Anonymous

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

State of the Army—Food, Clothing, and Shelter—Absence of a Road—Want of Transport—Numbers of the Sick—State of the Hospitals—Miss Nightingale—Mr. Roebuck's Committee—Military Operations—The French Mistake—Improvement of the Situation—Arrival of General Niel—Attack upon the Malakoff Hill approved—The Russian Redoubt constructed—Attacks and Counter-Attacks—Death of Nicholas—Todleben's Counter-Approaches—The 23rd of March—Raglan and Canrobert disagree—The second Bombardment—Egerton's Pit—Night Attack of General de Salles—The Emperor's Interference—Canrobert's Indecision—The Kertch Project—Orders and Counter-Orders—Recall of the Expedition—It is finally abandoned—Arrival of the Sardinian Contingent—The Emperor's Visit to Windsor—The Emperor's Plan of Campaign—It is rejected by Raglan and Omar—Resignation of Canrobert.

THE state of the army in the Crimea after the battle of Inkermann was most painful. The troops had to preserve their own existence, and to defend the ground they occupied in the face of a watchful enemy. Their base of operations, their source of supply, was Balaclava; and the road, or, rather track, from that place to the camp was a mere quagmire. As we have already stated, the numbers of the army were inadequate to the work imposed upon them, and the suffering they endured arose in a great part from that cause, but not entirely. The men were not "starved," as stated at the time. Up to the middle of November no army had ever been better fed. The rations were large and varied, and the troops received them just as regularly as if they had been at home. After November, parts of the extra rations were not always delivered; but not a day passed on which the men did not obtain a good supply of the necessaries of life. But then it was said they were not clothed. Now, although the Government did not anticipate that the army would winter in the Crimea, they did, in the summer, make provision for supplying that army, which must winter somewhere, with winter clothing. The requisitions were made upon proper departments as early as July. The ships freighted therewith sailed from England in October, and of these the Prince only was lost. When the news of that calamity arrived in England, while Lord Raglan had sent to Constantinople for warm clothing, the Duke of Newcastle issued fresh orders at home, and saw that they were executed. There never was a time after the end of November when there was not more warm clothing at Balaclava than the means at the disposal of the army could carry to the front. In the same way there was a deficiency of shelter. The troops, when covered, were covered only by single canvas, except in some rare instances where old campaigners had made themselves imperfect huts out of stones and branches of trees. But from the end of November there was a large quantity of wood at Balaclava. It was the same with fuel. There was always charcoal to be had at Balaclava by those who could fetch it. Moreover, there were enormous magazines of provisions and large herds of cattle at Constantinople. Nor were forage and chopped straw ever deficient; and even the supply of hay, which had to be sent all the way from England, was only interrupted for a short time. So that the supplies of these essentials—food, clothing, shelter, fuel, forage—were duly provided for the army. Private benevolence had come in to supplement public exertion; and Balaclava, in the winter, was choked up with luxuries and essentials.

But there were two things which had not been provided, and these were also essentials. No road had been made; and, in the absence of a road, no transport able to overcome the tremendous difficulties of the transit from Balaclava to the camp had been collected. Here were the sources of the greater part of the suffering and loss endured by the army. What was called the road was a mere track across the open country. While the fine weather lasted, it was hard and sound. When the rain fell continuously, it broke up; that is, became a strip of deep mud, varied by deep holes full of water, impassable to carts and waggons, passable only by men and horses with great labour and fatigue. But why not repair it? The thing was tried and failed. Turks were employed to mend this road, but they could not do it. The truth is that the road required to be made; that is, built upon a good foundation, and kept in order by constant attention. Why was this not done? For a plain and sufficient reason. It is usual for an army to find its own labourers. An army makes its own roads, builds its own bridges, erects its own batteries, constructs its own depÔts. The army in the Crimea was too weak to make a road from Balaclava to the front, and no one had sufficient resource to send for labourers from England.

THE LADY WITH THE LAMP: MISS NIGHTINGALE IN THE HOSPITAL AT SCUTARI.

(After the Picture by Henrietta Rae [Mrs. Normand.)]

