomat is guilty of obscuring facts in a diplomatic negotiation he is thinking of his country.—H. v. Treitschke, P., Vol i., p. 91.
373. It is natural, and within certain limits, politically a matter of course, that the German Emperor should have thought that, until Germany had a strong fleet, we must try to keep on good terms with England, and even, on occasion, to make concessions.—Graf E. v. Reventlow, D.A.P., p. 60.
374. No State can pledge its future to another. It knows no arbiter, and draws up all its treaties with this implied reservation.... Moreover, every sovereign State has the undoubted right to declare war at its pleasure, and is consequently entitled to repudiate its treaties.—H. v. Treitschke, p. i., 28.
375. The question of alliances in war is always an open one, for circumstances may at any moment arise such as Bismarck referred to when he said: "No power is bound [or, we will add, entitled][37] to sacrifice important interests of its own on the altar of faithfulness to an alliance!"—Graf E. v. Reventlow, D.A.P., p. 22.
376. It was a most serious mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was favourable and success might confidently have been expected.... This policy somewhat resembles the supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 239.
377. Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 95.
(After July, 1914.)
378. Perhaps the greatest danger for us Germans—greatest because it does not threaten us from without, but within our own hearts—is our magnanimity. O, there is something glorious about this virtue, and we Germans may be quite particularly proud of possessing it.... But woe to the people which does not stand as one man behind the statesman who, by dint of hard struggles with his own soul, has fought his way to the only true standpoint—namely, that in international relations magnanimity is wholly out of place, and that here the voice of expediency can alone be heard.—Ein Deutscher, W.K.B.M., p. 12.
379. Through our policy of peace ... we deprive ourselves of the right of determining the time for bringing about a decision by force of arms, as Bismarck did in three wars, in which, thanks to his diplomatic adroitness, he forced upon his adversaries the outward appearance of declaring war, while in reality Prussia-Germany was the assailant. Bismarck is quoted in Germany as having discouraged preventive wars.... But we must not forget that the three great wars which Bismarck waged were in fact preventive. Even in 1870 the outbreak of war might have been stayed. It was only the brilliant manipulation (geniale Fassung) of the Ems telegram that put France in the wrong and drove her into war, just as Bismarck had foreseen.—K. v. Strantz, E.S.V., p. 38.380. For the will of the State, no other principle exists but that of expediency (ZweckmÄssigkeit), which is at the same time selfishness; not, however, the short-sighted selfishness commended by Machiavelli, but far-seeing, shrewdly-calculating selfishness.—Ein Deutscher, W.K.B.M., p. 11.
381. Far-seeing selfishness does not exclude the endeavour to win the confidence of other nations, which can be won only by honesty. But this honesty, at any rate on vital questions, ought on no account to be carried to the pitch of inexpedient Quixotism. Ein Deutscher, W.K.B.M., p. 11.
382. War was in our eyes the most honourable and the holiest means of awakening the people from its dazed condition. Whether this war came as an aggressive or as a defensive war was, in principle, a matter of indifference. That it came to us in the form of a war of defence was one of those historical strokes of luck which God vouchsafes to those peoples whom He loves. The time has not yet come to enquire whether the leaders of German foreign policy took deliberate measures to place us in the attitude of defence which the masses always regard as more moral. It may perhaps be so; but it is far from impossible that the disinclination for war which placed certain high dignitaries of the German Empire in constant opposition to the will of the people may have so far imposed upon our adversaries as to induce them to attack us.—K.A. Kuhn, W.U.W., p. 9.
383. Treaties under international law are no more than the formulated expression of the existent relations of power between States. If these relations of power have so far changed that the real or imaginary vital interests of one of the States demand and render possible the alteration of such treaties, it is the simple duty of the leader of that State to effect the alteration by all conceivable means, so long as the risk does not appear greater than the anticipated advantage.—Ein Deutscher, W.K.B.M., p. 7.
Might is Right.
(Before the War.)
384. The law of the strong holds good everywhere.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 18.
385. What does right matter to me? I have no need of it. What I can acquire by force, that I possess and enjoy; what I cannot obtain, I renounce, and I set up no pretensions to indefeasible right.... I have the right to do what I have the power to do.—M. Stirner, D.E.S.E., p. 275.
386. Might is the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 23.
387. Let it not be said that every people has a right to its existence (Bestand), its speech, &c. By making play with this principle, one may put on a cheap appearance of civilization, but only so long as the people in question ... does not stand in the way of any more powerful people.—J.L. Reimer, E.P.D., p. 129.388. It is a persistent struggle for possessions, power and sovereignty that primarily governs the relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only as it is compatible with advantage.—General v. Bernhardi, G.N.W., p. 19.
389. The earth is constantly being divided anew among the strong and powerful. The smaller peoples disappear; they are necessarily absorbed by their larger neighbours.—Prof. E. Hasse, D.G., p. 169.
(After July, 1914.)
390. It is a base calumny to attribute to us the brutal principle that might is equivalent to right.—Prof. F. Meinecke, D.R.S.Z., No. 29, p. 23.
391. In the age of the most tremendous mobilization of physical and spiritual forces the world has ever seen, we proclaim—no, we do not proclaim it, but it reveals itself—the Religion of Strength.—Prof. A. Deissmann, D.R.S.Z., No. 9, p. 24.
See also Nos. 84, 499.
FOOTNOTES:
[37] Reventlow's interpolation.
