The blue book as to the treatment of the Armenians which has recently been issued (Miscellaneous, No. 31, 1916) contains a large mass of evidence relating to facts which, incredible as they are, have been so incontrovertibly established that no doubt as to their existence can possibly be entertained by any reasonable person. The greater part of the documents included in the blue book does not, however, throw much light on the attitude taken by the German public and the German Government with reference to the crimes which have been committed. The object of this pamphlet is to bring before the public a collection of documents specially selected for the purpose of throwing light on this subject. Some of them are included in the blue book, but the documents Nos. 1, 6, 9, 10 and 12 have not, as yet, been published in Great Britain or the United States. The two documents printed in the Appendix have no direct bearing on the questions relating to the German attitude. But as they came into the possession of the British authorities after the publication of the blue book and are of special interest as giving the impressions of two intelligent Turkish officers,1 it was thought right to include them.

A perusal of the documents included in this collection must convince the reader of three things: (1) that the Germans in Armenia are as full of indignation, and as anxious to see a stop put to the methods of extermination applied by the Turkish Government, as the most ardent friends of the Armenian cause in this country; (2) that, owing to the wilful or reckless perversion of the facts in the German press and the German pamphlet-literature, and owing also to the indifference and credulity of the general German public, the true state of things is unknown or ignored by the majority; (3) that the German Government could have stopped the outrages if they had desired to do so and that their non-interference was not in any way due to ignorance of the true facts.

One very interesting document which has come to the Editor’s notice is of too confidential a nature to be reproduced in this place. It is a Memorandum written by a distinguished German scholar, whose name for obvious reasons has to be suppressed, but whose good faith and whose critical acumen would be acknowledged by every one of his countrymen whose powers of judgment have not been perverted by the passion of war. This Memorandum contains ample evidence of the fact referred to above, that in consequence of the misstatements or suppressions of fact of which German writers on the subject have been guilty, public opinion in Germany has entirely failed to realise the horrors of the Armenian situation, and that some influential persons even approve of the action of the Turkish authorities. The old legend about the unscrupulousness of the Armenian traders and their exploitation of Turkish innocence and trustfulness—of which the groundlessness is convincingly demonstrated by the author of the Memorandum—seems to be firmly believed throughout Germany, and is made use of by those German politicians and journalists who approve cruelty, provided only it serves the cause of German world-dominion. Thus Count Reventlow in a passage quoted in the Memorandum refers to these matters in the following terms: “The Turk is unsuspicious and good-natured; everywhere he furnishes a convenient object for exploitation—up to a certain point and to a certain degree; then despair seizes him and he rises against his tormentors. Regrettable as such unlawful self-defence may be from the point of view of civilisation, it is obvious that the Armenians ... least of all deserve the pity and the compassionate emotions of the civilized world.”

The author of the Memorandum disposes of this tirade by saying that “it is of course unknown to the writer” of the passage quoted by us “that 80 per cent. of the Armenian population, and particularly those who were affected by the deportations, are peasant farmers, who presumably were not engaged in the exploitation of the Kurdish brigands by whom they were surrounded.... The assumption that the deportation and annihilation of the Armenian race was in the nature of unlawful self-defence is so far removed from the true facts that it does not require any refutation.”

The whole German press—as stated by the author of the Memorandum—reproduced an interview with Dr. Rifaat, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, originally published in a Danish paper, in the course of which the interviewed politician spoke of “a conspiracy embracing the whole Armenian population residing in Turkey, threatening the very existence of the country and intended to play Constantinople into the hands of the Allies.” He further stated that the plot was discovered before it had ripened, that many of the conspirators, including the Arabian Chief Abd-ul-Kerim, had been arrested and punished, and that 21 of the adherents of the latter were hanged. The author of the Memorandum makes the following comment on this statement: “If Dr. Rifaat knows anything of an Arabian conspiracy, it is impossible for us to verify this finding. In any case an ‘Arabian’ conspiracy is not an ‘Armenian’ conspiracy. But the number of the 21 conspirators hanged and the other contents of the ‘interview’ lead inevitably to the conclusion that Dr. Rifaat did intentionally mislead public opinion, by representing the plot of the Turkish opposition which had already been discovered before the war,2 and which aimed at the fall of the present government and the murder of Talaat Bey and other Young Turk leaders, as ‘a conspiracy embracing the whole Armenian population residing in Turkey.’”

