THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

Defect of the Delhi Fortifications—The Batteries are constructed—An effective Cannonade—The Plan of Attack—The British Advance—Nicholson's Column—The Cashmere Gate exploded—Entry into the City—Campbell's Column—Nicholson mortally wounded—Failure at the Lahore Gate—Cavalry and Artillery save the Situation—A Lodgment in Delhi—Excesses of the Troops—The British possess the City—Capture of the King—The Princes shot—Significance of their Fate—Effect of the Fall of Delhi—Greathed's Column—The Relief of Agra—Affairs at Lucknow—Weakness of the Defences—The Garrison—Character of the Attack—Effort against the Redan—Explosion of Mines—The Daily Wear-and-Tear—Inglis's Report—Sir Colin Campbell at Calcutta—Havelock superseded by Outram—Position of Havelock's Army—Eyre's Exploits—Havelock crosses the Ganges—Combat of Mungulwar—Battle at the Alumbagh—The Plan of Attack—The Charbagh Bridge is won—Under the Kaiserbagh—The Goal is reached—The Scene that Evening—Havelock's Losses—Outram determines to remain—Energy of the Indian Government—The Force at Cawnpore—Sir Colin to the Front—Kavanagh's daring Deed—The Canal is crossed—Capture of the Secunderbagh—Sortie of the Garrison—The Relief accomplished—Campbell retires on Cawnpore—Death of Havelock.

THE crisis in the siege of Delhi had now arrived. Although the Sepoys had shown some skill and some enterprise in defence of Delhi, our engineers, scanning the place, had long seen that they had committed a capital fault. We were forced to assail the north front of the city, because we were tied to the plateau and the ridge, by the fact that our line of communications lay in rear of the ridge, and because we could not establish any base of supplies in any other quarter. Now, the fortifications on this side consisted, starting from the Jumna, on our left, of the Water Bastion, the Cashmere Bastion, and the Moree Bastion. A curtain wall, loopholed for musketry, but not pierced or prepared for guns, connected each bastion with the other. The consequence was that guns were mounted only on the bastions, and not on the curtains; and the effect of this was that we were enabled to erect a line of batteries strong enough to silence the guns on the bastions and breach the curtain walls. Had the mutineers possessed an engineer of ordinary faculty, he would have seen the use to which the curtains could have been put. He would have caused a thick rampart of earth to be piled up behind the curtains. On these he would have mounted guns drawn from the magazine—there were 200 new pieces in store—and thus the whole of the north front, from the Moree to the Water Bastion, would have been one bristling line of batteries. Fortunately for us the enemy did not find this out until it was too late. It was not likely that an engineer so accomplished as Colonel Baird Smith would overlook the capital defect of the enemy. He did not; and his plan of attack, executed by Captain Taylor, took ample advantage of the opportunity afforded by the negligence of the foe.

The active operations of the siege began on the 7th of September. That night it was resolved that the right battery, No. 1, should be completed and armed. It was an immense undertaking, but was successfully accomplished.

As soon as it was light the mutineers in the Moree and along the curtain beheld with indignant astonishment the newly built battery, and opened upon it with a destructive fire, under which it had to be finished, gun after gun opening as it was got into its place. The effect of our fire was soon manifest, for by the afternoon of the 8th the Moree was a silent heap of ruins. Nevertheless, at intervals throughout the bombardment, the enemy sticking to the Moree, now and then opened fire from a gun until it was knocked over. On the same day, the 7th, a strong force had surprised and occupied Ludlow Castle, and the Koodsia Bagh, a garden to the left of it, and under the Water Bastion. It was in this quarter that the real siege batteries were to be constructed, and the work had been commenced on the right with the double object of crushing the Moree, and drawing off the attention of the enemy from the Cashmere Gate and Bastion. On this side four batteries were speedily made, all under a heavy fire, for they were within musketry range, and the broken ground between the batteries and the place afforded excellent cover. There were two batteries in front of Ludlow Castle, an array of eighteen guns; a mortar battery in line with them, but farther to the left; and a fourth battery near the customhouse, within 150 yards of the Water Bastion. Until all was ready the embrasures were masked with gabions, and when the time came to open fire, these were removed by volunteers, who for the time were exposed to the enemy's shot. These were great and successful operations, and without native labour could not have been accomplished. But the natives worked well for pay, and readily plied the spade and pick under a searching fire. The losses were heavy, but the work was very urgent.

The mortars had been in steady play from sunset on the 10th, and on the 11th the breaching battery of eighteen guns opened with such effect on the Cashmere Bastion, and the curtain between it and the Water Bastion, that the guns on the former ceased to reply, and the latter came clattering down in huge cantles. The shot shook down the wall, the shells tore open the parapets. Hour by hour the breach grew wider. The right of the Cashmere Bastion and the left of the Water Bastion were crumbling away under the ceaseless blows. But these were not given without a sharp return of fire. The mutineers covered their whole front with a trench, and lined it with infantry. They brought light guns on to the ramparts. They skilfully planted a battery to the left of the Moree in such a position that it took the right and centre batteries in flank, and could not itself be seen by any gun of ours; while across the Jumna there was a second battery, which enfiladed the left, though with less effect. In spite of all this our troops worked their guns with unfaltering steadiness. For three days this went on incessantly; the big guns firing by day, the mortars shelling the breaches and parapets all night. On the 13th there were two great breaches in the walls. If these were practicable, it was determined that the place should be assaulted forthwith, as the Sepoys were at length engaged in piling up earth behind the curtain connecting the Moree and Cashmere Bastions in order that they might line the wall with heavy guns. The engineers—no officers were called upon to do more, or answered the call better, than the officers of this corps—were ordered to examine the breaches, and reported that the attempt was quite feasible.

The general had already drawn up his plan of assault. The chief engineer advised that it should be delivered at daybreak the next morning. His advice was adopted, and accordingly the welcome order went through the camp, and roused the soldiers for an encounter they so sternly desired. In order to capture the city, the general formed five columns. Of these, the first, under Nicholson, consisted of the 75th Foot, the 1st Fusiliers, and the 2nd Punjabees. It was to break in at the Cashmere Bastion, through the breach. The second, under Brigadier Jones, consisted of the 8th Foot, the 2nd Fusiliers, and the 4th Sikhs. This column was directed to enter the Water Bastion breach. The third column, under Colonel Campbell, of the 52nd, consisted of the 52nd Foot, the Kumaon Battalion, and the 1st Punjabees. To them was entrusted the duty of rushing in at the Cashmere Gate after it had been blown open. The fourth column, under Major Reid, the constant and gallant defender of the Hindoo Rao's house, was formed of a detachment of British, his own Ghoorkas, and part of the Cashmere Contingent. They were to carry the suburb of Kishengunge, the enfilading battery under the Moree, and, if possible, the Lahore Gate. The fifth column, under Brigadier Longfield, formed the reserve. The whole force did not exceed 5,000 men.

Before daybreak the first three columns and the reserve moved down from the ridge towards Ludlow Castle and the Koodsia Bagh. Just before reaching the former, Nicholson marched to the left and Campbell to the right of Ludlow Castle, while Jones led his men into the jungles of the Koodsia Bagh. The whole then lay down under cover, while the 60th Rifles in advance took post in open order within musket-shot of the walls, their duty being to fire on the mutineers on the parapets of the curtain flanking the breaches. It was now seen that the enemy had improvised defences in the breaches during the night, and the batteries once more opened on them to clear away the obstructions, and to shake the courage of the Sepoys. The Rifles springing up with a cheer, and moving forward, was to be the signal for the batteries to cease firing, and for the columns to go in simultaneously. Presently the dark forms of the 60th rose from their cover; their cheering shouts were followed by the crack of their rifles; a burst of musketry from the walls replied with a steady vigour; the columns emerged, and each went as straight at the object before them as the ground would permit. With throbbing pulses, but firm, quick tramp, they swept along. So the columns closed with the enemy who had kept them at bay four months.

Nicholson's column, headed by the ladder party, which was led by the engineers, Medley, Lang, and Bingham, rushed towards the breach. But the mutineers shot closely and fast, and the party were so smitten on the edge of the ditch, that minutes elapsed before the ladders could be got down: at length the thing was done. Then the leaders and the stormers slid down the slope, planted the ladders against the scarp below the breach, and began to ascend. The enemy fought furiously and yelled furiously, and rolled down stones and sustained a terrific fire, and dared our men to come on. They got a speedy answer. Up went Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of the 75th, the first to mount, but he was instantly shot dead. But others followed fast, and seeing how resolute their assailants were, the enemy fled, and the breach was won. Swarming in, the column poured down into the main guard. They had assailed the proper right of the bastion. On the proper left was the famous Cashmere Gate, and here an exploit had been performed, which, for daring, ranks amongst the choicest exploits recorded in the history of war.

That exploit was the blowing in of the gate in broad daylight. The men ordered to perform this feat were the engineer officers, Lieutenants Home and Salkeld; the sapper sergeants, Carmichael, Burgess, and Smith, and Havildar Madhoo, with seven native sappers to carry powder-bags. With them went Robert Hawthorn, bugler of the 52nd, whose duty it was to sound the advance when the gate was blown in. Campbell's column, as we have seen, was lying down awaiting the signal. As soon as it was given, the explosion party started on their dreadful errand. Captain Medley has described the scene that ensued so well that we must quote from his pages. There was an outer barrier gate, which was found open. Through this went Home. Before him stretched a broken drawbridge spanning the ditch. Over its shattered timbers, accompanied by four natives, each carrying a bag of twenty-five pounds of powder, he went, and placed them at the foot of the great double gate. "So utterly paralysed were the enemy at the audacity of the proceeding that they only fired a few straggling shots, and made haste to close the wicket, with every appearance of alarm, so that Lieutenant Home, after laying his bags, jumped into the ditch unhurt. It was now Salkeld's turn. He also advanced with four other bags of powder, and a lighted port-fire. But the enemy had now recovered from their consternation, and had seen the smallness of the party, and the object of their approach. A deadly fire was poured upon the little band from the top of the gateway from both flanks, and from the open wicket not ten feet distant. Salkeld laid his bags, but was shot through the arm and leg, and fell back on the bridge, handing the port-fire to Sergeant Burgess, bidding him light the fusee. Burgess was instantly shot dead in the attempt. Sergeant Carmichael then advanced, took up the port-fire, and succeeded in the attempt; but immediately fell mortally wounded. Sergeant Smith, seeing him fall, advanced at a run; but, finding that the fusee was already burning, threw himself down into the ditch, where the bugler had already conveyed poor Salkeld. In another moment a terrific explosion shattered the massive gate."

Ere the roar of the powder had died away, the bugle of the steadfast Hawthorn rang out the well-known notes, which told his comrades to come on. Campbell gave the word, and the column, headed by the noble old 52nd, started forward. First went Captain Bayley and a company of the 52nd. These, rushing over the drawbridge, and through the gate, were quickly followed by fifty men from each battalion, and these by the whole force of the column. There was no resistance. The exploding powder had killed all the defenders of the gate but one, and he was soon despatched. As the men were forming afresh for work, down came Nicholson's column from the other side. So far the work had been well and quickly done. The second column in its advance on the Water Bastion breach had suffered great losses, three-fourths of the ladder-party falling, together with Greathed and Hovenden, the engineers. Part of the column, however, got in at the breach; but a large number straggled off to the right, and followed the track of Nicholson. Once inside, Campbell and Nicholson got their men into order. The work of the first was to clear the buildings near the Cashmere Gate, and then march straight forward upon the Chandni Chowk, having for object the possession of that High Street of Delhi, and the strong and lofty Jumma Musjid, which rose up just beyond it. The second undertook to sweep along the ramparts, capture in succession the Moree, Cabul, Burun, and Lahore Bastions, give admission to Reid's column, if it carried the suburbs, and, connecting with Campbell in the Chandni Chowk, press on to the Ajmere Gate. We must follow each column in turn.

Colonel Campbell's column, before it started inwards, cleared the cutchery, the church, and several houses, and sent a company into the Water Bastion, where the enemy still lingered. Then gathering up his men, and guided by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who knew every inch of the city, he made his way through the streets and gardens towards the Chandni Chowk. On the road the detached company, which had cleared the Water Bastion, rejoined the main body, having worked its way through the narrow streets from the waterside. The column met with little opposition. Working through the Begum Bagh, the column found the gate closed; but an adventurous native policeman, and half a dozen 52nd men, speedily broke open the gate, and the force emerged into the Chandni Chowk, and at once occupied the Kotwallee, or police-station. Then they tried the Jumina Musjid; but the enemy had closed the gate and bricked up the side arches. He had swarmed into the houses on each side, and his cavalry, even, were galloping about the streets. As Colonel Campbell had neither powder-bags nor guns, he could do nothing; so he fell back into the Begum Bagh under a smart fire. Here he waited some time, in the hope of seeing Reid's and Nicholson's men sweep up the Chandni Chowk from the Lahore Gate. They did not come; and he therefore relinquished the ground won, and fell back upon the church.

In the meantime, Nicholson had led his men along the Rampart Road, which runs the whole circuit of the city within the wall. He rapidly seized the Moree Bastion and the Cabul Gate, and was pressing on for the Lahore Gate, when the column met with a check. They had gone some distance, the 75th Foot in front, writes Mr. Cave Browne, when, "at a curve in the road, a gun in the Burun Bastion opened fire upon them. In the lane, too, was a slight breastwork with a brass gun to dispute the road; but this was soon withdrawn before the brisk fire of the 75th. Unhappily, no rush was made to capture it. The men in advance hesitated, and fell back to the Cabul Gate, with three officers—Captain Freer (of the 27th), Wadeson, and Darrell—wounded. Here Nicholson, who had mounted the Moree Bastion to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy outside, joined them, and found the aspect of affairs suddenly changed. In the lane, which had before been comparatively clear, one of the guns (originally placed at the Lahore Gate to sweep the Chandni Chowk) had now been run some distance down the lane, and another placed at the entrance to support it. The windows and roofs of the low houses on the left were also now swarming with riflemen; and where a short time before a vigorous rush might have cleared the almost empty lane, and taken the gun and carried the Lahore Gate in flank, with probably but little loss, now every inch of ground had to be fought, and the advance made in the face of a deadly fire from the field-piece, through the lane alive with a concealed foe. Nicholson saw the emergency, and resolved on recovering, if possible, the lost ground. He pushed on the 1st Fusiliers, who answered to his call right gallantly. One gun was taken and spiked; twice they rushed at the second. The grape ploughed through the lane, bullets poured down like hail from the walls and houses. Major Jobson fell mortally wounded at the head of his men; Captain Speke and Captain Greville were disabled; the men were falling fast—there was hesitation. Nicholson sprang forward, and while in the act of waving his sword to urge the men on once more—alas for the column, alas for the army, for India!—he fell back mortally wounded, shot through the chest by a rebel from a house window close by, and was carried off by two of the 1st Fusiliers. The command of the column devolved on Major Brookes, of the 75th Regiment, who, on Colonel Herbert's retiring wounded at the glacis, had taken command of that regiment. They now fell back on the Cabul Gate, which was for some time to be our advanced position. The delay had lost us the Lahore Gate and Nicholson."

It was this check which compelled the retreat of Campbell from the Begum Bagh, and of Ramsay, with his Ghoorkas from the Kotwallee, in the Chandni Chowk, a post he had held for five hours. By this time the reserve had entered the city, and Bourchier was bringing in his guns, when the aspect of affairs outside directed attention to that quarter.

The attempt to reach the Lahore Gate, by carrying the suburb in front of it, had failed. The Sepoys, who, as we have remarked, were not wanting in military qualities, had prepared for an attack on Kishengunge. Indeed, one reason for hurrying on the assault of Delhi was that they were known to be making a battery for seventeen guns in this quarter, with which to take in flank our whole line of batteries. So that when Major Reid, starting from the ridge, led his weak column from the Subzee Mundi towards the Kishengunge suburb, he found the gardens and houses full of troops, two or three breast-works in his path, plenty of guns, and several squadrons of horsemen hovering about on the watch for a chance. His troops were under the fire of the western bastions of the city, and artillerymen were so scarce that the three guns with him were under-manned. The column moved on, and came in contact with the enemy. The Cashmere Contingent, forming the right of the line, rushed prematurely into action, and ran as prematurely out of it. Their conduct obliged the handful of Rifles and Ghoorkas to precipitate their attack, and in the first onset they stormed the first line of the enemy's defences. But at this crisis, Major Reid, who had escaped scot-free in twenty-five actions, fell severely wounded in this his twenty-sixth; and the enemy, developing an immense force of all arms, Captain Muter, of the Rifles, who succeeded to the command, withdrew the whole column, covered by the fire of the ridge batteries.

This was a moment of real peril. If the victorious foe wheeled to his right, he might have swept along the line of the siege batteries, and fallen on the flank and rear of the assaulting columns. Or he might have tried to capture the ridge and camp. To prevent this, the cavalry performed a rare exploit in war. Brigadier Hope Grant, whose horsemen had been in the saddle since three in the morning, descended from the ridge with 600 sabres and lances and a few guns, led by the gallant Tombs, and rode under the city walls, so as to interpose between the assaulting troops and the enemy. "In an instant," writes Hodson, "horse artillery and cavalry were ordered to the front, and we went there at the gallop, bang through our own batteries, the gunners cheering us as we leapt over the sand-bags, etc., and halted under the Moree Bastion, under as heavy a fire of round-shot, grape, and canister, as I have ever been under in my life. Our artillery dashed to the front, unlimbered, and opened upon the enemy; and at it they both went, 'hammer and tongs.' Now, you must understand we had no infantry with us. All the infantry were fighting in the city. They sent out large bodies of infantry and cavalry against us, and then began the fire of musketry. It was tremendous. There we were—9th Lancer, 1st, 2nd, 4th Sikhs, Guide Cavalry, and Hodson's Horse—protecting the artillery, who were threatened by their infantry and cavalry. And fancy what a pleasant position we were in, under this infernal fire, and never returning a shot.... Well, all things must have an end. Some infantry came down and cleared the gardens in our front; and, as their cavalry never showed, and we had no opportunity of charging, we fell back, and (the fire being over in that quarter) halted and dismounted."

When the evening of the 14th arrived we had made a lodgment in Delhi. We held the ramparts from the Cabul Gate, along the north front, to the Jumna. We held the church and the college, and several houses. The palace, the magazine, the Selimghur, the great gardens, the Jumma Musjid—four-fifths of the city—were still in the hands of the enemy. To win what we had won had cost the little army 66 officers and 1,104 men killed and wounded—nearly a third of the whole force engaged! The position gained was fortified, and preparations were made for pushing on the work next day. But, unhappily, the troops found plenteous stores of liquor, and, demoralised by prolonged labour, with systems exhausted by the burning climate, they drank without stint, and on the night of the 14th and the morning of the 15th the Sepoys might have driven the helpless host out of the place. General Wilson was so alarmed that he talked of retreating to the ridge! Happily there were firmer minds about him, and he had sense enough to take their advice, and hold on. Nicholson's voice pealed up from his death-bed against the madness of the thought, the bare mention of which raised a storm of anger in our lines. To put a stop to intoxication, General Wilson sent a party into the warehouses to destroy every bottle of beer, wine, or spirits that could be found. It was done, and the army was saved at the expense of the sick and wounded, who needed the stimulants poured out in waste in the cellars of Delhi.

Once rescued from drunkenness, the troops steadily carried out their arduous enterprise, and at the end of six days Delhi was ours. On the 16th the walls of the magazine were breached, and the 4th Punjabees and Beloochees, going in with the bayonet, drove out or killed the defenders. The enemy, losing courage, withdrew from Kishengunge, and the Ghoorkas replaced them. On the 17th the Delhi Bank House was carried, and a mortar battery planted to bombard the palace. All this time the enemy kept up a heavy fire from every point of vantage; but this did not prevent us from making progress. On the 18th the Burun Bastion was taken by surprise, and the Rifles had sapped their way through the houses up to the palace, the main gate of which was now exposed to a severe cannonade. The people and the Sepoys were now hurrying out of the city on all sides. Hosts of women had passed through our lines towards our camp, guarded by our soldiers, for we did not make war on women. There were signs that the palace had been deserted, and, rushing in, the troops found only a few fanatics inside, and these soon received the death they sought. On the 20th we were in entire possession of the city, every large building and fortified post having been taken or abandoned.

But the King of Delhi, the descendant of Timur—the man around whom insurrection would gather its thousands—had not been taken. With the blood-stained princes of his house, he had found refuge in the Tomb of Humayoun, and the ruins of old Delhi. Hodson, who always saw into the heart of the business in hand, now felt that without the capture of the king, the capture of Delhi would be shorn of half its fruit. He therefore implored the general to allow him to take a body of his horse, and bring in the king, on the sole condition that his life should be spared if he surrendered. Wilson was obdurate. He did not want to be "bothered" with the king and the princes. He could not spare European troops, and so on. Neville Chamberlain threw the weight of his counsel into Hodson's scale, and again the words of Nicholson were forthcoming on the same side. The general gave way. He gave Hodson authority to spare the life of the king, but he declined to be responsible for the enterprise. Hodson selected fifty troopers from his Horse. The ruins were swarming with townspeople and the followers of the king. The peril was very great. Here was one white man; he had fifty faithful swordsmen with him; around him were a host of natives, chiefly Moslems. But he did not hesitate, and the king surrendered. The march towards the city began—the longest five miles, as Captain Hodson said, that he ever rode; for of course the palkees only went at a foot pace, with his handful of men around them, followed by thousands, any one of whom could have shot him down in a moment. His orderly said that it was wonderful to see the influence which his calm and undaunted look had on the crowd. They seemed perfectly paralysed at the fact of one white man (for they thought nothing of his fifty black sowars) carrying off their king alone. Gradually as they approached the city the crowd slunk away, and very few followed up to the Lahore Gate.

This adventure was followed by one still more striking, more tragic—the capture and summary execution of the felon princes. Again the general had to be entreated earnestly to permit their capture. Having obtained permission, Hodson called up his lieutenant, Macdowell, and ordered him to bring a hundred men. They set out about eight in the morning of the 21st, and arriving at the Tomb, the troopers were so posted as to invest the huge building, in which were several thousands of armed men. In spite of this support the princes surrendered. Writes Macdowell, recounting the story to a friend, "As we got about a mile off, Hodson turned to me and said, 'Well, Mac, we've got them at last;' and we both gave a sigh of relief. Never in my life, under the heaviest fire, have I been in such imminent danger. Everybody says it is the most dashing and daring thing that has been done for years (not on my part, for I merely obeyed orders; but on Hodson's, who planned and carried it out). Well, I must finish my story. We came up to the princes, now about five miles from where we had taken them, and close to Delhi. The increasing crowd pressed close on the horses of the sowars, and assumed every moment a more hostile appearance. 'What shall we do with them?' said Hodson to me. 'I think we had better shoot them here; we shall never get them in.' There was no time to be lost; we halted the troop, put five troopers across the road, behind and in front. Hodson ordered the princes to strip (that is, to take off their upper garments), and get again into the cart; he then shot them with his own hand. So ended the career of the chiefs of the revolt, and of the greatest villains that ever shamed humanity. Before they were shot, Hodson addressed our men, explaining who they were, and why they were to suffer death. The effect was marvellous—the Mussulmans seemed struck with a wholesome idea of retribution, and the Sikhs shouted with delight, while the mass moved off slowly and silently." The bodies were taken into the city, and flung down in the Chandni Chowk, in front of the Kotwallee, the very place where, four months before, they had exposed the bodies of our countrywomen whom they had slain! Our soldiers looked on this as poetic justice. To the Sikhs it had a deeper significance. Two hundred years before, the great King Aurungzebe, a fanatical Moslem, as intolerant as an inquisitor, had cut off the head of the Sikh prophet, Tej Singh, and had caused his body to be thrown on that very spot. Here, also, had come retribution for them, and the awful fulfilment of one of their cherished prophecies. There lay three scions of the hated house of Timur, on the public way. Hodson, who had fulfilled their desire of vengeance, and who had done rough justice at the same time, at once rose tenfold in their estimation.

Delhi captured, the king in captivity, the Sepoy army routed, broken, demoralised—and all without any aid from England—the back of the mutiny in the North-West was broken. This was the work of Lawrence, and Edwardes, and Montgomery, and the able men who were their assistants. That Delhi did not fall a moment too soon is shown by the fact that, contemporaneously with its fall, a rebellion broke out in Gogaira, the country lying between Mooltan and Lahore, a wilderness inhabited by predatory tribes. Nearly two months were occupied in quenching this fresh flame; but long before that the road to Mooltan was cleared. The incident itself showed what combustible material was scattered over the Punjab. Had Delhi not been taken, there would have been perhaps a general revolt. As it was, the "good fortune" of the British filled the people with awe and admiration, for nothing succeeds like success, especially in Asia. The name of Sir John Lawrence, always powerful in the Punjab, was now more powerful than ever. All doubt of our might disappeared, and recruits to any amount were forthcoming at the slightest hint that men were wanted. But this supremacy had not been reasserted without measures of extreme severity. No mercy was shown anywhere to mutineers or rebels. All caught in the act were hanged or blown from guns. The only justification for this sweeping destruction of life is the old one—necessity. It was their lives or ours. Sometimes, no doubt, men were killed who may have been innocent, but on the whole, considering the peril of the hour, justice was done.

Once established in Delhi, it became of the utmost importance to clear the Doab, or country between the Jumna and Ganges, as far as Agra, and re-open communications with Calcutta by way of Cawnpore. It was reported everywhere that we had been foiled at Delhi, and that the Padishah was still a great king. Ocular and tangible proof of the contrary was required, and on the 22nd a column 2,790 strong, with sixteen guns, traversed Delhi, crossed the Jumna, and emerged into the purer air of the open country. The whole were under Colonel Greathed. Crossing the Hindon by the suspension bridge, the scene of Wilson's first successes, the force swept round to the right, and marched on Bolundshuhur. Here a smart action ensued; but in three hours the enemy was routed, driven through the town, and his guns were captured. Crossing the Kalee Nuddee, it was found that Walidad Khan, the rebel chief, had fled from Malaghur across the Ganges. The fort was blown up, but in that operation Lieutenant Home, who had earned the Victoria Cross by his exploits at the Cashmere Gate of Delhi, was accidentally killed. Marching on, the column did justice on the road upon well-known and flagrant offenders, and had passed Alighur, when expresses came from Agra demanding instant help. For 10,000 mutineers from Delhi and elsewhere were moving from Dholpore upon Agra, and Colonel Fraser, who had succeeded Mr. Colvin, had got alarmed beyond measure.

Greathed put his troops in motion at once, and on the 10th of October, after two forced marches, filed over the Jumna, passed through Agra, and pitched his camp on the other side. His wearied soldiers little thought they were on the very threshold of a battle. He had been told that the enemy had retreated. So much for the intelligence of Colonel Fraser. A crowd of sight seers followed the soldiers to the Native Infantry parade ground, a fine open plain. Many of the troops went to sleep immediately, and officers rode off to see friends in the fort. Few tents were up, the baggage was coming in, when suddenly a round shot crashed through the camp; then another, and finally a salvo from twelve guns. The sight-seers fled at the first gun; but the war-worn and war-trained troops sprang to arms with admirable alacrity, turning out with such clothes as they had on. The enemy had surprised the camp, but he was surprised in turn, for our artillery soon answered his fire; our infantry and horse were promptly in motion. The whole force closed with the enemy, and delivered such stunning blows that he fled nine miles, almost without a halt to breathe. On his track, swift and sharp, were the horse batteries and cavalry. This splendid little action relieved Agra. After resting three days, a rest well deserved, the column, now under Hope Grant, moved out for Cawnpore, which it reached on the 26th of October.

The Punjab army had thus sent help towards, instead of receiving aid from, Calcutta. Matters had greatly changed in this quarter since we left Havelock a victor at Bithoor in August; and how the change had been brought about we must now narrate. The reader will remember that we left the small garrison of Lucknow beleaguered in its extemporised lines by the rebel force of Oude; and that we narrated the first campaign of Havelock to relieve the garrison, and its failure. The result of that campaign simply enabled us to recover Cawnpore, and to show the mutineers that we had still power to rout them in the open field; and this was an immense gain at that time. We have now to recount the story of the defence of the Lucknow Residency and its various outposts, and then to show how the noble garrison was first succoured by Havelock and Outram, and finally rescued by Sir Colin Campbell.

The defeat of the British forces at Chinhut, the abandonment of the Muchee Bowun, the defection of all but a few hundreds of the native troops, the suddenness of the disaster, created great confusion. The position occupied consisted of a number of buildings around the Residency. The defences begun early in June were still incomplete. There were large gaps at vital points. The engineers had been permitted to level only a few of the surrounding houses, and this only on the north side facing the river. Hence the enemy, as soon as he closed around, was able to occupy the near houses, and from these, as well as from the more distant buildings, the vast palaces and stronger houses, to open at once, and maintain almost without intermission, a terrible fire of shot, shell, and musketry. Consequently, the defences had to be completed under fire; and had the enemy shown the least courage, he might have stormed in at more than one point; but, strong in numbers, he was weak in bravery, and he feared to grapple at close quarters, even with the few hundreds encircled by his fire. The position occupied was a piece of table land, on the crown of which stood the Residency. The ground fell sharply towards the river, and all along the northern face ran a low rampart, eked out with sand-bags, and having a ditch in front. The north-eastern and eastern fronts consisted of lines of buildings connected by barricades and banks of earth. Here were the hospital, the Treasury, the Bailey Guard, a strong gateway well banked up with earth, Dr. Fayrer's house and enclosures, the Financial Garrison House and wall, Sago's house, and Anderson's house, which was entrenched and formed the south-eastern angle of the position. Then, looking south, came the Cawnpore Battery, so named because it swept the Cawnpore Road. From this point the line of available buildings trended in a westerly direction, until the house of Mr. Gubbins was reached. This was made by that energetic civil servant into a very strong post at the eleventh hour. The western face of the position was the series of houses connected with the north face by an entrenchment running along the brow of the high land on that side. Within the outer line were inner posts, some of which commanded those in front, and at suitable points batteries were constructed and armed with guns. Nevertheless, it was soon found that there were few spots into which the projectiles of the enemy did not make way. In fact the whole position was encircled by hosts of foes, who, from batteries placed within a hundred yards, from houses still nearer, from the roofs and upper storeys of the lofty and more distant palaces on the east, kept up an incessant hail of shot.

The garrison consisted of the men of the 32nd Foot, under Brigadier Inglis, portions of the 13th and 48th Native Infantry, some Sikhs of the 71st, many officers of the mutinied regiments, the civil servants of the East India Company, and several merchants: in all 1,692 men, of whom 765 were natives. The force of the assailants varied in numbers. Always formidable, never less than 30,000 men, the nucleus of whom were the Oude Sepoys, the number sometimes rose to 100,000. Chiefs came in from the country districts, bringing their retainers, stayed as long as they deemed expedient, and went away. Then Havelock's advance drew off a portion of the investing force for a long period. Nevertheless, the active operations of the siege went on without cessation for nearly four months. The investment all this time was so strictly maintained that until after the arrival of Outram and Havelock in September, only one messenger, Ungud by name, was able to go out with despatches and return.

Within the first week of the siege the enemy had established batteries on every side. He had also manned the houses. The round shot and shell brought down the walls of the larger buildings, and the bullets fell in every part of the place like rain. It was only by keeping close under shelter that any one escaped. In some spots balls fell so thickly that soldiers and officers crossing the space on duty, were obliged to run at speed. Many refused to run, and of these not a few fell, sacrificed to an excessive spirit of honour. It was this perpetual fire, and not the assaults of the enemy, that caused the greatest losses. The brave men among the besiegers were few. They would lead an assault and fall, and then, instead of pressing the charge home, their companions would run back to the first cover. Strict watch had to be kept night and day, and the sentries would often fire at anything mistaken for a dark form. At night the garrison were compelled, not only to repair damages, but to bury the dead, and not only the dead bodies of their comrades, and of women and children, but of the cattle and horses—the latter at first numerous—that fell under the enemy's fire. They had to cook their own food, for there were few servants in the lines, and their food soon became scanty. Fortunately they had an abundance of guns and an immense supply of ammunition. They had, also, the one thing needful—a stoutness of heart that never failed, a determination to perish rather than yield. Even the sick soldiers came out of hospital of their own accord, looking like ghosts of men, and when reproved and ordered back again, nobly replied, "Well, sir, in these times a man must do his best." The ladies and women shared in the labours and the dangers, ready to cook for the strong, and to attend on the sick; and the virtues of the tender sex never shone out more brightly than in this siege.

Up to the 20th of July the enemy contented himself with keeping up an incessant fire of cannon and musketry, to which with musketry and cannon we replied. They had been busy underground. They had begun to mine. Their first effort was against the Redan. On the morning of the 20th they sprang their mine, but it did no harm. "As soon as the smoke had cleared away," writes Brigadier Inglis in his famous report, "the enemy boldly advanced under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon and musketry, with the object of storming the Redan; but they were received with such a heavy fire, that after a short struggle they fell back with much loss. A strong column advanced at the same time to attack Innes' post, and came on to within ten yards of the palisades, affording to Lieutenant Loughnan—13th Native Infantry, who commanded the position—and his brave garrison, composed of gentlemen of the uncovenanted service, a few of her Majesty's 32nd Foot and the 13th Native Infantry, an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, which they were not slow to avail themselves of, and the enemy were driven back with great slaughter. The insurgents made minor attacks at almost every outpost, but were invariably defeated; and at two p.m. they ceased their attempts to storm the place, although their musketry fire and cannonading continued to harass us unceasingly as usual."

The action thus described was a very severe one. The enemy, in more than one place, got close under the defences, and some among our volunteers, especially the half-castes, engaged in a war of insults with the enemy, in which our own Sepoys joined. The defenders were few, the assailants many, but in no place did the latter penetrate the lines. After this struggle the old state of things recurred,—a ceaseless cannonade and fusilade, constant deaths and wounds, sleepless watchfulness. Day after day passed with a horrible monotony, varied only by the deaths of friends. Still the garrison kept up its courage, and stood ever ready to fight. The besiegers were again at work underground, and we had begun to countermine, doing considerable damage to the works of the enemy. But on the 10th of August they fired a mine on the south side, which entirely destroyed the defences of the place for the space of twenty feet, and blew in a wall, forming a breach "through which a regiment could have advanced in perfect order." Another mine was sprung on the east side, and a general attack commenced. A few went gallantly up to the first breach, but fell under a flank fire. On the eastern side some ran up under the walls, and laid hold of the bayonets through the loopholes: these were soon shot down. Another party attacked the Cawnpore Battery. They rushed on with fixed bayonets and trailed arms. They dashed through the stockade, and reached the mound in front of the inner ditch; but no farther; the fire in front and flank was too sharp and telling; the leading men all fell. Again and again the chiefs cried, "Come on, the place is taken!" but those who obeyed were soon driven back. About a hundred got under the Cawnpore Battery, carrying ladders; but a few hand grenades, dropped among them, sent them flying.

In these encounters the enemy lost immense numbers, the killed alone on the 10th amounting to 470 men, by the admission of the natives themselves. "On the 18th of August," says the brigadier's report, "the enemy sprang another mine in front of the Sikh lines with very fatal effect. Captain Orr, Lieutenants Mecham and Soppitt, who commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown into the air; but providentially returned to earth with no further injury than a severe shaking. The garrison, however, were not so fortunate. No less than eleven men were buried alive under the ruins, whence it was impossible to extricate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from houses situated not ten yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty. But they succeeded, under cover of the breach, in establishing themselves in one of the houses in our position, from which they were driven in the evening by the bayonets of her Majesty's 32nd and 84th Foot." The enemy made one more serious assault, this time on the 5th of September. He sprang two mines in succession, and strove to storm into the place. He brought up scaling ladders, and tried to mount, but could not stand against the fire of musketry and the explosion of hand grenades. On this, as on other occasions, he was routed with immense slaughter.

But these actions were not what the garrison had most to dread. The glory of the defence did not lie in these fierce combats, but in the unfaltering fortitude which enabled all to bear the incessant fire, the daily losses, the horrid stench, the ever-present dread of mines, the absence of the common conveniences of life, the want of a knowledge of the events occurring in the outer world, the fear lest all the natives should desert. The unceasing cannonade knocked down the walls, and tore through and through some of the buildings. It seemed as if, by sheer force of heavy shot, the enemy would level the defences in one common ruin. But it is astonishing what an amount of cannonading a clump of well-built houses will bear. The enemy, fortunately, did not possess a good supply of shells, so that the arrival of these destructive missiles was comparatively rare. We had shells, but no howitzer to fire them from, and to supply this want, Lieutenant Bonham ingeniously rigged a carriage for a mortar. It was called "the ship," and did good service in horizontal shell firing. The history of the mining operations is not the least remarkable. The enemy was ever employed in digging and mining all round the place, and hence we were compelled to countermine. Shafts were sunk and galleries run out in the direction of the enemy's mines, that direction being discovered by close observation above, and intense listening under, ground. In this very severe work the Sikhs and Hindostanees behaved extremely well. As there was more skill in the garrison than in the rebel army, so the former were more fortunate in their mines.

The eloquent report of Brigadier Inglis contains at once the most authentic and most touching account of the sufferings and endurance of this illustrious garrison, and we cannot do better than quote it. After a description of the mining operations, he says—"The whole of the officers and men have been on duty night and day during the eighty-seven days which the siege had lasted up to the arrival of Sir J. Outram, G.C.B. In addition to this incessant military duty, the force has been nightly employed in repairing defences, in moving guns, in burying dead animals, in conveying ammunition and commissariat stores from one place to another, and in fatigue duties too numerous and too trivial to enumerate here. I feel, however, that any words of mine will fail to convey any adequate idea of what our fatigues and labours have been—labours in which all ranks and all classes, civilians, officers, and soldiers, have all borne an equally noble part. All have together descended into the mine; all have together handled the shovel for the interment of the putrid bullock; and all, accoutred with musket and bayonet, have relieved each other on sentry without regard to the distinctions of rank, civil or military. Notwithstanding all these hardships, the garrison has made no less than five sorties, in which they spiked two of the enemy's heaviest guns, and blew up several of the houses from which they had kept up the most harassing fire. Owing to the extreme paucity of our numbers, each man was taught to feel that on his own individual efforts alone depended in no small measure the safety of the entire position. This consciousness incited every officer, soldier, and man to defend the post assigned to him with such desperate tenacity, and fight for the lives which Providence had entrusted to his care with such dauntless determination, that the enemy, despite their constant attacks, their heavy mines, their overwhelming numbers, and their incessant fire, could never succeed in gaining one inch of ground within the bounds of this straggling position, which was so feebly fortified that had they once obtained a footing in any of the outposts, the whole place must inevitably have fallen. If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the struggle which we have, under God's blessing, so long and so successfully waged, I would point to the roofless and ruined houses, to the crumbled walls, to the exploded mines, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and defences, and lastly to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted officers and men who have fallen. These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended. During the early part of these vicissitudes we were left without any information whatever regarding the posture of affairs outside. An occasional spy did, indeed, come in, with the object of inducing our Sepoys and native servants to desert; but the intelligence derived from such sources was, of course, entirely untrustworthy. We sent messengers daily, calling for aid and asking for information, none of whom ever returned, until the twenty-sixth day of the siege, when a pensioner, named Ungud, came back, with a letter from General Havelock's camp, informing us that they were advancing with a force sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would be with us in five or six days. A messenger was immediately despatched, requesting that on the evening of their arrival on the outskirts of the city, two rockets might be sent up, in order that we might take the necessary measures for assisting them in forcing their way in. The sixth day, however, expired, and they came not; but for many evenings after officers and men watched for the ascension of the expected rockets, with hopes such as make the heart sick. We knew not then, nor did we learn until the 29th of August, or thirty-five days later, that the relieving force, after having fought most nobly to effect our deliverance, had been obliged to fall back for reinforcements; and this was the last communication we received until two days before the arrival of Sir James Outram on September 25th. Besides heavy visitations of cholera and small-pox, we have also had to contend against a sickness which has almost universally pervaded the garrison. Commencing with a very painful eruption, it has merged into a low fever, combined with diarrhoea; and although few or no men have actually died from its effects, it leaves behind a weakness and lassitude which, in the absence of all material sustenance, save coarse beef and still coarser flour, none have been entirely able to get over.... I cannot refrain from bringing to the prominent notice of his Lordship in Council the patient endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by the women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel struggle. But all such seemed resigned to the will of Providence, and many—among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barbor, and of Gall—have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital."

Sir Colin Campbell had just arrived in Calcutta. When the news of General Anson's death reached London, the name of only one man occurred to the Duke of Cambridge, as that of a soldier fit to restore to us an empire in the East. By a sort of instinct, in moments of real peril, nations select their commanders; and when the Duke of Cambridge sent for Sir Colin Campbell, he only anticipated the national choice of a fit leader. The scene at the Horse Guards was characteristic. The Duke offered the command of the Indian army to the veteran who but a few months before was simply a colonel. Sir Colin accepted the appointment, and when he was asked how soon he would be ready to start, he replied—in four-and-twenty hours. He was as good as his word, and embarking for India at once, arrived in Calcutta on the 13th of August, two months and a half after the death of Anson. But the army he was to command was slowly steaming and sailing round the Cape of Good Hope. The French Emperor had offered to our Government free passage for troops through France, but we had not become so humiliated as a nation as to be in a position to accept that offer, and for the same reason Lord Palmerston rejected the proffered assistance of Belgium from full confidence that Britain "could win off her own bat." Many persons urged the Government to send the Indian reinforcements through Egypt as if Egypt were our own. Had the Government done so, a doubtful precedent would have been set, one that might have provoked unpleasant relations with certain Continental Powers. Therefore the Government wisely sent the troops by the sea route, even though in doubling the Cape an amount of time would be inevitably consumed that could hardly be spared.

As soon as he heard of Sir Colin's arrival, Havelock reported to him, and begged that he might be reinforced. The Indian Government, however, had taken the unusual step of superseding Havelock by Sir James Outram, and left the former to learn his supersession from the columns of the Calcutta Gazette. Havelock felt this keenly, but he was a good soldier, and did not complain. His friends supplied the required amount of indignation, and his biographers, from excusable motives, have not failed to censure the Government. It cannot, however, be contended that there was anything unfit in placing over Havelock the man under whom he had so recently served in Persia.

The position of Havelock at Cawnpore was one of great peril; enemies were accumulating all around him. There was a mutinous force at Futtehpore; the Gwalior Contingent, kept inactive by the skill of Scindia and his able Minister, Dinkur Rao, nevertheless threatened to move on Calpee. The Oude insurgents had occupied the abandoned position at Mungulwar, and scouring the left bank of the Ganges, threatened to strike at his line of communications with Allahabad. Agra, it must be remembered, was beset. Delhi, it should be borne in mind, had not been taken; indeed, Nicholson had only just entered the camp with the movable column. Central India was ablaze with mutiny. To hold Cawnpore we had not more than 1,000 men. Deducting the force required to guard an entrenched position covering the point of passage over the river, and a hundred men sent down the Ganges in a steamer to destroy the boats collected on the Oude bank for an inroad into the Doab at Futtehpore, Havelock could only muster 685 Europeans. Thus it was impossible that he could act in the field. Indeed, at the end of August he was forced to contemplate the fatal step of retreating on Allahabad, unless he were speedily reinforced.

But these reinforcements did not arrive very quickly. As soon as he assumed command, Sir Colin Campbell requested General Outram to push on the 5th and 90th from Behar to Allahabad, together with all the detachments available, as fast as possible. The 90th had no sooner started than the civilians called them back. Then Koer Singh reappeared in the field, and part of the troops destined for Cawnpore had to be detained to watch and counteract him. Moreover, Sir James Outram conceived a new plan of campaign—a march up the Gogra or Goomtee, combined with the advance of Havelock from Cawnpore, instead of the dash of a single column from Cawnpore on Lucknow. To this both Sir Colin and Lord Canning were opposed. And when Sir James Outram heard that Havelock could not hold Cawnpore unless reinforced he gave up his own views at once, and set his face towards Cawnpore. At the same time he apprised Havelock of his approach, and told his old comrade in arms that he would not supersede him. "I shall join you with reinforcements," so ran his message; "but to you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already struggled so much. I shall accompany you as civil commissioner, placing my military service at your disposal, should you please, serving under you as a volunteer." Well might Sir Colin Campbell say, "Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a Commander-in-Chief to publish and confirm such an order."

Outram's column had reached Aong, the scene of one of Havelock's victories, when news arrived that a force from Oude had crossed the Ganges, the forerunner of a regular irruption, intent on interrupting our communications. Sir James saw at once how necessary it would be to put a stop to that, and he detached Major Eyre at the head of 150 men, two guns, and forty native troopers, under Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Charles Havelock, to attack the invaders. Eyre put his infantry on elephants, and, making a rapid march, came upon the enemy at daybreak. Detaching his horsemen, to keep them in play, and urging on his elephants, he found that the enemy had fled to his boats, and that the cavalry were gallantly engaging him and holding him to the shore. The infantry went briskly into action and the guns were brought to bear. The Oude men were smitten with terror, and bundling into the river tried to escape by swimming. So deadly was the fire of grape and musketry that only three men out of the host succeeded in recrossing the Ganges. This was a deadly blow and left a deep impression. Another body had come over, four miles above, and Eyre at once turned upon them; but they had got news of the slaughter of their comrades, and before Eyre could strike them, they had swept back into Oude. Eyre then made a forced march and joined Sir James at Futtehpore.

To this swift and sharp blow the Lower Doab was indebted for future security. The Oude borderers did not again get within reach by attempting to molest the roads in our rear. Sir James Outram reached Cawnpore on the evening of the 15th, and with him came the last of the reinforcements. The two chiefs now had all the men they could possibly obtain. Brigadier Inglis had named the 21st of September as the day he could hold out to. There was no time to be lost. Indeed, Havelock had already begun to take measures for the reconstruction of his bridge of boats. The bridge was established in three days, the enemy watching the operation supinely from Mungulwar. Leaving 400 men to guard the entrenchment at Cawnpore, Havelock on the 19th crossed the Ganges with 3,179 men and 18 guns, confident that, if he arrived in time, he should save the noble Lucknow garrison. The heavy guns and stores for thirteen days were carried over the bridge on the 20th, and on the 21st the army began its march in two brigades, the first under General Neill, the second under Colonel Hamilton, of the 78th.

The progress of the force was far more rapid than that of Havelock when he first crossed into Oude. Moving upon Mungulwar, he found the enemy posted there with six guns. Mindful of former defeats, the enemy made no stand, and being started from cover by the infantry and guns, were chased by Outram with the Volunteer Horse as far as Busserutgunge, where two guns, much ammunition, and a standard were captured. The whole force came up the same night, and slept on the scene of Havelock's three brilliant combats. The next day the troops marched fifteen miles. They found the bridge over the Sye unbroken and they encamped on the opposite bank. On the 23rd, ten miles from the Sye, they found the enemy in position at the Alumbagh. This was a large park or garden, devised as a pleasaunce for one of the favourite wives of a former King of Oude. The park was enclosed by a wall, with turrets at each angle; it was entered by a handsome gateway and contained a large palace.

The enemy had brought up 10,000 men, including 1,500 horse from Lucknow, and supported them with many guns. Part of his front was covered by a morass, his centre stood across the road, and his left was in the Alumbagh. In order to get at him, the whole column had to move along his front under fire, having the water of the swamp between it and the foe. But when once this obstacle was surmounted, and it became possible to open with heavy guns, both artillery and cavalry fell away to the rear in confusion. One gun alone remained. Its gunners were gallant well-trained regulars, and they went through their work without flinching. Suddenly a little band of horse swept down upon them and, closing in, cut them down. It was Lieutenant Johnson and his native irregulars. He was now more than half a mile in front of our line, and of course could not keep the gun, but the enemy did not go near it again. However he put two pieces into the Alumbagh, making holes in the wall, to serve as embrasures. This stood the foe in no stead, for the 5th Foot charged him, and drove him out of the garden and palace. We captured five guns, and pressed the enemy back upon Lucknow, with the Volunteer Horse at his heels.

Havelock was now in actual contact with the assailants of the garrison in Lucknow. He was within sight of the goal he had done so much to reach. It had been comparatively easy to defeat the enemy in the open field. The task of breaking into Lucknow, through its tortuous lanes and mighty buildings, was far more arduous. It had to be undertaken with resolution, but also very circumspectly: it was needful to temper daring with craft.

The 24th was spent by the generals in devising a plan of attack. First, it was wisely proposed to hold the Alumbagh, which thus served as an intermediate base of operations. It was highly defensible, and plentifully supplied with water. All the baggage was to be deposited here, and a garrison of 250 men, under Colonel M'Intyre, was entrusted with the defence. The next step—the choice of a route into Lucknow—was more difficult. One plan was to force the Charbagh Bridge, and to cut a passage to the Residency along the Cawnpore road. This plan was at once abandoned because the route which the column would have to take lay through the heart of the city, and because every yard presented an obstacle. Another plan was to move the whole column to the right, seize the Delkoosha Palace and park, and, under cover of its excellent defences, bridge the Goomtee, throw the column over, and sweeping up the left bank of the river, capture the iron bridge, and so release the garrison.

The actual plan adopted was a compromise between the two. It was resolved that the Charbagh Bridge should be carried, but that, instead of pushing forward into the city, the column should wheel to the right, and fight its way through the palaces and large houses lying to the east of the Residency. There is reason to believe that the second plan would have been adopted, as the safer and less costly in life, but it would have taken some days to execute it, and the latest communications from Brigadier Inglis painted the dangers of the garrison from mines, and the possible defection of the native troops, in such colours, that the idea was abandoned and the deadlier project adopted. Havelock determined to take with him his heavy guns, and well it was that he did so. Therefore, leaving in Alumbagh, including the sick and wounded, about 400 men, the force paraded on the 25th to fight its way into Lucknow.

The troops moved off between eight and nine. First went a brigade of infantry, followed by the guns, under Sir James Outram; then the remainder of the infantry, under Havelock himself. As soon as the skirmishers had passed the picket the column came under fire. But, in spite of this fire, on it swept; and, led by Captain Maude, the artillery got through, but with a loss of a third of the men. On the right was a large garden called the Charbagh, on the left clusters of enclosures, in front the bridge over the canal. The enemy had planted a battery of six guns to defend the bridge, and had filled all the neighbouring houses with infantry. Meeting the storm of shot at a turn in the road, the troops were ordered to lie down until the guns could be got into position. But the narrowness of the road did not enable our artillery captains to place more than two upon it, and with these two Maude contended with six. In order to bring a flank fire to bear on the bridge, Outram led a body of infantry into the Charbagh. The unequal artillery combat continued. Maude's gunners fell rapidly; infantry soldiers replaced them. General Neill, now leading the first brigade, listened anxiously for the sound of Outram's musketry. All was silent in the Charbagh. Feeling that this protracted artillery duel would not help them into Lucknow, Neill resolved to carry the bridge with the bayonet. The word had scarcely been given ere Lieutenant Arnold and a few of the Madras Fusiliers charged on to the bridge. With them went Colonel Tytler and Lieutenant Henry Havelock. The first blast of the enemy's grape swept them all down, Havelock excepted. For a moment he was seen standing alone on the bridge, a target for scores of muskets, waving his sword, and calling to the Madras Fusiliers. The next moment they were with him. With a loud cheer the Fusiliers dashed over the bridge, and bayoneted the gunners at their pieces before they had time to load again. Thus was the bridge of the Charbagh won. Sir James Outram and his men appeared on the bank of the canal just as the guns were captured.

Now the whole column rolled over the bridge. As if they were about to storm along the Cawnpore road, the 78th moved up the street, contending with the enemy in the houses, and occupied its outlet. But this was only a feint. To the surprise of the Sepoys the main column wheeled to the right, and disappeared from view. The baggage followed in a steady stream. Enraged at being thus foiled, the enemy, seeing the Highlanders without support, turned upon them. For three hours the gallant 78th kept the street against all odds. They held the houses at a point where two roads met. When the enemy became too audacious, they sallied out and scared him away. When he brought up two guns, the 78th dashed out of the houses and captured the guns, a feat which won for Captain Macpherson the Victoria Cross. The surgeon of the regiment, Macmaster, was to be seen nobly doing his duties under the hottest fire, and a Cross was granted to him also. At length the last waggon passed over the bridge. Young Havelock, who had been charged with the safety of the convoy, was now shot in the arm, just as he had ordered the 78th to withdraw.

LIEUT. HAVELOCK AND THE MADRAS FUSILIERS CARRYING THE CHARBAGH BRIDGE AT LUCKNOW. (See p. 248.)