THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

The Schleswig-Holstein Difficulty—Austria favours a Settlement—Bismarck's Terms rejected—His high-handed Proceedings—Convention of Gastein—Bismarck at Biarritz—The Italian Treaty—Question of Disarmament—Fresh Austrian Proposals—Bismarck advocates Federal Reform—La Marmora's Perplexity—He abides by Prussia—Efforts of the Neutral Powers—Failure of the projected Congress—Rupture of the Gastein Convention—The War begins—The rival Strengths—Distribution of the Prussian Armies—Collapse of the Resistance in North Germany—Occupation of Dresden—The Advance of the Prussian Armies—Battle of KÜniggrÄtz—Cession of Venetia—Italian Reverses—The South German Campaign—Occupation of Frankfort—The Defence of Vienna—French Mediation—The Preliminaries of Nikolsburg—Treaty of Prague—Conditions awarded to Bavaria and the Southern States—The Secret Treaties—Their Disclosure—Humiliation of the French Emperor—His pretended Indifference.

WHILE the strife of parties was raging in the lobbies of the House of Commons during the Reform debates of 1866, a warfare of a more decisive kind was in course of preparation in Germany. Its connection with English history, however, being of the slightest, we shall confine ourselves to a brief notice. At the close of 1864 the first symptom of ill-will between the allied Powers that had cut with the sword the Schleswig-Holstein knot made itself apparent. To Austria every day during which the joint occupation was prolonged brought fresh cause of trouble and anxiety. However long she might keep her troops in the duchies, not an acre of soil, she knew well, could ever fall to her share; the expense of the occupation was considerable; and a quarrel with Prussia must instantly, as she clearly foresaw, render her position untenable. Her policy, therefore, was to get the Schleswig-Holstein question settled as soon as possible and settled in the way that would least benefit Prussia, and be most for the advantage of Austria's position in Germany. The Austrian Government thought that they saw their way to such a satisfactory settlement when they observed the continued loyalty and enthusiasm with which the German population of the duchies clung to the Prince whom they regarded as their rightful Duke, and also noted the strength of the desire that animated the Governments of the middle and many of the minor German States to favour the erection of an independent State and disappoint the ambition of Prussia. The Prussian Minister seemed himself to waver in the face of the compact opposition which the disclosure of the designs of Prussia upon the duchies had called forth, though he secured a declaration from the Prussian jurists that the claims of the Augustenburg candidate were invalid. In February, 1865, he sent a despatch to Vienna, in which he expressed the willingness of the King that Schleswig-Holstein should become an independent German State, but upon condition that its military force should be at the disposal of Prussia, and that to the same Power certain fortresses in the duchies, with suitable territory attached to them, should be made over. These proposals were rejected by Count Mensdorff and the German Diet. Bismarck thereupon proceeded to fresh aggressions. Prussia transferred her naval station on the Baltic from Dantzic to Kiel, and declared her intention of fortifying the harbour: the Austrian commissioner protested, and ordered up two Austrian ships of war to Kiel; yet his Government gave way, and Prussia established herself firmly at that important harbour. Bismarck also ejected from Schleswig-Holstein the Prince of Augustenburg. It was clearly seen at Vienna that the plan of joint administration would no longer work: if war was to be staved off, some different modus vivendi must be established in the duchies. But the Minister was moving too fast for his master, accordingly, a meeting was arranged between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria at Gastein, in Tyrol. Hither came the Sovereigns in August, attended by their chief Ministers; an understanding was speedily arrived at, and the Convention of Gastein was the result.

By this convention, dated August 14th, 1865, it was agreed that the joint occupation should cease; that—although the right of sovereignty of either Power over both duchies, as acquired by the Treaty of Vienna, remained inviolate—Austria should for the future confine her troops and officials to Holstein, and Prussia hers to Schleswig; that the Powers would propose to the Diet to erect Rendsburg into a Federal fortress; that the duchies should join the Zollverein, or German Customs-union; and that the Emperor of Austria should cede to the King of Prussia his sovereign rights over Lauenburg, acquired by the before-cited Treaty of Vienna, in exchange for the sum of 2,500,000 Danish rix-thalers. The Prussian Chambers, the members of which were still for the most part favourable to the Augustenburg claim, disliked this convention, and let it be understood that they would not vote the money required for the purchase of Lauenburg; but the King of Prussia paid the stipulated sum out of his private purse, and the convention was carried into effect without delay, Austrian troops withdrawing from Schleswig, and Prussian troops withdrawing from Holstein. General Manteuffel was appointed Prussian Governor of Schleswig, and Austria placed General von Gablenz in the similar post in Holstein.

Bismarck was still determined on war. One point alone was doubtful and disquieting—what would France do in the event of war breaking out between Prussia and Austria, especially if Italy took part in the contest? Count Bismarck resolved to seek an interview with Napoleon, in order, if possible, to gain some security that France would be neutral. What passed in the interviews between him and Napoleon at Biarritz is variously stated; but the result proved that the success of the Prussian statesman was complete. On his return through Paris, Bismarck saw the Italian Minister, the Chevalier Nigra, and told him that war between Prussia and Austria was inevitable. "He showed himself full of confidence that France would not be hostile to it;" and so deeply had he reflected on all the conditions of the political problem, so keenly did he realise the importance to Prussia of the Italian alliance, in distracting the attention and dividing the forces of Austria, that he playfully said to Nigra that "if Italy did not exist, it would be necessary to invent her." The French Emperor is supposed to have approved of the project of alliance between Prussia and Italy; and it is certain that he looked forward with pleasure to the severance of Venetia from the Austrian Empire as one result of the anticipated war. But how was France to be indemnified if she observed a friendly neutrality? There can be no doubt that Bismarck, in spite of his later denials, held out such hopes of territorial extension for France, either on the side of the Rhine, or in the form of an annexation of Luxemburg or some part of Belgium, to be actively aided by Prussia, as induced the French Emperor to regard the Prussian programme with favour and hopeful anticipation, and readily to give the desired promise of neutrality. Napoleon would the less care to exact a distinct promise from Bismarck in regard to territorial indemnification, because he, like the rest of Europe at the time, did not share in the superb confidence which the negotiator expressed of the ability of Prussia to overpower Austria; he must have reckoned on the war lasting for a considerable time, with mutually exhaustive results, in which case France might play the part of a mediator, and, while performing that dignified office, not lose sight of her own interests in the general re-adjustment.

Step by step, as though by an inevitable destiny, or unalterable concatenation of events, the fatal hour drew on. At the end of March General Govone was in Berlin, charged by the Italian Prime Minister, General La Marmora, with the duty of negotiating a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia. That Italy would forego the opportunity which a rupture between Prussia and Austria afforded her of obtaining by force the Venetian territories of the latter Power, was hardly to be expected; for such a chance, once let slip, might never occur again. But to Prussia also the alliance of Italy was of the highest importance. With her vast superiority of population, Austria, could her military force have been wholly concentrated against Prussia, though she might have lost battles, could not have been crushed and compelled to yield; such a consummation was only rendered possible by the division and dilution of her strength necessitated by the attack of Italy upon Venetia. Could even Austria have been content to cede Venetia itself, and take Venetia's money value, she might have rid herself of her Transalpine foe and employed her whole strength in Bohemia. Secret overtures had been made at Vienna by the Italian Premier, in the autumn of 1865, for the cession of Venetia by purchase; but the Emperor conceived his military and ancestral honour to be involved and absolutely rejected the proposal. On April 8th the treaty of alliance between Prussia and Italy was signed at Berlin. Prussia, under it, reserved to herself the right of declaring war within three months, in which case Italy bound herself to attack Austria; but Prussia did not bind herself to declare war in Germany, or to help the Italians on their own ground, if Austria attacked Italy. Each Power bound itself not to make peace separately from the other, and to continue the war till Italy had gained Venetia and Prussia secured a corresponding augmentation of territory in Germany. Already—between March 29th and 31st—orders had been issued for the mobilisation of the whole Prussian army, and the necessary movements were effected with extraordinary celerity. Austria, though she had commenced her preparations earlier, was soon distanced by her opponent, and, when the war broke out, her arrangements were still far from complete. The King of Italy published a decree on the 25th of March, increasing the Italian army by 100,000 men.

For several weeks after the treaty between Prussia and Italy had been signed, continual diplomatic fencing was maintained on the part of the two Governments. First there were criminations and recriminations on the question of priority of armaments. On the 6th of April a note from the Prussian Foreign Office was sent to Vienna, insisting on the magnitude of the Austrian preparations, which could not be adequately accounted for by the alleged apprehension of disturbances in Bohemia, and ending with the declaration that nothing was farther from the views of the King than an offensive war. Yet only two days after this, as we have seen, the alliance was concluded with Italy. Nevertheless, there was a basis of truth in the statement as to the King of Prussia's inclinations: he was, in truth, earnestly, almost superstitiously, averse from being the first to resort to arms; and Bismarck had infinite trouble to bring his royal master up to the point of commencing the war. Accordingly the negotiations were conducted in a conciliatory tone. The real feelings of Count Bismarck we learn from a telegram from Count Barral, the Italian Minister at Berlin, sent on the previous day to the Italian Premier, General La Marmora, and published by the latter in his remarkable work, entitled, "A Little More Light on the Political and Military Events of the Year 1866." Count Barral telegraphed, "The impression of the General [Govone] and myself is, that Bismarck is disappointed by the Austrian proposition, and visibly discouraged by the new pacific phase upon which the conflict is about to enter." But now Count Mensdorff found himself in a difficulty. The attitude of the Italian army on the frontiers of Venetia was believed at Vienna to have grown so menacing that it was impossible for Austria to replace matters on a peace footing in Venetia, short of a positive understanding with Italy similar to that which seemed on the point of being concluded with Prussia. We have the distinct assurance of General La Marmora, in the work just quoted, that at this time Italy had made no concentrations of troops whatever—had, in fact, taken no warlike step of any kind. But he admits that the impression to the contrary which prevailed at Vienna was a bon fide one, and accounts for its existence in a very curious manner. It was, he thinks, the British Government—the warm and importunate advocate of European peace—which, misled by reports from English diplomatic agents in Italy, who had imagined some inconsiderable movements of troops that were really directed against brigands to be part of a scheme for concentrating the Italian army near the frontier, had conveyed, of course, with the most friendly intentions, this false information to the Austrian Cabinet. However this may have been, the effect of the erroneous persuasion as to Italian armaments, which Austria had taken up, in overclouding the prospects of peace was soon apparent.

Besides disarmament, two other important subjects were debated in the correspondence between Austria and Prussia in these critical weeks. One related to Schleswig-Holstein, the other to the reform of the Confederation. Anxious to withdraw from her hazardous position in the duchies, but to make her withdrawal in such a way as would augment her popularity with the minor German States, Austria invited the Prussian Government, in a note dated April 26th, to make in the Diet a joint declaration that the two Powers would cede the rights acquired by them under the Treaty of Vienna to that claimant of the sovereignty of the duchies whom the Diet recognised as having a predominant right to the succession. Although some collateral offers, such as that Prussia should have full and permanent possession of certain strategic points in the duchies, at Kiel and elsewhere, were added to the main proposal, in order to make it more palatable to the condominant Power, Count Mensdorff probably expected a refusal, and he was not disappointed. Count Bismarck, in his reply (May 7th), professed in the strongest terms Prussia's intention to adhere faithfully to the Treaty of Vienna and the Gastein Convention, but maintained that by those instruments the intervention of any third party, not excepting the Diet, in the affairs of the duchies was precluded. The note went on to say that Prussia, while repudiating the interference of any third party, was always ready to treat with Austria as to the conditions on which she would be disposed to cede her share of the rights accruing to her by the Treaty of Vienna. King William's hesitation was fast disappearing.

The other subject discussed was the reform of the Confederation. The Prussian Envoy proposed in the Diet on the 9th of April that, within a period to be precisely fixed, the Diet should decree the convocation of a National Assembly to be elected by universal and direct suffrage, for the purpose of receiving and deliberating on the proposals of the German Governments for the reform of the Confederation. This proposition, which caused great surprise and excitement in Germany, was referred by a Dietal vote of the 21st of April to a committee of nine; at the same time the Diet requested Prussia to state the nature of the proposals which it intended to submit to the Assembly when convened. Count Bismarck sharply replied (April 27) that the determination of the date at which such a Parliament or Assembly should meet was of the essence of the Prussian proposition; the modes of procedure habitual to the Diet would, he knew, lead to the indefinite adjournment and final miscarriage of the project; however, he would bring under the notice of the committee such information as would show to what regions of political life the Prussian proposals would extend. This promise he redeemed on the 11th of May by laying before the Committee of the Diet the heads of the changes that Prussia deemed necessary. These included the completion of the central power by means of a freely elected German Parliament, the concession to the central power so reorganised of a wide legislative competency, the removal of all fetters on German trade, an improved military system, and the formation of a German navy. Bavaria, as chief of the secondary States, acceded to the proposal on condition that both parties should disarm. Promises were given, but as Austria declined to discontinue her preparations against Italy, Bismarck was able to charge her with insincerity.

Italy, though she had enlarged her army, had not made any distinctly warlike preparations before the appearance of General La Marmora's circular of the 27th of April. From that time war was looked upon as inevitable; and in order to enlist the national feeling more fully in its favour, a decree was published at Florence on May 8th ordering the formation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under the immediate command of Garibaldi. But the Italian Premier was in sore perplexity. He thoroughly distrusted Bismarck, whom he thought quite capable of patching up a peace with Austria and leaving Italy in the lurch, and he had received tempting offers from Paris. On the 5th of May General La Marmora received a telegram in cipher from Paris, of which the first words were, "Decipher for yourself." After he had done so, he found the purport of the telegram (which was from the Chevalier Nigra) to be this—that Austria was willing to cede Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who would at once transfer it to the King of Italy, on condition that she should be left free to recoup herself at the expense of Prussia. La Marmora telegraphed back that his first impression was that it was a question of honour and good faith for Italy not to break her engagements with Prussia. Again (May 6th) came the tempting voice from Paris, saying that the Emperor had told Nigra that Prince Metternich was formally authorised to sign the cession of Venetia in exchange for a simple promise of neutrality. If his resolution had been momentarily shaken, other telegrams soon arrived, of a nature to confirm him in it. On May 6th Count Barral telegraphed that he had been just informed by Count Bismarck that the Prussian army might now be regarded as entirely mobilised; and on the 9th Nigra telegraphed from Paris that Govone had just arrived from Berlin, and was under the full conviction that Prussia had absolutely decided to draw the sword, at latest, towards the beginning of June, and would, in any case, declare war if Italy were attacked. Setting against the risks of war the odium which the acceptance of the French proposal, involving as it did a direct breach of faith with Prussia, would bring down upon the young Italian kingdom, and the painful and inconvenient consequences that might ensue from Italy's debt of obligation to France being so greatly extended, the Italian Premier wisely determined to be true to his first faith; and the project for the cession of Venetia to France vanished for the present into space.

The efforts of neutral and friendly Powers were, of course, not wanting to the cause of peace. From the beginning of May the project of a Congress of the five great Powers, together with Italy and the German Confederation, to discuss the three European questions of the most urgent interest—the cession of Venetia, the fate of Schleswig-Holstein, and the reform of the German Confederation—had found favour with the Emperor Napoleon. Russia had cordially accepted the scheme, and Britain also was favourable to it, though with a proviso that marks the progress which Lord Russell, through sad experience and many failures, had made in his diplomatic education. For, although the actual Foreign Minister at this time was the Earl of Clarendon, yet the empressement with which the British Government, at the outset of the negotiations, volunteered a statement that its interference would in no possible circumstances be carried beyond the limits of persuasion, evidently bespeaks the hand of the Minister whose previous attempts at a dictatorial intervention had failed so disastrously. The Marquis d'Azeglio telegraphed on May 11th from London, that "England accepted the Congress in principle, and also the bases which France proposed with reference to the three urgent questions, but refused categorically to bind herself to impose any decision of the kind otherwise than by persuasion."

Some time elapsed before the three mediating Powers could arrive at a precise understanding as to the form in which the Congress should be proposed to Prussia and Austria. Of the three topics for discussion, the first was described by France as "the cession of Venetia;" this was afterwards modified to "the question of Venetia"; but even in this form the Russian Government considered that there was something in the phrase wounding to the susceptibilities of Austria, and obtained the consent of France to the substitution of the words, "difference between Austria and Italy." Everything at last appeared to be in train; it was arranged that the Congress should be held in Paris, and that the principal Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the different States should attend it. Bismarck, knowing the settled resolve of the Emperor Napoleon to facilitate and promote the cession of Venetia to Italy, was not disposed to refuse the invitation to the Congress; he said to those around him that it would end in nothing and that they would simply adjourn from the Congress-chamber to the battle-field; and he told Count Barral (May 26th) that the Congress was a vain simulacrum, and that he saw no human power capable of preventing war. Yet even Bismarck, three days later, was confounded by the insistance with which France appeared to labour to avert war, and said to Barral, in a tone of deep dissatisfaction, "The Emperor of the French now wishes for peace at any price." To go to war against the will of France was, as Bismarck had before admitted to Govone, hardly within the bounds of possibility. An unfriendly neutrality west of the Rhine would have compelled a concentration of Prussian troops in Westphalia and Rhineland which would have left her too weak to contend with Austria in Saxony or Bohemia. On the 28th of May, notes, couched in almost identical terms, from the Governments of France, Britain, and Russia, communicated to the Powers at variance the proposal of the mediating Courts for the convocation of a Congress. Count Bismarck, while stipulating that the proceedings should be brief, and that the opening of the Congress should not be delayed if the representatives of the Confederation were not nominated in time, accepted the proposal for Prussia, but he took an opportunity of declaring to the French Ambassador, M. Benedetti, in vehement and impassioned tones, that the position of affairs was become intolerable and must be brought to a close at all risks. Italy also agreed to the Congress, as well she might, knowing the settled opinion and desire of the Emperor Napoleon with regard to the cession of Venetia. For Austria, the desirable course was not so clear. If she rejected the Congress, she alienated the good opinion of the neutral Powers. Yet if she accepted it, she knew that she could expect no good from its deliberations. The Chevalier Nigra wrote to La Marmora, on the 24th of May, that the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, had assured him that it was "well understood between the three neutral Powers that the Congress should discuss the cession of Venetia." Beyond question the existence of this "understanding" was known at Vienna; the Austrian statesmen knew that they would enter a Congress the members of which had already made up their minds on the one subject of discussion that vitally affected her interests and her honour. It is true that Austria had a month before offered to cede Venetia; but at that time she reckoned on compensation. If Italy could be induced by the cession to stand neutral, Austria hoped to overrun and annex Silesia. Yet to refuse the Congress absolutely was not to be thought of. Austria, therefore, hit upon a middle course; she professed a readiness to send a plenipotentiary to the Congress, but only on condition that no combination should be discussed which would result in an extension of territory for any one of the States invited. Such a limitation—especially when the preconceived views of the neutral Powers are remembered—was felt on all sides to render the project of a Congress nugatory, and it was accordingly dropped.

Simultaneously Austria invited the Diet to take the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein under its direction, and convoked the Holstein estates. In reply Count Bismarck sent a despatch, on June 3rd, to Vienna, renewing the protest that had been made by the Prussian Envoy in the Diet against the infraction by Austria of the Convention of Gastein, and declaring that Prussia now considered herself justified in reverting to the basis of the Treaty of Vienna, and that the Government had consequently placed the defence of its condominate rights in the hands of General Manteuffel. At the same time, the Prussian Minister addressed a circular to the Prussian representatives at all foreign Courts, accusing Austria of giving direct provocations to Prussia, with the manifest intention of settling the matters in dispute by an appeal to arms. This circular was couched in terms of the bitterest invective and sufficiently indicated that all prospect of accommodation was renounced. Already General von Gablenz had retreated from Holstein before Manteuffel into Hanover. Thereupon Austria demanded from the Diet the mobilisation of the Federal armies, whereupon the Prussian representative, declaring the union dissolved, withdrew from Frankfort, after handing in his plan of reform. Diplomatic relations between Austria and Prussia were suspended on June 12th; on the 15th Bismarck requested Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel to disarm. They declined and the war began.

The forces ranged against each other at the opening of the war of 1866 may be briefly exhibited in tabular form, thus:—

Artillery: Prussian guns, 1,092; Italian guns, 480: total, 1,572.

Artillery: Austrian guns, 1,036; German guns, 360: total. 1,396.

Thus, merely reckoning the field armies on both sides, the accession of Italy threw a decided preponderance, even of numbers, into the scale of Prussia. Austria, to oppose the Italian army, was obliged to keep 150,000 of her best troops south of the Alps; had one-third of these stood in line at KÖniggrÄtz, the fortune of the day would probably have been different. In the special and scientific services Prussia had an additional superiority over Austria; she had 30,000 cavalry, 35,000 artillery, and 18,000 pioneers, while the Austrian strength in each of these branches was considerably smaller. Besides, the Austrian system was thoroughly obsolete, and its organisers had neglected to adopt the needle-gun despite its proved superiority in the Danish war. The Prussian army, thanks to Von Roon and Von Moltke, had been raised, on the contrary, to the highest degree of efficiency.

The forces of the Prussians, which were formed into three armies, were distributed in the following manner. The First Army, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, the King's nephew, consisted of three infantry and one cavalry corps, numbering 120,000 men; its headquarters were at GÖrlitz, close to the eastern frontier of Saxony. The Second Army, commanded by the Crown Prince, contained the Guards corps and three others, numbering 125,000 men; the headquarters were at Neisse in Silesia, being purposely placed so far to the south in order to induce a belief that the objective of this army was OlmÜtz or BrÜnn, and to disguise as long as possible the real design of leading it across the mountains into Bohemia. The Third Army was that of the Elbe, commanded by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, whose headquarters were at Halle; it numbered about 50,000 men, including cavalry. Besides these three armies, which were all designed to act against Austria, special forces to the number of about 60,000 men were prepared to invade Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and afterwards to operate against the forces of the southern States friendly to Austria, as circumstances should direct. The forces that were to attack Hanover were under the command of Lieutenant-General von Falkenstein, the military governor of Westphalia. Those that were detailed against Hesse-Cassel were commanded by General Beyer, whose headquarters were at Wetzlar, the chief town of a small Prussian enclave, surrounded by the territories of Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and Hesse-Darmstadt.

In the North of Germany the campaign was brief indeed, although it opened with a Prussian reverse. Through some mismanagement the real superiority of force which the Prussians could bring to bear against the Hanoverians was not made available, and Major-General Flies, the Prussian commander, was about to attack an army considerably more numerous than his own. Misleading reports as to the movements both of the Bavarians and Hanoverians had reached Von Falkenstein at Eisenach. He therefore ordered Goeben with his division to watch the Bavarians, who were supposed to be advancing from the south, and despatched Manteuffel towards MÜhlhausen, a town between GÖttingen and Langensalza, under the erroneous belief that the Hanoverians were now retreating northwards, and meant to seek a strong position among the Harz Mountains. The Hanoverian general, Arenttschildt, entertained no such intention, but, expecting to be attacked from Gotha, he had drawn up his little army on the northern bank of the Unstrut, a marshy stream that runs past Langensalza in a general easterly direction, to join the Saale near Leipsic. The Prussians advanced gallantly, drove in the Hanoverian outposts on the right or south bank of the Unstrut, and attempted to cross the river. But the Hanoverian artillery, judiciously posted and well served, defeated this attempt. A number of partial actions, in which great bravery was exhibited on both sides, occurred in different parts of the field. The Prussians, however, being decidedly over-matched, were unable to gain ground; and about one o'clock General Arenttschildt ordered his brigade commanders to cross the Unstrut and assume the offensive. This was done—ineffectually for a time on the Hanoverian left, where the swampy nature of the ground by the river presented great obstacles to an advance—but with complete success on their right, where General BÜlow drove the Prussians steadily before him, and was able to use his superior cavalry with considerable effect. The excellent military qualities of the Prussian soldier, and the deadly rapidity of fire of the needle-gun, prevented the retreat from becoming a disaster. However, General Flies had no choice but to order a general retreat, and fall back in the direction of Gotha. Two guns and two thousand stand of arms fell into the hands of the victors, whose cavalry continued the pursuit till half-past four, making many prisoners. The Hanoverian situation, however, was really desperate, and on the arrival of the main body of the Prussians the Hanoverians were compelled to capitulate. The King fled into Austria, but his ally the Elector of Hesse-Cassel was made a prisoner of war.

On June 16th Prince Frederick Charles, moving from GÖrlitz, crossed the Saxon frontier, and advanced upon Dresden. A junction was effected with Herwarth near Meissen, and both marched to Dresden, which was occupied without opposition on the 18th. By the 20th of June, the whole of Saxony (with the exception of the virgin fortress of KÖnigstein in the Saxon Switzerland) was in the hands of the Prussians. The war had lasted but five days, and already the vigour and rapidity with which Prussia dealt her blows had secured for her advantages of inestimable value. Her right flank was now secure from attack through the prostration of the power of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel; the prestige and the terror of her arms were greatly enhanced by the occupation of the beautiful capital of Saxony; and the conquest of that kingdom had rendered possible the union of two Prussian armies, and secured a corresponding shortening and strengthening of her lines. The Saxon army retreated into Bohemia, and joined the main body of the Austrians under General Benedek.

The Prince broke up his headquarters at GÖrlitz on the 22nd of June, and marched thence with the main body of the First Army direct for Zittau, the last town in Saxony towards Bohemia. The passes through the mountains were found to be undefended; in fact, the rapid movements of the Prussians had left no time for Benedek to take the necessary measures. Count Clam Gallas, in command of the 1st Austrian Corps, was defeated in a series of battles, extending from the 26th to the 29th of June, and driven behind Gitschin. While the First Army and the Army of the Elbe were thus advancing from the north, the Second Army was moving from Silesia, in circumstances of far greater difficulty and peril, to effect a junction with them in Bohemia. After a defeat at Trautenau, the Crown Prince established communications with Prince Frederick Charles, the movements of the three armies being directed by telegraph from Berlin by Moltke, the chief of the staff. On the 30th the King of Prussia, accompanied by Count Bismarck and General Moltke, left Berlin, and reached headquarters at Gitschin on the 2nd of July. Thus the First Army and the Army of the Elbe were brought into communication with the Army of Silesia; and the imminent peril which had existed of an attack by Benedek, in overwhelming force, upon one of these invading armies, before the other was near enough to help it, was now at an end. Military authorities are agreed in casting great blame on the generalship of Benedek. That he did not take the initiative by an advance into Saxony was probably not his fault; but if compelled to receive the attack, it was manifestly his policy, as he knew the Prussians to be advancing on two sides, to detain one of their armies by a detachment, with orders to throw all possible difficulties in its path, while avoiding a pitched battle; but to fall upon the other with the full remaining strength of his own army, and endeavour to inflict upon it, while isolated, a crushing defeat. He had been thwarted by the energy of the Crown Prince's attack, and, seeing that the campaign was lost, had telegraphed to the Emperor on the 1st of July that a catastrophe was inevitable unless peace was made.

The position which Benedek had taken up, on a mass of rolling hilly ground, the highest point of which is marked by the village and church of Chlumetz, bounded on the west by the Bistritz, and on the east by the Elbe, and with the fortress of KÖniggrÄtz in its rear, would have been an exceedingly good one, had he had no other army but that of Frederick Charles to think of. As against the First Army, the line of the Bistritz, with its commanding ridge, its woods affording shelter for marksmen, and the difficulties presented by the (in places) marshy character of its valley, presented a defensive position of the first order. But Benedek had to reckon also with the army of the Crown Prince, and this he well knew; for an Austrian force had been driven out of KÖniginhof by the Prussian Guards on the evening of the 29th. Prince Frederick Charles attacked at daybreak, advancing through the village of Sadowa, and for hours sustained an unequal struggle with the superior forces of the Austrians. Herwarth was also, about one o'clock, checked in his advance. The First Army could do no more; it was even a question whether it could hold its ground; and the Prussian commanders on the plateau of Dub turned many an anxious glance to the left, wondering why the columns of the Crown Prince did not make their appearance. The King himself frequently turned his field-glass in that direction. The heavy rain that had fallen prevented the march of the Crown Prince from being marked by those clouds of dust that are the usual accompaniment of a moving army. Some Austrian guns about Lipa, it is true, appeared to be firing towards the north, but it was not certain that they were not directed against some movement of Franzecky's division. Yet all this time two corps belonging to the army of the Crown Prince had been in action since half-past twelve with the Austrian right, and one of them was pressing forward to the occupation of ground the defence of which was vital to the continued maintenance of its position by the Austrian army. Their onslaught on Benedek's right at once decided the battle, and, effecting a retreat across the Elbe with the utmost difficulty, he fled eastwards, leaving 18,000 on the field and 24,000 prisoners.

The Emperor, seeing his capital threatened, and the empire menaced with dissolution, determined to rid himself of one enemy by removing the ground of dispute. He accordingly ceded Venetia to the Emperor of the French, with the understanding that it was to be transferred to the King of Italy at the conclusion of the war. Napoleon accepted the cession, and from that time was unremitting in his endeavours to bring hostilities to a termination. His proposal of an armistice was accepted in principle by the King of Prussia, with the reservation that the preliminaries of peace must first be recognised by the Austrian Court. Meanwhile the Italians had suffered decisive defeats at the hands of the Austrians. La Marmora, who took command, crossed the Mincio with 120,000 men, but was defeated by the Archduke Albrecht with smaller numbers upon the field of Custozza (June 24th), and compelled to fall back in disorder. A naval action at Lissa off the Istrian coast also terminated in a complete victory for the Austrians under Admiral Tegethoff.

The course of events in the western portion of the theatre of war must now be briefly described. It will be remembered that, for the purpose of sudden and simultaneous operations against Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, a considerable Prussian force had been collected—drawn partly from the Elbe duchies, partly from the garrisons of neighbouring fortresses—and placed under the command of General Vogel von Falkenstein. After the surrender of the Hanoverians on the 29th of June, this force was concentrated about Gotha and Eisenach, and was free to act against the armies that had taken the field in the cause of Austria and the Diet farther south. Falkenstein had two separate armies in his front—the Bavarians under their Prince Charles, now numbering upwards of 50,000 sabres and bayonets, with 136 guns, and the 8th Federal Corps, commanded by Prince Alexander of Hesse and numbering little short of 50,000 men, with 134 guns. Devoid of co-operation, they suffered a series of defeats at the hands of Falkenstein and Manteuffel in a campaign marked by small battles and intricate manoeuvres. On the 16th of July the Prussians marched into Frankfort with all military precautions, a regiment of cuirassiers with drawn swords leading the way. They posted two guns in the great square, and stacked their arms there and in the Zeil. Late at night they broke into groups, and went to the different houses, on which, without previous consultation with the municipality, they had been billeted, forcing their way in without ceremony wherever a recalcitrant householder was found. It was observed that especially large numbers of soldiers were billeted on the houses of those citizens who were known to be anti-Prussian in their politics. One of these, Herr Mumm, was required to lodge and feed 15 officers and 200 men. General Falkenstein took up his quarters in the town, having issued a proclamation announcing that, by orders of the King of Prussia, he had assumed the government of the imperial city, together with Nassau, and the parts of Bavaria that were in Prussian occupation. He at once imposed upon the citizens a war contribution of 7,000,000 gulden (about £600,000), besides 300 horses, and other contributions in kind. The Burgomaster Fellner and the Syndic MÜller visited this modern Brennus, to endeavour to obtain some diminution of the impost; but they were only treated to a Prussian version of the classic declaration, "VÆ Victis." Falkenstein roughly told the burgomaster that he used the rights of conquest; and is said to have threatened that if his demands were not promptly complied with, the city should be given up to pillage. Thus Count Bismarck paid off his old scores against the German Diet.

Meanwhile the victorious career of Prussia was carrying her arms without a check to the banks of the Danube and under the walls of Vienna. Marshal Benedek, after having put the Elbe between the Prussians and his exhausted troops, had to decide instantly what was to be done. An armistice was thought of; and Von Gablenz was sent on a mission to the Prussian headquarters to see if one could be obtained; but on this, and on a subsequent visit made with the same object, he failed. Benedek found that his army was so disorganised and disheartened by the defeat of the 3rd of July, that it was idle to think of defending the line of the Elbe. He resolved, therefore, to retire within the lines of the fortress of OlmÜtz, and there re-form his broken ranks and recruit his dilapidated resources. But the press and populace of Vienna clamoured vehemently for his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief; and this was presently done, though not in such a manner as to disgrace him. The Archduke Albrecht, the victor of Custozza, was appointed to the command of the Austrian Army of the North, with General von John for his Chief of the Staff. Benedek was left in command at OlmÜtz, with orders to send all the corps lately under his command, as soon as they were ready for the field again, by rail to Vienna, there to be united under the Archduke for the defence of the capital. The junction was effected, but the Prussian advance was alarmingly rapid, and on the 20th of July the advance-posts of Herwarth were within fifteen miles of Vienna.

Another battle lost—and with inferior numbers, inferior arms, and inferior strategy, the Austrians could not reasonably count on victory—must have laid Austria utterly prostrate at the feet of Prussia, and would probably have resulted, considering the difficult and exasperating constitutional questions at that time still unsettled between the Emperor's government and the subject kingdoms, in her dismemberment and political degradation. From this fate Austria was saved, not by the moderation of Prussia, but by the firm and friendly mediation of France. The Prussians, both officers and soldiers, were eager to march on to the assault of Vienna, though the Government was deterred by the facts that Hungary was still intact, and the Italian army paralysed by the dissensions of its commanders. But France, having accepted Venetia as a pledge that she would discharge the office of mediator, discharged it effectually. That description of mediation, to which Lord Russell was so much attached, which proclaimed beforehand that it would employ no other agency but "persuasion," did not commend itself to the French mind. It is absurd to suppose that Count Bismarck would have paid any attention to the pleadings of Benedetti had he not well understood that France was mediating sword in hand. On this point the Count's own frank declaration, made in the Prussian Lower House in the December following the war—though its immediate reference is to the question of Schleswig—does not permit us to remain in doubt. He said: "In July last France was enabled, by the general situation of Europe, to urge her views more forcibly than before. I need not depict the situation of this country at the time I am speaking of. You all know what I mean. Nobody could expect us to carry on two wars at the same time. Peace with Austria had not yet been concluded; were we to imperil the fruits of our glorious campaign by plunging headlong into hostilities with a new, a second enemy? France, then, being called on by Austria to mediate between the contending parties, as a matter of course did not omit to urge some wishes of her own upon us." Everything seems to show that Austria owed to France, at this critical moment, her continued existence as a great Power.

But for the time the negotiations hung fire, as Napoleon declined to recognise the federation of all Germany under Prussian leadership, even though Bismarck hinted that France should be allowed to annex Belgium by way of compensation. On the 17th of July the King of Prussia arrived at Nikolsburg, a place about forty miles to the north of Vienna, close to the frontier line of Moravia and Lower Austria. Benedetti was already at Nikolsburg, empowered by the Emperor of Austria to agree to an armistice of five days, nearly upon the conditions originally proposed by Prussia, viz. that Austria should withdraw all her troops, except those in garrisons, to the south of the Thaya; in other words, abandon all Moravia except the fortress and entrenched camp of OlmÜtz, to the Prussians. On these conditions an armistice was concluded at Nikolsburg, to take effect from noon on the 22nd of July, and to last till noon on the 27th. It was well understood on both sides that this armistice was preparatory to negotiations for peace. These were conducted actively at Nikolsburg, Austria being represented by General Degenfeld and Count Karolyi; Prussia by General Moltke and Count Bismarck. Preliminaries of peace between the two Powers were signed on the 26th of July. The terms agreed to were—That Austria should cease to be a member of the German Confederation; that she should pay a contribution of 40,000,000 thalers towards Prussia's expenses in the war; and that she should offer no opposition to the steps that Prussia might take with regard to Northern Germany. The principal measures thus sanctioned were—the annexation of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the portion of Hesse-Darmstadt which lies to the north of the Main; the concession to Prussia of the reversion of Brunswick on the death of the Duke then living, who was without issue; the entry of Saxony into the new North German Confederation about to be formed; and the grant to Prussia of the supreme military and diplomatic leadership in that Confederation. The Prussian armies were to be withdrawn beyond the Thaya on the 2nd of August, but were to occupy Bohemia and Moravia till the conclusion of the final treaty of peace, and to hold Austrian Silesia until the war indemnity was paid. It was with great difficulty that the Emperor Francis Joseph wrung from the King of Prussia his consent to the continued independence of Saxony. But the little kingdom and its monarch had stood so nobly by Austria during the war that honour demanded of the Emperor that he should not permit them to be sacrificed, even though, by insisting, he risked the re-opening of hostilities.

COUNT VON MOLTKE.