Among those who sent most cordial letters of greeting, with requests that their names should be enrolled in the centennial autograph-book as signers of the woman's declaration of sentiments, were: Maine, Lavinia M. Snow, Lucy A. Snow; New Hampshire, Marilla M. Ricker, Abby P. Ela; Massachusetts, E. T. Strickland, Sarah E. Wall; Rhode Island, Paulina Wright Davis; Connecticut, Isabella Beecher Hooker, Frances Ellen Burr, Julia and Abby Smith; New York, Clemence S. Lozier, Henrietta Paine Westbrook, Nettie A. Ford, Elizabeth B. Phelps, Charlotte A. Cleveland, Elizabeth M. Atwell; Pennsylvania, E. A. Stetson Lozier, Anna Thomson; New Jersey, Ellen Dickinson, S. Mary Clute, Mary M. Van Clief, S. H. Cornell, Emma L. Wilde, Jennie Dixon, Casa Tonti, Marie Howland, Lucinda B. Chandler; District of Columbia, Addie T. Holton, Margaret E. Johnson, Sabra P. Abell, Ruth Carr Dennison, Ellen H. Sheldon, Mary Shadd Cary and ninety-four others, Mary F. Foster, Susan A. Edson; Virginia, Sally Holly, Carrie Putnam; Kentucky, Annie Laurie Quinby; Tennessee, Elizabeth Avery Meriwether; Louisiana, Elizabeth Lisle Saxon; Michigan, Sarah C. Owen, Margaret J. E. Millar; Illinois, A. J. Grover, Edward P. Powell, Cynthia A. Leonard, Susan H. Richardson; Missouri, Francis Minor, Annie R. Irvine; California, Sarah L. Knox, Sarah J. Wallis, Carrie M. Robinson, Mary E. Kellogg, Georgiana Bruce Kirby; Oregon, Mrs. A. J. Johns, Eveline Merrick Roork, Charles A. Reed; Washington Territory, Mary Olney Brown, Abby H. H. Stuart; Utah Territory, Annie Godbe; Iowa, Amelia Bloomer, Submit C. Loomis, Philo A. Lyon and seventy-five others of Humboldt, Jane A. Telker, Nancy R. Allen, Margaret Euart Colby, Mrs. Ellen M. Robinson, Mrs. G. R. Woodworth, Mrs. W. W. Johnson, Mrs. Caroline A. Ingham, Mrs. Mabel A. Stough, Mrs. R. H. Spencer, Mrs. J. W. Kenyon, Mrs. A. M. Horton, Miss L. T. Dood, Mary L. Watson, Mrs. Sarah A. McCoy, Mrs. J. J. Wilson, Mrs. F. L. Calkins, Mrs. L. H. Smith, Mrs. Emma C. Spear, Mrs. M. L. Burlingame, Mrs. G. W. Blanchard, Mrs. D. L. Ford, Mrs. E. C. Buffam, Mrs. Cora A. Jones, Mrs. Clara M. Wilson; Wisconsin, Laura Ross Wolcott, M. Josephine Pearce, Eliza T. Wilson, H. S. Brown; Minnesota, Sarah Burger Stearns; Kansas, Susan E. Wattles, Elsie Stewart, Henrietta L. Miller, Lottie Griffin, Jane M. Burke, Malura Hickson, Elsie J. Miller; Colorado, Alida C. Avery; Ohio, Sarah R. L. Williams, Margaret V. Longley; England, Lydia E. Becker, Caroline A. Biggs, Jessie M. Wellstood.

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CHAPTER XXX.

Constitution of the National Woman Suffrage Association.

Article 1. This organization shall be called the National Woman Suffrage Association.

Article 2. The object of this Association shall be to secure National Protection for women in the exercise of their right to vote.

Article 3. All citizens of the United States subscribing to this Constitution, and contributing not less than one dollar annually, shall be considered members of the Association, with the right to participate in its deliberations.

Article 4. The officers of this Association shall be a President, a Vice-President from each of the States and Territories, Corresponding and Recording Secretaries, a Treasurer and an Executive Committee of not less than five.

Article 5. A quorum of the Executive Committee shall consist of nine, and all officers of this Association shall be ex-officio members of the committee, with power to vote.

Article 6. All woman suffrage societies throughout the country shall be welcomed as auxiliaries, and their accredited officers or duly appointed representatives shall be recognized as members of the National Association.

Officers of the National Woman Suffrage Association, 1886.

President—Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Tenafly, N. J.

Vice-Presidents-at-Large—Susan B. Anthony, Rochester, N. Y.; Matilda Joslyn Gage, Fayetteville, N. Y.; Rev. Olympia Brown, Racine, Wis.; Phoebe W. Couzins, St. Louis, Mo.; Abigail Scott Duniway, Portland, Ore.

Honorary Vice-Presidents—Ernestine L. Rose, London, England; Priscilla Holmes Drake, Huntsville, Ala.; Mrs. Perry Spear, Eureka Springs, Ark.; Sarah. J. Wallis, Mayfield; Sarah Knox Goodrich, San JosÉ, Cal.; Mary F. Shields, Colorado Springs, Col.; Rev. Phebe A. Hanaford, New Haven, Conn.; Rev. Eliza Tupper Wilkes, Sioux Falls, Dak. Ter.; Rosina M. Parnell, Susan A. Edson, M. D., Ellen M. O'Connor, Washington, D. C.; Catherine V. Waite, Myra Bradwell, Chicago, Ill.; Zerelda G. Wallace, Indianapolis; Eliza Hamilton, Fort Wayne, Ind.; Amelia Bloomer, Council Bluffs; Mary V. Cowgill, West Liberty, Ia.; Prudence Crandall Philleo, Elk Falls; Mary T. Gray, Wyandotte; Mary A. Humphrey, Junction City, Kan.; Elizabeth H. Duval, Rinaldo, Ky.; Ann T. Greeley, Ellsworth; Lucy A. Snow, Rockland, Me.; Anna Ella Carroll, Baltimore, Md.; Sarah E. Wall, Worcester; Paulina Gerry, Stoneham, Mass.; Catherine A. F. Stebbins, Detroit, Mich.; Charlotte O. Van Cleve, Minneapolis, Minn.; Caroline Johnson Todd, St. Louis, Mo.; Harriet S. Brooks, Omaha, Neb.; Eliza E. Morrill, Sarah H. Pillsbury, Concord; Mary Powers Filley, North Haverhill, N. H.; Sarah G. Hurn, Vineland; Delia Stewart Parnell, Bordentown, N. J.; Clemence S. Lozier, M. D., New York; Amy Post, Rochester; Sarah H. Hallock, Milton; Mary R. Pell, Flushing, N. Y.; Elizabeth Oakes Smith, Hollywood, N. C.; Sophia O. Allen, South Newbury; Sarah R. L. Williams, Toledo; Louise Southworth, Cleveland, O.; Harriet W. Williams, Portland, Ore.; M. Adeline Thomson, Philadelphia, Penn.; Catherine C. Knowles, East Greenwich; Elizabeth B. Chace, Valley Falls, R. I.; Elizabeth Van Lew, Richmond, Va.; Mary Olney Brown, Abbie H. H. Stuart, Olympia, Wash. Ter.; Laura Ross Wolcott, Milwaukee; Emma C. Bascom, Madison, Wis.

