THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

The Peace of Zurich—Its Repudiation by Italy—The Idea of a Congress—Garibaldi in Central Italy—The Cession of Nice and Savoy—The Sicilian Expedition—Garibaldi lands at Marsala—Capture of Palermo—The Convention for Evacuation signed—Battle of Milazzo and Evacuation of Messina—Garibaldi master of Sicily—Attempts to prevent the Conquest of Naples—A Landing effected—The victorious March—Flight of the King—Garibaldi occupies Naples—He is warned off Venetia—The Sardinian Troops occupy the Papal States—Battle of the Volturno—Victor Emmanuel's Advance—His Meeting with Garibaldi—Accomplishment of Garibaldi's Programme—Refusal of his Demands—He retires to Caprera—Lord John Russell's Despatch.

PLENIPOTENTIARIES were appointed to arrange the terms of a definitive treaty of peace at Zurich, where they met on the 6th of August, and it was signed on the 11th of November following. The document consisted of three parts, which might be regarded as three distinct treaties, the first containing a conveyance of Lombardy to France, the second a conveyance of the same province from France to Sardinia, and the third re-establishing peace between the three Powers.

The Venetian territory was still in the possession of Austria, with the right of entering into the proposed Italian confederation, under the presidency of the Pope. It was the height of absurdity to suppose that the Pope would ever consent to be the president of any confederation of the kind, or that Venice could derive advantage from the nominal concession of any rights so long as she was subject to the foreign domination of Austria. One of the most unsatisfactory portions of the treaty was the stipulation for the restoration of the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena to their dominions, from which they had fled in consternation, their subjects having revolted, almost to a man, against them. According to the Treaty of Villafranca, and the state of things which it recognised, the whole gain to Italy resulting from the war was the rescuing of Lombardy from Austria and annexing it to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel. This was no doubt a great advantage—an important accession to the cause of constitutional government; but as the fortresses of Austria still menaced the independence of Piedmont, the whole results were in the highest degree disappointing, not only to the people of North Italy, but to the provinces that had thrown off the yoke of their petty princes and had already established provisional governments. In rapid succession Parma, Modena, and Tuscany voted for annexation to Italy, and the Papal States were evidently ripe for revolt.

In the midst of his perplexities Napoleon caught at the idea of a European Congress in order to prevent his treaty from becoming mere waste paper. The idea was highly unacceptable to the British Cabinet, which believed the Italian confederation to be a wholly unworkable plan. Lord Palmerston bitterly remarked that "l'Italie rendue À ellemÊme" had become "l'Italie vendue À l'Autriche," and Lord John Russell bluntly informed the Austrian Court that every free Italian State had a right to decide its own destiny. Queen Victoria was inclined to favour the Austrian position, deeming that the language used by her Ministers was much too strong, and even went so far as to appeal from Lord John and Palmerston to the Cabinet as a whole. They were compelled to inform her that unless their views were adopted they would have no alternative but to resign their offices. Presently events began to favour Lord John's policy. In order to reconcile the British Government to the idea of a Congress, Napoleon III. declared himself ready to constitute a confederation without Austria, and added that he had no intention of employing force to restore the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena. Lord John thereupon informed the Sardinian Envoy that the defence of Tuscany from internal disorder would be perfectly legitimate, and the advice was promptly acted upon, in spite of the indignation of Napoleon. Further, in September Austria admitted that she was not prepared to use force. So that when the invitations for a Congress were issued shortly after the signature of the treaty, it was clear its meeting would be perfectly futile if the treaty was to be taken as a basis of discussion. This Napoleon saw and, though the British Government accepted the invitation, the Emperor gave the project its death-blow by causing an adverse pamphlet to be written, entitled "Le Pape et le CongrÈs." In his subtle machinations he had been foiled by one man, and that man was the simple-minded Garibaldi.

