THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

The Vatican Council—Unusualness of the Occasion—Dr. Newman's Letter—Jesuit Influence—Dr. Cumming—Symptoms of Opposition—Opening of the Council—Inequalities of Representation—Order of Business—Production of the Schemata—The Doctrine of Papal Infallibility—Opposition of France and Austria—Withdrawal of the French Troops—The Ecclesiastical Opposition—Withdrawal of the Anti-Protestant Preamble—Adoption of the Constitution De Fide—Discussion on the Constitution De Ecclesi—Application of the Closure—The Dogma defined—Secession of the Minority—Confirmation of the Constitution—Victor Emmanuel determines on the Occupation of Rome—The Popular Vote—The Papal Guarantees—The Spanish Throne—The Savoy Candidature—Death of Prim—Paris after the Revolution of September—Jules Favre's Circular—Bismarck's Reply—The Negotiations at FerriÈres—The Fortifications of Paris—The Investment completed—Thiers and Gambetta—Fall of Strasburg—Bazaine in Metz—An abortive Sortie—Emperor or Country?—Regnier's Intrigue—The Empress declines to be a Party—A Council of War—Boyer's Mission—Its Failure—The Army of Metz capitulates—A Riot in Paris—Thiers negotiates in vain—Abortive Sorties—The Army of the Loire—D'Aurelle de Paladines reoccupies Orleans—Reasons for his Inaction—He is ordered to advance—Chanzy's Defeat and Recapture of Orleans—The Second Army of the Loire—Garibaldi in the East—The New Year in Paris—Dispositions of the German Armies—Battle of Amiens—FaÍdherbe's Campaign—Bapaume—St. Quentin—An Unpleasant Incident—Le Mans—The Bombardment of Paris—The Armistice—Termination of the Siege—Bourbaki's Attempt—Action at Villersexel—The Eastern Army crosses the Swiss Frontier—The National Assembly at Bordeaux—Prolongation of the Armistice—Resignation of Gambetta—Preliminaries of Peace—Occupation of Paris—Acceptance of the Preliminaries—The Definitive Treaty—German Unity.

THE earlier portion of the year, of which the later months ushered in so much bloodshed and such dire calamities, was rendered memorable by the sessions of the Vatican Council at Rome, the first General Council of the Latin Church that Europe had witnessed since the Council of Trent. To England, indeed, as a Protestant country, the proceedings of a purely Roman Catholic council could not be of immediate and vital interest. Yet, besides the necessity and duty of watching keenly transactions tending to affect the faith and conduct of a large portion of that Christendom to which England also belonged, the closeness of her connection with Ireland, whose people zealously participated in the preparatory movements, brought the subject home to her in various ways; the questions themselves which it was understood were likely to come before the Council were of a remarkable nature; and a well-founded apprehension existed that the settlement of these questions in a particular way was likely to have large and wide-spreading political results. It will not therefore be out of place in this History, while keeping clear of anything like theological discussion, to insert a brief notice of the Vatican Council, showing in what circumstances and with what intentions it was called together, and describing how, after great and weighty opposition, a dogma issued from its deliberations that afterwards acted like a firebrand cast into the society of all Roman Catholic countries.

The (according to the Roman computation) twenty-second General Council was convened, by the Bull Æterni Patris dated the 29th of June, 1868, to meet at the Vatican on the 8th of December, 1869. The principal subjects for its deliberations were stated to be—the magisterium or supremacy of the Roman Pontiff, the relations between the State and the Church, and the deep-seated evils and corruptions of modern society, owing to the prevalence of revolutionary principles in religion, morals, and philosophy. Why the Council was summoned at this particular time, it was not easy to understand. Dissensions on questions of faith, threatening to terminate in schism, or which already had terminated in schism, appear to have been, in former ages of the Church, the invariable antecedents of the convocation of an Œcumenical Council. But in the present case there never had been a time in which greater unanimity in faith, or a more ardent spirit of loyal obedience to the Pope, had pervaded the Roman Catholic world. It had been indeed alleged that the rash speculations of some German professors at the universities of Munich and Vienna, the drift of which was to extend the authority of National Churches, and to set limits to the Papal sovereignty, supplied a natural occasion and a sufficient justification for the fuller and more exact definition of the Pontifical and Petrine privileges which the promoters of the Council desired to see recorded. Yet, at the time, little was heard of these speculations: they did not aim at popularity; they were not taken up as the watchwords of any important party in the Church. The non-necessity for, the inopportunity of, the Council—at any rate with reference to questions of dogma—was an opinion strongly entertained by many earnest and able Roman Catholics. "What have we done?" wrote Dr. Newman to Bishop Ullathorne, "to be treated as the faithful never were treated before? When has a definition de fide been a luxury of devotion, and not a stern, painful necessity? Why should an aggressive and insolent faction be allowed to 'make the heart of the just sad, whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful'? Why cannot we be let alone when we have pursued peace and thought no evil?... If it is God's will that the Pope's infallibility is defined, then is it God's will to throw back 'the times and the moments' of that triumph which He has destined for His kingdom, and I shall feel I have but to bow my head to His adorable, inscrutable Providence." Many were of opinion that the Society of Jesus—the members of which were numerous at Rome, were supposed to have great influence over the Pope, and were certainly very active in paving the way for the Council—saw in the extension and more precise definition of the Papal prerogatives, which the adoption of the dogma of infallibility would involve, an opportunity for strengthening that system of centralised and unquestioned power which they have done so much to establish in the Roman Church. "The dogma," it was said, "is intended to make the Pope the ruler of the world; but the Jesuits rule the Pope, therefore the master-influence for the future in that large section of mankind which is included in the Latin Church will be wielded by the Jesuits." Nor was this opinion as to the preponderating share assigned to the Order in the arrangements for the Council confined to Protestants. Soon after the commencement of the sessions, Bishop Strossmayer, a Croatian prelate, denounced the Jesuits before the assembled fathers as manipulating and directing the business of the Council in a manner liable to be disastrous to the interests of the Church.