The interview with Dr. Rifaat is also one of the trump-cards played in a pamphlet published in Berlin under the title of “The Armenian Question” by C. A. Bratter, a person describing himself as “a Citizen of a neutral State and a German Journalist.” This pamphlet (which was written in order to counteract the influence of an appeal in favour of the Armenians over the signatures of a number of distinguished Swiss residents) is minutely analyzed by the author of the Memorandum, together with its pretended sources of information; and he demonstrates irrefutably its utter untrustworthiness as well as the bad faith of its writer. He significantly adds: “How forgetful and how uncritical must any reader be to whom it is possible to present such lies.”3

Being ourselves in a position of greater freedom, we can say that this forgetfulness and this want of critical power are not surprising in the German public, having regard to the fact that their Government is in close alliance with the perpetrators of the crimes which Bratter and other persons of the same mental and moral calibre try to explain away or justify, and which could and would have been prevented long ago if that Government had not disregarded the elementary dictates of humanity.

The German scholar’s Memorandum contains some very interesting evidence showing: (a) that the Armenian leaders, far from engaging in an anti-Turkish conspiracy either before or during the war, were entirely loyal to the Turkish Government, in fact so loyal that this was made a cause of complaint by some of the Turkish opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress; (b) that the policy finally adopted with regard to the Armenians was originally opposed by some of the members of the ruling party, but when so adopted was a deliberate policy of extermination; (c) that the acts of resistance on the part of the Armenians, which are relied upon as an excuse for their treatment, were isolated acts due in each case to particularly grave provocation; that, in every instance except that of Zeitoun, they were later in date than the beginning of the deportations, and were in fact provoked by the fear of suffering the fate which had already overtaken neighbouring Armenian communities [see historical summary in blue book]; (d) that some of the other excuses put forward are so much at variance with the well-known facts that they could only deceive persons unable or unwilling to ascertain the truth.

As regards the loyalty of the Turkish Armenians, it is shown by extracts from leading papers, circulars sent out by the ecclesiastical dignitaries and by the “Dashnakzagan” (the only influential party organisation of the Armenians), as well as by several official announcements of the Turkish Government or of its agents, issued as late as August, 1915, that that loyalty was not only the policy declared by the Armenian leaders and carried out by the bulk of the population, but that it was also fully acknowledged by the authorities.

In a letter dated the 26th February, 1915, written by Enver Pasha to the Armenian Bishop of Konia, the former says: “I avail myself of this opportunity to tell you that the Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman Army conscientiously perform their duties in the theatre of war, as I can testify from personal observation. I beg of you to communicate to the Armenian people, whose perfect devotion to the Ottoman Government is well known, the expression of my satisfaction and gratitude.” Several other testimonies of a similar kind are quoted in the Memorandum.

In the days of Abd-ul-Hamid the “Dashnakzagan” were closely allied with the Committee of Union and Progress, and several of the members of that Committee received considerable help and protection from the Armenians. Those among them, whose sense of gratitude was not entirely destroyed by racial fanaticism, were therefore inclined to oppose the sinister schemes of their less scrupulous colleagues. These schemes, however, were the natural result of the tendencies which had gradually gained the upper hand in the Committee of Union and Progress, which Committee, as is well known, had met with considerable opposition in some powerful sections of the Turkish population, and for the sake of removing that opposition had been driven into a policy of Pan-Islamism. This policy had already been proclaimed in a report presented to the Congress of the Young Turk party held in 1911, on which occasion it was urged that “sooner or later the complete Ottomanisation of all Turkish subjects must be carried through, but that it was clear that this object could never be obtained by persuasion, and that the force of arms would have to be resorted to.” The nationalities in the said report are declared to be a “quantitÉ nÉgligeable”; they might keep their religion, but not their language.

The first symptoms of the fact that the advocates of the policy of “thorough” against the Armenians had overcome the resistance of their more scrupulous colleagues appeared on the 18/31 March, 1915, when the press organ of the “Dashnakzagan” was suppressed. On the 12/25 April 235 leading Armenians were arrested in Constantinople and deported. The excuse given by Talaat Bey to Vartkes, one of the Armenian members of the Ottoman Parliament, shows: (1) that the destruction of the Armenians had then been definitely decided on; (2) that no act of disloyalty on the part of the Armenians could have been adduced for the justification of this decision. These are Talaat’s words: “In the days of our weakness you put your knife to our throat by raising the question of reform. For that reason we will now avail ourselves of our present favourable situation, for the purpose of scattering your people to such an extent that for the next fifty years all thought of reforms will be driven out of your heads.” Vartkes thereupon said: “Then it is the intention to continue the work of Abd-ul-Hamid?” Talaat laconically replied, “Yes.” As pointed out by the author of the Memorandum, the movement for reform referred to by Talaat had for its only object the protection of the life and property of the Armenians against the attacks of Kurdish brigands; the reforms had been stipulated for by Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and had been constantly supported by the Great Powers, including Germany, which last named power had been specially active in that behalf during the year 1913.

The Constantinople arrests were soon followed by the deportations in the provinces and many acts of violence. The two members of Parliament, Zohrab and Vartkes, were arrested shortly after the interview of the latter with Talaat; they were deported and murdered. Thenceforth the policy of extermination manifested itself in all its nakedness. One of the principal officials in the Turkish Ministry of Justice said to an Armenian: “There is not sufficient room in this Empire for you and ourselves; it would be unpardonable recklessness on our part if we did not use this opportunity to clear you out of the way.” Some members of the Young Turk Committee even showed their hand more openly by declaring that “all foreigners must disappear from Turkey, first the Armenians, then the Greeks, then the Jews, and finally the Europeans.” One of the Ministers of State boasted that he would have attained in three weeks what Abd-ul-Hamid failed to accomplish in thirty years.

The excuses brought forward in a number of successive official statements made by the Turkish Government for the purpose of stifling the consciences of their wilfully credulous German Allies are summed up in the Memorandum. The substance of this summary appears from the following statement, in which the contrast between the accusation and the real facts is pointed out under each head:—

1. One Garo Pasdermadjian, a Russian Armenian, is vaguely alleged to have joined certain volunteer corps in the district of Erzeroum. (All the positive acts ascribed to him are connected with the doings of the Russian Armenians.)

2. Two Armenians are alleged to have—on the instigation of the British authorities—caused a train in Cilicia to go off the rails. (In the Turkish official statement dated 4th June, 1915, in which this accusation is made, a preliminary observation appears, to the effect that the Armenians “of Cilicia had done no act which could have disturbed the public peace and order, or could have necessitated any repressive measures”).

3. The Commanders of English and French warships are accused of having placed themselves in communication with Armenians of Adana, Alexandretta, and other places on the coast, for the purpose of inciting them to rebellion. (No evidence is produced as to this accusation, and it is not even alleged that the attempt complained of had any success.)

4. The resistance of the Armenians of Zeitoun to the Turkish authorities is referred to. (The events at Zeitoun are well known. Turkish Gendarmes had taken possession of some Armenian young women; twenty young men had thereupon come to blows with the Gendarmes and had barricaded themselves in a monastery some distance away from the town. The town was then surrounded by soldiers and the whole population of the town was deported.)

5. It is made a complaint that four “Hintchakists” were involved in a plot against the Turkish Government organized by the party in opposition. (The plot was started in 1912, and had been discovered before the outbreak of war. The “Hintchakists” were active as a revolutionary Armenian party in the nineties, but in 1913 the Turkish Hintchakists repudiated all connection with any revolutionary movement; the four Hintchakists in question were Egyptian, Armenians, and had been arrested before the outbreak of war.)

6. It is stated that Armenians in Van and other places hear the south-eastern corner of Lake Van, had risen in arms against the Government. (The events in this district are well-known; there was no premeditated resistance; but the violence of the Turkish and Kurdish soldiers, which caused many inhabitants to cross the Russian frontier, also caused some occasional acts of resistance.)

7. The occupation of the Castle Rock at Shabin-Karahissar by 500 Armenians is made another ground of complaint. (This happened after the town had been surrounded by soldiers, who had been summoned on account of the excitement caused in the town by the execution of a citizen and the threats of deportations.)

The far-fetched character of the justification of the outrages is laid bare by the analysis given above, which is a summarised reproduction of the criticism contained in the German scholar’s Memorandum. The old maxim, “Qui s’excuse s’accuse,” is particularly appropriate in this instance. The deliberate character of the policy of extermination is only seen with greater distinctness through the flimsy cloak of pretexts which is intended to conceal it. The result is described as follows in the German Memorandum: “What has happened, is an eviction carried out on the largest possible scale, affecting 1½ millions of citizens, who by their pertinacity and capacity for work have had the greatest share in the development of the economic progress of the country.”

Some persons in Germany seem to think that the fate of the Armenians was due to the fact that the continued co-existence in the same country of races so antagonistic to one another as the Turkish and Armenian is impossible in the nature of things; but this is most emphatically denied by the author of the Memorandum, who asserts that in this instance the Government did not even make use of its favourite method of inciting one part of the population against another part, but carried out its scheme by the sole agency of administrative measures.

The author of the Memorandum is no doubt himself actuated entirely by humane and high-minded feelings, and the very fact of his taking such a very strong attitude on the Armenian question reveals an amount of courage which calls for unqualified admiration; but he evidently knows that many of his countrymen require more tangible inducements for abandoning their callous or hostile attitude on the Armenian question. He therefore calls attention to the serious loss which not only Turkish economic life but also German trade interests will suffer, if the extermination of the Armenians is to be carried to the bitter end. He shows that the Turks are absolutely without any talent for trade and industry, and that the legend about the dishonesty of the Armenians and Greeks as opposed to the honesty of the Turks has no foundation in fact of any sort. He says that many German merchants are under the impression that their customers in Turkey are Turks, while in reality they are Armenians, Greeks, or Jews. The Greeks apparently are chiefly concerned with export trade, while the import trade is mainly in the hands of Armenian merchants. The German exporters, who give longer credits than others, are of course interested in the solvency of their customers, but many of them are ignorant of their nationality, and—starting from the notion that everyone who wears a fez is of Turkish nationality—they think that they are dealing with Turks. These exporters will have a rude wakening when the true facts become known to them. The Memorandum, by way of illustration, mentions one firm of importers in Constantinople who sell goods to 378 customers residing in 42 towns in the interior. The total amount owing by these customers at the date when the information was given, was nearly £14,000, which sum had to be written off as lost, as all the 378 debtors, with their employees and with their goods, have vanished; they are either dead or wander about as beggars on the borders of the Arabian desert.

During the Balkan war some members of the Young Turk Committee tried to damage the trade of the Armenians and of the Greeks by means of a boycott, which was put into operation with the aid of the Government. The rural population, which was in this way compelled to make their purchases in Turkish shops only, obtained bad goods at increased prices, and returned to the Armenians and Greeks as soon as the boycott was raised.

The Memorandum quotes a report, dated 15th August, 1915, and made by the American Consul at Aleppo, which sums up the result of the deportations of the Armenians in the following passage:—

“As 90 per cent. of the trade into the interior is in the hands of the Armenians, the result is that the country has to face economic ruin. As the greater part of the commercial transactions are credit transactions, hundreds of business men of high standing, though not themselves Armenians, have to face bankruptcy. In the evacuated localities, barring a few exceptions, there will not be a single mason, smith, tailor, carpenter, potter, tentmaker, weaver, shoemaker, jeweller, chemist, doctor, lawyer, or any other person engaged in trade or in a profession; the country will, in fact, be in a helpless position.”

The author of the Memorandum winds up the section relating to the effect of the deportations on Turkish trade with the following passage:—

“The popularity of the—otherwise unpopular—war may have been temporarily increased with the Turkish populace by the annihilation and spoliation of the non-Mohammedan population, more particularly of the Armenians, but partly also of the Syrians, the Greeks, the Maronites, and the Jews; but the more thoughtful Mohammedans will, on perceiving the net result of the damage suffered by their country, regretfully lament the economic ruin of Turkey, and come to the conclusion that the Turkish Government has lost incomparably more by the internal warfare than it can ever gain by external victories.”

As regards the “moral consequences” of the Armenian massacres, the German scholar says that they will not be properly felt till after the end of the war. He means by that, that the civilized world will then wake up to the horrors of the deeds which have been perpetrated by the Turkish Government. He continues: “The world will not allow itself to be persuaded by the contention that strategical considerations had required the deportation of half a million of women and children, wholesale conversions to the Mohammedan faith, and the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of defenceless persons.”

The German scholar’s Memorandum, for obvious reasons, is very silent as to the moral responsibility of the German Government for the deeds which rouse his indignation, but several of his countrymen are more outspoken. In this respect some of the documents included in this pamphlet are very instructive.

The German whose experiences are recorded in Document 9 reports that a Turkish official said to him: “This time Germany has given these unbelieving swine a lesson which they will not forget.” (See below, p. 66.) At Arab Pounar a Turkish major addressed him in the following language: “I and my brother took possession of a young girl at Ras-el-Ain, who had been left on the road. We are very angry with the Germans for doing such things.” When challenged on this point the Turks replied: “The chief of the General Staff is a German; von der Goltz is Commander-in-Chief, and ever so many German officers are in our Army. Our Koran does not permit such treatment as the Armenians have to suffer now.” (See p. 79.) In Nuss Tell a Mohammedan inspector made a similar remark, and when asked to explain himself he replied: “It is not only I who say this; everyone will tell you the same tale.” (See p. 79.)

Document No. 12, which voices the indignation of a German teacher in a German secondary school in Turkey, is also of peculiar interest. The following passages deserve special notice:—“We deem it our duty to call attention to the fact that our educational work will lose its moral foundation and the esteem of the natives, if the German Government is not in a position to prevent the brutality with which the wives and children of slaughtered Armenians are treated in this place.” (See p. 95.) “‘Ta alim el aleman’ (‘that is the teaching of the Germans’) says the simple Turk, when asked about the authors of these measures. The educated Moslems are convinced that, though the German people may disapprove of such horrors, the German Government is taking no steps to prevent them, out of consideration for its Turkish allies. Mohammedans of more refined feelings, Turks as well as Arabs, shake their heads disapprovingly; they do not even conceal their tears, when, in the passage of a convoy of deported Armenians through the town, they see Turkish soldiers inflicting blows with heavy sticks on women in advanced pregnancy or dying persons who cannot drag themselves any further. They cannot imagine that their Government has ordered these cruelties, and ascribe all excesses to the guilt of the Germans, who during the war are held to be the teachers of the Turks in all matters. Even the Mollahs declare in the Mosques that it was not the Sublime Porte but the German officers who had ordered the ill-treatment and annihilation of the Armenians. The things which in this place have been before everybody’s eyes during many months must indeed remain a blot on Germany’s shield of honour in the memory of Oriental nations.” (See pp. 96–97.) “Nothing would be more humiliating for us than the erection of a costly palace at Constantinople commemorating German-Turkish friendship, while we are unable to protect our fellow-Christians from barbarities unparalleled even in the blood-stained history of Turkey.” (See p. 106.)

The author of the document considers it “out of the question that the German Government, if it were seriously inclined to stem the tide of destruction even at this eleventh hour, could find it impossible to bring the Turkish Government to reason.” He proceeds as follows: “If the Turks are really so well disposed to us Germans as people say, then it is surely permissible to show them to what an extent they compromise us before the whole civilised world, if we, as their Allies, are to look on calmly, when hundreds of thousands of our fellow-Christians in Turkey are slaughtered, when their wives and daughters are violated, and their children brought up in the faith of Islam.” (See p. 105.)

He concludes his report with the following peroration:

“We may indignantly repudiate the lies circulated in enemy countries accusing the German Consuls of having organized the massacres. We shall not, however, destroy the belief of the Turkish people that Germany has ordered the Armenian massacres unless energetic action be at last taken by German diplomatists and German officers.”

More than a year has elapsed since the appeal was issued, but the rulers of Germany apparently are more inclined to act on Count Reventlow’s suggestion, according to which “the Armenians least of all deserve the pity and the compassionate emotions of the civilized world,” than to listen to an eye-witness whose conceptions as to the true mission of German culture differ so widely from the ideas which, to the disgrace and misfortune of his country, have of late characterised German political aims and German methods of warfare.