Vice-Presidents—Caroline M. Patterson, Harrison, Ark.; Ellen Clarke Sargent, San Francisco, Cal.; Mrs. L. J. Terry, Pueblo, Col.; Isabella Beecher Hooker, Hartford, Conn.; Marietta M. Bones, Webster City, Dak.; Mary A. Stewart, Greenwood, Del.; Ruth C. Dennison, Washington, D. C.; Mrs. C. B. S. Wilcox, Interlachen, Fla.; Althea L. Lord, Savannah, Ga.; Dr. Jennie Bearby, Mountain Home, Idaho; Elizabeth Boynton Harbert, Evanston, Ill.; Helen M. Gougar, Lafayette, Ind.; Jane Amy McKinney, Decorah, Ia.; Laura M. Johns, Salina Kan.; Mary B. Clay, Richmond, Ky.; Caroline E. Merrick, New Orleans, La.; Sophronia C. Snow, Hampden Corners, Me.; Caroline Hallowell Miller, Sandy Spring, Md.; Harriette R. Shattuck, Malden, Mass.; Fannie Holden Fowler, Manistee, Mich.; Sarah Burger Stearns, Duluth, Minn.; Olivia Fitzhugh, Vicksburg, Miss.; Virginia L. Minor, St. Louis, Mo.; Clara Bewick Colby, Beatrice, Neb.; Maria H. Boardman, Reno, Nev.; Ada M. Jarrett, Magdalena, N. Mex.; Marilla M. Ricker, Dover, N. H.; Cornelia C. Hussey, East Orange, N. J.; Lillie Devereux Blake, New York, N. Y.; Mary Bayard Clarke, New Berne, N. C.; Frances D. Casement, Painesville, O.; Harriette A. Loughary, McMinneville, Ore.; Matilda Hindman, Pittsburgh, Penn.; Anna S. Aldrich, Providence, R. I.; Elizabeth Lisle Saxon, Memphis, Tenn.; Jennie Bland Beauchamp, Denton, Tex.; Jennie A. Froiseth, Salt Lake City, Utah; Lydia Putnam, Brattleboro', Vt.; Mrs. Roger S. Greene, SeÄttle, Wash. Ter.: Alura C. Collins, Milwaukee, Wis.; Amalia B. Post, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Executive Committee—May Wright Sewall, Chairman, 429 North New Jersey street, Indianapolis, Ind.; Laura DeForce Gordon, San Francisco; Mary J. Channing, Pasadena, Cal.; Dr. Alida C. Avery, Denver, Col.; Frances Ellen Burr, Emily P. Collins, Hartford, Conn.; Mrs. J. S. Pickler, Falktown; Linda W. Slaughter, Bismark, Dak. Ter.; Belva A. Lockwood, Dr. Caroline B. Winslow, Washington, D. C.; Flora M. Wright, Drayton Island, Fla.; Julia Mills Dunn, Moline; Rev. Florence Kollock, Englewood; Dr. Alice B. Stockham, Ada C. Sweet, Chicago, Ill.; Mary E. Haggart, Mary E. N. Cary, Indianapolis, Ind.; Narcisa T. Bemis, Independence; Mary J. Coggeshall, Des Moines, Ia; Annie C. Wait, Lincoln Center; Henrietta B. Wall, Mrs. S. A. Hauk, Hutchinson, Kan.; Sally Clay Bennett, Mary A. Somers, Richmond; Laura White, Manchester, Ky.; Maria I. Johnson, Mound, La.; Charlotte A. Thomas, Portland, Me.; Amanda M. Best, Bright Seat, Md.; Harriet H. Robinson, Malden; Sara A. Underwood, Dorchester Mass.; Julia Upton, Big Rapids; Cordelia Fitch Briggs, Grand Rapids, Mich.; Julia Bullard Nelson, Red Wing: Mrs. L. H. Hawkins, Shakopee; Mary P. Wheeler, Kasson, Minn.; Anne R. Irvine, Oregon; Elizabeth A. Meriwether, St. Louis, Mo.; Jennie F. Holmes, Tecumseh; Orpha C. Dinsmoore, Omaha, Neb.; Hannah R. Clapp, Carson City, Nev.; Mrs. A. B. I. Roberts, Candia, N. H.; Augusta Cooper Bristol, Vineland; Theresa A. Seabrook, Keyport, N. J.; Mathilde F. Wendt, New York; Caroline G. Rogers, Lansingburgh; Ellen S. Fray, Lewia C. Smith, Rochester, N. Y.; Sarah M. Perkins, Elvira J. Bushnell, Cleveland; Sarah S. Bissell, Toledo, O.; Mrs. J. M. Kelty, Lafayette, Ore.; Deborah L. Pennock, Kennett Square; Harriet Purvis, Philadelphia, Penn.; Lillie Chace Wyman, Valley Falls, R. I.; Lide Meriwether, Memphis, Tenn.; Mrs. D. Clinton Smith, Middleboro', Vt.; Mrs. F. D. Gordon, Richmond, Va.; Eliza T. Wilson, Menomonie; Laura James, Richland Center, Wis.; Barbara J, Thompson, Tacoma, Wash. Ter.; Mrs. J. H. Hayford, Laramie City, Wyoming Ter.

Recording Secretaries—Julia A. Wilbur, Caroline A. Sherman, Washington, D. C.

Corresponding Secretaries—Rachel G. Foster, Philadelphia, Penn.; Ellen H. Sheldon, Washington, D. C.

Foreign Corresponding Secretaries—Caroline A. Biggs, London; Lydia E. Becker, Manchester, England; Marguerite Berry Stanton, Hubertine Auclert, Charlotte B. Wilbour, Paris, France; Clara Neymann, Berlin, Germany.

Treasurer—Jane H. Spofford, Riggs House, Washington, D. C.

Auditors—Eliza T. Ward, Ellen M. O'Connor, Washington, D. C.

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CHAPTER XXXII.

CONNECTICUT.

Is the Family the Basis of the State?

BY JOHN HOOKER.

The proposition that the family is the basis of the State has come down through many generations, so far as I know, unchallenged; but in the sense in which it is ordinarily understood, and for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used, it is entirely a fallacy. The State depends upon the family for the continuance of its population, just as it depends upon the school for the intelligence of its people and on religious institutions for their morality. But the State stands in no political relation to the family any more than to the school and the church. What is meant by the proposition as generally used is, that the State is politically an aggregate of families and not of individuals. This is entirely untrue, and if true the fact would be calamitous. Civil government is supposed to have had its origin in family government, the patriarch becoming chief of a tribe which was substantially the outgrowth and expansion of a single family; but if a nation was to be formed of such tribes it would be essential to its peace and prosperity that they should as soon as possible mingle into one homogeneous mass, and that no citizen should consider himself of one tribe rather than another. It is the family idea in a government like ours that makes the feuds which are handed down from generation to generation in some parts of the country. It made the frequent bloody contests of the clans in Scotland, and the dissensions of the Hebrew tribes. In a republic nothing can be more disastrous than that great political leaders should have large family followings. The first duty of the citizen is to forget that he belongs to any family in particular. He is an individual citizen of the State, and when he becomes a magistrate he must practically ignore the fact that he has family relatives who feel entitled to his special favor. He must, like justice, be blind to every fact except that the applicant for office or for justice is an individual citizen and must stand wholly on his personal merits or the justice of his cause.

The proposition that the family is the basis of the State thus taken by itself is entirely false; but even if true, the use made of it as an argument against giving suffrage to women is equally fallacious. This can be shown by a single illustration. We will suppose there are two families, in both of which the father dies, leaving in one case a widow and one son, and in the other a widow and six daughters. Where is now the family representation? The son whom we will suppose to be of age, goes to the polls and we will suppose sufficiently represents the family to which he belongs; but where is the family representation for the other widow and her six daughters? She may be the largest tax-payer in the State, and yet she can have no voice in determining what taxes shall be laid, nor to what purposes the money shall be appropriated.

