Anonymous

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

The Course of Diplomacy—Austria's Position—She becomes a Peace-maker—The Treaty of the 2nd of December—The Four Points—The Czar agrees to negotiate—Russell's Mission to Vienna—Opening of the Conference—Prince Gortschakoff's Declaration—The Third Point broached—Its Rejection by Russia—Count Buol's Compromise—A Diplomatic Farce—Count Buol's final Proposition—Resignation of Drouyn de Lhuys—The War debated in Parliament—Lord John Russell resigns—Strength of the Government—The Sardinian and Turkish Loans—Vote of Censure on the Aberdeen Cabinet—Finance of the War—General PÉlissier—The Fight for the Cemetery—Success of the French—Occupation of the Tchernaya—Expedition to Kertch—Description of the Peninsula—Sir George Brown's Force—The Russians blow up their Magazines—Occupation of Kertch and Yenikale—Lyons in the Sea of Azotf—Result of the Expedition—Attack upon Sebastopol decided—Ordnance of the Allies—The Attack—The French occupy the Mamelon—The British in the Quarries—Lord Raglan overruled—New Batteries—PÉlissier's Change of Plan—The Fourth Bombardment—Preparations for the Assault—Mayran's Mistake—Brunet and D'Autemarre—The Attack on the Redan fails—Abandonment of the Assault—General Eyre—Losses on both Sides—Death of Lord Raglan.

WHILE the armies in the Crimea had been occupied in holding their ground, and recovering from the effects of the winter campaign, the political action of the allied Governments had been directed into a channel of negotiations opened by Austria and conducted at Vienna.

Austria had not approved of the expedition to the Crimea. She had, to a certain extent, joined the Western Powers; and although Russia might not deem it expedient to turn upon Austria and make war upon her, still that was possible; for Austria had given a cause of war to Russia by exerting that pressure—severe, though distant and indirect—which impelled the Czar to raise the siege of Silistria, and then abandon the Principalities. Then the troops of Austria, by slow degrees, occupied the country as far as the Pruth, and thus enabled the Western Powers to divert their armies upon Sebastopol. But when they took that direction, and left Austria alone face to face with Russia, supported only by a few Turks, and having a very doubtful ally in Prussia, Austria was discontented. She had, however, gone too far to recede. She was committed to the course of armed neutrality, verging always upon open war. Becoming aware of her situation, and having, just before the war broke out, reduced her army by 90,000 men, she now spent £16,000,000 sterling in order to place her public force on an effective war footing. For a moment, in the victory of the Alma and the first bombardment of Sebastopol, she saw prospects of a speedy termination of the war. The dark cloud of Inkermann and the failure of the bombardment suddenly hid those prospects from her view. The Allies had not been beaten, but they had been frustrated; and Austria saw in the new circumstances an opening for a new effort to bring about peace. Her special object had been gained when the Russian monopoly of the Lower Danube had been removed, and she did not appear to appreciate the larger objects of the Allies, namely, a definite reduction of Russian power in the Black Sea; or she did not feel capable of aiding in their accomplishment by a direct participation in hostilities. She therefore renewed her part of peacemaker.

In order to place herself in a better position as regards the Western Powers, she agreed to sign a treaty known as the Treaty of the 2nd of December, 1854. This document stated that the Three Powers, being desirous of bringing the war to an end as speedily as possible, and of re-establishing peace on a solid basis, and being convinced that nothing would be more conducive to this result than the complete union of their efforts, they had resolved to conclude this treaty. By it they undertook not to make peace without first deliberating in common. Austria engaged to defend the frontier of the Principalities against any return of the Russian forces; in case war ensued between Austria and Russia, the Three Powers mutually promised to each other their offensive and defensive alliance; and in case peace should not be re-established before the 1st of January, 1855, the Three Powers agreed "to deliberate, without delay, upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance." Here, then, it seemed, were fetters binding Austria to the fortunes of the alliance; and the Western Powers believed that at last they had a fair prospect of aid from Austrian arms, especially when she concluded a defensive alliance with Prussia. The object of Austria, however, was not war, but negotiation. By giving what seemed a proof of her willingness to share the fortunes of the Allies, she took up a position which enhanced the value of any peace proposals she might devise. Accordingly, she set to work, contriving how, upon the bases of the negotiations carried on in the summer, which took the shape of the Four Points, she could present a scheme which Russia would be willing to consider. These four points were a further definition of the Protocol signed by the Powers at the beginning of the war, by which the purpose of the contest was set forth. If she succeeded, she would relieve herself from the obligation of fighting imposed by the treaty; if she failed, some excuse might be evolved in the process of failure. Thereupon negotiations were quietly resumed at Vienna between Count Buol and the Ministers of the Allies. Prussia, having declined to accede to the treaty of December 2nd, had no part in these proceedings. By the 28th of December the Ministers had agreed to a paper defining the sense of the Four Points. Those points were first, the cessation of the Russian protectorate in the Principalities, and the substitution therefor of a European protectorate; second, the free navigation of the Danube; third, an arrangement having "for its object to connect the existence of the Ottoman Empire more completely with the European equilibrium, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea;" fourth, renunciation by Russia of her pretentions to exercise a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan. These bases of negotiation were presented to Prince Gortschakoff, Russian Minister at Vienna, and by him transmitted to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The Emperor of Russia was not at all disinclined to treat. He had nothing to lose by negotiations, and, as it was possible something might occur at a conference to disturb the harmony of the Allies, he might have something to gain. Then it may well be that he counted on the presence of a Prussian envoy, and consequently of a backer; and therefore in December he gave his Minister at Vienna conditional, and on the 7th of January definite, power to negotiate. But the British Ministry falling under the shock of a popular tempest, it became impossible to send any plenipotentiary to Vienna until the Government of England was once more in such a position, as regarded Parliament, that it could act with authority. Lord Palmerston adopted the resolution of sending Lord John Russell to attend a conference at Vienna. While at Paris Lord John received and accepted an offer of the post of Colonial Secretary. He had been sent off so hurriedly that his written instructions were not prepared until two days after he had sailed. Passing through Paris and Berlin, and conferring in each capital with the highest personages of the State, he did not reach Vienna until the 4th of March, and even then ten more days passed before the Conference held its first sitting.

This took place on the 15th of March, in the Austrian Foreign Office. The Plenipotentiaries were, for Austria, Count Buol-Schauenstein and Baron Prokesch-Osten; for France, Baron de Bourqueney; for England, Lord John Russell and the Earl of Westmorland; for Turkey, Aarifi Effendi; and for Russia, Prince Gortschakoff and M. de Titoff. Count Buol, as a matter of course, became the President of the Conference. At the very outset there was a faint foreshadowing of the discussion which subsequently occurred. The Czar Nicholas had just died, but his successor had declared with emphasis that he should pursue the policy of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and Nicholas. When, therefore, the mild tones of conciliation in which Count Buol opened the Conference had died away, and Baron de Bourqueney and Lord John Russell had, on behalf of their Governments, reserved the right of making special conditions over and above the four guarantees, Prince Gortschakoff seemed to regard this as a challenge. At all events, he took it up as such, and answered promptly. He hoped, he said, they all had a common object, the object of arriving at an honourable peace. "If," he added, "from whatever quarter they come, conditions of peace were wished to be imposed on Russia which should not be compatible with her honour, Russia would never consent to them, however serious might be the consequences." He did not contest the right of the belligerent Powers to add new demands according to the chances of the war; but, for his part, he considered himself under the obligation to keep within the limits of the Four Points. Having thus broken ground, the Conference went at once into the details of the First Point, and determined to debate them in the order laid down. We need not enter into these details. It is sufficient to state that in five sittings the plenipotentiaries had agreed upon a form of words, fully embodying the spirit of the original basis of the first two Points. It was on the third, the key-stone of the whole, that they split asunder.