Amidst all that was doubtful, ambiguous, or perplexing in the Italian revolution, which resulted so happily in the establishment of the Kingdom of United Italy under the constitutional government of Victor Emmanuel, there was at least one character which always appeared without a shadow—which shone with unclouded lustre to the end. Garibaldi was the real hero of the Italian war. He was the man of action who realised the great thoughts of Mazzini. If the latter was the first to conceive the idea of Italian unity, it was the former that made it a fact. The campaign of the hero in the Valteline displayed uniformly the qualities of a great general and extorted the admiration of the enemy. The Austrian officers encamped on the Stelvio spoke of him in the highest terms of praise and thought him a truly wonderful man; as for the Croats, they firmly believed that he was the son of the devil. Garibaldi, it may well be supposed, felt as deeply as Cavour the blow inflicted on the hitherto triumphant cause of his country by the French Emperor in the Treaty of Villafranca. When Cavour resigned, the General went to the King to give up his commission, with all the officers of his corps; but Victor Emmanuel said—"No; Italy still requires the legions you command, and you must remain." Garibaldi consented. Then followed in Italian affairs a period of uncertainty, perplexity, confusion, and mystery. The "Ratazzi Ministry had no settled plans, and not knowing what was best to do, did nothing." The Sardinian envoys were recalled from the duchies and the Romagna; Garibaldi was requested to resign the command of the Æmilian army; the vote of the different provincial Parliaments for annexation to Sardinia was neither refused nor accepted; the nomination of Prince Carignano to the regency of the provinces was declined after England had refused her armed support, and Buoncompagni, who had not been asked for, was sent in his stead. The organisation of the Sardinian army also was neglected, and the incorporation of the Lombard provinces with Piedmont was conducted so inefficiently as to cause great discontent. At this juncture the volunteers were thrown into Tuscany. Wherever Garibaldi went in his tour of inspection, the inhabitants received him with unbounded joy. He accepted all the demonstrations gladly, as inspired by devotion to their country and loyalty to Victor Emmanuel; but this did not save him from the jealousy of the generals of the regular army, particularly La Marmora, who refused to recognise Garibaldi's nominations, and gave orders to dismiss all the volunteers from Central Italy, that they might serve in their own province. It is stated that as many as 18,000 or 20,000 of these passed through Modena; but not one could be induced to enter the regular army, so sickened were they of their Piedmontese experience; but all were ready to follow Garibaldi. General Fanti, who had resigned the chief command of the army, became Minister of War at Modena, and thwarted Garibaldi in every possible manner; going so far as even to send confidential messages to his officers, warning them not to execute his orders. These studied annoyances were designed to cause the high-spirited General to give up his command, in compliance, it is believed, with the desire of the French Emperor. In consequence of these intrigues Garibaldi retired, but by that time the unity of Central Italy with Sardinia was practically secure.

In January, 1860, the Ratazzi Cabinet resigned, being indignant at Lord John Russell's suggestion that Cavour should come to Paris and London, "congress or no congress"; and Count Cavour was charged with the formation of a new Ministry. At the general election Garibaldi was returned as a member of the Chamber for Nice, his native city, the authorities, at the same time, presenting him with a sword of honour. Soon after the conclusion of peace, rumours were rife that Nice and Savoy were to be surrendered to France, as a reward for her services. This was deemed incredible, for the French Emperor had emphatically disclaimed any interested motives or any desire for the acquisition of territory, and it could not be supposed that Victor Emmanuel would ever consent to alienate the cradle of his dynasty. When Cavour was questioned on the subject by Garibaldi, he distinctly denied that he had ever dreamt of such a thing. This denial was often repeated; but when the fact of a secret compact to this effect became notorious, the Emperor authorised Lord John Russell to assure the House of Commons that, however confident in the justice of his claim, he would not take any step to carry it into effect without first consulting the Great Powers of Europe. Yet he shortly afterwards quietly entered into possession without troubling them on the subject. Not a word of discussion on the matter was permitted by Cavour in the Sardinian Chamber; and without any appeal to his Parliament, the King withdrew his governors and his troops; whereupon Savoy and Nice were immediately occupied by French soldiers. On the 12th of April Garibaldi, in his place in the Chamber, made an attempt to defeat the scheme by showing that the transfer of territory without the consent of Parliament was unconstitutional and illegal. His motion was lost; but his effort to save the fair city—an Italian city that had fought for the common cause—won for him an enthusiastic reception from the people outside, by whom he was actually carried away in triumph. The first act of the Italian Parliament was to ratify the sale of the people of Nice. This transaction caused an irreconcilable breach between Garibaldi and Cavour. Lord John Russell launched a vigorous protest against the annexation and the doctrine of "natural frontiers," which Napoleon enunciated in its defence, but his remonstrances in the nature of things went unheeded, even though his declarations in the House of Commons were outspoken in the extreme. "But this means war," said General Flahault to Palmerston. "Very well," was the reply, "if it is war, it is war." Things, however, took their natural course, though Russell's language undoubtedly prevented French intervention in the events that we are about to relate, and therefore helped freedom's cause.