The question whether the family is the basis of the State cannot be made an abstract question of political philosophy. Indeed the question is unmeaning when put as an abstract one. We might just as well ask, "Is the climate cold in a State?" or, "Is the English language spoken in a State?" It is only as we ask these questions about a particular State that they have any meaning. "Is it cold in Russia?" "Is English spoken in Connecticut?"

Take the case of a State ruled by a despot. Here the people are not the political basis of the State, either as families or as individuals. They have no political power whatever. The political basis of the State is the will of the despot. He is himself and alone the State politically. He makes the laws himself, and shoots and hangs those who disobey them. The people are indispensable to the State, and so in one sense its basis, just as the square miles that compose its territory are its physical basis, but the people stand in no political relation whatever to the State, any more than the rocks and gravel of its territory. It is only where the people of the State have the whole or a part of its political power, that the question can possibly arise as to whether individuals or families are its political basis. And when it thus arises, it comes up wholly with reference to a particular State, and not as an abstract question. And then it is wholly a question of fact, not one of political philosophy; a matter for simple ascertainment, not for speculation and reasoning. Thus, suppose the question to be, "Is the family or the individual the political basis of the State of Connecticut?" We are to answer the question solely by looking at the constitution and laws of the State. We look there and find that it is as clear as language can make it that the political basis of the State is the individual and not the family. The individual is made the voter—not the family—and that is the whole question. It was perfectly easy for the people, if they had so desired, when they were adopting a constitution, to make families and not individuals the depositaries of political power, but they chose to give the power to individuals, and thus the question is absolutely settled for the State. It is true, the State does not carry out completely its own theory, but this was its theory, and what it did was wholly in this direction and away from the family theory. We go to the constitution of the State to settle this question, just as we would to settle the question whether the governor's term is one year or two, or whether the judges hold office for a term of years or for life. While considering whether either of these provisions ought to be adopted, we are dealing with a matter proper for opinions and argument, but when the provisions have been adopted, the whole question becomes one of fact, and we look only to the constitution to determine it, and treat it as a matter not for discussion but for absolute ascertainment.

When one is advocating the theory that the family should be the political basis of the State, he is simply saying that the constitution ought to be amended and the right of voting taken away from individuals and given to families. But it is idle to urge this. Such a measure would not get even a respectable minority of votes. It is decisive on this point that not a single representative government, so far as the writer knows, has adopted the theory that the family and not the individual should vote. A law peculiar to Russia gives its villages, in the management of their local matters, the right of voting by families—a perfect illustration, on a very small scale, of the family as the political basis of a State. But here woman suffrage is admitted as a necessary result; and where there is no man to represent the family, or he is unable to attend, the woman of the house casts the vote.

The advocates of woman suffrage have no interest whatever in this question, as it is idle to suppose that it can become a practical one. The writer has taken what trouble he has in the matter solely in the interest of correct thinking.

Hartford, May, 1879.

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CHAPTER XXXVII.

NEW YORK.

Brief on the Legislature's Power to Extend the Suffrage, Submitted February 19, 1880, to the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly of the State of New York.

BY HAMILTON WILCOX.

I. Legislature Omnipotent.—Unlike the Federal constitution, the State constitution does not reserve all powers not expressly delegated. It is held by the authorities that in the absence of positive restriction the legislature is omnipotent.

"In a judicial sense, their authority is absolute and unlimited, except by the express restrictions of the fundamental law" (Court of Appeals, 1863, Bank of Chenango vs. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; S. P., Cathcart vs. Fire Department of New York, Id., 529; Supreme Court, 1864, Clark vs. Miller, 42 Barb., 255; Luke vs. City of Brooklyn, 43 Id., 54).

"Only on the ground of express constitutional provisions limiting legislative power, can courts declare void any legislative enactment" (Court of Error. 1838, Cochran vs. Van Surlay, 29 Wend., 365; Newell vs. People, 7 N. Y. [3 Seld.], 9, 109).

"Before proceeding to amend, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption" (Court of Appeals, 1858, People vs. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y., 235; affi'g, 27 Barb., 575).

II. Powers Undefined.—The constitution forbids the legislature to do certain things. Otherwise it does not define or limit the legislature's powers (Art. 3, §§ 3, 18, 19, 24).

III. No Prohibition.—No constitution of New York has ever forbidden the legislature to extend the suffrage beyond the classes specified by such constitution; nor has any ever forbidden unspecified persons to vote. The constitution simply secures the suffrage to certain classes, and there leaves the matter.

IV. Rule of Construction.—The constitution declares that the object of its establishment is to secure the blessings of freedom to the people (Preamble, Revised Statutes, vol. 1., p. 82). Hence it, and all enactments under it, must be understood and construed, where a contrary intent is not clearly expressed, to be aimed at securing freedom to all.

V. Disfranchisement.—The constitution follows this declaration by laying down at its outset, as its fundamental principle, that "No member of this State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizens thereof, except by the law of the land" (Art. 1, § 1, do., do.). Disfranchisement, then, must be express by the law. It cannot constitutionally be inflicted through mere implication or silence.

Rules for the securing of freedom have often been found to cover unforeseen cases. Such was the fact in the famous decision of Lord Mansfield in 1774, that slavery was against the common law, under which slavery was afterward abolished throughout the British empire; and the decision of the highest court of Massachusetts, that the terms of the constitution of 1780 conferred freedom on the slaves of that State.

Women, it is now fully recognized, are citizens, and hence "members of the State," entitled to the security guaranteed. The practice under the constitution has been to treat as disfranchised all persons not specified as entitled to vote. Though this practice is plainly against the declared object and principle of the constitution, it has been general and mostly continuous, and has thus acquired the force of law. This, however, does not impair the legislature's power to correct the practice by express enactment.

VI. Precedents.—The legislature has repeatedly corrected this practice by express enactments securing freedom to various portions of the people.

(a). Constitutional Convention, 1801.—The act calling this convention extended the suffrage for members of that body—the highest officers of the State—to "all free male citizens over twenty-one years of age," while the constitution secured suffrage only to male holders of and actual taxpayers on a fixed amount of real estate (Session Law 1801, ch. 69, p. 151; constitution of 1777, do., 1, 39).

(b). Constitutional Convention, 1821.—The act providing for the convention that framed the constitution of 1822, while the existing constitution (as above) only specified as entitled to vote, holders of and taxpayers on a fixed amount of real estate—this act allowed all freeholders, however small the value of their holdings, all actual taxpayers, all officers and privates, ex-officers and ex-privates, in militia or in volunteer or uniform corps, all persons exempt by law from taxation or militia duty, all workers on public roads and highways, or payers of commutation for such work; to vote on the question whether the convention should be held, to vote in the choice of delegates thereto—again for the highest officers of the State—and to vote on the question of adoption of the new constitution—to exercise a voice in framing the State's fundamental law. The council of revision, including the governor, which opposed and defeated part of this act, made no objection to this feature (Session Laws 1821, ch. 90, p. 83).

The vote for governor, 1820, was 93,437—the largest ever cast in the State. That on the question of calling the convention in 1821 was 144,247. One act of the legislature thus enfranchised fifty thousand persons. The vote on the new constitution stood: For, 74,732; against, 41,402; majority for, 33,330. Thus the votes of fifty thousand persons—enfranchised, not by the constitution but by the legislature—carried the adoption of a new constitution, which further secured to them the freedom which the legislature had opened to them. The vote for governor in 1824—the next hotly-contested election—was 190,545; so that the immediate effect of the legislature's act was to add 97,108 persons to the constituency—to make a mass of new voters who outnumbered those specified by the constitution.