In these circumstances the horrors of the winter could only be mitigated by an ample supply of mules and horses. By the breaking up of the road, the land transport at the disposal of Commissary-General Filder was reduced to one-sixth; for whereas a horse and cart could transport six hundred pounds' weight to the front, a horse alone could only carry two hundred pounds'. It follows that the supplies could only be maintained by extra work on the part of the animals, or by an extra number of animals. At a critical moment, when he wanted more horse power, Mr. Filder sent a steamer to fetch animals from his depÔt; but, by some cause unexplained, the steamer was detained at Constantinople for three weeks. Then, although there was a large park of ponies and horses on the Bosphorus, they not being forthcoming, the valuable chargers of the cavalry, and even the teams of the artillery and the horses belonging to the officers, were put in requisition. Still all this was not enough. The horses, from hard usage by their drivers and keepers, from overwork and exposure, from neglect to feed them, although forage was at hand, died by scores. The drivers, imported from Turkey, died, deserted, refused to work: they could not stand the exposure and fatigue. The consequence was that, during the most critical period, there was never more transport than was sufficient to feed the troops irregularly and from hand to mouth, and to keep the men and guns supplied with the minimum of ammunition consistent with safety. The burden of responsibility, the amount of work required from the commissariat, was too heavy and too vast for a body so imperfectly organised and so undermanned. The harbour of Balaclava was too small, its shores were too confined, for the service demanded at an emergency. Months of labour were required to make it suitable. But making every allowance—and the exceptional position of the commissariat, with large extra labours imposed upon it, requires in justice large allowance—it is plain that, from some cause never fully explained, the commissariat failed to import and keep in the Crimea a supply of transport adequate to the extraordinary demands of the army. When the perilous position of the army dawned upon them, Ministers thought of an Army Works Corps, employed Messrs. Peto & Co. to make a railway, and instructed Colonel M'Murdo to raise a Land Transport Corps. But then it was too late. So we come round again to the original sources—not of all the suffering, for war and suffering are inseparable—but of the peculiar kind of suffering endured by the army in the Crimea, namely, inadequate and unorganised military establishments; and the responsibility for this rested not upon one Government alone, but upon all Governments from 1830 up to that time, and not upon all Governments only, but also upon the nation.

Had there been a good road from Balaclava to the camp—had there been plenty of transport, plenty of clothing, plenty of shelter, plenty of fuel—the sufferings of the army from hard work and exposure would have been very great; for war is not a condition of existence conducive to health and long life, even in the most favourable circumstances; and when war is carried on through the winter, when the form of that war is a siege, when the army carrying on the siege is itself besieged by the enemy, and restricted to one narrow pass leading to a little bay for all its supplies, for everything to keep it alive except water, the ordinary miseries and hardships of war become intense, terrible, and destructive. So it was in the Crimea. Scantily clothed, irregularly fed, existing, when on duty, in the mud and water of the trenches, sleeping, when they returned to their tents, in wet clothes on a wet floor, improvident of the little means within their reach which would have lessened their sufferings, none but the most iron constitutions could endure this and live. Our brave, obstinate, hardy soldiers were like children in all that lies beyond the range of their regular duties, and many perished because they were ignorant and reckless. But the bulk of the sickness and mortality was caused by overwork and exposure, necessarily consequent upon the discharge of their duty. A few figures will suggest better than pages of writing how much this army suffered. On the 1st of October—that is, just after the arrival of the army before Sebastopol—the number of men and officers in a state fit for duty was 23,000; and the number sick, including the wounded, was 6,713. On the 3rd of November the number fit for duty had fallen to 22,343, the number of sick had increased to 7,116. Then came the battle of Inkermann. On the 14th of November the effective force was 20,780, the number of sick and wounded 8,366. The force of "bayonets"—that is, privates and corporals of infantry, "rank and file," as the technical term is—had fallen to 14,874; and it is on the bayonets that a quartermaster-general relies for his working and fatigue parties. But now reinforcements began to trickle in. Troops to the number of 3,480 men arrived. Yet so severe was the pressure, even in the middle of November, that this augmentation only raised the effective force from 20,780 to 22,825. The next item explains this. The roll of sick had risen from 8,366 to 9,170, an increase of 804 in one week. A week later, on the 30th of November, in spite of the reinforcements, the effective force had fallen to 21,895; the sick had increased to 10,095, although 640 men had landed in the interval. Let us pass over a month—a month in which nearly 5,000 men landed at Balaclava. What do we find? That on the 1st of January, 1855, the effective force stands at only 21,973, or 78 more than it stood on the 30th of November; while the number of sick had increased to 13,915. A fortnight later, and the effective force was 20,444; the sick 16,176; while the force of bayonets was actually fewer by 36 than it was on the 14th of November, before any of the 10,000 reinforcements had arrived. Nor must it be forgotten that all this time the dead were being buried, and the convalescents were returning to duty, and going again into the hospital. These figures are the measure of the unspeakable sufferings of the army in the Crimea, the main and unavoidable causes of which we have described.