The Romans and Venetians were still in bondage, and there seemed as yet no way opened for their liberation. The former were kept down by a powerful French garrison, which could be increased to any extent at the shortest notice; the latter dwelt under the shadows of the Quadrilateral, the strongest fortresses in the world, and Austria was determined to hold that province with its seaboard at any cost. But it occurred to Garibaldi and his friends that something might be done to overthrow the feeble government of the King of Naples in Sicily. Mazzini had sent an agent there, who reported that it would be dangerous to attempt anything in that quarter. Still, there was a chance that if Garibaldi placed himself at the head of an expedition to that island, the immense prestige of his character, and the magic of his name, might work wonders amongst the people. Mazzini took this view, and promised the support of the secret societies, with all the funds he could collect in England and other countries. The General had resigned his commission in the Piedmontese service, and was therefore free to act independently. We must assume that the Government of Victor Emmanuel considered this attempt of Garibaldi extremely rash and hopeless. Whatever might be their motives, they did all in their power to prevent the enterprise. They accordingly seized upon the funds and the arms that had been deposited at Genoa and Milan, and neither arms nor money were ever afterwards restored to Garibaldi. This was a great discouragement, as the supplies that had been collected were far too scanty. Garibaldi had only 1,000 volunteers, while the military force with which his expedition would have to contend consisted of twelve times as many well-appointed regular troops. With his small army, numbering not more than a single regiment, he started from a country house near Genoa on the night of the 5th of May, 1860, to make war against the King of Naples, with whom his own Sovereign was at peace. Two steamers, with appropriate names—the Piedmonte and Lombardo—were seized by the volunteers in the roadstead at Genoa, and steaming along the coast, they picked up their comrades at the points previously fixed upon. The Sardinian Government, hearing of the embarkation, immediately sent out the fast screw frigate Maria Adelaide, under the orders of Admiral Persano, in pursuit of the expedition. Lord John Russell did not altogether approve of the enterprise; nevertheless he declined to interfere, and warned Napoleon that the annexation of Sardinia by France as compensation "would be viewed with extreme displeasure by Great Britain."

The "thousand heroes" steered their course to the harbour of Marsala, where the men had just time to land on the 11th of May, and get their guns and stores on shore, before two Neapolitan ships, which were pursuing at full speed, could come within reach. Some broadsides were fired at the Garibaldians, but without effect. Sicily had been prepared for the advent of the deliverer. Some partial attempts to effect a revolution had been crushed with great brutality by the Neapolitan troops, but the effect was to extend throughout the island the spirit of revolt. The Neapolitan army was commanded by General Lanza, who, in an order of the day, proclaimed his intention to extinguish the firebrand of Italy, the outlawed filibuster of South America. Nothing daunted by this bravado, Garibaldi, on the 15th of May, attacked the enemy in their strong positions. The battle lasted three hours; Garibaldi had 200 men hors de combat, while his son Menotti, and the son of the great Manin, and Baron Stocco were amongst the wounded. From Calatafimi to Palermo, the liberators marched on, fighting and conquering, and carrying out, under the guidance of Garibaldi, the most admirable strategical plans. The General, after crossing the mountains, feigned a hasty retreat, which so completely deceived the Neapolitan generals in that quarter that they telegraphed to Lanza at Palermo, stating that Garibaldi had fled and that his troops were being utterly demoralised. But on the morning of the 27th the Commander-in-Chief received, while yet in bed, the startling intelligence that the despised "filibuster" was encamped in the vicinity of that city. It was defended by 12,000 troops. In less than four hours they were dislodged from their positions. Before night Garibaldi was in possession of the whole of the town, with the exception of the royal palace, its immediate vicinity, and the forts, from which, as well as from the Neapolitan ships hard by, a shower of projectiles fell upon the Italians, for the enemy had opened fire upon the city in spite of the energetic protest of the English Rear-Admiral Mundy. The result of this marvellous success was a conference with Garibaldi, which was held on board the British flagship Hannibal on the 30th of May, in presence of the French, American, and Sardinian naval commanders. An armistice was agreed to, and ultimately a convention, signed on the 6th of June, by which the Neapolitans were to evacuate Palermo, and the whole of Sicily, except Messina, Melazza, and some other less important fortresses. The Italians paid a just tribute to the humanity, energy, and diplomatic skill of Admiral Mundy, but for whose exertions the city would have been almost totally destroyed by a treacherous bombardment after the hour for a conference had been fixed.