It was on the 26th of March that Count Buol broached the question. It may be remembered that the object in view was to connect Turkey with the European system, and, in the words used by Lord Clarendon's instructions to Lord John, to abrogate the supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea. For this, indeed, three fleets and three armies were thundering against the stronghold of the Czar. It was this supremacy and the temptation it held out to Russia which had led her Sovereign into arrogant courses, and had brought on the war. In opening the debate on this now famous Third Point, Count Buol, speaking not only for himself but his allies, suggested that it would be the better course for the Ministers of Russia and Turkey to state to the Conference what means they thought adequate to accomplish the ends desired. The French and British Ministers supported this suggestion, Lord John enforcing it with the courteous remark, called forth by Prince Gortschakoff's early declaration touching the honour of his country, that England and her allies deemed "the best and only admissible conditions of peace would be those which, being the most in harmony with the honour of Russia, should at the same time be sufficient for the security of Europe." Of course, Prince Gortschakoff could only be gratified, and could not do less than agree to ask his Cabinet whether they would act on the suggestion of Count Buol. The Turks did the same. As it was unavoidable that some time should elapse before answers were received, Count Buol proposed to pass to the Fourth Point; but to this neither the Cabinet of Britain nor that of France, and both were consulted, would consent. Thus several days were wasted, during which the French and Turkish Ministers for Foreign Affairs were hurrying towards Vienna to take part in these very critical negotiations.

SEBASTOPOL FROM THE RIGHT ATTACK.

At the ninth sitting, on the 9th of April, these two, M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Aali Pasha, were formally introduced. But no other business was transacted, because Prince Gortschakoff had not received instructions from his Court in regard to Count Buol's suggestion touching the views of Russia on the Third Point. On the 17th the Conference again assembled. Would Russia take the initiative and propound a plan for the abrogation of her preponderance? The question was answered at once, and all the more readily, perhaps, because the second bombardment of Sebastopol had failed. Russia would not take the initiative; moreover, "Russia would not consent to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed number, either by treaty or in any other manner." The Allies were, or affected to be, in consternation. They had no plan, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys suggested that they should meet at once to decide what they should demand. Lord John Russell blurted out the opinion that the refusal of Russia had diminished the chances of peace. Prince Gortschakoff rejoined that Russia would consider any mode except that of limitation. That was not consistent with honour. The high spirit and bold front maintained by the new Czar are shown in nothing more than the arrogance with which, at this period, his Ministers endeavoured to prevent the Allies from meeting to consult on and arrange the terms to be offered to Russia! Of course, the Allies would not suffer such arrogant pretensions. They retired to debate among themselves, and a singular debate it was. The Austrian Cabinet clearly wished to shrink out of the engagement of the 2nd of December. Although in favour of the complete neutralisation of the Black Sea, preferring limitation to counterpoise, and agreeing to support the plan of limitation, Count Buol not only declined on behalf of Austria to make a refusal by Russia of the two former a casus belli, but suggested the extravagant plan of simply binding Russia not to increase her naval force in the Black Sea beyond the point at which it stood before the war! To this, strange to say, Lord John Russell assented, telling his Government that if this system of settlement could be made an ultimatum by Austria, the Western Powers ought to accept it. But when, a few days afterwards, Count Colloredo, in London, submitted the scheme to Lord Clarendon, the Minister did not hesitate a moment in rejecting it.

In the meantime, with this tendency to give way on the side of the Allies, the Conference had become a farce. They met on the 19th, after consulting, and propounded a plan. The first proposition declared that the Powers undertook to respect, as an essential condition of the general equilibrium, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Russians concurred, but—did not intend thereby to pledge their Court to a territorial guarantee! So the virtue of the article vanished at once. Then came the proposal intended to take away Russian preponderance by limiting the number of her ships in the Black Sea. Prince Gortschakoff demanded time to consider the project, and M. de Titoff took the liberty of regretting that Russia had not the option of settling the whole question by discussion with a State "free in its movements and resolutions"—meaning Turkey, which he knew, as well as the other Ministers, was, like Britain and France, bound to act on the basis of a common understanding. The taunt is of no moment, except as an illustration of the assurance of the Russian envoys. They had not exhausted the ample stock of that commodity they brought to Vienna. Indeed, it seemed to increase under the influence of Austrian vacillation and timidity. The Conference held two more sittings. On the 21st of April Prince Gortschakoff refused point-blank to accede even to the mild and inadequate proposal of limitation, and brought forward an alternative plan for throwing open the Black Sea and, of course, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to the war ships of all nations—a very startling mode of liberating Turkey from menace, and preserving her independence. The Ministers of Britain and France at once declined to discuss such a proposal, and declared their instructions to be exhausted; and Lord John Russell started for London. M. Drouyn de Lhuys lingered to attend another conference, and to hear Prince Gortschakoff, as if in mockery of the Allies, put forth a proposition to maintain the old plan of keeping the Strait closed, and—admirable benevolence!—giving the Sultan the right, a right he already possessed, of opening the Strait, and calling up the ships of his Allies when he was menaced. The Conference closed, leaving the Russians exulting at the skill with which they had done what they were sent to do—that is, to feel the pulse of Austria, to find out whether she would actively join the war or only make a brave show of resolution before all Europe.

Although the Conference had closed, Count Buol persisted in thinking that he could devise terms of peace. He had pledged himself to discover such terms, and when the British Government pressed upon Austria the fulfilment of the treaty of December, the answer was that Count Buol was engaged in his search after a satisfactory measure of pacification. Now it happened that, although the Western Powers were not averse from an honourable peace, which they did not believe Russia would grant, they were extremely desirous to obtain the active support of Austria in the war. Therefore Count Buol went on with his search, and by the middle of May he had hit upon a scheme so weak and ineffective that the Allies warned him beforehand they could not assent to it. This scheme contained the guarantee of independence and integrity for Turkey; maintained the principle that the Strait should be closed, but gave the contracting Powers the right of keeping two frigates in the Black Sea; laid it down that Turkey and Russia should agree as to what force they would maintain there, the amount not to exceed, on either side, the force of Russian vessels then (May, 1855) afloat in the Euxine; and stipulated that this agreement should form an integral part of the treaty. Subsequently an article was added whereby Austria bound herself to regard as a casus belli such additions to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea as would bring it up to the number existing in 1853! As the Western Powers would not agree to any such proposals, Austria declared that she had fulfilled her part; that Russia was now no longer exclusively to blame for the failure of negotiations; that Austria regarded herself as absolved from her pledge in the treaty of December 2nd, and that she had nothing to do but wish success to the Allies. So the great central German Power shuffled out of her engagements; and it cannot be doubted that one of her reasons for so acting was to be found in the fact that the flag of Italy was waving in the breezes of the Crimea. There was a meeting of the Conference on the 4th of June, called solely that Austria might record her propositions, and place herself in a position to say that she had redeemed her promises. The only result of it was this: it enabled Prince Gortschakoff to boast that Austria had proposed bases which she deemed sufficient, but which her Allies deemed insufficient, and thus to publish the dissension in the allied camp. Such were the conferences at Vienna in 1855. The Allies had agreed to them solely at the instance of Austria, and because she had made her active co-operation in the war depend upon the failure of attempts to conclude peace on the terms agreed upon between the Three Powers. The Allies were, therefore, discredited in the eyes of Europe by their complaisance towards Austria; but although she gained her end, which was to evade the obligations she had undertaken of her own free will, the conferences served to show Europe more clearly than ever that Alexander was as obstinately bent as Nicholas upon maintaining Russian preponderance in the Black Sea.