(c). Aliens Voting.—The constitution specifies none but "citizens" as entitled to vote; yet the legislature, by a school law of many years' standing, allowed aliens to vote for school functionaries, on filing with the secretary of state notice of intention to become naturalized (1 R. S., art. 2, § 1, p. 65; 2 R. S., 63, § 12; 2 R. S., 1,096, § 31).

(d). Northfield.—The proprietors of swamp-lands in the town of Northfield, Richmond county, were authorized to elect directors of drainage, without any restriction or qualification but ownership (Session Laws 1862, ch. 80, § 2, p. 233).

(e). The taxpayers of Newport, Herkimer county, were authorized to vote on the question of issuing bonds to raise money for a town-house. Under this law women who were taxpayers voted (Act April 9, 1873, Session Laws, ch. 187, § 3, p. 304).

(f). The taxpayers of Dansville, Livingston county, were authorized to vote on the issue of water-bonds. Under this act women voted (Act April 24, 1873, Session Laws, ch. 285, § 4, p. 409).

(g). The taxpayers of Saratoga Springs were authorized to vote on the question of issuing bonds for the construction of an additional water-main. Under this ninety-nine women voted (Act May 13, 1876, Session Laws, ch. 254, § 4, p. 250).

VII. School Suffrage.—If the legislature can admit aliens to vote at school-meetings, it can admit female citizens to do so.

VIII. Presidential Suffrage.—1. The federal constitution provides that electors of president and vice-president shall be appointed "in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct" (Art. 2, § 2).

2. It also provides that "this constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding" (Art. 6, § 2).

3. The legislature has the power under the federal constitution to provide whatever method it may choose for the appointment of the electors. The courts have no power to interfere, and even an executive veto would have no force. The legislature has sole and full power to say who may vote for electors and how the election shall be held.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

PENNSYLVANIA.

BY CARRIE S. BURNHAM.

The common law of England as modified by English statutes prior to the Revolution has been formally adopted either by constitutions and statutes or assumed by courts of justice as the law of the land in every State save Louisiana, and in the absence of positive statutes is the common law of the United States. To understand the legal status of woman in Pennsylvania it is therefore necessary, First—To ascertain her condition under the common law; Second—How this law has been modified in this State by statutes.

Common Law.

By the common law, which Lord Coke calls "the perfection of reason," women arrive at the age of discretion at twelve, men at fourteen; both sexes are of full age at twenty-one, entitled to civil rights, and if unmarried and possessed of freehold, they are equally entitled to the exercise of political rights (Blackstone, I., 463; IV., 212; Bouvier's Institutes, 156, 157; Decisions of English courts in 1612, quoted in 7 Mod. Rep., 264).

"By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law"; that is, the legal existence of the woman is "merged in that of her husband." He is her "baron," or "lord," bound to supply her with shelter, food, clothing and medicine, and is entitled to her earnings—the use and custody of her person, which he may seize wherever he may find it (Blackstone, I., 442, 443; Coke Litt., 112 a, 187 b; 8 Dowl., P. C., 632.)

The husband being bound to provide for his wife the necessaries of life, and being responsible for "her morals" and the good order of the household, may choose and govern the domicil, choose her associates, separate her from her relatives, restrain her religious and personal freedom, compel her to cohabit with him, correct her faults by mild means and, if necessary, chastise her with moderation, as though she was his apprentice or child. This is in "respect to the terms of the marriage contract and the infirmity of the sex" (Bl., I., 444; 1 Bishop on Mar. and Div., 758; 8 Dowl. P. C., 632; Bouv. Insts., 277, 278, 2,283; 1 Wend. Bl., 442, note; 4 Petersdorf's A. B., 21, note).

Woman's character, exposed to the vilest slanders of "malignity and falsehood," and her chastity are protected on account of the injury sustained by the father, husband or master from loss of her services, or wrongful entry of his house, rather than the injury done to her as an individual (Bl. I., 445, note; III., 141, 143, note; 3 Serg. and Rawle, Penn., 36; 3 Penn., 49; 2 Watts' Penn., 474).

The husband is entitled to recover damages for "criminal conversation with his wife," or for injury to her person whereby he is deprived of his "marital rights," or of her "company and assistance"; also an action of trespass vi et armis against the individual enticing her away or encouraging her to live separately from him; the offense implies force and constraint, "the wife having no power to consent," and is punishable with fine and imprisonment (Bl., III., 139; 2 Inst., 434; Bouvier's Institutes, 3,495).

The wife has no action for injuries to her husband as she is not entitled to his services, neither has she any separate interest in anything during her coverture. The law takes notice only of the injuries done to the "superior of the parties related"; because "the inferior has no kind of property in the company, care or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior" (Blackstone, III., 143; Bouv. Insts., 3,495).

The husband, by marriage, becomes entitled absolutely to the personal property of his wife, which at his death goes to his representatives; also to the rents and profits of her lands, to the interest in her chattels real and choses in action, of which he can dispose at pleasure, except by will. He acquires the same right in any property whether real or personal of which she may become possessed after marriage, and is liable during coverture for her debts contracted before marriage (Bl., II., 434, 435; Bouv. Insts., 4,005; Coke Litt., 46, 351).

At his death she becomes possessed of her wardrobe and jewels, such of her chattels as remain undisposed of, and her own real estate; also quarantine (i. e., forty days' residence in "his mansion"), one-third of his personality absolutely and the use of one-third of any real estate of which he is possessed during coverture for the term of her natural life. His mansion, realty and personalty includes what they have jointly earned as well as that of which he was possessed at marriage. The widow's right to one-third of the personal estate was abolished by English statutes prior to the Revolution, but has since been revived by Pennsylvania statutes (Blackstone, II., 129, 134, 139, 436, 492, 493; Coke Litt., 31, 34; Bouvier's Institutes, 1,750; Brightley's Purdon, 806, 2 and 3).

At the death of the wife their joint earnings, also her chattels real, vest absolutely in the husband, and if they have had a living child the husband, as "tenant by the curtesy," becomes possessed of her entire real estate for life. The wife loses her dower by adultery, but the husband does not lose his curtesy on that account. Her dower is also barred by his treason and by a divorce grounded on his adultery (Blackstone, II., 127, 434; Roper, Husband and Wife, 1,210; 2 Kent, 131; 7 Watts, 563; Bouvier's Institutes, 1,732).

A husband cannot convey real estate directly to his wife, but may through a trustee; neither can he give "anything to her nor covenant with her, for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence, and to covenant with her would be to covenant with himself." Their covenants or indebtedness to each other before marriage are by the marriage extinguished (Blackstone, I., 442; Coke Litt., 3, 30; 112 a; 187 b; Connyn. Dig. Baron and Feme, D).

The husband may devise any property to his wife, but the wife cannot make a will, the law supposing her to be under his coercion; neither can she bind her person or property, nor make nor enforce a contract, nor can she be a witness in any matter in which her husband is interested (Blackstone, II., 293, 498, 444; 2 Kent, 179; Bouv. Insts., 1,441; Connyn. Dig. Pleader, 2 A, 1; Baron and Feme, W; 2 Roper, Husband and Wife, 171).

A wife, with the consent of her husband, may act as his or other's attorney, may be a guardian, trustee, administratrix or executrix, but cannot sue in auter droit unless her husband join in the suit. This incapacitates her to act independently in either capacity (Blackstone, II., 503; 1 Anders., 117; 2 Story, Eq. Juris., 1,367, note; 57 Penn. St. Rep., 356).

