Anonymous

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

The Schleswig-Holstein Question—The Nationalities of Denmark—The Connection between Schleswig and Denmark—The Declaration of 1846—Incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark—The Rebellion and its Suppression—The Protocol of London—Defects of the Arrangement—Danification of the Duchies—A Common Constitution decreed and revoked—The King's Proclamation—Schleswig incorporated in Denmark—Federal Execution voted—Russell's high-handed Diplomacy—Death of Frederick VII.—The Augustenburg Candidate—Austria and Prussia override the Diet—Russell's abortive Conference—The Austrian and Prussian Troops advance—Collapse of the Danes—Russell proposes an Armistice—Russell and M. Bille—France declines to interfere—Possibilities of Swedish and Russian Intervention—The Cabinet divided—An Armistice—A futile Conference—The War resumed—Fate of Denmark is sealed—To whom do the Spoils belong?—Summary of Events in Mexico and North America—Southern Filibusters in Canada—Their Acquittal at Montreal—Excitement in America—The Sentence reversed.

THE series of transactions on which we have now to enter is one in regard to which few Englishmen, even of those most wedded to the principle of non-intervention, can look back to the part played by their country without pain and some degree of misgiving. In 1864, Schleswig and Holstein, provinces that had been dependent on the crown of Denmark (though under different titles), the first since 1027, the second since 1386, were invaded and overrun by the armed hosts of Austria and Prussia, and forcibly severed from the Danish crown. This was done in disregard of the remonstrances and in defiance of the menaces of England, and in spite of the known disapproval of France. But first for the sake of clearness, a few geographical details may properly be given. Continental Denmark consisted, before the war of 1864, of four provinces—Jutland, in the extreme north; Schleswig to the south of Jutland, bounded on the south by the river Eider; Holstein between the Eider and the Elbe; and Lauenburg, a small province to the east of Holstein, lying between it and Mecklenburg. The language and nationality of Denmark proper are wholly Danish; in Schleswig the population is pretty nearly divided between those who speak Danish and those who speak German, the former occupying the northern, the latter the southern districts of the duchy. Holstein and Lauenburg are wholly German. In religious profession there was no difference of any moment throughout the Danish monarchy; Lutheranism was the prevailing creed of Danes and Germans alike.

Let us now trace back to its origin the connection of the Duchies with Denmark. In the fourteenth century Schleswig, which had previously been conquered by Denmark, was ceded to a Count of Holstein, on the condition that it should never be united to Denmark. Thus the Count-Duke, while still owing allegiance to the German Empire in respect of Holstein, did homage to the Sovereign of Denmark for the Duchy of Schleswig. His line expired in 1375, when it was succeeded by a branch of the House of Oldenburg. In 1448 Duke Adolf's eldest nephew, Count Christian of Oldenburg, had been raised to the throne of Denmark, and soon afterwards, probably not without pressure from his uncle, he confirmed the Constitution, first made in 1326, to the effect that Schleswig should never be united to the Danish Crown. Moreover, when, by Adolf's death, the ducal throne was vacant, the Landrath, or Estates, of Schleswig-Holstein, with whom by ancient constitutional right the choice of a new ruler rested, met in 1460, and elected their late Duke's nephew, Christian I., King of Denmark, to be their Duke, "not as a King of Denmark, but out of affection towards his person." A personal union was thus established between Denmark and Schleswig, which was tolerably well respected during the next two centuries. The incoming King of Denmark was elected, as a matter of course, Duke of Schleswig (and also Count of Holstein), provided that he first swore to ratify the ancient rights and privileges of the united lands. But the union between Denmark and Schleswig became gradually closer, and was extended, in 1533, to offensive as well as defensive alliance. The arrangement was confirmed in 1773, when Schleswig-Holstein reverted to Denmark under the same conditions as had held good under Christian I.