The next step in Garibaldi's liberating progress was to dislodge the enemy from Milazzo. The garrison was commanded by General Bosco, who had under him four regiments of rifles, numbering 4,800 men; the 15th Regiment of the line, 1,000 strong; two squadrons of dragoons, five pieces of artillery, and twelve field pieces, all remarkably well mounted. He had, besides, every advantage in point of position. Garibaldi's forces were greatly inferior in point of numbers, amounting to only about 4,400 men, with three guns, two of them old ship twelve-pounders, and a six-pounder, cast in the seventeenth century. But his little army was enthusiastic and daring, having unbounded confidence in its chivalrous leader, and after a tough battle the enemy was thoroughly beaten. The Dictator, for so Garibaldi styled himself, had now learned, from an intercepted letter, that the King of Naples, despairing of Sicily, had ordered his troops to evacuate the island. He therefore resolved to prevent the departure of the troops, and to force the garrison of Messina to come to terms, to which the general agreed without difficulty, signing a convention, by which he surrendered the town and all the forts, except the citadel. Messina and the harbour were to be respected, and no bombardment was to take place without provocation on the part of the Garibaldians; the towns of Syracuse and Augusta were also to be evacuated by the royal troops; thus Garibaldi became master of Sicily, and had obtained from the enemy large supplies of war material to enable him to effect the liberation of Naples.

In the meantime the King, alarmed at the progress of revolution, and fearing the loss of his throne, supplicated the interposition of the French Emperor, promising a constitution and all sorts of reforms. Napoleon, therefore, wrote in very urgent terms to Victor Emmanuel, deprecating the invasion of Naples. In consequence of this interposition, Count Litta was sent to remonstrate with Garibaldi. Garibaldi resolved to disobey the royal injunctions. He wrote a reply full of devotion and affection, in which he declared nothing on earth should influence him to swerve from his mission till it was accomplished—until he made his Majesty King of United Italy. Napoleon then had recourse to England, and suggested that France and Great Britain should combine to stop Garibaldi's passage. Lord John Russell, however, declined to accede to this view and Naples was left to its fate by the Powers.

On the 18th of August Garibaldi embarked, with an expedition of 4,000 men, for the conquest of a kingdom defended by a well-organised army of at least 80,000. He surprised Reggio, whose garrison capitulated and was placed on board the Neapolitan ships. As the liberating army advanced, Garibaldi and his officers everywhere out-manoeuvred the Neapolitans, giving them to understand that a small reconnoitring band was but the advanced guard of a powerful army and inducing them to retire or surrender. Garibaldi pursued his conquering march with the utmost rapidity. On arriving at Monteleone he found that the Neapolitan corps under General Ghio had decamped the evening before. Hastening on to Tiriolo, he was joyfully greeted by the National Guards. At Savoria a sudden attack spread terror amongst the royal troops, though the town contained 7,000 infantry, with cavalry and artillery. Colonel Peard was sent forward to General Ghio to demand that he should capitulate, to which he assented without any difficulty. At length the Liberator arrived at Salerno, which was his last resting-place before entering the capital. On the 5th of September it was decided that the King and Queen with their court should quit Naples and retire to Gaeta, leaving their loyal Ministers and generals to defend the capital and throne as well as they could. As soon as the King had departed, the Ministers who had been left to preserve order held a meeting, and decided that a deputation should proceed at once to Salerno, and make arrangements for the public entry of Garibaldi into the capital. "The warrior of Freedom" made his entrance into Naples accompanied only by a few followers. He passed unguarded under the guns of Castel Nuovo and St. Elmo, still garrisoned by the troops of the departed King. As his carriage advanced with difficulty through the applauding multitude the crowd grew thicker and thicker. At last the hero arrived at the Palace of Forestiera, where he was received by the National Guard and the Municipal Council. In compliance with the demand of the people, he immediately showed himself on the balcony and delivered a brief address, in which he told them that they must prove to Italy that they were the worthy descendants of Massaniello. The Neapolitan garrison, however, which still held the fortress of St. Elmo, overlooking and commanding the town, occasioned much anxiety, as the troops remained faithful to the King and might possibly bombard the city. But the alarm was set at rest by the capitulation of the garrison. So far everything went well; but Garibaldi could not organise a government and began to squabble with Mazzini as to the destiny of his conquests. Should they be surrendered to Victor Emmanuel or should they be a republic?

