THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

Changes in the Allied Camp—Advance upon the Malakoff and Redan—Attempt to raise the Siege—Prince Gortschakoff determines to Attack—The Allied Camp on the Tchernaya—Gortschakoff's Reinforcements—The Russian Plan—The Allies partially surprised—Read's Precipitation—Check of the Russian Attack—The French Counter-stroke—Gortschakoff changes his Front—A last Effort—The Battle is won—Allied Losses—Progress of the Siege—The French sap towards the Malakoff—The British Bombardment—The Covering Army—The Allies on the alert—Combats before the Malakoff—The Crisis arrives—Gortschakoff secures his Retreat—Council of September 3rd—Plan of Attack—The Last Bombardment—The Hour of Attack—Disposition of the Allied Troops—The Russians—The Signal—Assault of the Malakoff—Description of the Works—MacMahon and Vinoy—Failures upon the Curtain and Little Redan—MacMahon is Impregnable—Failure to take the Redan—Evening—Gortschakoff's Retreat—End of the Siege.

GENERAL JAMES SIMPSON succeeded to the command of the British army, and General Barnard became Chief of the Staff. Captain Keppel succeeded Captain, now Admiral, Sir Stephen Lushington in the command of the Naval Brigade. Sickness also drove home Sir Richard England, and Sir William Eyre took the 3rd Division. Lieutenant-General Markham, coming from India (there was a clamour for the appointment of Indian officers), succeeded to the 2nd Division, and Sir William Codrington to the Light Division. In the French camp there had been some changes. General Canrobert was recalled to France. General Bosquet reassumed the command of the French troops on the right, and General Herbillon, as senior officer present there, commanded the French on the Tchernaya.

The great object of the Allies was now to press as closely as possible to the body of the place. The French had begun to see distinctly that the Malakoff was the key of the whole defences on the eastern side, and that, with the fall of that redoubt, the town and the western side would be untenable. Accordingly, they continued with vigour the works of approach begun after the capture of the Mamelon. They descended the eastern slope of this hillock, burrowing in the ground where the soil was soft, planting gabions and piling up sand-bags, and using blasting powder where it was hard and rocky. Day after day the space between the Mamelon and Malakoff showed signs of their labours; the works on the Careening Ridge were extended and strengthened; and the whole front protected by being tied together by a connecting parallel. But the loss of men was very great. The fire of guns and mortars, although not heavy, was constant, and the shells, flung with low charges from a short distance, burst in the parallels and batteries, and among the working parties, with destructive effect. The labour required was prodigious; for every approach had to be protected by traverses from an enfilading fire. The watchful eyes of Todleben were never turned from the works of the Allies, and as fast as they projected a new approach, he found means of taking it in flank or raking it from his side. Unseen mortars, far in the rear, sent their shells into the Allied works. The steamers were still active, and, although they were frequently fired at, yet they were rarely, if ever, hit. Then the fire of musketry was incessant, and so from shell, and shot, and bullet the soldiers in the trenches lost numbers night and day. The British were quite unable to work the rocky soil in front of the Quarries. They pushed out but a little way under an irregular but searching fire of shells, flung in clusters of eight or ten and sometimes twelve at a time. The engineers were chiefly engaged in enlarging and strengthening the works, and in placing a still heavier armament in the batteries. The British loss was also very large—between thirty and forty men per diem were put hors de combat.

So, through the month of July and the beginning of August, these deadly labours were continued, and the Allies crept nearer and nearer to the Malakoff and the Redans, and to the ramparts on the western face. In the meantime came reports that the Russian Government, determined to strike one blow for victory, had directed several divisions from Poland towards the Crimea. These reports were true. An effort was about to be made to raise the siege. As no attack could be made from the head of the harbour, it was plain that the covering army would be assailed from the Heights of Mackenzie and the Valley of Chouliou; wherefore the Sardinian infantry from Tchorgoun made several excursions into the hilly region to the north-east, yet they found no enemy. The Turks also entered the mountains, and the French cavalry in the Baidar Valley kept an eye on all the rugged passes leading into that fertile spot. They found no enemies in force, and they obtained from the valley a boundless supply of forage. But in the beginning of August it was observed that the Russians were constructing new works on the road from the Tchernaya to the Heights of Mackenzie, at points whence they could fire into the front and flanks of an advancing column. Clusters of Cossacks came down more frequently to the brow of the hills, gazed curiously into the valley, and sometimes skirmished with the French outposts. Small parties of the same useful troops hung about the French cavalry camps in the Baidar Valley, and one or two were caught by the active Chasseurs d'Afrique. From the end of the first week in August the Allies were on the look-out for an assault in force upon the Tchernaya.