Soon after the publication of the Bull convening the Council a Papal Brief appeared, addressed to all Protestants and non-Roman Catholics, informing them that a General Council was about to be held, entreating them not to rest contented with a position in which they could not be sure of their salvation, and urging them to reconciliation and submission. Dr. Cumming, of the Scottish Church, London, understood this appeal as tantamount to an invitation to the Council, and manifested an intention of attending at the Council at the time appointed and taking part in the discussion. The Pope, however, writing to Archbishop Manning, desired that "Dr. Cumming, of Scotland," should be informed that no opinions and practices that had been condemned by any previous Council could be again brought under discussion, and that the object of reminding Protestants of the Council was to induce them to reflect upon the instability of their religious position. In order that confusion might not characterise the proceedings of so numerous an assembly, composed of men of every nation, a large proportion of whom had never set eyes upon each other before, six commissions were appointed by the Pope, with orders to prepare and rough-hew the materials for deliberation in council on the several topics of Religious Dogma, Ecclesiastical Politics, Church Discipline, Monastic Orders, the East, and Rites and Ceremonies.

In Roman Catholic countries it was believed that the object for which the Council was convened was to declare the infallibility of the Pope; and for months before the Council opened great agitation prevailed. In France, Bishop Maret and PÈre Gratry, the Oratorian, published pamphlets impugning, not the opportuneness only, but the truth, of the doctrine in question. In Germany the celebrated Dr. DÖllinger contributed to the Allgemeine Zeitung a short but weighty essay, "Against the Infallibility of the Pope." But of all writings of this class none attracted so much attention as an able work named "The Pope and the Council" that appeared under the pseudonym of "Janus." The object of the writer was to establish by reference to history the untenable nature of the claims now made on behalf of the Roman Pontiffs. The Governments of the Roman Catholic Powers became uneasy and sought information from Cardinal Antonelli as to the probable course that the deliberations would take; some of them also spoke of asserting a claim to send ambassadors to the Council, as in former times, for the protection of lay interests. But Cardinal Antonelli replied in smooth and conciliatory terms; he would not admit that the definition of the dogma of infallibility was probable; and with regard to the non-admission into the Council of ambassadors from Roman Catholic Powers, he justified it by the changed circumstances of modern times.

The Council assembled for the first time on the appointed day, the 8th of December, 1869. Out of 1,044 bishops, mitred abbots, or generals of orders, who were qualified to sit in the Council, 767 actually attended. The bishops of Poland alone, among European countries, were absent, having been forbidden to attend by the Czar. England and Scotland were represented by twelve or thirteen bishops, the most prominent of whom were Archbishop Manning and Dr. Ullathorne. Ireland sent twenty-three representatives, including Cardinal Cullen, Archbishop MacHale, and the learned and enlightened Bishop of Kerry, Dr. Moriarty. The French bishops were about eighty in number; those of North Germany only fourteen. The total number of bishops from all European countries—except Italy—amounted to 265. The Italian bishops, together with the hundred and nineteen bishops whose sees were in partibus infidelium, formed a total of 276. The missionary bishops—congregating to Rome from all parts of the known world, the expenses of their journey and residence in Rome being borne by the Papal treasury—formed nearly three hundred. It was objected that the representative character of the Council was impaired by the inequality of the relations existing between the bishops and the faithful who composed their flocks. The North German bishops, it was said, were only as one to 810,000 lay Catholics in North Germany; while the bishops from the Pontifical State numbered one for every 12,000 of the laity. Again, it was urged that, whereas in the primitive times one of the most distinctive characteristics of a bishop sitting in a council was that he bore testimony concerning the faith of his flock, this could not be the case with the numerous bishops in partibus now assembled at the Vatican, whose few and ignorant converts, for the most part just reclaimed from barbarism, had no traditional Christianity to put in plea. To all such objections it was replied, on the other side, that a bishop sat in council in virtue of his consecration only and that the doctrine of equal numerical representation had never been received in the Church.

For the regulation of the order of business the Bull Multiplices inter was prepared, and communicated to the Council at the commencement of its proceedings. It was said that under this Bull the liberty of the Council was abridged to an extent never known in former councils. It lodged in the hands of the Pope the nomination of the presidents of all congregations and commissions and enjoined that any proposition that a bishop desired to bring before the Council should first be laid before a special commission, which should decide on its admissibility and report accordingly to the Pope; without whose permission in the last resort it could not be brought forward. It need hardly be said that Latin was prescribed as the only language to be used in the public declarations.

The first public session (December 8th, 1869) was devoted to the formalities of opening. The proceedings of the Council being suddenly suspended in October, there were but four public sessions altogether. The second was held on the feast of the Epiphany, January 6th, 1870; when, no decree being at that time ready for discussion, every bishop attending the Council, with the Pope at their head, made the formal profession of his faith by publicly declaring his adhesion to the creed of Pope Pius IV., in which were summed up the principal dogmatic definitions and decrees of the Council of Trent. In the course of January several Schemata, or rough drafts of decrees, were introduced into the Council and referred to the several examining commissions. The first was the Schema De Fide: it was headed, in its original form, by a preamble containing language of a very disparaging nature respecting Protestantism, to the influence of which it ascribed Rationalism, Pantheism, Atheism, Socialism, etc., which it proceeded to condemn and anathematise. The second Schema related to Church discipline, and was brought in on the 14th of January; it dealt chiefly with the duties of bishops. The third Schema, De EcclesiÂ, on the Church and the Papal primacy, was brought in on the 21st of January; it originally contained three chapters, but a fourth was added in the circumstances presently to be related.

The repugnance to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility—or, at any rate, to the opportuneness of its definition at the present juncture—had been now so loudly expressed by a number of bishops (chiefly French and German, but with a sprinkling of English and Americans) that the majority in the Council began to fear that the advisers of the Pope would recommend the postponement of the subject to a future occasion. Wherefore a petition, or postulatum, was prepared, soon after the session of the 6th January, praying the Pope that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Chair of Peter might be defined; this was signed by five hundred bishops. The Governments of France and Austria, alarmed at this intelligence, thought that the time was come for exercising a pressure in a contrary direction on the Papal Court. Count Daru, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, instructed the Marquis de Banneville, the French Ambassador at Rome, to inform Cardinal Antonelli of the desire of the French Cabinet to be informed beforehand of all proceedings of a political nature that were taken by the Council, and of the decidedly adverse opinion of the said Cabinet against any definition of Papal infallibility. The Austrian Minister held similar language. Cardinal Antonelli replied to Count Daru in a long despatch written in March, when the prospect of the adoption of the dogma was increasingly favourable, denying that the Concordat existing between France and Rome gave the French Government any right to demand the special information required and claiming it as the privilege and the duty of the Council to proceed to the doctrinal definition deprecated by the French Cabinet, which he hoped would be greeted by the faithful everywhere as "the rainbow of peace and the dawn of a brighter future." It has been stated that the French Government replied to this letter from Cardinal Antonelli, stating that, as he determined to pursue a course that could only end in its ruin, France would for the future abstain from interference; but that on the day of the declaration of Papal Infallibility the Concordat would cease to be valid, the State would separate itself from the Church, and the French troops would be withdrawn from the Papal territory. It is certain that the resolution to withdraw the French troops, which was officially communicated by the Marquis de Banneville to the Holy See on the 27th July, was arrived at before France had sustained any military reverses, and may therefore have been prompted, or at least accelerated, by the proclamation of the dogma; but it does not appear that the menace of treating the Concordat as invalid was ever acted upon in the smallest degree; it seems probable therefore that the terms of the despatch were not in reality quite so stringent.

In reply to the petition of the five hundred bishops, a counter-petition was prepared by the opposition, and received a hundred and thirty-seven signatures, chiefly those of French, German, and Hungarian bishops. But the signers of this document—which was drawn up by Cardinal Rauscher—were careful not to commit themselves to an unconditional hostility to the dogma. They were content with pointing out the stumbling-blocks and dangers by which the question was surrounded—the thorny controversies, supposed to be long since buried, which it would disinter and quicken into a disastrous activity—and the as yet unresolved difficulties that passages in the history of the Papacy opposed to the belief in its infallibility.

The controversy, both in and out of the Council, waxed hotter and hotter, especially when the Infallibilists, emboldened it would seem by the hesitating and qualified character of the opposition, as expressed in the counter-petition—brought in in March, and annexed to the three chapters of the Schema De Ecclesi already submitted, the celebrated fourth chapter, containing the dogma itself fully formulated. But for the moment discussion ran upon the Constitution De Fide, which was rapidly approaching maturity. The opposition required, and finally with success, material alterations in that portion of the preamble which said so many hard things of Protestantism. In the end, the offensive preamble was withdrawn and a new one drawn up which the minority could agree to. The Constitution De Fide was adopted unanimously in the public session of the 24th of April, all the bishops present voting placet, but eighty-three adding the words "juxta modum," by which was meant that the signer adhered to the constitution in a particular sense attached by himself to its terms and not in any other sense. Strossmayer alone absented himself from the voting.

The Constitution De Fide being now out of the way, that of De EcclesiÂ, with its new fourth chapter, was pushed forward with the greatest ardour. The opposition resorted to the press and several remarkable pamphlets by men of note appeared. One of these was by the learned Hefele, lately appointed Bishop of Rottenburg. It was a discussion of the well-known case of Pope Honorius, condemned for heresy by Pope Agatho and a council in the year 680. Other brochures on the same side were written by Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, the Cardinals Rauscher and Schwarzenberg and Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis. The first meeting for the discussion of the Constitution De Ecclesi was held on the 14th of May and the debate was continued during three weeks. The principal speakers in support of the dogma were Cardinal Patrizi, Cardinal Cullen, the Archbishop of Malines, and Moreno, the Cardinal Archbishop of Valladolid. One of the most able and effective speeches was that of Dr. Cullen, who endeavoured to convict Hefele of self-contradiction, by contrasting the conclusions of his late pamphlet with the account given of Pope Honorius in his Church History. Darboy, the Archbishop of Paris, made an earnest and powerful speech against the decree; and Simor, the Primate of Hungary, Jussuf, the Patriarch of Antioch, and Dr. MacHale, of Tuam, spoke on the same side. The discussion dragged on wearily. June arrived, and with it the burning heat and unwholesome air of a Roman summer; and still the names of forty-nine bishops were inscribed as desiring to take part in the discussion. At this point the majority exercised their right of closing the debate and the general discussion was brought abruptly to an end on the 3rd of June. Several weeks were then consumed in the consideration of the chapters, paragraph by paragraph. The voting on the fourth chapter, that enunciating the dogma, came on on the 13th of July. As finally settled, the definition was expressed in the following terms:—

"We teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedrÂ, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in St. Peter, is strong [pollere] with that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals, and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not from the consent of the Church."

On this definition the Council voted in the general congregation of the 13th July, and with the following result: 400 placet, 88 non placet, and 61 placet juxta modum. About seventy others, though in Rome, abstained from voting. It was now a question with the minority what course they should take. Cardinal Rauscher proposed that they should all wait for the public session, which had been fixed for the 25th of July, and then vote non placet in the presence of the Pope. But more pacific counsels prevailed. A letter was prepared on the 17th inst., and signed by 110 bishops, in which, after adverting to the particulars of the voting on the 13th, they declared to the Pope that their hostility to the definition of the dogma remained unchanged, and that by the present writing they confirmed their previous suffrages, but that nevertheless, out of respect and affection for his Holiness, they had determined not to stay and vote openly, "in facie patris," on a question so nearly concerning the person of the Pope. The bishops of the minority accordingly took their departure from Rome.

The turmoil caused by the approach of war led to the anticipation of the date that had been fixed for the public session. On the 18th of July, the Pope himself presiding, the Constitution De EcclesiÂ, which included the definition of infallibility, was put to the vote and received 533 placets, and 2 non placets. The negative votes were given by Riccio, Bishop of Cajazzo, and Fitzgerald, Bishop of Little Rock, in the State of Arkansas in the United States. The Pope then read out the constitution to the assembled fathers, and confirmed it. During the reading a violent storm of thunder and lightning burst over St. Peter's, and the darkness became so great that the Pope was obliged to send for a candle. Little or no excitement was visible among the Romans; the Ambassadors of France, Prussia, and Austria pointedly stayed away. An analysis of the eighty-eight negative votes in the general congregation of the 13th of July, showed that thirty-two were given by German, Austrian, or Hungarian prelates, twenty-four by French, and seven by Oriental bishops. Two were Irish (Drs. MacHale and Moriarty, Bishop of Kerry); two English (Vaughan, Bishop of Plymouth, and Clifford, Bishop of Clifton); one Colonial (Conolly, Archbishop of Halifax), and five North Americans. Six Italian bishops, six bishops in partibus, and three whose names could not be ascertained, complete the list.

The importance of the definition of infallibility was considered by politicians and lay society in general to consist, not so much in the assertion and claim that the mere words of the decree contain, as in the retrospective force that it might be used to impart to Papal decisions dating from the Middle Ages, at a time when the power and pretensions of the Holy See were almost unbounded. If such a dogmatic utterance, for instance, as the Bull Unam sanctam of Boniface VIII., by which it was declared that, "if the temporal power errs, it is judged by the spiritual," and that "there are two swords—the spiritual and the temporal; ... both are in the power of the Church; ... the former that of priests, the latter that of kings and soldiers, to be wielded at the good pleasure and by the allowance of the priest,"—if such a Papal declaration, and others of a similar kind to be found in the Roman Bullarium, were held to be ex cathedrÂ, and therefore infallibly true, what a prospect was opened for the non-Roman Catholic Sovereigns of Roman Catholic subjects, should the new definition come to be generally accepted by the human conscience throughout the Roman Catholic world. These fears proved, however, of an alarmist character, and the Roman Catholic populations were on the whole no less law-abiding than the Protestant.

So far as it was connected with temporal power, the supremacy asserted for the Pope by the Constitution De Ecclesi was about to receive a notable check and diminution. The declaration of war between France and Prussia had been speedily followed by an announcement (July 27th), on the part of the Ollivier Government, that France would withdraw all her troops from Rome, and this was soon afterwards effected. The Opposition in the Italian Parliament immediately began to attack the September Convention, and to urge the occupation of Rome; but Signor Lanzi replied that the Convention was still binding, and must be adhered to. But in September, after the fall of the Empire and the Regency, the Italian Government could not afford to overlook the opportunity which the prostration of France afforded of extending a kingdom which was itself in so large a measure the child of revolution. Already, on the 6th of September, the Chevalier Nigra sounded Jules Favre on the possibility of obtaining the approval and sanction of the new French Government to the King of Italy taking possession of Rome. M. Favre, though not personally opposed to the measure, was too well acquainted with the feeling that prevailed in France on the subject to give official countenance to the act. On the 8th of September the King addressed a letter to Pius IX., in which, grounding his determination on the critical condition of Italy, and also on the presence of foreigners among the troops composing the Papal army, he announced his intention to send Italian troops into the Roman territory, who should occupy those positions which should be "indispensable for the security of your Holiness," and for the maintenance of order. The Pope flatly declined to treat, and on the 20th of September the national army, after overcoming a brief show of resistance on the part of the Papal Zouaves, entered Rome. The Italian Government, desirous of covering the seizure of Rome under a show of legality, ordered an appeal to be made to the people of the Papal territory, who were invited to vote on the question whether or not they approved of the annexation of Rome to the kingdom of Italy, the spiritual rights of the Pope being preserved. The voting took place on the 2nd of October with the following result: Ayes, 133,681; Noes, 1,507. The Italian Parliament met in December and sanctioned the transfer of the capital from Florence to Rome. Victor Emmanuel made his public entry into Rome on the 31st of December.

The Pope having refused the terms offered through the Count Ponza di San Martino, the following arrangements were made by the Italian Government, with the sanction of the Parliament, without consulting him. He was confirmed in the possession of his sovereign rights, allowed to retain his guards, and provided with an income of 3,255,000 francs (which, however, Pius IX. never consented to accept). He was to keep the Vatican Palace (the Quirinal Palace being appropriated for the use of the King of Italy), the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, his residence at Castel Gandolfo, and their dependencies. Various provisions were added for the purpose of securing the freedom and inviolability of the Papal correspondence. The seminaries and other Roman Catholic institutions were to derive their authority from the Holy See alone, without any interference from the Italian educational authorities, and the Pope was left an entire fulness of authority in the appointment of bishops and the general government of the Church. In fact, the Guarantees, had Pius IX. chosen to accept them, would have given him a power such as he possessed in no other European country.

Spain, the unlucky cause of the deadly war that had broken out between France and Germany, though striving after repose and a settled government, failed to obtain it. In May the names of Espartero and Montpensier were formally before the Cortes as candidates for the Throne. But Espartero soon afterwards retired on the ground of his advanced age; and Prim, whose influence was predominant in the Government, would not hear of the election of the Duke of Montpensier. In June Queen Isabella abdicated in favour of her son Alfonso, the Prince of Asturias. The next month witnessed Prim's unsuccessful attempt to secure the elevation to the Throne of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. Not daunted by so many failures, Prim now turned his eyes again to the House of Savoy, and prevailed on the King of Italy to consent to the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by his second son, the Duke of Aosta. In October this arrangement was given out as completed, subject to the approval of the Cortes. On the 16th of November a formal vote was taken in the Cortes, and there appeared—for the Duke of Aosta, 191 votes; for the Federal Republic, 60; for Montpensier, 27; for a Unitarian Republic, 3. Supported by this decisive majority, Prim proceeded to make the necessary preparations for the fitting reception of the new Sovereign. The Duke and Duchess of Aosta embarked at Leghorn and landed at Cartagena on the 30th of December. They were received by Admiral Topete, and informed by him of a terrible crime that had just occurred in Madrid. On the 28th of December, Marshal Prim, while going in his carriage from the Cortes to the Ministry of War, was fired at by some assassins (supposed to be Republican fanatics, to whom Prim was odious as the supporter of monarchy) and severely wounded in the arm and hand. The assassins made their escape. The wounds were at first not believed to be dangerous, but inflammation set in and Prim expired on the night of the 30th of December. If he had erred through ambition, the brave Prim was yet a true lover of his country and a wise, courageous, and sagacious ruler; at this critical juncture of her affairs, his death was to Spain an unspeakable and irreparable loss.

It will be remembered that the narrative of the Franco-German War has been brought down to the capitulation of Sedan and the Revolution of the 4th of September. Of the gallant struggle made by the French nation after the fall of the Empire, when the men who had installed themselves in the seats of power vainly tried to bring back to the standards of the raw Mobiles that victory which had deserted the eagles of the veterans of the Crimea, it does not fall within the scope of this work to speak at length.

M. Jules Favre, Gambetta, CrÉmieux, and the rest (always excepting Trochu), believing in democracy with an implicit and absolute faith, seem to have been honestly convinced that what the French, or rather the Parisian, populace were determined should be or should not be, would in some way or other be arranged to suit their wishes. How else could the foolish and presumptuous language—falsified so miserably by the event—of M. Favre's circular of the 6th of September have escaped from the pen of any man of common sense or common prudence? The Empire, he said, sought to divide the nation from the army, but misfortune and duty have brought them together again; "this alliance renders us invincible." He then proceeded to misrepresent what the King of Prussia had said in his proclamation upon entering French territory, as if he had declared that he made war, "not against France, but against the Imperial dynasty;" whereas the King merely announced that he was making war against the armies of France, not against the civil population—a very different thing. But if Prussia was so ill advised as to continue the war, the new Government would accept the challenge. "We will not cede either an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses."

Bismarck, upon receiving a copy of Jules Favre's circular, despatched a counter-manifesto to the Prussian diplomatic agents. "The demand," he remarked, "that we should conclude an armistice without any guarantee for our conditions of peace, could be founded only on the erroneous supposition that we lack military and political judgment, or are indifferent to the interests of Germany." Germany cared nothing about the dynasty; but whatever permanent Government might be established in France must be prepared to give to Germany solid guarantees for the maintenance of peace. "We are far from any inclination to mix in the internal affairs of France. It is immaterial to us what kind of government the French people shall formally establish for themselves. The Government of the Emperor Napoleon has hitherto been the only one recognised by us; but our conditions of peace with whatever Government, legitimate for the purpose, we may have to negotiate are wholly independent of the question how or by whom France is governed. They are prescribed to us by the nature of things, and by the law of self-defence against a violent and hostile neighbour. The unanimous voice of the German Governments and German people demands that Germany shall be protected by better boundaries than we have had hitherto against the dangers and violence that we have experienced from all French Governments for centuries. As long as France remains in possession of Strasburg and Metz, so long is its offensive strategically stronger than our defensive power, so far as all South Germany, and North Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, are concerned. Strasburg, in the possession of France, is a gate always wide open for attack on South Germany. In the hands of Germany, Strasburg and Metz obtain a defensive character." It is now known that Bismarck would have been content with the acquisition of Strasburg, but the military authorities insisted upon Metz as well.

With views so divergent, the inutility of a conference between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prussian Chancellor would seem to be obvious. Nevertheless, the pressure of circumstances brought about such a conference, and for this reason—the Government of the 4th of September, though it probably continued to regard itself as a "heaven-born Ministry," had become alive to the fact that its earthly title to legitimacy was but slender; it therefore desired to bring about the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly, which might, as it saw fit, either confirm them in their offices or choose another Government. On the other hand, it was to the Germans also a matter of prime importance that a regular Government should be established in France, in order that negotiations might be opened with it for peace. But in order that the elections from which such an Assembly was to result might be held, there must be a temporary cessation of hostilities; and this was a matter that could only be arranged by means of an interview. Through the exertions of Lord Lyons, the consent of the King of Prussia to a meeting between Bismarck and Jules Favre, to settle the terms of an armistice, was obtained. Several interviews between the two took place at FerriÈres, near Meaux (September 19th and 20th), but no accommodation could be arrived at. As a military equivalent for the consent to a cessation of hostilities, Bismarck demanded the surrender of Toul, Phalsburg, and Strasburg; but to this Jules Favre would not listen, and became violently agitated at the suggestion that the garrison of Strasburg should give themselves up as prisoners of war. Again, the subject of an armistice was discussed in connection with the re-provisioning of Paris. During the three weeks that would be required for the election and first meeting of a National Assembly, if an armistice were to prevail, Paris would naturally seek to augment the stock of provisions within the walls; but, in that case, Bismarck said, Germany must have a military equivalent to compensate her for the long delay, and, as such an equivalent, he demanded the surrender of the fortress of Mont ValÉrien. Favre was again much excited; he said, and certainly with reason, that Bismarck might as well ask for Paris at once. The conferences were broken off without result and Jules Favre returned to Paris.

The remainder of the events of the war to the end of 1870 we propose to sketch briefly in the following order:—(1) The siege of Paris (noticing in connection therewith the sieges of Strasburg and Metz); (2) Other sieges and stormings of fortresses; (3) The operations on the Loire; (4) The operations in the east of France. Our object will be to keep the chief current of action before the reader in avoidance of details.

The main defence of Paris consisted in the outer ring of forts, heavily armed, by which the lines of investment of a besieging army were kept at such a distance that the bombardment and destruction of the city were rendered impossible until the forts themselves had been reduced. On the south side the forts were not sufficiently distant from the city to make it unattainable by shells, with the modern range of artillery, to an enemy who had seized the heights of Meudon and Clamart, and the plateau of Villejuif; secondly, the interval left between the fort of Issy and Mont ValÉrien was far too great; and, again, the interval between Mont ValÉrien and the forts of St. Denis was dangerously large. To remedy these defects a system of earthworks was planned and partly executed, after Trochu had charge of the defence. The disastrous issue of the sortie of the 19th of September, made by General Ducrot in the direction of ChatÎllon, when the redoubt at that place fell into the hands of the Prussians, and the 14th Corps, yielding to a disgraceful panic, fled in disorder to the city gates, not only, in General Vinoy's opinion, exercised a baneful influence over all the subsequent defence, but led to the evacuation by the French of the whole of the redoubts above described. Two of them, however, one to the west, the other to the east of Villejuif, were re-taken by General Vinoy, with little loss, on the 23rd of September; and being immediately repaired and put in the best condition of defence, were held by the French during the remainder of the siege, throwing back the Prussian line of investment at this point considerably and making the bombardment of the city, on all the eastern half of the southern face, impossible. Had equal energy been shown in holding, or recovering, the redoubts of Meudon and ChatÎllon, Paris could not have been bombarded to any purpose on this side. Of this there can be no question.

After the repulse of Ducrot on the 19th of September, the investment of Paris, which could not be considered final till the quality of the troops composing the active army had been ascertained, was regularly completed. Its salient points were Stains on the north, Chelles on the east, Sceaux on the south, and Garches on the west. On the 30th of September General Vinoy headed a grand sortie against the 6th Corps (TÜmpling), which guarded that portion of the Prussian lines which lay south of Villejuif, with the intention of driving the Germans out of Choisy-le-Roi, and destroying the bridge over the Seine at that point, so as to make a break in the German communications. It was hoped that the enemy would have been surprised; but a delay of twenty-four hours required by Trochu, in order that a larger force might be got ready to share in the operation, and the vigilance of the German Intelligence Department, caused that expectation to fail; and the German troops at Choisy, being reinforced and prepared for the attack, could not be dislodged. The French loss was considerable, amounting to nearly 2,000 men; but the troops fought well and the retreat was effected in good order.

About this time, M. Thiers, at the request of the Government of the National Defence, visited all the principal Courts of Europe, everywhere eloquently pleading the cause of his country. Nowhere, not even in Russia, did his words fail to awaken interest and sympathy; but when M. Thiers hinted at active intervention, he was met by a general indisposition to interfere at the present stage of the struggle.

On the 7th of October Gambetta made his escape from Paris in a balloon, and landed safely in the neighbourhood of Rouen. He at once repaired to Tours, where a delegation from the Government of Paris had been for some time established, though it was entirely unequal to its task. He lost no time in issuing a proclamation, to be circulated through France, describing in highly coloured language the patriotic exertions which the Parisians were making, and urging the inhabitants of the unoccupied provinces to rise and hasten to their succour. He then superseded CrÉmieux in the Ministry of War, and appointed himself to the office, in addition to that of Minister of the Interior. Gambetta evidently thought himself another Carnot, about to "organise victory." The real nature and scope of his abilities, which were undoubtedly great, appear to have been seized by a keen-eyed newspaper correspondent, who said that Gambetta reminded him of an "energetic traffic-manager" on an English railway. But his activity and hopefulness were inexhaustible, and he certainly did contrive to conjure up, as it were out of the earth, armies of some sort or other, and to find arms and accoutrements for them; though the first were not uniform and the second miserably insufficient. Nevertheless he did the best he could with the materials at his hand. Of his military arrangements it is enough to say that he put an end to the disorders in the great cities that attempted to rival the central power.

Meanwhile the days crept on and the time came when famine forced the defenders of Metz to drop their arms. Already Strasburg had fallen (September 28th) after a gallant defence by General Uhrich, and the Germans had established a civil government in Alsace. When last we spoke of Bazaine, it was to mention that after the battle of Gravelotte he withdrew the Army of the Rhine under cover of the fortifications of Metz. Nothing of moment occurred for some days; Prince Frederick Charles was engaged in hutting the German army round Metz and entrenching his position; while Bazaine was busily preparing for another attempt. A messenger from MacMahon, passing safely through the German lines, brought word to Bazaine that the Army of ChÂlons had commenced its march to his relief on the 21st of August. In order to co-operate with it, Bazaine planned a great sortie for the 31st, about which day he calculated that MacMahon would have arrived in the neighbourhood of the fortress. But he delayed the attack till the afternoon, for reasons which, even upon his own showing, appear insufficient; and through the indecision of subordinate commanders, another delay supervened, so that the advance was not made till four o'clock. The Germans had time to concentrate a sufficient mass of troops in the rear of Noisseville and Servigny to repel the French attack, which was made with no great vigour. Bivouacking on the ground, the French resumed the action on the next day; but their efforts were ill planned and ill united; the Germans brought up an overpowering artillery to crush the French right; and between two and three o'clock, Bazaine, who had heard nothing of the approach of MacMahon's army, gave the order for retreat. For the next weeks he confined himself to foraging for provisions, and even in a sortie on the 7th of October only 40,000 of his troops were employed.

The Revolution of the 4th of September occurred and the news was received by Bazaine with unmitigated disgust. The master whom he had served long, and who had rewarded him well, was the Emperor; if the Emperor was a prisoner and could give him no orders, then his obedience was due to the Empress as Regent. He determined not to recognise and to hold no communications with the men who had supplanted a regular Government under favour of a street riot and the Republican cry. So far, if Bazaine's antecedents are considered, it is impossible to blame him; he did not become culpable till he made the interest of France—which had a more sacred claim on his allegiance than any form of government—subordinate to political aims and personal ambition. Count von Moltke, however, in his "History of the Franco-German War," maintained that he was not a traitor.

In the course of September a strange incident occurred. There was an individual of the name of Regnier, much attached to the Empire, who was said to have held some appointment in the household of the Empress. M. Regnier appears to have been a fanciful and vain personage; and the notion came into his head that he might become the humble but serviceable instrument of liberating the Emperor, re-establishing the Imperial system, and terminating the misfortunes of France. For this, it seemed to him, three things were necessary: the consent of the Imperial family; the negotiation of a treaty of peace between them and the Germans; and the liberation of Bazaine and his army in consequence of that treaty, who should act as an "Army of Order," put down the Republic and the men of the 4th of September, and replace the Emperor on the throne. Regnier first went to Chislehurst and propounded his views to the Empress, begging that she would furnish him with some kind of credentials. The Empress, it is plain, put little faith either in the man or in his project; however, after much importunity, she gave him the credentials he desired. Having obtained these, Regnier repaired to FerriÈres, where the King and Bismarck were then quartered. He obtained an interview with the Chancellor and unfolded his plan. Bismarck was at first inclined to treat him as a dreamer and a meddler, but eventually thought the scheme of Regnier might be worth a trial. He accordingly gave him a general pass, which would allow of his passing through the lines of any German army that he might meet with, in order that he might go to Metz and sound Bazaine with reference to the project. Passing in this way through the lines of Prince Frederick Charles, Regnier entered Metz and sought an interview with Bazaine (September 23rd). The marshal, though he expressed himself cautiously, did not disguise the feelings of aversion and contempt with which he regarded the Government of the National Defence; and in consequence of Regnier's visit he sent Bourbaki, the commander of the Imperial Guard, that same evening out of Metz on a mission to Chislehurst. The emissary—Prince Frederick Charles being doubtless cognisant of the whole intrigue—found no difficulty in passing through the investing lines. Up to this point Regnier's little plan had apparently prospered, but now the bubble burst. The Empress was not a woman of that strength and sternness of character which, in the pursuit of an object of ambition, would lead her to brave obloquy and play high for a mighty stake. If she signed a treaty of peace as Regent, providing for the cession of Strasburg and Metz to Germany, the name of the Napoleonic dynasty, she thought, would be eternally execrated in France; and, after all, it was not certain that Bazaine could restore the Empire, or that his army, as a body, would support him in the attempt. She therefore absolutely declined to be a party to the scheme and it fell through. Bourbaki returned to France; but, instead of re-entering Metz, placed his sword at the disposal of the Government of Tours.

In October, the only description of food that remained abundant in Metz was horse-flesh and this was obtained at the cost of the efficiency of the cavalry and artillery. On the day after the sortie of the 7th Bazaine caused a meeting of divisional generals to be held, to consider the situation. However distasteful the thought of a capitulation might be, yet the fast diminishing supplies of food compelled the officers to face it; they were of opinion that a capitulation should be arranged on terms that would allow of the army retiring, without laying down its arms, to the south of France, under a pledge not to serve against Germany during the continuance of war. If, however, these conditions were not acceded to by the German leaders, it was the understanding of most of the divisional generals and of the mass of the officers under them, that a desperate effort must and would be made to cut a way, sword in hand, through the investing forces.

At a meeting of the corps commanders, called by Bazaine on the 10th of October, it was resolved that no new sorties should be attempted, but that efforts should be made to obtain a military convention by negotiation with the enemy. The use of the term "military convention" shows that something different from an ordinary capitulation—something political—was in view. At all events, General Boyer arrived at Versailles on the 13th of October to talk over the situation. The course of the negotiation that ensued was curiously similar to that which the Regnier incident had occasioned. "You ask," said Bismarck, "that the army in Metz may be allowed to retire to the south of France, pledged not to bear arms against Germany during the continuance of the war. But who is to guarantee the convention under which such an arrangement would be executed? Whom does Bazaine obey? What is the Government that he serves? If the Government of the National Defence,—that is an authority that we Germans do not recognise, at any rate until a Constituent Assembly shall have met and validated their powers. If the Emperor,—he is a helpless prisoner in Germany. If the Empress and the Regency,—that may perhaps be satisfactory, but her sanction must be obtained; she must sign a treaty that will give us what we want; and the Army of the Rhine, besides the pledge not to bear arms against Germany, must proclaim the Regency as the legitimate Government of France, and Bazaine must undertake to play the part of Monk in an Imperial restoration." Boyer returned to Metz with this answer on the 18th of October, and thence was sent to Chislehurst. The result was the same as before; the Empress, after much wavering, refused to sign any treaty of peace by which French territory would be ceded to the invader. General Boyer communicated to the King on the 23rd the ill-success of his mission, and Prince Frederick Charles was immediately instructed to inform Bazaine that all hope of arriving at any result by political negotiation was abandoned at the royal headquarters. On the 27th the capitulation was signed and the fortress with an army of 170,000 men passed into the hands of the Germans.

The confirmation of the news of the capitulation of Bazaine, and the rumour that an armistice was under consideration, caused a great ferment in the anarchical or communist element of the Parisian population. Bands of armed men marched (October 31st) from Belleville to the HÔtel de Ville, placed Trochu and other members of the Government under arrest, declared the independence of the Commune of Paris and undertook its government. The leaders were Flourens, FÉlix Pyat, Blanqui, etc. Fortunately, Ernest Picard, the Minister of Finance, contrived to escape, and before the day closed he brought a Breton battalion of the Gardes Mobiles to the HÔtel de Ville, who soon rescued their countryman Trochu and dispersed the revolutionists. The utmost forbearance was shown to the rioters by the partisans of order. Trochu and his colleagues, after this Émeute, thought it desirable to submit the question of their remaining in power to the suffrages of the people of Paris. The votes were taken accordingly; nearly 558,000 were favourable to the Government, while 62,638 were dissentient.

M. Thiers, on his return from his unsuccessful journey to the foreign Courts, was requested by the Government to re-open negotiations with Count Bismarck, with a view to a cessation of hostilities and the election of a Constituent Assembly. But the project again foundered on the question of re-victualling Paris, to which the military authorities at the Prussian headquarters would not allow Bismarck to consent, unless on condition of the surrender of one, if not two, of the forts round Paris—a concession that Thiers could not make.

Sad and dull was life in Paris during the month of November, cheered only by one gleam of better fortune, when news came that the Army of the Loire had gained a victory at Coulmiers. At the end of the month a grand sortie was resolved upon, in order to facilitate the flanking operations of General d'Aurelle de Paladines' army, which Gambetta hoped to impel upon Paris at the same time. Great preparations were made and several demonstrations against various points of the German lines concerted, in order to deceive the enemy as to the object of the main attack, which was the peninsula of Champigny, beyond Charenton. Breaking through the Prussian lines at this point, Trochu hoped to push forward into the district of Brie, and march onwards till he fell in with the advancing army of De Paladines. Ducrot was appointed to the command of the troops destined for the operation, which numbered about 60,000 men. Bridges were thrown across the Marne, and on the morning of the 30th the Saxons and WÜrtembergers who guarded this part of the line were vigorously attacked and the villages of Brie and Champigny wrested from them. Still no great progress was made, and on the night of the 30th it became suddenly cold, and the French soldiers unused to the hardships of campaigning suffered terribly from exposure. The 1st of December was employed by Trochu and Ducrot in strengthening the line, Brie-Champigny, which they had seized. On the 2nd the Germans brought up fresh forces, and severe fighting took place, at the end of which the French retained all their positions, except the eastern end of the village of Champigny. On the 3rd Trochu resolved to retreat, moved to do so by the absence of any news of De Paladines and the increasing severity of the weather. The retreat was covered by the guns of the forts and was effected with little loss. Another great sortie was made on the 21st of December, with some vague hope of co-operating with a northern army, supposed to be at that time advancing towards Paris. The attack was directed against the Prussian Guard at Stains and the Saxons more to the east. It was repelled with little difficulty, the French losing considerably and showing in this sortie a lack of spirit and endurance, naturally to be accounted for by want of food, severe cold, and the depressing circumstances of the siege.

Besides Metz and Strasburg, eight other fortified places were compelled to surrender before the close of the year. In the case of Laon, the surrender on the 9th of September of a citadel and a position remarkably strong by nature, was rendered necessary by the weakness of the garrison. Toul, after a savage bombardment for several days, by which the town was set on fire in several places, surrendered to the Duke of Mecklenburg on the 23rd of September. Soissons, Verdun, La FÈre, and Thionville were reduced in the course of October and November. Phalsburg (the fortress at which is laid the scene of Erckmann-Chatrian's famous novel, "Le Blocus"), after its brave commandant, General Talhouet, and its no less brave inhabitants, had endured a bombardment and blockade—the first intermittent, the second continuous—during four months, was compelled to surrender, by failure of provisions, on the 12th of December.

EVACUATION OF METZ. (See p. 584.)