Here the British Government wisely interposed. On the 9th of September, Mr. Elliot, the British Minister at Naples, received a telegram from Lord John Russell, desiring him to express to General Garibaldi the hope that no attack would be made upon Venetia. On September 10th General Garibaldi and Mr. Elliot met on board the Hannibal at eleven o'clock. "After I had made her Majesty's Minister and the Dictator acquainted with each other," wrote Admiral Mundy, "I requested the latter to desire his attendant staff to leave the cabin, as Mr. Elliot was desirous of a private conversation, and Captain Farquhar took them on the lower deck to watch the gunnery exercise. Mr. Elliot having expressed to General Garibaldi the astonishment with which, in common with all the world, he had witnessed the marvellous results he had accomplished with such trifling means, informed him that though he could have no official relations with him, he should remain at Naples until he received further instructions from her Majesty's Government. This information appeared to give great satisfaction to the Dictator, who said he fully understood that official intercourse was not practicable. Mr. Elliot then informed him that Lord John Russell had charged him to express the hope that no attack would be made on Venetia, as, in his lordship's opinion, it would be calculated to bring the greatest calamities upon Italy. Garibaldi replied by stating that he would make no concealment of his plans, which were plain and straightforward. He intended to push on at once to Rome, and there place the crown of United Italy on the head of King Victor Emmanuel, upon whom would devolve the task of the liberation of Venetia, and in which he would himself be but the lieutenant of his Majesty. If that liberation could be accomplished by purchase or by negotiation, so much the better. He added that he was sure that Lord John Russell, in counselling the abandonment of Venetia, did not fairly represent the generous feelings of the people of England towards the Italian nation, although he cheerfully recognised the obligation Italy was under to her Majesty's Government for the sympathy they had exhibited with regard to Rome." Nevertheless the warning, accompanied by another to the King of Sardinia, was not without its effect.

The speedy annexation of Naples to Piedmont was most desirable; and the main difficulty that stood in the way was the antagonism between Garibaldi and Cavour. The former wrote to the King requesting that the obnoxious Minister might be removed from office; but Victor Emmanuel answered that he could not, as a constitutional Sovereign, withdraw a Minister who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of his subjects. Garibaldi, however, lost no time in making all necessary arrangements for the annexation, which was hastened by the march of events in another quarter. The celebrated French General, LamoriciÈre, had tendered his sword to the Pope and had organised an army of volunteers which began to assume alarming proportions. Garibaldi would have marched to meet this new enemy and would have attacked Rome. The French garrison of that city must then have interfered and France would have been forced into actual war against the liberators of Italy. This complication of circumstances led the Emperor to consent to the invasion of the Papal States by Victor Emmanuel, which was the very thing that Cavour desired. Consequently, with but a few days' notice, the Sardinian army crossed the Papal frontier, scattered LamoriciÈre's forces, compelling himself to fly for safety, and added some of the finest provinces in Italy to the new Italian kingdom.