After 1773 there is nothing in the relations between Denmark and Schleswig that need detain us until we come down to the nineteenth century. During the disruption of the German Empire in 1806 the Duchies were formally incorporated into his kingdom by Christian VII., and even after 1815 the German Diet declined to interfere at the request of the Holsteiners. The old Estates having long before come to an end by desuetude, Frederic VI., in 1831 and 1834, granted separate constitutional Chambers to Schleswig and Holstein, by which they were accepted and worked till February, 1848. After 1835, the probability of the extinction of the male line of the House of Oldenburg, through the eventual death without issue of Frederic, only surviving son of Christian VIII., became stronger with each succeeding year. To keep the Danish monarchy together became, therefore, the one paramount object of Danish statesmanship. At first the Danish Court thought of persuading or bribing the Duke of Sonderburg-Augustenburg, representing the younger branch of the elder or royal line of the House of Oldenburg, to whom, if females were excluded, both Schleswig and Holstein would descend at the failure of male heirs in the royal line, to resign his right to the succession. This plan was abandoned by Christian VIII., who appointed a special commission to examine the ancient laws, treaties, and other historic documents in the Danish archives. The result of the commission appeared in the King's letters patent of 8th July, 1846, in which Christian VIII. stated it as his firm conviction that, so far as Schleswig was concerned, in consequence of the letters patent of 1721, and the homage then done, the succession in Schleswig was now the same as in Denmark, and that he should exercise and maintain his right accordingly; while, in regard to Holstein, or certain parts of it, there existed facts militating against an equally positive opinion.

In the ferment that arose in every capital of Europe after the Revolution in Paris of February, 1848, a violent Danish national feeling manifested itself at Copenhagen, and forced the King, Frederic VII., to issue a proclamation declaring that Denmark and Schleswig were thenceforth to form an inseparable union under a common free constitution. The Duchies, incited by a strong democratic and national feeling that had arisen in Germany, regarded this proclamation as a breach of their Constitution, and broke out into rebellion. They were aided, but in a hesitating, irresolute way, by the King of Prussia, and carried on the war with Denmark with various success to the end of the summer of 1850. By the end of 1849 Austria had subdued both Hungary and Sardinia, and had now leisure to look after her interests in Germany. She disapproved of the advances which Frederic William had made to the German democracy, and of his making war on Denmark, and convened a meeting of the Diet at Frankfort with the view of counteracting Prussian schemes. The weak King immediately yielded, especially as Russia was giving urgently and imperiously the same advice, abandoned the Duchies, made peace with Denmark (July 2nd, 1850), and actually assisted her in the task of subjugation. The Duchies resolved to continue the war, but they were defeated in a great battle and soon afterwards compelled to submit. Schleswig was thus recovered; but the Danish troops halted on the frontier of Holstein, in obedience to an article in the Treaty of the 2nd of July, 1850, requiring Denmark to apply for the intervention of the Bund before resorting to hostilities against Holstein. This application was made; and, in reply to it, an Austro-Prussian army, acting in the name of the Bund, marched into Holstein and required the de facto Government to lay down its arms. Thus was the whole of Schleswig-Holstein pacified (January 11, 1851); but military occupation of Holstein was still retained by the German Powers, pending the attainment of a definitive arrangement for the affairs of the Duchies. Negotiations were at once opened between the King of Denmark, on the one part, and Austria and Prussia, representing the Bund, on the other part, and were protracted through the whole of the year 1851. By the Protocol of London of August, 1850, and the Treaty of 1852, the succession to the Kingdom and Duchies was assigned to Prince Christian of Glucksburg; the integrity of the whole Danish monarchy was declared permanent, but the rights of the German Confederation in respect of Holstein and Schleswig were reserved. This arrangement was mainly the work of Lord Palmerston, and was signed by England, France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. Count Vitzthum, in "St. Petersburg and London," declares that it was imposed upon him by Russia as the price for the Czar's acquiescence in his coercion of Greece; but there is no reason for supposing that he was acting otherwise than proprio motu.

The matter thus seemed to be settled, but it really was not. For, in the first place, all that the Princess Louise, niece to Christian VIII. and wife of Christian of Glucksburg, could surrender to any one was her right to the succession in Denmark (and possibly in Schleswig); she had no right whatever to the succession in Holstein, because that could only pass to male heirs. Secondly, it was highly questionable in law whether the Princess could execute a valid renunciation of her rights in favour of one who did not stand next in the order of succession to herself, without the consent of those whose right intervened between her and him; but no such consent was ever obtained. Thirdly, the Duke of Augustenburg might with some reason allege that his abandonment of his rights was not made freely, but under compulsion, or else one of his sons (as actually happened) might declare that his father's act did not bind him. Fourthly, even supposing the renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg and his family to be persevered in, there were other Princes of the Sonderburg line whose rights, at any rate to the Holstein succession, were prior to that of Prince Christian, and who had not renounced those rights. Fifthly, and chiefly, the German Confederation was not a party to the Treaty of London; it was therefore free to resist the arrangement it contained, if it considered the interests of Holstein and the Bund to require it.

Yet, after all, the arrangements provided by the Treaty of London would probably have resulted in a solid settlement, had not the relations between the Danish Government and the German population of the Duchies, during the eleven years following the Treaty of London, become strained and embittered to a dangerous extent. For this result Denmark was chiefly responsible, and it was in flagrant breach of the Treaty of London, by which Denmark was pledged to observe the ancient rights of the Duchies. The majority in the Rigsraad was largely influenced by the views of the Eider Dane party, a set of politicians fanatically bent upon the elevation and extension of the Scandinavian nationality. This party, unable to expel from their minds the feelings of animosity which the war had engendered, regarded the German inhabitants of the Duchies as the population of a conquered country, and resolved, so far as they dared, and in spite of the engagements by which their King was bound to Austria and Prussia, to make them feel and taste their subjection. The protective Danish tariff was extended to both Duchies, their revenue appropriated to the interests of the kingdom; their military establishment, hitherto kept separate from the Danish forces, was incorporated in that army. The best offices in Schleswig were given to Danes. In the churches and schools of Schleswig the Danish language was substituted for the German, even in districts where not one in twenty understood a word of Danish, and the inhabitants were prohibited from employing private German teachers in their families. It is therefore abundantly clear that the engagement, by which Denmark had pledged her word to Austria and Prussia that "the German and Danish nationalities in Schleswig should meet with equal protection," was not kept. Nor can it be reasonably doubted that the engagement—"That all ties of a non-political kind between Holstein and Schleswig should remain intact"—was not faithfully observed. But, in point of form, it was not the breach of either of these engagements, but that of a third, binding Denmark to submit the common Constitution of the monarchy to the previous examination of the four local Diets, which led directly to the Federal execution and all its momentous consequences. The sequence of events was as follows:—A common Constitution for the monarchy was framed in 1854, and having passed the Danish Parliament, was published by Royal Ordinance (October 2nd, 1855), for the Duchies of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg, without any previous consultation of their Diets. The matter was taken up by the German Federal Diet, which, in 1858, declared that by Federal law the common Constitution proclaimed in 1855 was illegal, so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned, because it had not been assented to by the Legislatures of these States, and decreed a Federal execution in Holstein in case of the non-abrogation of that Constitution. After many endeavours to evade compliance, Denmark (November, 1858) did abrogate the common Constitution, so far as Holstein and Schleswig were concerned. The execution was accordingly stayed (1860), but on the understanding that the king and his Holstein subjects would in concert frame some arrangement by which, in a manner acceptable to them and to the Diet, Holstein might participate in the common Constitution. But on the 30th of March, 1863, the king published, of his own mere motion, a proclamation fixing the future position of Holstein in the monarchy. The ruling idea of this proclamation was, that since Holstein would not come in to the common Constitution on Denmark's terms, and since it was backed up by the Bund in this resolve, it must be allowed to remain outside; while, as between Denmark and Schleswig, the common Constitution of 1855 should still be maintained. The most important clause was this: That, as regarded the common affairs of the monarchy, the legislative power should be exercised by the king and the Holstein Diet conjointly. The effect of the proclamation was—or would have been—the severance of the Danish monarchy into two distinct groups, united by the personal nexus only—the line of intersection falling between Holstein and Schleswig. When this proclamation became known in Germany, it aroused a strenuous spirit of opposition. The Diet, in July, demanded the retractation of the Ordinance of March 30th, and on the Danish Government's refusal to comply, decreed that Federal execution should take place with the due forms. So far from attempting to appease the rising wrath of Germany, the Danish Government made matters worse by issuing (November 18th) a new Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, intended to complete the scheme of government which the Patent of March 30th had commenced.

On the 7th of December the Diet voted for immediate execution, and entrusted the fulfilment of its mandate to Saxon and Hanoverian troops. Denmark then withdrew the Ordinance of March 30th; but the excitement in Germany had by this time risen to such a point that the execution could no longer be stayed, though its character was somewhat altered. The Danish troops quietly marched out of every town of Holstein just before the Germans marched in. In most places the Danish arms were then taken down, and the Schleswig-Holstein tricolour was hoisted; but the execution was completed without bloodshed, and on the last day of the year the troops of the Bund were facing the Danes along the line of the Eider.

It is now time to ask what part Britain had been taking in the transactions and negotiations that had resulted in so grave a complication. In September, 1862, Lord Russell had proposed, with reference to the dispute between the Bund and Denmark as to the common Constitution, that the schedule of "common affairs" should be greatly curtailed, and that a large part of what had been hitherto deemed such should be placed within the legislative competence of the local Diets. This proposal Denmark had rejected, on the ground that its adoption must inevitably lead either to anarchy or to a return to arbitrary government. Again, in July, 1863, some days after the decree of the Bund ordering execution in Holstein, Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, had declared, in his place in Parliament, with reference to the proceedings of the German Powers, that (in certain circumstances) "it would not be with Denmark alone they would have to contend." This public declaration inspired the Danes with a firm confidence that England would come to their assistance in case of need, and doubtless made them resist the demands of Germany more obstinately. The despatches of Lord Russell to Lord Bloomfield at Vienna (July 31st) and to Sir Alexander Malet at Frankfort (September 29th) assume a high—almost a menacing—tone. Taught, however, by their experience of British intervention in favour of Poland, German diplomatists were not disturbed by the vehemence of tone that characterised the despatches from the British Foreign Office. Baron von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Envoy to the Diet, told Sir Alexander Malet one day that "he looked on Earl Russell's despatches as so much waste paper." Still the greater German Powers thought it expedient to proceed with caution; and as Lord Russell, in a Memorandum dated November 24th, 1863, had said that "should it appear that Federal troops had entered the Duchy on international grounds, her Majesty's Government might be obliged to interfere," Austria and Prussia persuaded the Diet to proceed by way of execution, and not, as Bavaria and other States would have wished, by way of "prise de possession"—a formally hostile and therefore international act. Up to the end of 1863, then, although British remonstrances had not met with much attention, the general policy of Great Britain in regard to Denmark had not suffered a defeat.

LORD PALMERSTON. (From a Photograph by Fradelle & Young.)

But even before the execution an event had occurred that aggravated tenfold the difficulties of the situation. Frederic VII., King of Denmark, died suddenly on November 15, 1863. On the next day Prince Frederic of Augustenburg, son of a Duke of Augustenburg who had accepted a sum of money for his forfeited estates from Denmark in 1852, and agreed not to oppose the new succession, issued a proclamation, addressed to the "Schleswig-Holsteiners," in which he claimed the succession to both Duchies. The minor States of Germany were inclined to support him; for an independent German State of Schleswig-Holstein would have been an accession of strength to their party in the Diet, and helped them to stand their ground against their two great overbearing confederates, Austria and Prussia. But by this time Count Bismarck, whose one guiding thought was the aggrandisement of the Prussian monarchy out of all these complications, had decided upon his policy. For some months in 1863 the minor States had carried matters their own way; and Baron von der Pfordten, the Bavarian envoy, the ablest exponent of their policy, was for a time the most powerful man in Germany. But now Bismarck, having secured the cordial support of Austria by guaranteeing, on the part of Prussia, the integrity of her possessions, proceeded to take the initiative. On the 28th of December Prussia and Austria proposed to the Diet that since the new Danish Constitution of the 18th of November amounted to a distinct violation of the pledge given in 1851-2, not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, nor to take any steps leading thereto, the Diet should, upon international grounds, order the military occupation of Schleswig, as a material pledge for the fulfilment by Denmark of her engagements. Bismarck had probably satisfied himself that no opposition of a material kind would be offered by England in any circumstances; or else, now that Prussia was firmly allied with Austria, he did not fear such opposition. No action was taken by the Diet on this proposal for the moment, and a few days afterwards it was renewed with greater urgency by the two Governments, on the ground that the 1st of January, 1864, was the day on which the new Constitution was fixed to come into force. The minor States had different views; they wished first to get Duke Frederic firmly enthroned in Holstein, after which they would have proceeded quietly to take up the question of Schleswig. When the proposal came to be voted upon in the Diet (January 14, 1864), a combination of the minor States rejected it by a majority of 11 to 5. The representatives of Austria and Prussia then informed the Diet that their Governments intended to carry out the proposal in spite of the adverse vote.

Yielding to the advice of Lord Russell, the Danes had offered no resistance to the execution; but when—probably after hearing of the proposal made to the Diet by Austria and Prussia on the 28th of December—the Foreign Secretary sent Lord Wodehouse to Copenhagen to induce the Danish Government to revoke the Constitution of the 18th of November, the mission was ineffectual. In a despatch of the 31st of December Lord Russell proposed to the Diet that a conference of representatives of the Powers who signed the Treaty of London, together with a representative of the Bund, should meet and take into their consideration the points in dispute between Denmark and Germany; and that in the meantime, and until the conference had finished its labours, the status quo should be maintained. The proposal was received with cold disapproval by most of the members of the Diet, and Sir Alexander Malet wrote, a few days afterwards (January 8th, 1864), "there is an absolute persuasion that England will not interfere materially, and our counsels, regarded as unfriendly, have no weight."

Prussia and Austria, having announced their intention of acting independently of the Diet, carried out their plans with energy and celerity. The Danes saw the gathering storm, yet made no sign of yielding. The truth is, Denmark reckoned with tolerable confidence on receiving material aid from the Western Powers, particularly from England; and this hope was encouraged by the knowledge that Earl Russell was indefatigable in writing to, and sounding the intentions of, nearly every Court in Europe, and that in a despatch to Paris he had spoken of "material assistance" to Denmark to prevent her dismemberment. The Danes also placed considerable reliance on the strength of the Dannewerke, an immense system of earthworks, strengthened by forts, but it was carried on the 5th of February. Retreating northwards, the Danes concentrated under the guns of the fortress of Fredericia, on the borders of Schleswig and Jutland, and behind the lines of DÜppel, which command the approach to the island of Alsen. On the 7th of February Wrangel, commander of the Austro-Prussian army, issued a proclamation announcing that Austrian and Prussian commissioners would administer the civil government of Schleswig, and ordered that the German language should be thenceforth used in all branches of the administration. The fortified lines of DÜppel were stubbornly defended by the Danes, and their gradual reduction was not effected without severe loss to the assailants. On the 18th of April the last remaining bastions were stormed, and the Prussians became masters of the place. The main body of the Danish army, or rather garrison, retreated into Jutland, leaving a pretty strong force to occupy Alsen. Fredericia, which had been expected to offer a serious resistance, was evacuated soon after the fall of DÜppel, the garrison crossing over into FÜnen. The Prussians, satisfied with having taken DÜppel, made for the present no attempt upon Alsen, and there was a pause in the strife.

The only expedient which seems to have occurred to Earl Russell was to write (February 10th) to Berlin, urging that the belligerents—the war having lasted exactly ten days—should agree to an armistice! The request was, it need hardly be added, ineffectual. But now the Danish Government took measures formally to remind Lord Russell of the obligations under which England lay. M. Torben Bille, the Danish Minister in London, in a despatch, dated February 11th, 1864, stated that his Government indulged the hope that Earl Russell appreciated the steps which Denmark had taken with a view to the maintenance of peace, seeing that these steps had been taken by the Danish Government on the pressing advice of the Cabinet of London; that, however, the pacific desires of Denmark had been frustrated by the ambition of Austria and Prussia, and war had actually broken out; that in this war Denmark, if unaided, must eventually be crushed by the overwhelming numerical superiority of her opponents; that it was necessary, therefore, that, while there was yet time, the Powers friendly to Denmark should come to her aid, "and among those Powers there is none which the Danish Government address with more confidence than England." This was a categorical request, and the chilling reply which it elicited from Lord Russell must have been a bitter mortification to the overmatched and harassed Danes. After admitting generally that Denmark had followed the advice of the British Government, without which that Government "could not have given even its good offices to Denmark to prevent, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities," Lord Russell remarked that, as to "the request that friendly Powers should come to the assistance of Denmark, her Majesty's Government could only say that every step they might think it right to take in the further progress of this unhappy contest could only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and Russia." Such a reply plainly foreshadowed that Great Britain did not intend to fulfil her engagements if other Powers did not fulfil theirs.

Still there can be no doubt that Government felt a real reluctance to abandon Denmark to its fate; and if France had shown any zeal in the matter, it seems not improbable that intervention would have gone the length of material assistance. But the French Emperor had been not a little mortified by Lord Russell's abrupt and decided rejection of his proposal for a general Congress of Powers, made in the autumn of 1863. That proposal, starting from the assumption that the Treaties of 1815 were "upon almost all points destroyed, modified, misunderstood, or menaced," urged the expediency of a joint endeavour, on the part of the nations of Europe, "to regulate the present and secure the future in a Congress." No other European Power, great or small, had absolutely rejected the Emperor's proposal; most had assented to it on the condition of a previous definition of the subjects that should be laid before the Congress; but Lord Russell's unconditional refusal had caused the scheme to fall through. The feeling of mortification thence arising in the mind of the French Emperor led him to view the diplomatic efforts of Great Britain on behalf of Denmark with coldness, and her proposal for a limited Conference on Danish affairs with little favour. Still France, like Great Britain, was bound by the Treaty of 1720, and the fidelity of the Danes to the first Napoleon, and the sufferings which they had undergone in his cause, constituted a moral claim that ought not to have been lightly disregarded. But the Emperor was also deeply mortified by the refusal of Great Britain to interfere on behalf of Poland; accordingly, when Lord Clarendon went to Paris, he was informed, without much circumlocution, that France did not intend to stir in the matter of assisting the helpless Danes.

It may, however, be questioned whether, considering the small number of troops that England could bring into the field, there was any chance of a material intervention being successful in the face of the numerous battalions of two great military monarchies. Had both Austria and Prussia entered into the design of despoiling Denmark with equal heartiness, it may be admitted that material intervention on our part, though it might have retarded, would not have prevented, the catastrophe. But this was not the case; the Austrian Government was acting in the matter rather from a jealous disinclination to allow Prussia to take the lead and decide by herself questions in which German feeling was so deeply engaged, than because it desired to turn Denmark out of a Duchy which had been linked to it for 800 years. It is also nearly certain that Russia and Sweden, whose people sided most warmly with Denmark, would have immediately joined us had we resolved upon giving material aid. Both Russell and Palmerston wished to risk the chance, but their colleagues declined to countenance the step. Accordingly no action was attempted, though Palmerston made what he called "a notch off his own bat" by informing the Austrian Minister, Count Apponyi, that if the Austrian fleet sailed along the British coast and went to the assistance of the Prussians in the Baltic, he, for one, would not endure such an affront. Even this threat produced a strenuous remonstrance from Lord Granville.

The exertions of the Foreign Secretary to procure the consent of the belligerents and other great Powers to a Conference were at last crowned with a certain measure of success. Austria and Prussia agreed to the Conference but without an armistice. The first meeting was held on the 25th of April, and the prime immediate object of the plenipotentiaries of the non-belligerent Powers was to obtain a suspension of hostilities. Denmark at first insisted that during the armistice her fleets should be allowed to maintain the blockade of the German ports, as an equivalent for the military occupation of the Duchies; but to this the German Powers would not consent. Ultimately Denmark, pressed by Lord Russell, consented to give up the blockade, and an armistice was arranged to last from the 12th of May to the 12th of June. It is painful to trace the course of the negotiations that followed, and their complete futility may dispense us from the task of doing so at any considerable length. It soon became clear that the German Powers deemed the Treaty of 1852 to have been cancelled by the outbreak of war, and the envoy of the Diet declared that Germany would not consent to the re-union of the Duchies to Denmark under any conditions whatever. Austria and Prussia proposed that Schleswig and Holstein should form an independent single State, under the sovereignty of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg; but such a solution the Danish Plenipotentiaries declared to be wholly inadmissible. Lord Russell then brought forward the English proposal, which was that Holstein, Lauenburg, and the southern part of Schleswig, as far as the Schlei and the line of the Dannewerke, should be separated from the Danish monarchy. This arrangement, to the principle of which the Danish Plenipotentiaries acceded, would have left Denmark in possession of about three-fourths of the Duchy of Schleswig. The negotiations being now placed upon the basis of a partition of territory, the neutral Powers obtained with great difficulty the extension of the armistice from the 12th to the 26th of June. Austria and Prussia agreed to a partition, but insisted that the line of demarcation should be traced from Apenrade to Tondern, thus leaving less than half of the Duchy to Denmark, and depriving her of the purely Danish island of Alsen. Denmark would not yield this, and Prussia and Austria would concede no more. On the 18th of June, eight days before the expiration of the armistice, Lord Russell proposed that the question of boundary should be referred to the arbitration of a friendly Power, but to this neither belligerent would consent. Finally, the French Plenipotentiary proposed that the method of plÉbiscite, or popular vote, should be resorted to, and that the votes of the communes in Schleswig should be taken on the question whether they preferred continued union with Denmark or separation. The Danish Envoy, M. de Quaade, positively negatived this proposal, which was also extremely unpleasing to Austria, in whose Italian dominions the application of the principle of the plÉbiscite would have instantly terminated her rule. Thus the debates of the Conference came to an end, having produced no result.

The remainder of this melancholy history may be told in a few words. Hostilities recommenced, and on the 29th of June the Prussians forced their way across the narrow sound which divides the island of Alsen from the mainland, and stormed with great gallantry the fieldworks that had been thrown up on the opposite shore. The Prussians carried the position, but the greater part of the Danes made good their escape out of the island. The strong fortress of Fredericia had previously been abandoned; the Prussians were preparing to cross to FÜnen; and now nothing remained for the Danes, isolated as they were and without hope of aid, but to submit. Negotiations were opened immediately at Vienna, and on the 1st of August the preliminaries of peace were signed, and embodied in the following October in a formal treaty—the Treaty of Vienna. Denmark ceded Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, without reserve, to the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia. Though thus compelled to ratify her own spoliation, the brave little kingdom came out of the struggle with honour, and with an undiminished right to the respect of Europe: it were much to be wished that of all the neutral Powers that looked on and did nothing the same could be said. During the second spell of war Russell made several applications to the Emperor of the French to induce him to interfere in concert with England. At one moment Napoleon wavered, but when Russell discovered that his projects embraced the liberation of Venetia and the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, he as abruptly withdrew his overtures. Accordingly the war ended in the complete humiliation of British diplomacy. But Prussia declined to surrender the Duchies to the Augustenburg candidate, much to the indignation of the German Diet, and it was clear that another appeal to arms must occur before the spoils could be divided.

Meanwhile, stirring events were in progress in the New World. In Mexico the Archduke Maximilian, having in an evil hour accepted the fatal gift of Napoleon, assumed the Imperial crown, and, aided by French bayonets, proceeded to put down the resistance of the Juarists. But clearly his position was tenable only whilst the expeditionary corps remained, and the American Republic was occupied by its internal dissensions. There, however, the end was in sight, thanks to the overwhelming resources of the North. It is true that the Confederates snatched marked successes in the outlying districts of the vast territory, but in Virginia Grant made good his threat—"I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all the summer," and, though Lee's masterly disposal of his forces thwarted the advance upon Richmond and the capture of Petersburg, the Confederate strength was being rapidly drained. In Western Virginia Grant's subordinate, Sheridan, easily held his own against Early and then proceeded to lay waste the territory. Meanwhile Sherman was executing his famous march into Georgia, by which he cut his way through the heart of the enemy's territory, and divided it in twain by a broad belt of wasted country. His progress was facilitated by the substitution of the rash Hood for the cautious Johnston, and, thanks to the incapacity of that general, Savannah, one of the most important towns in the Confederacy, was Sherman's before the end of the year. The naval transactions comprised an action between the notorious Alabama and the Kearsarge, which resulted in the former being sunk off Cherbourg, while the capture of the Mobile forts closed one of the few harbours still open to blockade-runners. The re-election of President Lincoln for a further term of office showed that the North was not going to blench when the supreme crisis was at hand.

An unpleasant incident occurred in the autumn, which, but for the firm and moderate attitude of Mr. Lincoln, might easily have involved us in a serious difficulty with the United States. A considerable number of Confederate refugees had gradually gathered in Canada, men rendered desperate by the wreck of their property and the misfortunes of their country. Some twenty-five of these men, in the month of October, crossed the border into the State of Vermont, and entering the little town of St. Albans in the dead of night attacked and plundered the bank, shooting dead several of the townspeople, and escaping back into Canada. They were soon arrested by the Canadian authorities and the money was recovered. The case being an important one, it was removed from the jurisdiction of the magistrates of St. John's to that of the Supreme Court at Montreal and a writ of habeas corpus was refused. The American Consul, Mr. Edmonds, was instructed to demand their extradition, but this was refused on legal grounds and an investigation was instituted into the affair under the Ashburton Treaty. In the end Judge Coursol decided that his court had no jurisdiction in the case and ordered the release of the raiders from custody. The Canadian Government wisely resolved that so flagrant a miscarriage of justice should not be permitted; in fact, their law advisers gave it as their opinion that the Judge's decision was bad in law; and accordingly warrants were issued for the reapprehension of the criminals. But the news of the Judge's decision, releasing the raiders, had reached New York before the subsequent conduct of the Canadian Government was announced, and it aroused, not unnaturally, great excitement and indignation. However, in his message to the new Congress (December 6, 1864) Mr. Lincoln expressly stated that the colonial authorities of Canada were not deemed to be internationally unjust or unfriendly towards the United States; but that, on the contrary, there was every reason to expect that, with the approval of the home Government, they would take the necessary measures to prevent new excursions across the border. These anticipations were fully justified by the subsequent conduct of the Canadian Government. A strong force of militia was stationed at various points along the frontier, several of the raiders were arrested under the warrant for their re-apprehension, the Court at Montreal reversed its former decision and declared that it had jurisdiction, those captured were tried anew, and at least one of them was adjudged on the evidence to be guilty of robbery and ordered to be given up to the United States.