There was something enervating in the atmosphere of Vienna; for, as the Conference proceeded, the spirit and firmness with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell began their task diminished visibly. Lord John became painfully conscious that Austria would not propose or support any efficacious plan to abrogate Russian preponderance in the Black Sea if the support she gave led her into war. "The occupation of the Principalities by Russia," he wrote to his Cabinet, "she felt to be dangerous to her existence as a great Power, and she risked a war to put an end to it. But that point accomplished, I fear we must not count upon her aid to save Constantinople from the encroaching ambition of Russia." This is the language of despair. Britain and France could continue the war, "but the waste of life and money would be enormous." This was written on the 16th of April. On the 17th Lord John had become so down-hearted that he consented to support the Austrian proposal fixing the Russian maximum at the force possessed by Russia before the war. If this, which would have sacrificed the whole of the exertions of the Allies, could have been made an ultimatum by Austria, he thought the Western Powers should accept it. The Western Powers had resolved not to sink so low. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who was equally despondent and submissive, went home and resigned, because he had compromised his Government by giving even a qualified assent to terms so disastrous. Lord John Russell went home, pleaded his cause in the Cabinet, and being overruled, did not resign. He remained in office, and, on the first opportunity, made a speech, not in favour of his Vienna views, but in favour of "the vigorous prosecution of the war."

The resignation of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs did not pass without comment. The reason soon became apparent, and it was broadly stated that Lord John Russell himself had participated in the line of action adopted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys at Vienna. Count Buol himself, resenting the publication of the protocols of the Conference, issued a circular in which he stated that the English Plenipotentiary had supported the Austrian scheme of pacification. Then followed the publication by the British Government of several despatches, showing clearly the course taken by the British Plenipotentiary and the British Cabinet; and in July Mr. Milner Gibson brought the conduct of Lord John under the notice of the House, and demanded explanations. Lord John explained and defended the course he had taken; but not to the satisfaction of any one. The public feeling was strong; and the Opposition, taking advantage of the incident, Sir Edward Lytton gave notice of a motion censuring the whole of the Government. In the meantime there was commotion in the Ministerial ranks. The Minister then offered to resign, and in answer Lord Palmerston frankly said that it was for Lord John to judge; but if he determined not to resign, then the Cabinet would stand by him. But Lord John was informed that a large number of the Liberals could not resist the motion, and, to save himself from censure, and the Government from defeat, he resigned. Thus the Opposition was foiled. The resignation did not prevent a debate, although it prevented a division; and Lord John, having six months before broken up one Ministry by a rapid retreat, now saved another by a similar manoeuvre. This may be called the climax of the ill-fated Vienna Conference of 1855.

THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.

During the course of the Session the Opposition had done what it considered to be its duty as a body of critics on the proceedings of the Government. It was well known to Mr. Disraeli that, independently of the purely party votes he could command, a number of gentlemen of various opinions, if they did not vote with him, would at least help him to damage the Cabinet. When, therefore, in the middle of May, Mr. Milner Gibson gave notice of a motion in favour of peace, Mr. Disraeli promptly took it out of his hands with his full consent, and framed a resolution which, while it censured the Government for its ambiguous language and uncertain conduct in reference to the great question of peace or war, yet promised to give her Majesty every support in the prosecution of the war until a safe and honourable peace had been obtained. Mr. Disraeli's motion was rejected by 319 to 219; and when Lord Grey made a similar motion in the House of Peers, Lord Derby would not even divide the House upon it, so plainly was the general conviction against it. Nevertheless the debates in the House of Commons—debates raised upon amendments to Mr. Disraeli's motion—went on for several days, revealing the true character of the different sections, and showing the inadequate views which many had formed of the objects at stake. Mr. Bright and Mr Cobden thought Russia had a claim to preponderance in the Black Sea. Mr. Sidney Herbert, Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and their friends declared that the negotiations had been broken off on a question of "terms," mere phrases, a few ships more or less; that enough had been done to show that Russia could not be dominant in Europe; and that the propositions of Count Buol were adequate bases of a safe and honourable peace.

But while we lament the defective judgment and blindness of the Peelites, and the utter incapacity to understand the dynamics of the question displayed by the peace-at-any-price party, we are bound to admire and applaud the courage of both. They did their duty bravely—for it is the duty of the chief men of a nation to speak out; and no nation is well served in which the chief men, yielding to menace or succumbing to apathy, withhold their opinions in moments of great trial. The debates on the policy of the war, on the conduct of the war and of the negotiations, ended by rallying a larger support than ever to the Government; for even the leading Tories admitted that the war was so just that the Government ought not to have avoided it if they could, and so necessary that they could not have avoided it if they would, while no less a person than Lord Derby, allowing his judgment to get the better of his party feeling, insisted that it would be humiliation for Britain and France to retire from the contest baffled before Sebastopol.

Nevertheless, when the Government proposed to become a joint guarantee with France for a loan of £5,000,000 to be contracted by Turkey, Mr. Disraeli, who had earlier in the Session cavilled at a loan of £2,000,000 to Sardinia, now, seeing a prospect of obtaining a majority by a surprise, divided the House against the project and was only defeated by a majority of three. Yet the propriety of both measures was manifest. We wanted the aid of 15,000 Sardinian troops, and it was not too much for so small a State to ask us to lend her the means of placing them fairly on the theatre of war. In the same way the war had disordered more deeply the deeply involved finances of Turkey. By giving a guarantee, in conjunction with France, that the interest should be paid to the lenders, we enabled the Sultan to raise the money at smaller cost to the Turkish Treasury, and by so doing we were, of course, aiding her as effectually, in kind but not in degree, as we were by our fleets and armies. But a Turkish loan was a good subject for a hostile division. Mr. Disraeli saw his chance, seized it, and nearly surprised the Ministry. He would have been content to imperil the alliance and the war at the price of a Parliamentary victory.

Mr. Disraeli pursued a similar course, but with a divided party and no chance of success, upon another occasion. Mr. Roebuck, the head and front of the incomplete and abortive Sebastopol inquiry, moved on the 17th of July a vote of censure on all the members of the Aberdeen Cabinet, whose counsels led to what he was pleased to term the disastrous results of the winter campaign in the Crimea. General Peel, as one of the committee, moved the "previous question," on the ground that the inquiry was incomplete, and that the greater part of the sufferings of the army arose in the very nature of the duty which it fell upon them to perform. Mr. Disraeli and the bulk of his supporters made the motion a party question. But the course of the debate was decidedly against them, and they and Mr. Roebuck failed utterly in procuring from the House, either a retrospective censure on a dead Administration, or an endorsement of the Sebastopol Blue Books. The House decided, by 289 to 182, that the question should not even be put from the chair. Thus ended an attempt, first to discover evidence which would bear out the fierce accusations advanced during the winter, and then to base upon the imperfect and conflicting evidence discovered a censure not deserved.

The Government had, since January, 1855, effected considerable changes in the machinery for carrying on the war, chiefly, however, in the concentration of power in the War Department. They had raised the total force of the army to 193,595 men, including 14,950 who formed the Foreign Legion; and they had increased the number of sailors to 70,000. They had embodied fifty militia regiments, some of whom were in the Mediterranean garrisons; and from the whole militia force they had drawn 18,000 recruits for the army. Having found that the expenses of the war were outrunning the estimates of the spring, they increased those estimates, making the total for the whole service of the army, navy, transport, commissariat, and ambulance purposes, £49,537,692, bringing up the total estimated expenditure for the year to more than £88,000,000; to cover which they provided £96,339,000, leaving a large margin for contingencies. Among the ways and means were a loan of £1,600,000, and power to issue £10,000,000 Exchequer bills or bonds. The active navy consisted almost wholly of steamers, and among the supplementary votes of August was one to provide for the cost of a host of steam gunboats to be used, if required, in 1856.

General PÉlissier, the new Commander-in-Chief of the French army, was a hardy soldier, who had taken part in many campaigns, and had gained in Algeria a name not only for military ability in the field, but for skill in the cabinet as an administrator. A cloud hung over his reputation for a time, because he had caused a number of obstinate Arabs, who would not surrender, to be suffocated in the caves of Dahra. But when he went to the Crimea, men only faintly remembered this dreadful act, while all recognised the stern energy, sound military judgment, and stout moral courage of the new chief. Henceforth they felt there would be no faltering, no hesitation, no undue deference for opinions formed in Paris, no terror of responsibility. PÉlissier brought to his task a will quite as firm as that of the Emperor Napoleon, and a reputation for soldiership higher than that of his Imperial Majesty. He was told to abide as nearly as possible by his instructions; and if he modified them, he was to do so in concert with Lord Raglan. We have already pointed out that these two officers did not differ on the question before them. General PÉlissier differed from the Emperor, not from Lord Raglan. He recognised the soundness of the measures recommended over and over again by Sir John Burgoyne; and he resolved to take Sebastopol by capturing the key of the place—the Malakoff. It was more arduous now than it was two months before, because the Russians had been allowed to develop their hardy system of counter-approaches on the Malakoff ridge, and above the Careening Bay, consisting of the Mamelon Redoubt on the former, and what were called the White Works on the latter. These it was essential to capture and hold before the final blow could be levelled at the Malakoff.

It was on the 19th of May that he took command. On the 22nd, three days afterwards, the expedition to Kertch sailed, and on that very night PÉlissier began a bloody contest for the possession of the ground about the cemetery to the west of Quarantine Bay. The Russians had seen the advantage which works of more pretension than rifle-pits would give them on this quarter. They, therefore, began to connect the pits with the place by sinking a covered way across the ravine, and by connecting the pits with each other by a gabionade, that is, a parapet made of large baskets filled and then covered with earth. The incipient stages of this design were observed by the French on the 21st of May. General Todleben's object went further than the mere establishment of a series of strong rifle screens. He had in view the construction of a regular battery on the Russian left of the line, which would have poured a raking flanking fire through the principal works of the besiegers. To prevent this, PÉlissier ordered General de Salles, now commander of the Siege Corps, to storm and hold the new Russian line.

This line was of very great extent, stretching from flank to flank for nearly three-quarters of a mile along the broken ground. The whole of it was under the fire of the place, and the conformation of the ground between the Cemetery and Sebastopol, a ravine widening towards its mouth, gave the enemy great facilities for bringing up troops to feed the combat. The French general placed upwards of 4,000 men, including two battalions of the Light Infantry of the Guard, under the orders of General PatÉ. At nine o'clock the signal was given, and, dashing out of the trenches, the two columns fell upon the enemy so impetuously that he was driven out at the first shock. But it so chanced that at this very moment the troops, the battalions destined to furnish and cover the working parties of the enemy, had paraded in front of the place, under the orders of General Chruleff. Therefore the French had no sooner driven off the Russians who held the lines, than these fresh troops, moving rapidly across the ravine, first smote them with a crushing fire, and then coming on with lowered bayonets, engaged in a combat so close, and fierce, and vehement, that the French were overthrown on their right, and forced back into their trenches; while on their left General Brunet sustained with difficulty the forward position he had won. General la Motterouge, who commanded the French right column, was not the man to yield so easily. Re-forming his men, and bringing up his reserves, he flung them once more into the fight. The combat now raged along the whole line. As the French poured in fresh troops, the enemy, resolved to win, brought up eight battalions, our old foes at the Alma, the regiments of Minsk and Uglitz. And thus through the night the battle continued, sometimes dying away into a faint flicker of fire, and then bursting out again with sudden and appalling fury. When the French gained an advantage and pushed the enemy, their sappers in the rear of the confused roar of struggling men began to destroy the Russian lines; and then in the midst of their work, the battle would roll back upon them and sweep over the disputed ground. Just before daybreak the masses on both sides retired under shelter from the cannon of the opposing batteries; but General Brunet kept the line he had won, and turned the face of the rifle-pits and gabions towards the enemy.

Throughout the next day there was a brisk cannonade kept up on both sides, each intent on preventing the other from occupying in force the contested ground. At night the combat was renewed. General Couston, with four battalions, reinforced General Brunet's position, in order to defend it against any attack, and to complete the works of approach begun on that side. General Duval, with six battalions, issuing from the French trenches and assailing the Russian left, drove out the enemy's troops posted there, and held the ground in front, while the working parties, in the midst of a heavy fire from the main batteries of Sebastopol, rapidly transformed the Russian trench into a parallel of attack, giving ample shelter to the besiegers. Thus, in two nights, the French won this important ground, and connecting all their works together, showed a united front, and left but a comparatively narrow space, formed by the ravine across which they could not work their way, between them and the town. This line on the ridge a little east of the Cemetery was the limit of their regular approaches in that quarter.

Another result of the change of commanders was the occupation of the line of the Tchernaya by a combined force of French, Sardinians, and Turks. This was effected on the 25th. General Canrobert led his own division and that of General Brunet across the valley, and took post on the Fedoukine heights. General la Marmora and his Sardinians took up a position on the Hasfort Hill, above Tchorgoun. Sir Colin Campbell moved the Marines out of their lines near the sea to the ridge looking down on Kamara on one side, and the Baidar valley on the other. Omar Pasha, with 16,000 Turks, occupied the whole line of low hills on which stood the redoubts on October 25th. The whole force was about 43,000 strong. There were but few Russian troops on the river, and these gave way and retired up the opposite hills as soon as they felt the advance guard of the Allies. Thus the line of the Allies now extended from the sea on the right, through Kamara and Tchorgoun to the Fedoukine heights, just out of range of the Russian batteries, east of the Inkermann ruins. There were many who thought this a beginning of operations in the field. They were doomed to be disappointed. The Allies had now very large forces in the Crimea, but while Lord Raglan could not assent to the Emperor's plan of a regular campaign, the Emperor could not concur in Lord Raglan's suggestions; and thus, as a compromise, the Allies continued the siege, and undertook no other operation except one which we are now about to narrate—the naval and military expedition to the inhospitable and foggy regions of Kertch and the Sea of Azoff.

The Russian forces in the Crimea were dependent chiefly for their supplies upon the mainland itself, for the Crimea is a peninsula, projecting from the steppes of Southern Russia, and joined on to it only by the narrow neck of land at Perekop. The road through Perekop was the chief line of communication, leading as it did to Nicolaieff and Odessa. But there were other roads by which the enemy received supplies. At the eastern part of the Crimea was a small peninsula, called the Peninsula of Kertch, from the town of that name. In order to deprive the enemy of at least one road, and to ruin all his depÔts within reach, and deprive him of the waterway over the Sea of Azoff to Yenikale and Arabat, and force him upon a more circuitous route, it was determined to seize Kertch, push through the Strait into the Sea of Azoff, and destroy the ships on its waters and the magazines in its ports. In order to accomplish this, it was deemed expedient that a military force should occupy the towns of Kertch and Yenikale, which are within the Strait, and thus, by taking the land defences in reverse, open a road into the Sea of Azoff for the light steamers. The Strait is narrow, especially where the waters of the Sea of Azoff pour into it. In 1854 the Russians had sunk many ships in the channel below Kertch, but in the winter, the waters of the Sea of Azoff, fed by the swollen streams of Southern Russia, rushing through the confined space in full volume, and at the rate of between three and four miles an hour, swept away the wreck; so that what was not possible in 1854 became possible in 1855.

What the Allies required was to get command of the Strait; and to put all resistance out of the question, it was determined, on the very day after General PÉlissier assumed command, that the force sent should be overwhelming. Sir George Brown was again to take command of the expedition. The French supplied 6,800 men, including fifty Chasseurs d'Afrique and three batteries, under D'Autemarre; the Turks furnished 5,000 men and one battery; and the British 3,800 men, namely—the 42nd, 71st, 79th, and 93rd Highlanders, a battalion of Marines, fifty men of the 8th Hussars, and a battery. The force thus amounted to 15,600 men and thirty guns. The naval force consisted of twenty-four French ships, including three sail of the line, under Admiral Bruat; and thirty-four British vessels, including six sail of the line, under Admiral Lyons. The gunboats and light steamers were organised into a flying squadron, consisting of fourteen British and five French steamers, the whole under Captain Lyons, son of the admiral, and, like his sire, a bold and resourceful sailor.

Starting from Kamiesch and Balaclava on the 22nd, though obstructed by a dense fog, the ships were, on the morning of the 25th, off Cape Takli, the south foreland of the Strait; and soon after daylight the ships having troops on board rounded the cape and running as near the shore as the water would allow, proceeded to disembark the men. No enemy appeared, and the troops speedily got ashore; the French taking the right, and the British the left or exposed flank, while the Turks were held in reserve. But the enemy, though not in sight, was audible enough on land; for the troops had no sooner stepped ashore than the air was rent with the noise of repeated explosions, and tall pillars of white smoke rose up on the right of the allied forces. All along the coast, from Fort Paul towards Yenikale, the Russians were blowing up their magazines. On the sea a British gunboat, followed by another, was seen chasing the Russian ships and engaging the batteries, not yet abandoned, on both sides of the Strait. At the same time other vessels came up and silenced the battery on the spit opposite Yenikale; and the Russians, feeling resistance to be hopeless, blew up one magazine after another on both sides of the Strait; so that by the morning of the 25th there was not a gun or a man to resist the Allies. General Wrangel, who, with 6,000 men, had charge of the peninsula, retired to Argin, midway between Kertch and Kaffa, and in no way molested his opponents.

Therefore, on the 25th, the steamers of light draught went up to Yenikale; and the troops, quitting their bivouacs, set out to march on the same place. They proceeded in three columns, the French on the right next the sea, the British on the left, covering their flank, and the Turks in the rear. When they came to Kertch, the whole broke into one column and filed through the town, and by mid-day the troops reached Yenikale. The fleet had come up, and the generals and admirals held a consultation in the afternoon. The sailors having buoyed the channel into the Sea of Azoff, Captain Lyons led his flying squadron at once into those waters. Already, in two days, the Allies had captured upwards of a hundred heavy guns, many new; had destroyed immense stores of corn and flour; had seized a mass of naval stores, and had forced the enemy to burn or wreck thirty or forty ships. By day clouds of smoke rose upward on all sides, and at night the sky was lurid with flames. The strength of the Allies, and the swiftness with which it was applied, soon completed the work and dismayed the enemy. It is with pain that we record the shameful fact that the allied soldiers and sailors disgraced themselves by plundering the houses and public buildings of Kertch and Yenikale. The predatory instincts of our troops were repressed severely, but Sir George Brown had no real control over our allies, and the French generals and Turkish pashas did nothing to restrain their men. The plunder of Kertch and Yenikale is a blot upon this brilliant expedition.

The flying squadron under Captain Lyons really deserved its name. Speed was essential to success, for delay would have given the mass of shipping employed in feeding the Russian army time to run up the Don, or enter the Strait of Genitchi and push into the Putrid Sea. Captain Lyons was as swift as a spirit of fire. It was his business to destroy every sail afloat, to visit and burn all the public magazines of the Russian Government within the reach of his guns and boats, and to bombard every fortified place on the shore. He fulfilled his task. Within four-and-twenty hours he was off Berdiansk, the best port in the sea. Here he landed his small-arm men, and burnt stores worth £50,000, and many merchant ships. Then detaching ships to watch Genitchi and the mouth of the Don, he steamed with the rest of the squadron to Arabat. Here the Russians had a fort, mounting thirty guns, and Lyons and the French shelled the place and blew up the magazine. In three days he had destroyed a hundred transports laden with provisions for the enemy. Without delay he made for Genitchi. Lyons bombarded the place in order to cover the passage of his boats through the Strait into the Putrid Sea. The boats' crews worked through, fired the shipping and corn depÔts, and returned; but the wind shifting, it became necessary to go in again and complete the work. This was done by three volunteers: Lieutenant Buckley, Lieutenant Burgoyne, and Mr. John Roberts. These men had the hardihood to land alone, and, in the face of the Cossacks, performed the duty they undertook; and then the boats, under a fire of field-pieces, set fire to the shipping which had escaped before. At the end of the 29th of May the squadron had destroyed, in the Sea of Azoff, four war steamers, 246 merchant ships, and corn and flour worth £150,000. On the 2nd of June the indefatigable Lyons was off Taganrog. The governor would not accept terms of surrender, which would have saved private property; and under cover of the gunboats, in the face of 3,000 troops, Lieutenant Buckley and a band of volunteers landed repeatedly and performed the desperate service of firing the stores and Government buildings. Marioupol shared the fate of Taganrog. Thus Captain Lyons made a tour of the Sea of Azoff. Not one place escaped him or his able lieutenants, Sherard Osborn, Cowper Coles, Horton, Hewett, M'Killop, and his French coadjutors. The Russians lost not only the command of this sea, but masses of corn, forage, fish, and marine stores, and ships which it is impossible to estimate. Hewett and Lambert effectually destroyed all the means of connecting the spit of Arabat with the Crimea; and, after Captain Lyons had left, to meet an untimely death before Sebastopol, Sherard Osborn kept the sea, and left the enemy not a moment's rest. But ere this the French and British troops, leaving the Turks to hold a fortified camp at Yenikale, had returned to the camp at Sebastopol.

The losses inflicted by the flying squadron were not the only losses sustained by the enemy. When he quitted Kertch on the 24th of May, he destroyed himself 4,166,000 pounds of corn, and 508,000 pounds of flour; and it was estimated that this, with the quantity destroyed in the Sea of Azoff, would have furnished four months' rations for 100,000 men. The amount of supplies drawn from Kertch is shown by the fact that just before the Allies landed, the Russians had been sending off daily convoys of 1,500 waggons, each containing half a ton weight of grain or flour. Besides this, the fortress of Anapa, on the appearance of an allied fleet, was blown up by the garrison, and 245 guns rendered useless thereby. The garrison retired across the Kuban River, abandoning the last post held by them in that part of Circassia. Thus the expedition to Kertch and the Sea of Azoff surpassed in its effects the most sanguine expectations of its designers, and struck a severe blow at the vitals of the Russian army.

Once more the tide of war carries us back to the trenches before Sebastopol. General PÉlissier had, on taking command, accepted Lord Raglan's proposals for carrying on the siege by vigorous and direct attacks. The two officers being of one mind, and recognising the Malakoff as the true key of the place, determined, in council by themselves, that the Russians should be immediately deprived of their counter-approaches, and forced back into the body of their works. They agreed that on one and the same day, by simultaneous assault, the Quarries under the Redan, the Mamelon in front of the Malakoff, and the White Works above the Careening Bay, should be wrested from the enemy. This comprehensive operation was a necessity, for these three works supported each other. The Mamelon flanked, and was flanked by, the other two, and hence all three had to be taken together. Having determined to take them, they requested their generals to submit plans for the execution of their resolve. Accordingly, a council of war was held for this purpose. There were still in the French camp officers who were strongly in favour of operations in the field, and as strongly opposed to an assault, even of the outworks. The chief of these were Niel, Bosquet, and Martimprey, all able men. But at the council, when PÉlissier announced the decision of the generals, and named the day for the assault, and General Bosquet ventured to dissent, the Commander-in-Chief stopped him with the peremptory statement that the attack was "decided." The French generals had no choice but to obey.

The main points being settled, the work of preparation finished, the magazines well filled, the troops all eager, orders went forth that the bombardment should begin on the morning of the 6th of June, and should continue four-and-twenty hours, and that then the works should be carried by storm. By dint of great exertions, and drawing from our large resources, we were able to put in battery 157 pieces of ordnance. All the lighter pieces, the siege guns of an older period, the famous 24-pounders of the early years of the century, were withdrawn. The 32-pounder was the lightest gun in the trenches. So heavy an armament had never before been arrayed at any siege. There were in battery no fewer than twenty-seven 13-inch, seventeen 10-inch mortars, and forty-nine 32-pounders. The remainder were 68-pounders, and 10-inch and 8-inch guns. The French batteries, were armed with 300 pieces, but the bulk of these were opposed to the western face of the town, and, for some unexplained reason, did not maintain a fire equal in intensity to those on the east front. According to the plan laid down, our left attack, while pouring a torrent of missiles into the Redan, was also to keep up a combat with the Barrack and Garden Batteries, in which they were to be supported by the French on their left. Our right attack was to devote nearly the whole of its might upon the Mamelon and Malakoff, in aid of the direct fire of the French, and these latter were to pound at the White Works, as well as the Malakoff and Mamelon. Thus it will be seen that the fire of at least a hundred and fifty guns and mortars was to be concentrated on these works.

The 6th of June was a clear, sunny day, and the mighty lines of the enemy stood out in bold relief against the western sky. About half-past two in the afternoon, at a given signal, the allied batteries opened all at once, with a roar that rent the air and shook the earth. In two hours the effects of the ceaseless shower of shot and shell upon the Malakoff and Mamelon were visible to practised eyes; and the comparatively rare responses made by the enemy showed that his guns had suffered as well as his earthen parapets. From that time until nightfall, the complete superiority of the allied fire was secured; but as the French on the left fired feebly, the Barrack and Garden Batteries, and some of the guns in the Redan, stoutly maintained the combat with our left attack. When darkness set in, the firing did not cease; for the huge shells from our big mortars rushed upward all night, and fell crashing and exploding within the enemy's works. At daybreak on the 7th the smoke and the mists of the morning hung over the hills and ravines. The growing light showed that, although the enemy had worked hard in repairing damages, yet the outlines of the great entrenchments were less shapely and trim than heretofore. Once more the batteries on both sides put forth their might, and the deafening roar was renewed. The enemy showed some vigour at first, but the Malakoff and Mamelon were soon forced to succumb. It was plain, however, to all eyes and ears that, on the vital points, the enemy was the weaker, and that the attack had got the mastery over the defence. Late in the afternoon, and for an hour or two preceding the assault, the fire of our guns became quicker than ever. The men in the batteries put forth their whole energies, and for an hour before the assault the cannonade was fiercer and more deadly than at any preceding period.

The British had told off about 3,200 men of the Light and 2nd Divisions to carry the Quarries. Two small columns, each 200 strong, were to turn the flanks of the work, and then advancing towards the Redan, lie down, and cover by their fire a working party, 800 strong, whose duty it was to turn the face of the work towards the Redan. About 1,000 men were held in support in the trenches, and two battalions were posted in the Woronzoff Road to cover the flank of both our attacks. The French, having a more serious operation, and being more accustomed to act in masses, detailed about 28,000 men for the two assaults. General Mayran had the direction of the operations against the White Works—redoubts on the Careening Ridge, one more advanced than the other, and standing between the Great Harbour and the Careening Ravine. Two of his brigades—the right under De Lavarande, the left under De Failly—were to storm the redoubts, while General Dulac held an entire division in reserve to support both; and besides these, there were two battalions in the Careening Ravine, intended to push down it, and cut off the retreat of the enemy. General Camou was entrusted with the attack on the Mamelon. One brigade, under Wimpfen, was to carry that work; while another brigade and an entire division were drawn up in the middle ravine between the French left and our right. Behind them were two battalions of the Imperial Guard, and in rear of all, near the Inkermann battle-field, was a complete division of Turks. The whole operation was under the control of Bosquet, who proved himself quite equal to the occasion. The fire of the allied batteries was at its height when three rockets fired from the Victoria Redoubt, at 6.45 p.m., let loose the excited soldiers, who dashed at once upon the enemy.

The brigades on the extreme right went up to the White Works at a run, Lavarande's men first storming the redoubt on the right at the point of the bayonet, and De Failly rushing past this work, and being equally successful in carrying its counterpart; while the battalions in the ravine marched down it, and swept up a number of the flying garrison. Led away by a furious impulse, the troops even entered a third work, just above the Careening Bay, but this they could not hold. The other two redoubts, however, were firmly grasped and held in spite of the fire of the batteries on the north.

At the same time Wimpfen's brigade issued from the trenches in three columns, and went impetuously up the slope of the Mamelon, led by Colonel Brancion, of the 50th Regiment of the line. On his left were the 3rd Zouaves, on his right Algerian Native Light Infantry. Soon they were at the ditch, firing into the embrasures, and receiving from the parapets a telling fire. Then the 50th dashed into the ditch, and began to scramble up the slope of the work, and Zouave and Algerine closed bodily with it. In a few moments the redoubt was full of Frenchmen. They had won the victory with such comparative ease that their passions got the better of their judgment. Disobeying all orders, the Zouaves and Algerines pursued the Russians towards the Malakoff, into which our batteries were now pouring a terrible fire. It was an unhappy move; for the enemy immediately lined his parapets and brought his guns to bear, and the Zouaves, although they stood well and fought well, and although they were aided by shells pitched into the Malakoff from our batteries, yet they only stood to be slain. In the meantime, alarmed by some appearances indicating a mine, the troops holding the Mamelon all ran out, and the Zouaves and Algerines, returning from their mad rush on the Malakoff, pursued by a heavy and angry column of Russians, found the Mamelon empty. Shattered as they were, they could not hold it, and thus the enemy burst in triumph into his stronghold once more. It was an anxious moment, but General Bosquet was prompt in supplying a remedy. Throwing forward a fresh brigade, and giving it ample support, these new troops, rallying hundreds who had fled in terror at the idea of a mine, went steadily up to the work. There was a brief combat, and rattling volleys; but, overpowered, the enemy sullenly yielded possession and retired back into the town, this time unpursued. Thus the French stormed, and lost, and regained the famous Mamelon.

Soon after the first advance on the Mamelon, Colonel Shirley, obeying a signal from Lord Raglan, launched his little band against the Quarries. The men of the Light and 2nd Divisions carried the work and its outlying trenches without firing a shot, and then advancing, began to ply their rifles against the gunners of the Redan. Anticipating an assault, the enemy had filled this work with troops, and a horrible carnage was the consequence. Either to escape this fire or to succour the Malakoff, for a time the garrison of the Redan ran out of that work, and some British soldiers actually went up and peered into it, and saw it was empty. But when night came, the Russians returned to the Redan, and six times during the night they strove to expel the little band of Britishers who occupied the Quarries, and at one time, by turning the left flank, they succeeded for a brief space; then, with a rolling cheer, our soldiers went at them with the bayonet, and regained and held the lines, which were at once turned into a new parallel, and the site of a new and most formidable battery.

After the success of the 7th of June the question immediately arose—should that success be pushed, and should the whole place be at once assailed on all sides? To answer this question there was a council of war. It should always be remembered that the British played a very subordinate part in the siege of Sebastopol. They had reaped their glory at the Alma and at Inkermann. They had soon lost that equality in point of numbers with which they began the war, and the views of Lord Raglan could now only prevail by dint of their comparative sagacity. He had, of course, a certain authority as the representative of Britain; but it was one of the penalties we paid for making war side by side with France, that he should often have to succumb, and that in place of one plan or another a medium course should be struck out and acted on. Whatever we did in the siege was purely secondary after Inkermann. Our batteries, indeed, were very formidable, and paved the way for the French successes against the Mamelon and finally against the Malakoff; but our troops were so placed by the stress of circumstances, that it was impossible for them to perform any striking action. It would appear that Lord Raglan's plan of taking Sebastopol would have been to follow up a heavy fire by, if need be, repeated assaults at all points—some by way of diversion, to keep a large force of the enemy occupied, others driven home with the view of carrying the place. So that it is not surprising he should have wished to continue the bombardment on the 8th, and then assault at the moment when the enemy's batteries were at the lowest ebb of their power. But to this the French would not agree. They wanted more time to build more batteries, to push approaches nearer; and as they furnished the large assaulting columns on the vital point, Lord Raglan had no choice but to acquiesce. He knew that he could not take the place. He knew, and all knew, that if the Redan were captured, it could not be held so long as the Malakoff was in the hands of the Russians. Therefore he was obviously bound to assent when General PÉlissier proposed to defer the assault until the Mamelon and White Works were armed, and a battery established in the Quarries.

The French and British at once began to strengthen and arm their acquisitions, and to sap onward towards the enemy's lines. But this caused great losses day by day. Mortars from behind the Malakoff threw shells into the Mamelon, mortars from the Redan threw shells into the Quarries; guns and mortars from the north side threw their missiles into the White Works. On the left the French did little more to aid the siege. There was mining and counter-mining in plenty in front of the Flagstaff, and some new batteries were constructed and armed on the extreme left; but they did not now push the attack as they had done before. They had come at last to recognise the Malakoff as the true point of attack, and against this they turned all their energies. They worked out above a hundred and fifty yards from the Mamelon, formed a large sheltered place in which to assemble troops, and covered the front with a curving line of parapet. The British built up and armed a six-gun battery in the Quarries, which looked into the enemy's communications behind the Malakoff, and was destined to play an important part; and they also increased the armament in the two attacks until the 13-inch mortars alone amounted to thirty.

The Russians were not a whit less active. Their energies also were bent upon making more complete the formidable defences of the Malakoff. They were especially careful to close the gaps on its proper left towards the Careening Bay, to open new batteries sweeping the ground at the head of that bay, and to construct interior retrenchments and flanking batteries. Their line of works, beginning from the South Harbour and extending to the Great Harbour, was broken only at one point. About a quarter of a mile to the proper left of the Redan, the Karabelnaia, or Middle Ravine—that which ran between the British right attack and the French Malakoff attack—broke the line of the Russian works. On the opposite bank of the ravine, the outer defences of the Malakoff Redoubt began with a work called the Gervais Battery, connected by a curtain with the Malakoff. But in rear of this, as well as in rear of the Little Redan on the proper left of the Malakoff, and in rear of the connecting curtains, the enemy had thrown up retrenchments. In short, General Todleben developed his plan of defence to meet the plan of attack, and as he had plenty of men, and a boundless supply of guns and material, he could execute all his admirable designs. He was a worthy foe.

As usual, the plan of attack was debated at headquarters when it had been decided by superior generals that the guns should open on the 17th, and that the assault should take place the next day. How should this be carried out? It was arranged that the French on the west face of the town should attack its salient defences, the Flagstaff, Central, and Quarantine Bastions, in three columns, under General de Salles; and it was anticipated that if these attacks did not succeed, they would keep many thousands of the enemy employed, and might, if occasion offered, be converted into real attacks, pushed home. The British were to send a brigade down the South Ravine, to seize the cemetery lying at the bottom of its basin, and, in conjunction with a French force, threaten the enemy in that quarter. The main British assaults were to be made on the Redan. If the Redan was carried, then the column in the South Ravine was to climb up to the Barrack Battery, and join the Redan column in the rear. The French were to attack in three columns on the extreme right. One was to follow the Careening Ravine, and storm the Little Redan; a second was to rush upon the proper left of the Malakoff; while a third, issuing from the Middle Ravine, carried the Gervais Battery, and worked round thence to the rear of the Malakoff. The fleet was to send in steamers on the nights preceding the assault, to keep the enemy on the alert in his sea batteries. Immense reserves were to be provided along the whole line. Such was the original plan. It was settled on the 16th, but in the afternoon General PÉlissier desired to make an important modification. General de Salles urged that, as the attacks on the left could not succeed, they had better not take place; and General PÉlissier, much to the discontent of Lord Raglan, notified that this change had been made. Lord Raglan did not press his objections, and thus the French were merely to "demonstrate" on the left front. No other change was made, except that Lord Raglan decided to send a third column against the Redan, having for its object the salient angle of that work. Finally it was decided that the British should not attack until the French were in possession of the Malakoff. The reason for this was that the guns on the right face of the Malakoff commanded the Redan and the road to the Redan. The whole of the 1st British Division was brought up from Balaclava. The Imperial Guard was marched up to the open ground at the head of the Malakoff Ridge; and 10,000 Turks were posted on the field of Inkermann. There were in the British batteries 166 pieces of ordnance, and nearly 300 in the French.

The bombardment opened at daylight on the 17th with great effect. The Malakoff and the Redan were the objects of our gunners, and the torrent of shot and shell poured into these works had, by nine o'clock, reduced the fire of the Malakoff to an occasional gun. Throughout the day it was the same. The Redan, although it soon ceased to fire with any vigour, flung shells from small mortars with low charges into the Quarries. The Barrack and Garden Batteries were, as usual, conspicuous for their vivacity. But the fire of the Allies completely overpowered that of the eastern front. Its severity may be estimated by the fact that the ammunition consumed in the British batteries alone on the 17th and 18th was 22,684 projectiles, including 2,286 13-inch shells. It must have been nearly impossible for the Russians to work their guns, and quite impossible to work them without awful loss. When the sun went down on the 17th the mortars continued to hurl forth their monstrous missiles; and three or four of the steamers standing in opened a fire of shot, shell, and rockets on the town. It was on one of these occasions that Captain Lyons, fresh from his triumphs in the Sea of Azoff, was struck in the leg by a fragment of shell. The wound proved mortal, and death deprived the British navy of one of its most promising officers.

From the comparative silence of the Russian batteries, Lord Raglan and General PÉlissier inferred that the enemy was at the end of his resources. They hoped that at length he had exhausted his stores of artillery. It was a vain delusion. In spite of the bombardment, which went on all night, the enemy managed to replace the pieces in his batteries, and at dawn, as will be seen, he was ready to begin anew. This advantage, indeed, might have been counteracted had the Allies remained faithful to their original plan. There was, in the French camp, a sort of passion for an assault at the very first flush of the dawn. Their officers, PÉlissier excepted, had urged that the attack on the Mamelon should be given at daybreak. They were overruled. Now they came to the charge afresh. The whole scheme of the assault rested on the basis that the fire of the enemy had been crushed. To make sure, however, it was originally planned that the assault should be preceded by a three hours' violent cannonade. This would have searched every part of the enemy's works, and prevented him from massing his troops in them in large numbers. On this basis all the orders were given.

Literally at the eleventh hour, the French changed the whole plan. On the evening of the 17th, when all orders had been issued, General PÉlissier informed Lord Raglan that his officers declared they could not place their infantry in the trenches without their being seen by the enemy, and that consequently he desired the time of the assault to be altered and fixed for daybreak. Lord Raglan was justly much annoyed, but he yielded. It was a fatal concession. But how could he oppose a colleague who commanded a force nearly double that under Lord Raglan's orders? Therefore, a few hours before the assault was to take place, the old orders were revoked, and fresh orders were issued. This occupied the British commander nearly all night, and left him but one hour for repose.

Throughout the night the troops appointed to storm and support the stormers and the reserves were moving to their appointed places. Down into the British trenches went the men of the Light 2nd and 4th Divisions, under Sir John Campbell, Colonel Lacy Yea, and Colonel Shadforth; while Eyre's Brigade of the 3rd Division moved deep into the South Ravine, and Barnard's Brigade of the same division was placed higher up in support. The right column was to attack the left face of the Redan, the left column the right face. If these succeeded, then the centre column was to charge in at the salient. Eyre was to move towards the works at the end of the South Ravine. The French, in addition to the ordinary guards, marched three entire divisions, about 16,000 men, into their trenches, and placed in reserve a part of the division of the Imperial Guard, bringing the force up to about 24,000 men. The right division, under the orders of General Mayran, marched into the Careening Ravine; the centre, under General Brunet, had one brigade in front of the right of the Mamelon, the other in the trenches behind; the left, under General d'Autemarre, placed one brigade on the left front of the Mamelon, the other in the trenches in the rear. The trenches and the ravines were choked up with troops, all silent and crouching in the dark. Some were sitting under the parapets, others lying flat in the ravines. But there was also a good deal of movement, for the troops had to be placed so that they could most easily and with slightest disorder move swiftly out of the trenches. Seen from the higher ground in the rear, the soldiers are said to have looked, in the deep obscurity, like the people of a world of shadows.

The allied generals had intended to surprise the place; to break into it when its defenders were the least prepared. Some suppose that the enemy was forewarned by spies and deserters of the coming assault, for, far from being taken unawares, the Russians were as much on the alert as the Allies. Behind those dark and silent entrenchments there were thousands of soldiers under arms, and waiting in silence to do their duty at the first tap of the drum or bray of the trumpet. It needed not spies or deserters to forewarn them. The custom of armies when near each other is to parade before break of day, and this is not less the custom of garrisons when besieged, or of an army, like that in Sebastopol, defending a mighty entrenched camp. So it was on the 18th. Behind the huge Malakoff and the Great Redan, in rear of the connecting parapets, and in the houses of the suburb, lay 16,000 men ready to clutch their arms and fall on. In front of the works were watchful sentries, and in the works the gunners stood by their pieces, prompt to fire. The steamers in the harbour, sheltered under the cliffs, had their fires lighted and their steam up, and were prepared to throw shell, and grape, and canister on the assaulting columns. But had Lord Raglan's plan of a three hours' bombardment been carried out, the fire could not have failed to disarrange the plan of defence, the chances of surprising the defenders would have been great, and the assailants, moving upon what they could see, would have stormed with greater unity and greater confidence.

It was still dark. General Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angely, with the Imperial Guard, was in the Lancaster Battery. Lord Raglan was at his post, watching for the signal. The unemployed spectators, officers and amateurs, were on the hills in groups here and there. General PÉlissier was still on his way, and upwards of half a mile from his post. Hope, nay, confidence reigned in every breast. The British were cool, ready, and quiet. The French, to use their own expression, were quivering with eagerness, but their centre columns were not yet placed.

Suddenly, none knew why, flashes of fire, followed by a sullen uproar, were seen and heard on the extreme right. The flashes grew brighter and more frequent, the noise of exploding gunpowder grew louder. The roar of big guns rose above the crash of musketry, and the roll of drums and shrill notes of trumpets were heard in the transitory lulls of the larger tumult. What had happened? No signal rockets had climbed upwards from the Lancaster Battery to break into a bouquet of coloured fires. General PÉlissier, hurrying through the dark over the plateau, was perplexed and furious. Still the combat raged about the head of the Careening Bay, and the fire of the place grew fiercer and more sustained. Ten minutes elapsed—minutes that seemed weeks to the wondering spectators. The French general entered the battery in a fury; demanding sharply who had given the signal, his wrath changed into astonishment when he was told no signal had been given, and his astonishment into vexation when he learned that General Mayran had mistaken a military rocket, fired from the Mamelon, for the signal to assault! The unity and suddenness of the assault were thus destroyed; but General PÉlissier, without hesitation, ordered the rockets to be fired, and, at seven minutes past three, the clustering stars of fire hung for a moment up in the black sky, and then paled and vanished. The French troops dashed out in the gloom to the assault.

A fatal accident had precipitated the conflict. General Mayran had been up all night engaged in disposing himself the division he commanded. He had them all in hand in the Careening Ravine, and he was eager, he was impatient for the fray. In this frame of mind he was disposed to take every rocket fired from the Mamelon for the signal agreed on; and when, a little before three, one of these blazing missiles writhed and bounded through the air towards the Russian lines, he called out, "That is the signal." The rash step was taken; his division was ordered to move. With the first brigade Mayran went himself; the second was commanded by De Failly. But the troops no sooner rushed out than they were smitten by a heavy fire. The leading soldiers, after the fashion of their countrymen, began to fire on the retreating Russian outposts, and the flash and the sound guided the Russian artillery in training their guns. Then it was still dark, and the troops were unable to see the nature of the ground. Instead of following the left bank of the Careening Bay, and striving to turn the line of entrenchments, they went full in the teeth of a battery. The steamers came up to the mouth of the bay, and, at short range, poured in showers of grape and shell. So that this unhappy column, struggling in the obscurity over rough ground, was torn through and through by the iron sleet hurled at it in front and flank. Mayran was soon among the wounded, but he would neither retire nor give up the command. Another grapeshot striking him in the body, he was carried off mortally wounded; and part of his troops, after a vain but gallant stand, hurried back into the Careening Ravine, shattered and disorganised. But De Failly, bringing up the reserve, rallied them in a hollow, and held his ground.

THE ASSAULT ON THE REDAN. (See p. 110.)