Towards the middle of September Garibaldi had permanently established his headquarters in the magnificent palace of Caserta, the summer residence of the ex-royal family. The organisation of the army was his first care after his arrival in Naples. Altogether Garibaldi could muster an army of 37,000 men by the middle of September. He distributed his forces so as to be in a position to be able to repel any attack that might be made by the Royalists, and to be at the same time free to cross the Volturno and assume the offensive. Up to September the 17th there had been no encounter between the two armies but slight skirmishes, in which the Royalists were invariably worsted. On that day Garibaldi ordered a forward movement, which was conducted by Colonel Turr, and was followed by an attack upon Capua. In presence of the advancing column of Major Cattabene, the enemy abandoned the town of Cajazzo, a strong position which the Garibaldians were thus enabled to occupy. But they were only 600 in number, and separated by a river from their base of operations, which was four miles distant. Two days afterwards they were attacked by an overwhelming force, which cut off half their number and took the major prisoner to Capua. This unfortunate affair, which occurred on the 19th, was only a preliminary encounter. The advance of the Piedmontese army through the Papal States, threatening the rear of the Neapolitans, compelled them to assume the offensive against Garibaldi. It was consequently determined by a council of war that, on the 1st of October, the whole army should cross the Volturno at different points and fall upon the Garibaldian lines. The principal attack was directed against Garibaldi's line between Santa Maria and St. Angelo. It was vigorously conducted, and well supported by powerful artillery; but the military genius of Garibaldi and the enthusiasm of his troops prevailed, though the victory was by no means decisive. The remnant of the royal forces were withdrawn to Gaeta.

The advance of Victor Emmanuel's army on the Garigliano decided the fate of Southern Italy and of the Bourbon dynasty. It seemed rather a triumphal progress than a contest between two fighting armies. A Sardinian division under General de Sonaz landed at Manfredonia on the 14th of October, and marched on Maddaloni; while the main body of the Sardinian army, under General Cialdini, was pushing on from the Abruzzi towards Capua, compelling the Neapolitans to fall back on Gaeta. Garibaldi had, meantime, concentrated his forces at Calvi, whence he sent Colonel Missori to convey his respects to Victor Emmanuel at Teana. The King received Missori most affectionately, evincing the liveliest interest in the army of Garibaldi and complimenting the gallant envoy on his own exploits at Melazzo. It was agreed that the King should meet the Dictator next day at the foot of a hill called Santa Maria della Croce. The two great leaders of Italian unity cordially shook hands, and showed by their faces that the action was the expression of a true sentiment of affection on Garibaldi's part, and of the greatest admiration on the part of the King. The King complimented the General by saying that without his daring expedition the unity of Italy would not be a reality for ten years to come. "It may be, sire," answered Garibaldi; "but I could not have attempted my expedition had not Victor Emmanuel been the most noble and generous of kings."

The triumphs of the Piedmontese army were rapid. The earthworks were stormed, the Garigliano was crossed, and the main body of the Neapolitan army was driven back to Gaeta. Capua having been bombarded for forty-eight hours, the garrison surrendered on the 2nd of November, yielding almost without conditions. Meanwhile, universal suffrage had declared Victor Emmanuel King of the Two Sicilies; there being but about 10,000 votes for the Bourbon, against 1,300,000. The task of Garibaldi was now gloriously accomplished; his programme, as conqueror and Dictator, exactly fulfilled. On the 7th of November Victor Emmanuel made his triumphal entry into Naples. The General now asked three things of the King, in return for the two crowns he had given him, namely: first, to be appointed Governor of Southern Italy for three years; secondly, that the decrees he had signed during his dictatorship should be ratified, so far as they were in accordance with the constitutional laws of the country; and thirdly, that the rank conferred by him, in virtue of his dictatorship of the Two Sicilies, on his companions in arms, should be recognised by the new Italian Government. A peremptory refusal was given to the first request, which, indeed, it was impossible to grant. The two last the King's Ministers were disposed to grant, but upon certain conditions to be named by themselves. In the end, the King renewed the royal promise he had previously made, that Garibaldi's volunteers should be incorporated with the regular army, and be subject to the scrutiny of a mixed commission—a promise that was afterwards broken by his Ministers. In these circumstances it is not surprising that Garibaldi declined all the offers afterwards made to him and retired, poor and unrewarded, to Caprera. Although the task of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel was accomplished, yet the diplomatic situation was gloomy in the extreme. Napoleon III. sent a threatening squadron of ships in order to avert, if possible, the surrender of the final stronghold of the Neapolitans at Gaeta, but the Italian army persisted in the siege and the demonstration was a complete failure. Then France and Spain withdrew their Ministers from Turin; Austria and Prussia expressed their indignation and displeasure, and Russia followed suit by directing her Minister to depart. Lord John Russell thereupon wrote a famous despatch, dated the 27th of October, 1860. He declined to follow in the wake of the Powers, and after asserting that the people of Naples and the Roman States had taken up arms for good reasons, concluded with these stirring words—"Such having been the causes and concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy, her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient grounds for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe."