In 1905 Captain Jellicoe went to the Admiralty as Director of Naval Ordnance. Having been Fisher’s assistant late in the ’eighties he knew his department and the men connected with it. He knew better than any other man of his age what the Navy wanted, and he evidently made up his mind that she should have it. He was heart and soul a “Fisher man” and a great admirer of the splendid work Sir Percy Scott had performed. Indeed, much of Scott’s genius might have been lost or wasted without Jellicoe’s help and enthusiasm. He took the part of Director of Naval Ordnance just at the right time. One of the most important reforms for which the Service has to thank him was fitting all guns mounted in ships of the first line with new day and night sights, and the installation of fire-control instruments for “spotting” and controlling at long range firing. He was also instrumental in getting rid of all gunnery It was almost entirely due to him that in a period of eighteen months the percentage of “hits” was raised from forty-two out of a hundred rounds to an average of seventy. In recognition of this a knighthood was conferred upon him in 1909; though previous to this honour he was made Controller of the Navy. Here, again, his knowledge of matÉriel necessary to the Service and his great technical ability were invaluable; his quickness, firmness and quiet manner had a great effect on the celerity with which work was done in private as well as in the royal dockyards. There had been a great deal of trouble in the past with contractors owing to the difficulty in getting plans and estimates passed quickly. Jellicoe soon changed this, and inspired the men under him to be decisive and swift and thorough. Describing the work he accomplished during his Controllership of the Navy a critic in Engineering paid Sir John high and deserved tribute, on the After pointing out that Jellicoe’s tenure of office was marked by a period of unusual naval shipbuilding activity, the author of the article in Engineering gave the number of new vessels of all classes added to the Navy between 1907 and 1910 as ninety, including twelve battleships and armoured cruisers, eight protected and unarmoured cruisers, and seventy destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines. In addition to the numbers given, there were then about sixty ships building, including eight battleships and armoured cruisers, seven protected and unarmoured cruisers, and forty-five destroyers and submarines, whilst the preliminaries to laying down were well advanced in the case of a further twenty-two ships; these, as enumerated in the current year’s naval estimates, included five battleships and armoured cruisers, three protected and unarmoured cruisers, and fourteen destroyers, submarines and fleet auxiliaries. The sea-going and fighting efficiency of all these warships was in advance of their Shipbuilding output has thus been well maintained in the dockyards, and there, as in the private yards doing Admiralty work, the delay in beginning new vessels is now at a minimum. The whole machinery of administration in this respect has been accelerated. The period of construction of large armoured warships remained at two years, notwithstanding the great increase in the size and displacement of the latest types. Admiral Jellicoe was a frequent visitor at the works of contractors, and by this means was enabled to assist and encourage those responsible in realizing the best results and to infuse them with his characteristic enthusiasm for the efficiency of the Service. “The repairs and maintenance of the Fleet have been well looked after by Sir John Jellicoe,” wrote the critic of Engineering, “who has realized throughout the importance of liberal financial provision to enable the prompt and proper execution of repairs. The total number of men employed (shipbuilding and repairs, etc.) in the home dockyards has considerably increased during “Sir John Jellicoe has been a strong Controller and his severance from the Admiralty is a matter of personal regret, which is not by any means confined to the members of the Board and the heads of departments. It has been stated that during this period Sir John Jellicoe would sometimes work for fifteen or sixteen hours a day, when business pressed. He never “fussed” or gave the impression of “rush,” and he neither worried nor drove his subordinates. His words were few, but to the point. And he has never been known to make a request or give an order twice. It was during the period Jellicoe began to carry on the good work Fisher had started at the Admiralty that the Emperor of Germany wrote a remarkable letter to the late Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord in 1908. At the time it was declared by Tweedmouth to be confidential and purely personal, but the contents have at last become more or less public. This letter, in the light of latter-day events, is particularly interesting. It was quoted for the first time by The Morning Post, and it throws a strong light on the Kaiser’s real character. One can imagine the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Fisher—whom the German Naval Party feared so keenly— “During my last pleasant visit to your hospitable shores,” the Emperor wrote, “I tried to make your authorities understand what the drift of the German Naval policy is. But I am afraid that my explanations have been misunderstood or not believed, because I see the ‘German Danger’ and the ‘German Challenge to British Naval Supremacy’ constantly quoted in the different articles. This phrase, if not repudiated or corrected, sown broadcast over the country and daily dinned into British ears, might in the end create most deplorable results. “It is absolutely nonsensical and untrue that the German Naval Bill is to provide a Navy meant as a ‘challenge to British Naval Supremacy.’ The German Fleet is built against nobody at all. It is solely built for Germany’s needs in relation with that country’s rapidly growing trade. “There is nothing surprising, secret or underhand in it, and every reader may study the whole course mapped out for the development of the German Navy with the greatest ease.” After a long preamble on the subject of what England might do (from the Kaiser’s point of view) with regard to her shipbuilding programme, the letter refers to a letter written and published by Lord Esher, in which the Emperor accuses him of misinterpreting Germany’s feelings by alleging that “every German from the Emperor down to the last man wished for the downfall of Sir John Fisher”:
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