It was the fact that Prince Gortschakoff, having received large reinforcements, in obedience to orders from St. Petersburg—for the Emperor on the Neva, like the Emperor on the Seine, interfered in the conduct of the war—proposed to assail the Allies. He was painfully aware of the strength of their position. He knew the ground. It had long been visible to him throughout its whole extent. He could see the Sardinian entrenchments from the heights above Tchorgoun, and his very batteries could almost reach the French camps from the heights of Inkermann. He had two batteries, called by the French Gringalet and Bilboquet, upon these heights, whose missiles amused the French outposts, and sometimes annoyed them, but seldom did any harm. Knowing the ground well, and the strength of the force holding it, he designed a clever plan of attack, based on that knowledge, but depending entirely for success upon a surprise, followed by rapid movements urged on without hesitation.

The French were encamped on the crown of the Fedoukine hills. Their outposts on the left, or western side, were on the banks of the Tchernaya, and they held an angular entrenchment or redan on the right bank, to defend the access to the bridge. The valley in front of the French camps, looking north, was a meadowy plain, through which ran the road to the Heights of Mackenzie and Inkermann. The troops occupying this position were seven battalions of Turks, with four guns, whose duty it was to watch the ford of Alsou, and guard the course of the Tchernaya thence to the confluence of the Kreuzen, having ten battalions in support near Kamara, on the other side of the affluent. Next, the Sardinians under La Marmora, consisting of the divisions of Durando and Trotti, encamped on the Hasfort Hill, and in the plain the cavalry under Saviroux. The Sardinians had thirty guns, and a British battery of position, 32-pounder howitzers, under Captain Mowbray. Then came the three French divisions—that of Fancheux on the right, that of Herbillon in the centre, that of Camou on the left. The French cavalry, Morris's division, were encamped in the plain on the left of the Sardinians. The artillery park was in the rear of the Fedoukine heights. General Herbillon commanded the whole. Five brigades held the heights, and one occupied the eastern slopes of Mount Sapoune, and thus connected the army of observation with the corps engaged in pushing the attacks against the Malakoff. Including the British cavalry, 3,000 strong, there were nearly 40,000 men and 120 guns in line between Alsou and Mount Sapoune.

The information brought in by our spies and the reports of deserters had led the allied generals to look either for a sortie from the town, or for an attack on the line of the Tchernaya. On the 14th of August the troops in camp were under arms before daybreak, but nothing occurred on one side or the other. On the 15th more positive news arrived. General d'Allonville from the Baidar Valley notified by the semaphore that he had troops in front of him, or rather that his patrols had discovered bodies of the enemy moving down into the Valley of Chouliou. Signal lights flashed from Mackenzie to Inkermann, and from Inkermann to Sebastopol. An ostentatious gathering of troops in rear of the Redan and Malakoff was discovered from the tops of our men-of-war, and at the same time a suspicious movement of Russians towards Inkermann. All the commanders were warned, and orders were issued to be more than usually vigilant; General La Marmora directing his brigades to get under arms before daylight the next morning.

Prince Gortschakoff had, indeed, resolved to surprise if he could, if not, to force, the line of the Tchernaya. His reinforcements consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 7th divisions of infantry. To these he was able to add the 17th, 12th, 6th, and 11th; of these the 11th, 12th, and 17th had long been in the Crimea, and had fought at the Alma and Inkermann; but the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th were fresh troops, which had arrived recently from Poland and Bessarabia. In fact, as soon as it was certain that Austria did not mean to fight, the Czar put in motion all the troops that could be spared from the Austrian frontiers. Had all these divisions been in full strength, Prince Gortschakoff could have brought into line 78,000 infantry alone. But long marches had weakened some regiments, and others had suffered great losses in the field and the trenches; and instead of 78,000, he could only dispose of 50,900 infantry. To support them he had 7,200 cavalry, chiefly regulars, and 262 guns; in all about 60,000 men.

The plan of the Russian general was to move the bulk of his force, on the night of the 15th, by the roads leading from the Mackenzie Heights into lower ground, while two divisions marched from Korales down the Valley of Chouliou, and joined the left of the main body above Tchorgoun. The right column he entrusted to General Read. It consisted of the 7th and 12th divisions, and sixty-two guns. The left was under the orders of Liprandi, and was composed of the 5th, 17th, and 6th, and some ninety cannon. The 11th and 4th were in reserve, and remained so. General Liprandi led the way. On quitting the defile he was to move to his left, and before daylight drive the Sardinian outposts from the Mamelon, occupy that hill, and also the heights above Tchorgoun and Karlovka. The object of this was to give the Russians a good site, whence they might cannonade Mount Hasfort, and cover an infantry attack on that position. While Liprandi formed on the Sardinian Mamelon, Read was to bring his two divisions into line, but out of range; hold himself prepared to storm the Fedoukine heights, but not to make that attempt until he got orders to do so from Prince Gortschakoff.

All night on the 15th the Russian columns were moving silently down the steep road from Mackenzie, along the wooded valley of Chouliou, spreading out over the slopes, and pushing nearer and nearer to the outposts and patrols of the Allies. While this formidable host was approaching, the allied soldiers were asleep, and only the usual guards were under arms, and the usual patrols were moving across the front. Before daylight, however, the Sardinians got under arms; but the French do not appear to have turned out earlier than usual. Long security had bred confidence, and no doubt they relied upon their advanced posts, and not without reason. A thick fog hid everything in the valley, and hung heavily over the low meadows on both sides of the Tchernaya. Under cover of this, Prince Gortschakoff had got his troops into the positions he had designed them to occupy.

But the sentries were on the alert. There was a splutter of musketry in front of the bridge—a French patrol had stumbled in the fog upon the skirmishers of Read! Then followed a few reports near the Sardinian outpost, and a quick fire of musketry. General La Marmora, with great promptitude, sent a support across the Tchernaya to aid the riflemen on the Mamelon in delaying the advance of the enemy, while he made his final preparations. Liprandi had, while it was still dark, brought up such a heavy force, that although the Sardinians stood their ground with great gallantry, they were so pressed on all sides as to be forced out of their entrenchments, and were retiring down the hill as the support came up. The whole then gave ground before the enemy, and fell back upon the rocky elevation in front of the left of the Sardinian line, whence they were not expelled.

In the meantime the guns of Liprandi and Read were both in action; and the whole line of the Allies began to seize their arms and form. Morris's Chasseurs d'Afrique, 2,400 strong, formed between the left of the Sardinians and the right of the French, one regiment being at the head of the defile leading to the bridge. Saviroux's Sardinian cavalry, 300 men, came up on their right; and General Scarlett, turning out the British cavalry, a splendid force, 3,000 strong, moved them across the plain, and drew up in rear of the French and Italian squadrons. The Turkish and Sardinian guns were answering the fire of Liprandi's artillery; and two French batteries were ready to engage Read. So thick was the fog that the enemy's troops were still invisible, and pending the development of their attack, Generals La Marmora and Herbillon simply reinforced their outposts. Prince Gortschakoff has stated that about this time he had ridden on to the Sardinian Mamelon to survey the ground, and proceed with the execution of his original plan. While he was meditating and trying to pierce through the fog, he heard a violent fire of musketry on his right. General Read, without orders, as his superior officer avers, had begun the attack, and frustrated the whole scheme. From this moment the battle of the Tchernaya was a battle mainly between the French and Russians; the former, however, being assisted by the deadly fire of the British and Sardinian guns.

The Russian cannonade had thoroughly roused the French, but uncertain from what quarter the real attack of the enemy would come, the brigades were kept drawn up near their camps, ready to move in any direction. Suddenly dark masses were seen dimly through the mist moving down on the Tchernaya. They came on with great resolution, and very fast. At one and the same moment a column from the 12th Division assailed the bridge, and another from the 7th attacked the French left. The onset was so impetuous that the French outposts were at once thrust away from the river all along the line, and forced over the aqueduct. The advance of the 7th Division had been equally successful. Issuing from the fog, boldly passing the river, closing in from all sides on the French, the latter, outnumbered, were compelled to retire with all speed up the slopes of the Fedoukine hills. Now the tide of combat was going to change. In crossing the aqueduct the Russians had lost their regular formation, and they had to recover it as well as they could under a heavy fire. Thus their charge was stopped at the moment when victory depended upon its continuance; and while the troops in their front kept them in play, the French generals were executing movements intended to effect a bloody counter-stroke. The column of the 7th Division fell first under this calamity. They had crossed the river and aqueduct with comparatively little opposition, apparently only that of the outposts and the supports. They were advancing up the hill, when General Wimpfen, who commanded a brigade of General Camou's division, sent the 3rd Zouaves to check them. This brought the Russians to a stand. The heavy column, growing vaster as the men scrambling over the aqueduct came up, gave and received a telling fire, but did not advance. All this time, by the orders of Wimpfen, a battalion of the 82nd Regiment was rapidly coming down the hill to the aid of the Zouaves. As soon as the 82nd appeared, the French attacked with the bayonet. The Zouaves went headlong into the right, the 82nd into the left flank of the enemy. The outward ranks were lifted off their feet by the violence of the shock, and the column loosening at the rear, turned and hurried, in dreadful confusion, back over the aqueduct. A battery of artillery on the left of the line of attack poured grape into the flying mass, and augmented the slaughter.

So far the attack on the left had been repelled, but the beaten troops were still at hand to take advantage of any success that might fall to the share of their comrades, who had carried the bridge and were assailing the centre and right.

The Russians had poured over in three irregular columns. Those who crossed by the bridge formed the centre; what may be called the wings had forded the river and the aqueduct. Each column was bravely encountered and overthrown. When General Wimpfen saw that his Zouaves and one battalion of the 82nd were sufficient to deal with the Russian extreme right, he sent the whole of the 50th, with the remainder of the 82nd as a reserve, to fall upon the central Russian columns. Thus, while the battalions of Herbillon's division assailed the centre, the 50th, moving obliquely down the hill, came upon the flank of the Russian column which had passed the aqueduct on the Russian right of the bridge. Exposed to such an assault, the Russians were unable to stand, and, after a brief musketry fight, they turned and sought shelter beyond the aqueduct and the Tchernaya. At the same time, General de Failly, in the centre, had charged, and the effect of the combined movement was to sweep the enemy over the river. The mass of the French were kept behind the aqueduct; but Colonel Danner, with portions of the 97th and 95th, was sent over to re-occupy the bridge-head. On the other side of the road to Balaclava the Russian column had proved too strong for the 19th Chasseurs; and after driving them up the eastern hillock, had, regardless of the tearing flank fire of the Sardinian artillery on Mount Hasfort, sought to deploy and storm the height. They were just moving up when the 2nd Zouaves came over the crest. The Russians began to fire, but the Zouaves continued to march forward, and then, with loud shouts and levelled bayonets, they went down the hill at a charging pace, and literally lifting the Russians off their legs, drove them pell-mell over the aqueduct.

Prince Gortschakoff had heard the beginning of the attack upon the French left. He was, he says, astonished. General Read had frustrated his design of first driving the Sardinians from their entrenchments, and taking himself a solid grasp of Mount Hasfort. To effect this object he had in hand four divisions of infantry, and he was preparing to hurl his bolt when the uproar of Read's untimely onset broke upon his ear. At once he suspended the movement of these divisions, and changed the whole tide of his battle. He felt that he must support the troops of Read, for he could not be sure that the Allies would not assume the offensive, and, by good luck, they might interpose between him and the Mackenzie Heights, and throw the bulk of his army upon the hills and narrow valleys towards Aitodor and Chouliou. Wherefore he directed the cavalry to move up, and should the infantry be repulsed, hold themselves in readiness to charge or to cover the retreat of the 7th and 12th Divisions, and enable them to rally. At the same time he directed the 5th Division to move by its right into the plain and assail the French at and above the bridge. The 17th Division was ordered to descend the Sardinian Mamelon and cross the river, and strive to penetrate through the open space between Mount Hasfort and the most eastern slopes of the Fedoukine heights. The 6th Division moved up to guard the ground opposite the Sardinians above Karlovka and Tchorgoun, and the 4th Division remained in the rear up the valley of Chouliou as a reserve. The attack was vigorous enough, but the columns were defeated in detail and driven back.

But the enemy would not yet own himself beaten. The 17th Division had arrived on the right bank of the Tchernaya. It was formed of regiments that had met the Allies at the Alma and Inkermann. Undismayed by defeat, determined to risk another throw of the dice, Prince Gortschakoff ordered a brigade, composed of three regiments—that is, twelve battalions—supported by a large body of cavalry, to cross the river, and push in between the French and Sardinians. The march of these troops had been seen by the Allies. General Herbillon had reinforced the right by three regiments of Cler's brigade and part of Sencier's brigade, and General La Marmora had directed Mollard's brigade of Trotti's division to descend from Mount Hasfort and, crossing the valley, support the French right. The support, as it happened, was not needed, but it would have been most timely and effectual had the French been overmatched. As it was, the Russians crossed the river and the aqueduct, pushing the French before them, and partly turning their right. They moved with evident resolution, for their columns were struck by the fire of a powerful artillery in flank. A French battery, disregarding the shot and shell poured upon it by the Russian guns on the opposite hills, devoted all its might to the injury of the enemy's infantry. These were now smitten on all sides except their right. For when they saw the deep masses of cavalry facing the gorge into which they had entered, and when they felt the Sardinians on the left of their line of advance, they turned to the right and made a desperate attempt to crown the hillock. The first column which reached the crest was immediately assailed in flank by a French regiment of Cler's brigade, and driven helplessly into and over the aqueduct. But the other deep columns now filling the whole space between the aqueduct and the river still came on with unfaltering resolution, and flung themselves into a focus of fire. But they could make no way. The guns and musketry were too much for them. In vain their officers ran out and waved their swords and showed the way. In vain the columns tried to get along. Presently they fell into confusion; then turned and hurried back over the river, pursued by volleys of musketry and flights of grape and roundshot.

The Russians brought up into line a number of batteries to cover the retreat of the infantry, and their splendid-looking cavalry drew up in glittering lines out of range to protect the guns. But the heavy British pieces in the Sardinian earthworks, opening on the enemy's artillery, soon made them move farther away. It was about eight o'clock of the morning of the 16th. The battle was won.

In this action the Allies lost 1,747 men killed and wounded, of whom only 196 were killed. The Sardinians lost one general officer, the Count Montevecchio. But the Russian loss was awful. The French buried upwards of 2,000 bodies; the Russians more than 1,000. There were 2,250 prisoners in the hands of the French, some wounded, some whole. General Read and two other generals of his corps were among the dead; and among the wounded were eight generals and ten colonels. The Russian loss altogether could not have been less than 15,000 men. The battle of the Tchernaya sealed the fate of Sebastopol.

The battle of the Tchernaya did not interrupt the progress of the siege. The Russians only succeeded in drawing upon themselves the bulk of the covering army, for although the French showed a strong line of troops on the old Inkermann ground, and kept up a sharp look-out upon their own left, this did not hinder the working parties in the advanced works from continuing their labours.

It should still be borne in mind that the French had fully recognised the fact that the Malakoff was the key of Sebastopol, that their main efforts were directed towards it, and that all the other attacks had become subordinate to this one. In short the attack on the Malakoff had become what is termed regular. But Sebastopol was not invested. The supply of guns in the place was practically unlimited. As much ammunition as the enemy could find transport for could be and was carried into the town. Hence, although the progress of the sap went on against the Malakoff and the Little Redan alone, the whole fire of the Allies could not be concentrated on those works, because they had to reply to the other batteries used so vigorously by the enemy. These conditions of the siege had been long established; the new feature in it was the determined attack upon the Malakoff, to which the other attacks were made subordinate.

The moment the French began to descend the western slope of the Mamelon, and push up the eastern slope of the Malakoff, they became sensible of the arduous nature of the undertaking. Their trenches had to be designed with the utmost care, their connecting parallels to be constructed with rapidity and solidity in the face of a destructive fire. About the period of the battle of the Tchernaya they were losing a hundred men a night in the trenches. Batteries, low down in the Russian works and unseen by the Allies, flung shells into the trenches and batteries with fatal accuracy. Nevertheless, the French steadily gained ground. They had descended one slope, they were ascending the other. But when they had reached within a hundred yards of the ditch of the Malakoff they could go no farther. The work of the night was destroyed by the enemy the next day. In vain the sharpshooters in their pits and in the most advanced cover kept up a deadly fire on the embrasures of the Malakoff. The enemy's guns were so numerous and so well placed that there seemed to be always some capable of firing, and with the dawn came the destruction of the labours of the night.

In these circumstances, General Simpson agreed to open on the 17th of August the heaviest possible fire upon the Malakoff; and the batteries of the French on the left were to bombard the town front to prevent the Russians on that side from overwhelming our left attack. Accordingly, on the 17th, the British opened fire; but the French, for some reason, did not support them, and the Russians in the town batteries did us considerable damage and killed two good officers. Yet this did not prevent the British from accomplishing their object. They maintained so crushing a fire on the Malakoff that the Russian artillerymen were soon obliged to quit their pieces, and only fire a gun now and then. At six in the evening a magazine blew up in a work between the Redan and the Malakoff. This battery was ruined. All night the mortars of the Allies fired heavily into the Malakoff and Redan, to hinder the enemy from repairing damages; and all night the French worked lustily at their trenches, doing more in twenty-four hours than they had done in a fortnight. The bombardment continued on the 18th. On the night of that day signal was made that masses of Russians were in the Redan. Thereupon the mortars were directed upon this work, and the heavy shells must have destroyed many men. There was a considerable exchange of musketry fire between the advanced trenches and the place, but the enemy did not venture out. The French on the left, who had been almost silent, now found that, in order to complete their approaches to a certain point, they also must open a general fire. This they did on the evening of the 20th, taking the enemy somewhat by surprise. While under cover of this fire they pushed forward their sap.

From this time to the end of the month there were constant alarms on the side of the Tchernaya. The French had been very active in the valley of Baidar immediately after the battle of the 16th. General d'Allonville had caused his infantry to penetrate the passes leading to the Tchernaya from the north, and establish posts of observation on the hills. At the same time the Sardinians strengthened their formidable works on Mount Hasfort, and the French constructed three batteries for guns intended to sweep the ground about the Stone Bridge. On the right they mounted twelve pieces of heavy artillery, naming the work the Raglan Battery. On the other flank they placed the same number of guns in a battery named after La BoussiniÈre, a gallant artillery officer, distinguished at the Alma, and killed before Sebastopol. These guns looked obliquely up the road to the Mackenzie Heights. Then farther to the rear, and on the right of the road to Balaclava, they constructed a work for twelve pieces, whose fire would sweep the whole road as far as the bridge, and named it Battery Bizot. Behind these works they re-made the old Turkish redoubts of October, 1854. Thus the Allies covered Balaclava with a triple line, the third being the now famous line of Balaclava, constituting a position as strong as any in the world.

Although it seemed improbable that the Russians would repeat the enterprise of the 16th of August, yet the information that reached headquarters, the partial disappearance of the Russians from the North Camp, the incessant flashing of signal lights from the eastern mountains to Inkermann, and from Inkermann to Sebastopol, induced the Allies to keep on the alert. General Simpson reconnoitred the whole position on the Tchernaya. The troops were under arms, both on the plateau and on the Tchernaya, long before daylight for several days, dispersing only when the sun rose. The men-of-war in the harbour of Balaclava were in readiness to take up positions whence they could do the most damage to the enemy. The splendid cavalry of the Allies turned out every day, and showed its thousands of sabres and lances in the plains of Balaclava; a spectacle gratifying to the military eye, and not encouraging to the enemy. The Highland Division took post above Kamara. The field artillery of the Allies was in constant readiness. From the hills that enfold the Baidar valley to the heights of Inkermann all was vigilance. Prince Gortschakoff, who had his army on the plateau of Mackenzie, and in the little valleys leading down towards the outposts and main position of the Allies, probably looked upon this scene, enacted daily; if he did so, what he saw must have extinguished any notion of breaking into the allied lines at any point. There was no weak place in the chain.

Nevertheless, the siege works made steady progress towards the Malakoff. There the assailants and defenders were within a few yards of each other. The Russians had a series of rifle-pits on the slope under the Malakoff Redoubt itself. The French works had approached so near that it became necessary to seize these pits, and incorporate them with the main body of the approaches. Accordingly, on the 23rd of August, a body of Zouaves worked all day in opening a trench leading towards the pits; and in the evening the light infantry of a line regiment went in and carried them. But the Russians, determined not to lose their shelter without a struggle, dashed out of the Malakoff, and expelled the Frenchmen. The Russians, however, did not long enjoy their triumph, for the expelled troops, being supported by their comrades, returned to the assault, reconquered and held the work. The next day the enemy kept up a heavy fire on the Mamelon, in spite of the support that our batteries afforded to the French. But the onward march of the latter could not be arrested. On the evening of the 24th they seized the whole line of Russian works on the glacis. Again the enemy violently essayed to prevent the French from making good their hold. Before the morning the whole line was complete, and the French works were within thirty-four yards of the salient of the Malakoff. The efforts of the enemy were directed chiefly against the Mamelon and the approaches therefrom, the quarter, as they well knew, where their greatest peril lay. On the night of the 28th they made a lucky shot. One of their shells rolled into a magazine in the left or southern face of the Mamelon Redoubt. There were at the time 15,000 pounds of powder in the magazine. This exploded with an awful roar, awakening the whole camp, and killing or wounding 150 Frenchmen. This vast explosion of powder did not seriously damage the Mamelon; but it delayed the final assault, because the store of powder, thus expended, had to be replaced.

For the remainder of the month the trying labour of getting close to the Malakoff and Little Redan went on in the usual way. But the crisis of the long siege had now come. Neither side could bear much longer the horrible losses inflicted by this deadly strife. The Russians might endure, hoping against hope, to hold out until the winter once more became their keen ally; but the French and British felt that they must risk an assault or raise the siege.

When Prince Gortschakoff saw that the French had opened their seventh parallel within a few yards of the Malakoff, he must have felt certain that an assault would soon be attempted. He was quite as well aware as the allied generals that the Malakoff was the key of the place. General Todleben had, from the first, shown a just appreciation of the ground, and upon those two salient and commanding points, the Flagstaff and the Malakoff, he had exhausted the resources of his art. Once firmly established in one of these, he knew that the Allies must win the city. He knew also that if the Flagstaff only were taken, he could defend the place long enough to secure a retreat; but that if the Malakoff fell before a raft-bridge could be constructed, the Russians must surrender or die fighting, for the Malakoff Hill commanded the harbour. Here one cannot but admire the foresight of a general, who, while he defended his lines to the last, took early and ample precautions to secure a retreat. The great raft-bridge over that arm of the sea we call the Harbour, which is half a mile wide, was begun in July, and finished by the end of August. This stupendous work was designed and executed, no doubt, partly with the object of enabling the Russian general to pour troops rapidly into Sebastopol, but mainly to enable him to avoid capture in the last extremity. Nor was this the only work undertaken with the view of preparing against a calamity. The genius of Todleben had designed an inner line of works in rear and to the east of the Malakoff; and this must have been done only to gain time for the evacuation of the place in the event of the capture of that work.

THE FRENCH IN THE MALAKOFF. (See p. 124.)