A wife cannot enforce her rights nor defend any action brought against her, but must plead coverture in person, being incapable of appointing an attorney (Bouv. Insts., 2,787, 2,907; 41 N. H., 106; 2 Saund., 209; c. n. 1).

When a woman marries after having commenced a suit, the suit abates; but the husband may in equity sue her for his marital rights in her property; marriage of a female partner dissolves the partnership (Bouv. Insts., 4,037, 1,494; 4 Russ. Ch., 247; 3 Atk. Ch., 478; 2 P. Will Ch., 243).

The father of legitimate children is bound for their maintenance and education, is entitled to their labor and custody and has power to dispose of them until twenty-one years of age, by deed or legacy, even though they are unborn at his death. The testamentary guardian's right to their custody supersedes that of their mother (Bl., I., 447, 451, 453; 2 Kent, 191 and 193; Bouv. Insts., 344; 5 Rawle, 323; 2 Watts, 406; 5 East, 221; Purd. Dig., New Ed., 411, 29; 5 Pitts, L. J., 406; 1 Pitts, 412).

"A mother is entitled to no power, but to reverence and respect, from her children"; she has no legal authority over them nor right to their services, but her property is liable for their maintenance if the father has not an estate. The mother's appointment of a testamentary guardian is absolutely void (Bl., I., 453 and 461, note by Chitty; Vaughan, 180; 1 Leg. Gaz. R., 56).

The mother of a "natural or illegitimate" child is its natural guardian, entitled to its control and custody and her settlement is its domicil (Bl., I., 459; 2 Kent, 216; 5 Term Rep., 278; Newton vs. Braintree, 14 Mass., 382).

"Intestate personal property is divided equally between males and females, but a son, though younger than all his sisters, is the heir to the whole of real property" (Bl., I., 444, note by Christian).

Pennsylvania Statutes and Court Decisions.

This "perfection of reason" (the common law) has been changed in Pennsylvania in the following particulars:

All women, married and single, are deprived of political rights by the use of the generic word "freeman" in the constitution (29 Legal Intelligencer, 5).

Heir at common law is abolished by statute; however, the right to administer vests in the male in preference to the female of the same degree of consanguinity. Half-brothers are entitled to the preference over own sisters (Purdon, 410, 27; Single's Appeal, 59 Penn. St. R., 55).

Any property belonging to a woman before marriage, or which accrues to her during coverture by gift, bequest or purchase, continues, by the act of April 11, 1848, to be her separate property after marriage, and is not liable for the debts of her husband nor subject to his disposal without her written consent, duly acknowledged before one of the judges of the Court of Common Pleas as voluntarily given; provided, that he is not liable for the debts contracted before or after marriage, or for her torts (Purdon's Dig., 1,005, 13).

"This act protects the wife's interest in her separate property both as to title and possession," but "does not empower her to convey her real estate by a deed in which her husband has not joined," nor "create a lease without his concurrence," nor "execute an obligation for the payment of money or the performance of any other act," nor in any way dispose of her property save by gift or loan to him; she may bind her separate estate for his debts, and in security for the loan she may take a judgment or mortgage against the estate of the husband in the name of a third person, who shall act as her trustee (18 Penn. St. R., 506, 582; 21, 402; 1 Gr., 402; 6 Phila., 531; Pur. Dig., 1,007, 21).

The husband is the natural guardian or trustee of the property of the wife; but by application "to the Court of Common Pleas of the county where she was domiciled at the time of her marriage," the court will appoint a trustee (not her husband) to take charge of the property secured to her by the act of 1848. This act, however, does not authorize the appointment of a trustee, to the exclusion of her husband, of property owned by her prior to the passage of the act, nor was it intended to affect vested rights of husbands and does not protect them for the wife's benefit against the claims of creditors (10 Penn. St. Rep., 398 and 505; 18, 392 and 509; 21, 260; 1 Jones, 272).

In a clear case the wife's real estate cannot be levied upon and sold by a creditor of the husband, but the burden of proof is upon her to show by evidence "which does not admit of a reasonable doubt," that she owned the property before marriage or acquired it subsequently by gift, bequest, or paid for it with funds not furnished by her husband nor the result of their joint earnings. The wife's possession of money is no evidence of her title to it (18 Penn. St. Rep., 366; 7 Phila., 118).

If no property, or not sufficient property, of the husband can be found, the separate property and goods of the wife may be levied upon and sold for rent or for debts incurred for the support of the family (Purd. Dig., 1,006, 15; 38 Penn. St. Rep., 344).

A married woman's bond and warrant of attorney are absolutely void, nor can she make a valid contract except for a sewing-machine or for the improvement of her separate property, and her bond given or a judgment confessed by her for such debt is void (24 Penn. St. Rep., 80; Act of 1872, Pur. Dig., 1,010).

She may sell and transfer shares of the capital stock of any railroad company, but cannot herself or by attorney transfer certificates of city loan (28 Leg. Int., 116; Act June 2, 1871).

A married woman cannot enforce her rights against third persons, either for the performance of a contract or the recovery of her property, without her husband join in the suit, although the party contracting with her is liable to an action (1 Gr., 21; Act of 1850 and 1839; 6 Phila., 223).

If divorced or separated from her husband by his neglect or desertion, she may protect her reputation by an action for slander and libel; but if her husband is the defendant, this suit, as also for alimony and divorce, must be in the name of a "next friend." She is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if unlawfully restrained of her liberty (Purd. Dig., 510, 12; 513, 24; 754, 1).

The wife of a drunkard or profligate man by petitioning the Court of Common Pleas, setting forth these facts and his desertion of her and neglect to provide for her and their children, may be entitled to the custody of her children, and, as a "feme sole trader," empowered to transact business and acquire a separate property, which shall be subject to her own disposal during life, and liable for the maintenance and education of her children. Her testimony must be sustained "by two respectable witnesses" (Pur. Dig., 692, 5; Act of 1855, 2; 2 Roper, Husband and Wife, 171, 173).

By act of April, 1872, any married woman having first petitioned the court, stating under oath or affirmation her intention of claiming her separate earnings, is entitled to acquire by her labor a separate property which shall not be subject to any legal claim of her husband or of his creditors, she, however, being compelled "to show title and ownership in the same." The husband's possession of property is evidence of his title to it; not so with the wife (Purd. Dig., 1,010, 38, 39; 4 Lansing, 164; 61 Barb., 145).

A married woman may devise her separate property by will, subject, however, to the husband's curtesy, which in Pennsylvania attaches, though there be no issue born alive, and which she cannot bar (Purd. Dig., 806, 804; I Pars., 489; 26 Penn. St. R., 202, 203; 2 Brewster, 302).

The husband may bar the wife's dower by a bona fide mortgage given by himself alone or by a judicial sale for the payment of his debts. It is also barred by a divorce obtained by her on the ground of his adultery, and in case of such divorce she is entitled to the value of one-half of the money and property which the husband received through her at marriage (Purd. Dig., 514; 2 Dall. 127; 12 Serg. and R., 21; I Yeates Pa., 300).

A single woman's will is revoked by her subsequent marriage, and is not again revived by the death of her husband; a single man's will is revoked by marriage absolutely only when he leaves a widow but no known heirs or kindred (Purd. Dig., 1,477, 18 and 19; 47 Penn. S. Rep., 144, 34, 483).

If the husband die intestate leaving a widow and issue, the widow shall have one-third of his and their joint personalty absolutely, and one-third of the real estate for life; if there are no children, but collateral heirs, she is entitled to the use of one-half the realty, including the mansion-house, for her life, and one-half the personalty absolutely (Purd. Dig., 806, 2 and 3; Act of 1833, 1).

If the wife die intestate leaving a husband and no issue, he is entitled to her entire personalty and realty during his life; if there are children her personal estate is divided between the husband and children share and share alike; in either case he is entitled to their entire joint estate (Purd. Dig., 806, 5; Act of 1848, 9).

Married women may be corporate members of any institution composed of and managed by women, having as its object the care and education of children or the support of sick and indigent women (Purd. Dig., 283; Act of 1859, 1).

It is a crime, punishable by fine and imprisonment, to employ any woman to attend or wait upon an audience in a theater, opera or licensed entertainment, to procure or furnish commodities or refreshments (Purd. Dig., 337, 112).

A man, by marriage, is subjected to no political, civil, legal or commercial disabilities, but acquires all the rights and powers previously vested in his wife. He is capable of all the offices of the government from that of postmaster to the presidency, and of transacting all kinds of business from the measuring of tape to the practice of the most learned professions. Woman, deprived of political power, is limited in opportunities for education, and, if married, is incapable of making a contract; hence crippled in the transaction of any kind of business.

---

CHAPTER XLII.

INDIANA.

[A.]

Governor Porter made the following novel appointment: On August 30, 1882, Mrs. Georgia A. Ruggles, from Bartholomew county, presented to Governor Porter an application for a requisition from the governor of Indiana upon the governor of Kansas, for William J. Beck, charged with the crime of bigamy. Beck had been living a few months in Bartholomew county and had passed as an unmarried man; had gained the affections of a young lady much younger than himself and much superior to him by birth and education. After their marriage the fact that Beck had already one wife became known and he fled to Kansas. Mrs. Ruggles was a friend to the young lady who had been thus duped, and upon learning the facts she called the attention of the proper authorities to the matter, and begged them to effect Beck's arrest. They were not disposed to do so, and upon various excuses postponed action. She therefore determined to take the matter into her own hands. Governor Porter granted her the desired requisition; she went to Kansas, and on September 10, 1882, she received Beck from Samuel Hamilton, sheriff of Ellsworth county; she herself brought the prisoner, in cuffs, to Indiana, and, September 13, she delivered him into the hands of Thomas E. Burgess, sheriff of Bartholomew county. Beck was tried, convicted and sent to the penitentiary. This bit of justice was the fruit of a woman's pluck and a governor's good sense.

Extract from Gen. Coburn's Address.

The people expect that they will in their own way and time inaugurate such measures as will bring these questions in their entire magnitude into the arena. I hope to see 10,000 women in convention here. They can, if they will, create a public sentiment in favor of their enfranchisement that will be irresistible. They have the ears of the voters; they have access to the columns of the newspapers; they control all the avenues of social life. What can they not accomplish, if, with their whole hearts they set about it? The sphere of public life has many vacant places to be filled by women. Why shall they not serve upon the boards of trustees of our great reformatory and benevolent institutions, as superintendents in our hospitals, and as directors and inspectors in our prisons? The last legislature conferred upon them the right to hold any office in our great school system except one, that of State superintendent of public instruction. From them may now be selected, president of the State university, or of the Normal School, or of Purdue University, school commissioners and county superintendents. But the legislature should give them the power to rescue our prisons, hospitals and asylums from the indescribable horror of filth, neglect and cruelty which hangs like a murky cloud over many of them. Men have tried it and failed. Stupidity or partisanship or brutality or avarice, has transformed many a noble foundation of benevolence into a hell of abomination. Some one must step in to inspect; to enforce order, cleanliness and virtue; to bring comfort and hope to the downcast and to the outcast of society. This purpose must be backed up by the strong arm of power, by the sanction of the law, and that law must have upon it the stamp of woman's intellect. This year the women of Indiana can place themselves in the van of human progress and dictate the policy which mankind must recognize as just and true for ages to come. The public mind is not unprepared for this measure. The spread and the acceptance of great ideas is almost miraculous in intelligent communities.

[B.]

LEGAL OPINION BY W. D. WALLACE, ESQ., UPON THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO AUTHORIZE WOMEN TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.

Capt. W. DeWitt Wallace, Attorney-at-law, Lafayette, Ind.:

Dear Sir: You will confer a favor upon the friends of woman suffrage in Indiana, if you will send me, in writing, your opinion, as a lawyer, in answer to the following question, giving your reasons therefor: Can the legislature of this State empower women to vote for presidential electors?

Mary F. Thomas, President I. W. S. A.

Richmond, Ind., December 30, 1880.

Lafayette, Ind., January 5, 1881.

Dr. Mary F. Thomas, President of Indiana Woman Suffrage Association, Richmond, Indiana:

Dear Madam: In your favor of the 30th ult., you ask my opinion upon, to me, a novel and most interesting question, viz.: "Can the legislature empower women to vote for presidential electors?" After the most careful consideration which I have been able to give to the subject, consistent with other duties, and with the aid of such books as I have at command, I answer your question in the affirmative. The grounds of my opinion I will proceed to state: Section 1, article 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that the president and vice-president shall be chosen by electors appointed by the several States, declares in the following words how said electors shall be appointed:

Each State shall appoint in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which said State may be entitled in the congress, etc., etc.

Now, in the absence of any provision in the State constitution, limiting or attempting to limit the discretion of the legislature as to the manner in which the presidential electors shall be chosen, there can be no doubt but that the legislature could empower female, as well as male, citizens to participate in the choice of presidential electors.

Section 2, article 2 of our State constitution is as follows: In all elections, not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, and upwards, who shall have resided in the State during the six months immediately preceding such election * * * * shall be entitled to vote in the township or precinct where he may reside.

Two questions at once suggest themselves upon the reading of this section: First—Does the section apply to elections of presidential electors, and thus become a limitation upon the discretion of the legislature in case it shall direct the appointment of the electors by a popular vote? Second—If so, can a State constitution thus limit the discretion which the Constitution of the United States directs shall be exercised by the legislature? I shall consider the last question first.

While the legislature is created by the State, all its powers are not derived from, nor are all its duties enjoined by the State. The moment the State brings the legislature into being, that moment certain duties enjoined, and certain powers conferred, by the nation, attach to it. Among the powers and duties of the legislature, which spring from the national constitution, is the power and duty of determining how the State shall appoint presidential electors. The Constitution of the United States declares in the most explicit terms that the State shall do this "in such manner as the legislature may direct." In the case of Ex-Parte Henry E. Hayne, et al., reported in volume 9, at page 106, of the Chicago Legal News, the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, in speaking of the authority upon which a State legislature acts in providing for the appointment of presidential electors, says:

Section 1, article 2 of the constitution provides that electors shall be appointed in such manner as the legislature of each State may direct. When the legislature of a State, in obedience to that provision, has, by law, directed the manner of appointment of the electors, that law has its authorities solely from the Constitution of the United States. It is a law passed in pursuance of the constitution.

Hon. James A. Garfield, who was a member of the Electoral Commission, in discussing before that body the source of the power to appoint electors, said:

The constitution prescribes that States only shall choose electors. * * * To speak more accurately, I should say that the power is placed in the legislatures of the States; for if the constitution of any State were silent upon the subject, its legislature is none the less armed with plenary authority conferred upon it directly by the national constitution.—[Electoral Commission, p. 242.

That this section of the national constitution has always been understood to lodge an absolute discretion in the legislature, is proved by the practice in the different States. Chief Justice Story, in his "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States," in speaking of this section of the constitution and the practice under it, says:

Under this authority, the appointment of electors has been variously provided for by the State legislatures. In some States the legislatures have directly chosen the electors by themselves; in others they have been chosen by the people by a general ticket throughout the whole State, and in others by the people in electoral districts fixed by the legislature, a certain number of electors being apportioned to each district. No question has ever arisen as to the constitutionality of either mode, except that of a direct choice by the legislature. But this, though often doubted by able and ingenious minds, has been firmly established in practice ever since the adoption of the constitution, and does not now seem to admit of controversy, even if a suitable tribunal existed to adjudicate upon it.—[2 Story on Constitution, section 1,472.

Judge Strong, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and a member of the electoral commission, in discussing the subject of this section, says:

I doubt whether they [the framers of the national constitution] had in mind at all [in adopting this section] the idea of a popular election as a mode of appointing State electors. They used the word appoint, doubtless thinking that the legislatures of the States would themselves select the electors, or empower the governor or some other State officer to select them. The word appoint is not the most appropriate word for describing the result of a popular election. Such a mode of appointment, I submit is allowable, but there is little reason to think it was contemplated. * * * It was not until years afterward that the electors were chosen by vote.—[Electoral Commission, p. 252.

Senator Frelinghuysen, also a member of the Electoral Commission, thus speaks of the practice in the several States:

Under this power [the power given by the section of the national constitution, which we are now considering] the legislature might direct that the electors should be appointed by the legislature, by the executive, by the judiciary, or by the people. In the earliest days of the republic, electors were appointed by the legislatures. In Pennsylvania they were appointed by the judiciary. Now, in all the States except Colorado, they are appointed by the people.—[Electoral Commission, p. 204.

If then it be true that the power to determine how the presidential electors shall be appointed is derived from the national constitution, and that power is a discretionary one, to be exercised in such manner as the legislature may direct, how can it be said that a State constitution can limit or control the legislative discretion? If the State can limit that discretion in one respect it can limit it in another, and in another, and in another, until it may shut up the legislature to but a single mode of appointment, which is to take away, and absolutely destroy all its discretion, and this is nullification, pure and simple. One of the questions before the electoral commission in the case of South Carolina, was whether the electoral vote of that State should not be rejected because the legislature, in providing for the appointment of the electors, had failed to obey a requirement of the State constitution in regard to a registry law. This raised, in principle, the very question we are now considering, and on that question Senator O. P. Morton, who was a member of the commission, and who was an able lawyer as well as a great statesman, thus expressed himself:

They [the presidential electors] are to be appointed in the manner prescribed by the legislature of the State, and not by the constitution of the State. The manner of the appointment of electors has been placed by the Constitution of the United States in the legislature of each State, and cannot be taken from that body by the provisions of a State constitution. * * * The power to appoint electors by a State, is conferred by the Constitution of the United States, and does not spring from a State constitution, and cannot be impaired or controlled by a State constitution.—[Electoral Commission, p. 200.

The distinguished lawyer and statesman [Hon. William Lawrence] who made the principle argument before the commission in favor of admitting the vote of the State, took the same ground (Electoral Commission, p. 186).

The opinion of Justice Story, expressed in the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820, on a very similar question, and one involving the same principle, quoted by Mr. Lawrence in his argument, is very high authority, and I reproduce it here. He (Justice Story) said:

The question then was whether we have a right to insert in our constitution a provision which controls or destroys a discretion which may be, nay must be, exercised by the legislature in virtue of powers confided to it by the Constitution of the United States. The fourth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States declares that the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed by the legislature thereof. Here an express provision was made for the manner of choosing representatives by the State legislatures. They have an unlimited discretion on the subject. They may provide for an election in districts sending more than one, or by general ticket for the whole State. Here is a general discretion, a power of choice. What is the proposition on the table? It is to limit the discretion, to leave no choice to the legislature, to compel representatives to be chosen in districts; in other words to compel them to be chosen in a specific manner, excluding all others. Were not this plainly a violation of the constitution? Does it not affect to control the legislature in the exercise of its powers? * * * It assumes a control over the legislature, which the Constitution of the United States does not justify. It is bound to exercise its authority according to its own view of public policy and principle; and yet this proposition compels it to surrender all discretion. In my humble judgment * * * it is a direct and palpable infringement of the constitutional provisions to which I have referred.—[Electoral Commission, p. 186.

The conclusion seems irresistible that a State constitution cannot determine for the legislature who shall, or shall not, participate in the choice of presidential electors, and that in so far as our State constitution may attempt to do so, it is an infringement of the national constitution. The discretion of the legislature, by virtue of the supreme law of the land, being (except in so far as it is controlled by the national constitution itself) thus absolutely unlimited, it may, without doubt, as I think, authorize all citizens without regard to sex, to participate in the choice of presidential electors. But it has been suggested to me that possibly by the State legislature, as used in the section of the national constitution which we have been considering, was meant the whole people of the State in whom the legislative power originally resides and not the organized legislative body which they may create. We answer first that the language of the section will not admit of this construction. It clearly recognizes a distinction between the State or the people of the State, and its legislature. The language is not "each State shall appoint in such manner as it may direct," etc., but it is, "each State shall appoint in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct," etc.

Again, it is a familiar canon of construction that in determining the meaning of a statute, recourse may be had to the history of the times in which it was enacted. When the Constitution of the United States was framed, all of the States had organized legislatures, or representative bodies who wielded the legislative power, and without doing violence to language, we must suppose that it was to them the constitution referred. Again, the State legislatures are referred to not less than ten times in the national constitution, and in each instance the reference is such as to make it clear that the organized representative bodies are intended, and in article 5 they are, in express terms, distinguished from conventions of the States. Indeed, the fundamental idea of the American government is that of a representative republic as opposed to a pure democracy, and it may well be doubted whether a State government, without a representative legislative body of some kind, would, in the American sense, be republican in form.

Finally, it is apparent from the debates in the constitutional convention which framed the constitution, and from the whole plan devised for the election of president and vice-president, that it was not intended by the framers of the constitution to commit directly to the whole people of a State the authority to determine how the presidential electors should be chosen. Nothing seems to have given the convention more trouble than the mode of selecting a president. Many plans were proposed. Chief among these were: election by congress; election by the executives of the States; election by the people; election by the State legislatures; and election by electors. These were presented in many forms. The convention decided not less than three times, and once by a unanimous vote, in favor of election by the national congress, and as often reconsidered it (2 Madison Papers, pp. 770, 1,124, 1,190). The proposition that the president should be elected directly by the people, instead of by the national congress, received but one vote, while the proposition that he should be appointed by the State legislatures received two votes (2 Madison Papers, p. 1,124). The most cursory examination of the debates will, I think, convince any mind that it was to the organized legislature of the State, and not to the people of a State, that the framers of the constitution intended to commit the power of determining how the presidential electors should be chosen. It seems, both from the debates and the plan adopted, to have been their studied effort to prevent the people from acting in the choice of their chief magistrate otherwise than through their representatives, and in no single step of the process are the people directly required or authorized by the national constitution to act, but in every instance the duty and the authority are devolved upon their representatives. For these reasons I think it clear that it was intended to invest the organized State legislatures with the power of determining how the presidential electors should be chosen, and that the discretion thus lodged in the legislature cannot be limited or controlled by a State constitution.

W. De Witt Wallace.

[C.]

In 1868, the Indiana (Friends) Yearly Meeting appointed Mrs. Sarah J. Smith of Indianapolis, and Mrs. Rhoda M. Coffin of Richmond, to visit the prisons of the State, with a view to ascertain the spirit of the management of these institutions, and the moral condition of their inmates. In obedience to this appointment the two ladies visited both of the State prisons of Indiana, and made a particularly thorough examination of the condition of the Southern prison (at Jeffersonville) where all our women convicts were kept. Here they found the vilest immoralities being practiced; they discovered that the rumors which had induced their appointment were far surpassed by the revolting facts.

They visited Gov. Conrad Baker and urged him to recommend the General Assembly to make an appropriation for a separate prison for women. With the full sympathy of Governor Baker, who was not only a most honorable gentleman, but a sincere believer in the equal political rights of women, Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Coffin appeared before the legislature of 1869, and by an unvarnished account of what they had witnessed and learned in the Southern prison, they aroused the legislators to immediate action, and an act to establish a "Reformatory Institution for Women and Girls" was passed at that session (viz., that of 1869). By statute the new institution was located at Indianapolis. It was opened in 1873, the first separate prison for women in this country. Mrs. Sarah J. Smith was made its first superintendent, and she retained that office, discharging all its duties with great ability, until 1883, when upon her resignation she was succeeded by Mrs. Elmina S. Johnson, who had up to that time been associated with Mrs. Smith as assistant superintendent.

The first managing board of women consisted of Mrs. Eliza C. Hendricks (wife of Hon. Thomas A. Hendricks who was governor of Indiana on the opening of the prison), Mrs. Rhoda M. Coffin and Mrs. Emily A. Roach. The changes upon the board have been so infrequent that in addition to those on the first board and to those on the board at present, only three ladies can be mentioned in this connection, viz.: Mrs. Eliza S. Dodd of Indianapolis, Mrs. Mary E. Burson (a banker of Muncie) and Mrs. Sarah J. Smith, who, after resigning the superintendency, served on the board for a brief time.

The board at present consists of Mrs. Eliza C. Hendricks, president, Mrs. Claire A. Walker and Mrs. M. M. James. From the opening of this institution Mrs. Hendricks has been connected with it; first as a member of the advisory board, for eight years a member of the managing board and during a large part of the time its president, she has served its interest with singular fidelity. The position is no sinecure. The purchasing of all the supplies is only a part of the board's work; the business meetings are held monthly and often occupy half a day, sometimes an entire day. These Mrs. Hendricks always attends whether she is in Indianapolis or in Washington; from the latter point she has many times journeyed in weather most inclement by heat and by cold, simply to look after the prison and to transact the business for it imposed by her position on its board. During the last eight years, since women have had control of its affairs, Miss Anna Dunlop of Indianapolis has served the institution as its secretary and treasurer. Perhaps the highest tribute that can be paid to the ability with which Miss Dunlop has discharged the responsible and complicated duties of her double office, lies in the fact that with the General Assembly of the State it has passed into a proverb that "The Woman's Reformatory is the best and most economically managed of the State institutions." The committees appointed to visit the penal institutions always report that "The accounts of the reformatory are kept so accurately that its financial status can always be understood at a glance."

This institution has two distinct departments, the penal and the reformatory, occupying two sides of one main building and joined under one management. Convicts above sixteen years of age are ranked as women and confined in the penal department; those under sixteen years are accounted girls (children) and lodged in the reformatory department.

The average number of girls in the institution from its opening has been 150; the number of women 45. There are now (July, 1885,) over 200 inmates.

All of the work of the institution is done by its inmates. A school is maintained in the building for the children; a few trades are taught the girls; all are taught housework, laundry work, plain sewing and mending; the greatest pains is taken to form in the inmates habits of industry and personal tidiness, and to prepare them to be good servants; and when their period of incarceration has expired, the ladies interest themselves in finding homes and employment for the discharged convicts whom they seek to restore to normal relations to society. The secretary estimates that of those who have been discharged from the institution during the last twelve years, fully seventy-five per cent. have been really restored and are leading honest and industrious lives.

[D.]

Gov. Porter's Biennial Message, 1883: "I recommend that in the department for women in this hospital it shall be required by law that at least one of the physicians shall be a woman. There are now in this State not a few women who bear diplomas from respectable medical colleges, and who are qualified by professional attainments and experience to fill places as physicians in public institutions with credit and usefulness. It would be peculiarly fit that their services should be sought in cases of insanity among members of their own sex."

[E.]

About the year 1867, Miss Lucinda B. Jenkins, formerly of Wayne county, Indiana, left her work among the "Freedmen" in the South, to accept the position of matron in "The Soldiers' Orphans' Home" at Knightstown, Indiana. She afterwards became the wife of Dr. Wishard, the superintendent; and when the office was vacated by his death, she was authorized to assume his responsibilities, and perform his duties, with the exception of receipting bills and drawing appropriations, which latter duties, not being then considered as within the province of a woman, were delegated to the steward until the doctor's successor could be legally appointed.

She was a lady of intelligence and true moral worth, possessing a dignified, pleasing manner, and other good qualities, which, with her long experience as co-manager of the institution, admirably fitted her for the position of superintendent; but she was a woman, without a vote or political influence, and it was necessary that "party debts" should be paid. She therefore continued her influence for the good of the institution without public recognition until 1882, when she left to take charge of a private orphan asylum under the management of ladies of Indianapolis.

[F.]

Miss Susan Fussell is the daughter of the late Dr. B. Fussell of Philadelphia, to whom, with his estimable wife, women are indebted as the founder of the first medical college for women in the United States. At that period of our civil war, when women were admitted to the hospitals as nurses, Miss Fussell was at her brother's home at Pendleton, Indiana. She immediately volunteered her services, and was assigned to duty by the Indiana sanitary commission in the military hospitals in Louisville, Kentucky, where she served faithfully until the close of the war, giving the bloom of her youth to her country without hope of reward other than that which comes to all as the result of self-sacrificing devotion to the cause of humanity.

At the close of the war she returned to Philadelphia, but learning soon that an effort was being made to induce the State of Indiana to provide a home for the soldiers' orphans, she again offered her services in any useful capacity in that work. A benevolent gentleman of Indianapolis who had been most urgent in calling the attention of the officers of the State to their duty in that matter, finding that there was no hope, offered to furnish Miss Fussell with the money necessary to clothe, rear, educate and care for a family of ten orphans of soldiers, and bring them up to maturity, if she would furnish the motherly love, the years of hard labor and self-sacrifice, the sleepless nights and endless patience needed for the work. After a few days of prayerful consideration she accepted, and in the fall of 1865 ten orphans were gathered together in Indianapolis from various parts of the State from among those who had no friends able or willing to care for them. In the spring of 1866 they were removed to the Soldiers' Home near Knightstown, where a small cottage and garden were assigned to their use. In 1875, she placed the older boys in houses where their growing strength could be better utilized, and moved with the girls and younger boys to Spiceland to secure the benefit of better schools. In 1877, all of the ten but one were self-supporting, and have since taken useful and respectable positions in society. The one exception was a little feeble-minded boy, who, with his brother, had been found in the county poor-house; his condition and wants very soon impressed her with the necessity for a State home for feeble-minded children in Indiana, it having been found necessary to send this boy to another State to be educated. He is now in a neighboring State institution, and is almost self-supporting. With her usual energy and directness, she went to work to gather statistics on the subject of "Feeble-minded Children" in this and other States, and to interest others in their welfare. She at last found an active co-worker in Charles Hubbard, the representative from Henry county in the legislature, and their united efforts, aided by other friends of the cause, secured in 1876 the enactment of the law establishing the Home for Feeble-minded Children, now in operation near Knightstown, Indiana.