But these figures do not convey a full idea of the agonies of that winter campaign, except to those gifted with a lively imagination. It was the treatment of the sick and wounded, both in and out of the Crimea, that occasioned the worst of these agonies. The medical department utterly broke down under the burden thrown upon it. Although more medical men and more medicines and medical comforts were sent out to the East than ever were supplied to a force of similar strength, yet, in consequence of want of foresight, want of faculty, want of administrative skill, the medicines and medical comforts were so badly arranged and distributed, that, especially in the Crimea, they were not at hand when most required. The state of the hospitals at Scutari was the first thing that roused the public indignation. Government, having failed to organise a medical staff corps, had recourse to Miss Nightingale and a number of trained nurses collected by her, and sent them to the East; and the brightest picture in the dark story of the winter of 1854-5 is that of Florence Nightingale bringing order out of chaos, and tending the sick and wounded soldiers of England, in those far-off hospitals on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. That was the work of Government. The public feeling showed itself in another form. Sir Robert Peel proposed to raise £10,000 for supplying the sick with comforts, to be called the Times Fund, and put down £200 towards it; and in a few days the whole amount demanded had reached Printing House Square. Three gentlemen were sent to superintend the expenditure, and it is to Miss Nightingale principally, and to these private persons, that we are bound to attribute the alleviation of the sad state of the sick and wounded at Scutari in the winter of 1854-5. The truth is, that Government had been kept in the dark as to the condition of the hospitals. Knowing that amply sufficient supplies had been sent to the East, they were confounded when they heard that not comforts only, but actual necessaries, were wanting. When we look into the facts, it is manifest that the medical department in the East had not been well organised on a scale sufficiently large, and that it had not been governed by men of energy, foresight, and decision. Hence the horrible condition of the tent-hospitals in the Crimea, and the various hospitals on the Bosphorus. It is impossible to exonerate Government from censure, but it is equally impossible not to see the evil influence of a system adapted to a state of peace suddenly applied to a state of war. By slow degrees all the hospitals were improved, and finally brought up to a state of high efficiency; but in the meantime thousands had died, and hundreds had become permanent invalids; and it is this loss of life which is the heaviest charge that lies at the door of the Aberdeen Administration.

Hence grew the demand for the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol. Those who originated it used, throughout the inquiry, the great power it gave them as a means of obtaining grounds, real and colourable, to sustain the preconceived conclusions with which they began their inquisition. It was a most imperfect investigation. "The fulness of the investigation," as the Committee had the candour to confess, "has been restricted by considerations of State policy, so that in the outset of this report, your Committee must admit that they have been compelled to aid an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to complete." Indeed, to have probed the matter to the bottom, the Committee should have called at least General Canrobert and the Emperor of the French from the ranks of our allies, and in no case could any investigation be fair which did not include the evidence of Lord Raglan, General Airey, Mr. Filder, Miss Nightingale, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Yet, without having examined any of these, Mr. Roebuck coolly asked the Committee to endorse the most sweeping and arrogant charges against the principal persons concerned, including those who were absent, and unable to say a word in their own defence. And although the report drawn up by Mr. Roebuck and Mr. Layard was rejected by all the other members of the Committee, by his casting vote Mr. Roebuck was enabled to append a paragraph replete with epigrammatic assertions that were untrue. By the time this Committee had ended an inquiry that they could not, from the very character of the investigation, complete, the army had recovered its health, strength, and efficiency, and the new Minister of War, Lord Panmure, had, in his place, candidly ascribed the change in the army, in great part, to the measures of the very Minister, the Duke of Newcastle, who had been made the victim of the national fury.

It is a relief to turn from party conflicts and the exhibition of national wrath, not in the wisest form, to the military operations of that grievous winter campaign. The first renewed sign of military activity was seen on the 20th of November. In the vicious plan of siege adopted the British played a wholly secondary part. The French theory was, that by assailing and carrying the Flagstaff Bastion at the southern apex of the town, they would obtain possession of a commanding position, which would necessitate an abandonment of the place by the enemy. To this end they worked. But as the batteries on the eastern face of the enemy's lines took their approaches almost in flank, our engineers had to construct batteries intended to draw off and keep down the fire of these Russian works. Thus the British attacks were subordinate and supplementary to the great French attack. The British theory was that the Malakoff was the key of the whole position on the southern side of the great harbour; but the French engineers could not see the justness of this theory, and General Canrobert was not a man of sufficient moral strength to overrule his engineers, even supposing that he had sufficient military insight to comprehend the views of Sir John Burgoyne. Therefore the French persisted in their original error; and a dreary period ensued, during which the Russians made frequent sorties with partial success, while on the side of the Allies the chief success was the capture of the Russian rifle-pits by Lieutenant Tryon on the 20th of November. And so the winter wore away.

January, during which the troops suffered most from disease, was nevertheless the turning-point from gloom to brighter days. For huts and warm clothing had arrived in superabundance, and transport was improved. The shores of Balaclava bay had been rendered passable by roads on both sides, and wharves had been built. The railway was creeping out of the port and ascending the hills towards the front; and as the French had at last sent a brigade to reinforce the right at Inkermann, our men got less labour and more rest. The French had as yet no huts. They were still sheltered only in dog-tents. But they were tolerably fed and clothed, and large reinforcements, including a brigade of the new Imperial Guard, had brought their numbers up to 80,000 men. The resolve of the Allies to take Sebastopol, far from suffering any abatement, had become stronger, and every energy and resource was applied to secure its fulfilment. The Russian Emperor, the cause of this heroic conflict, was not less resolute, and day and night his thoughts were bent upon frustrating at any and every cost the designs of the Allies. The government of Lord Aberdeen had obtained from the King of Sardinia the promise that he would join the alliance, and furnish 15,000 men for service in the Crimea, and there was some reason to suppose that Austria would at length take the field; but whether it was that Austria resented the entry of Sardinia into the Western league, or whether timid counsels prevailed at Vienna, Austria did not change her position from that of a passive to that of an active ally.

The month of February was marked by many important incidents. On both sides there were renewed vigour and activity, in spite of the severity of the weather. For the French Emperor, discontented with General Canrobert, who had failed to realise the expectations formed of him, had sent out the Duke of Montebello to examine the state of the siege, and report thereon. The consequence was that General Niel, one of the first engineers in the French service, received orders to hasten to the Crimea and direct the engineering operations. Niel had not been long in the French camp before he justified the early and oft-repeated counsels of Sir John Burgoyne, and declared that the Malakoff Hill was the key of Sebastopol. It was at once determined to break ground on that side. By every fair consideration, the right of doing so should have been made over to the English. But no. There were two overmastering reasons. The British had fewer numbers by almost one-half, and the French are always greedy of glory. Lord Raglan could not insist—the alliance depended on submission. The French Emperor was bent on reaping the lion's share of the glory. He needed it for himself and his army. Thus, by force of circumstances, the British were left in their old positions, one of which, the left attack, led no whither, the other led to the Redan, which it was impossible to reach; while the French took up their ground on the plateau leading to the Malakoff, and on the heights on the right of the Careening Ravine.

THE "BLOCK" AT BALACLAVA. (See p. 80.)

Having once determined on the right point of attack, the French began to work with their usual industry, and by the middle of the month they had formed their first parallel from the Careening Ravine to the steep cliffs of the Great Harbour, had connected that parallel with the British right, and had constructed a strong redoubt and place of arms, called the Victoria Redoubt, on the upper part of the slope running down to the Malakoff. The Russians, seeing these works in progress, began to pull down the ruined tower on the Malakoff Hill, and to construct around its site that enormous redoubt which so long defied its assailants. On its right and left they were equally busy, and soon they took the daring and wise resolution of constructing counter-approaches in this quarter.

In the middle of the month, while these works of preparation were in progress, Omar Pasha won fresh laurels by repelling a vigorous attack on Eupatoria. The Allies lost 107 killed and 294 wounded. The Russian loss was estimated at 500 men. This success served to raise the reputation of the Turks and dispirit and vex the enemy, who could not feel altogether at ease with 20,000 good soldiers within two or three marches of his great north road. The day after this combat, and while the news of it was ringing through the allied camp, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert agreed upon a plan for surprising the Russians on the Tchernaya at Tchorgoun; for Prince Gortschakoff had again sent only small bodies over the river, and it was believed that the whole force on both sides of the stream might be captured. It was therefore arranged that on the 20th, while yet dark, General Bosquet should lead 12,000 men from the French camp, to co-operate with 3,000 from the British force at Balaclava, under Sir Colin Campbell, in this enterprise. But Bosquet did not move, and the affair miscarried. Nothing of importance took place during the remainder of February.

On the 2nd of March an event occurred which sanguine men thought would bring the war to a speedy end; and they thought this the more because negotiations for peace were at that moment pending in Vienna. The event was the rather sudden death of Nicholas, Czar of all the Russias. He died in the middle of the day, and five hours afterwards the news had been flashed along the electric wire to every European capital. His heir, Alexander II., who immediately ascended the throne, was described as mild and pacific by nature; nevertheless, he did not fail to tell his awe-stricken subjects that he would incessantly pursue the aims of Peter, of Catherine, of Alexander I., and of his father; aims incompatible with the peace of Europe, and the independence and integrity of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, as well as Turkey. The news reached the allied camp on the 6th, and perhaps the "sensation" in this quarter was greater than in the capitals of Europe, for here were men engaged in frustrating one of the grandest of the comprehensive aims of Catherine and Nicholas. But really, it was not the Czar only with whom Europe was contending; it was the ambition of the Russian nobles and the traditional policy of the house of Romanoff. There was a kind of poetical justice in this sudden death of the man whose arrogance had brought calamity on his subjects.

The month of March was spent by the Allies in making preparations for a second bombardment, and by the enemy in prodigious efforts to meet and frustrate it. Far from reviving operations against the new Russian works on the Careening Ridge called by the Allies the White Works, the French allowed the enemy to strengthen and complete them. General Todleben had devised a system of counter-approaches. As the operations against Sebastopol were mainly of the nature of an attack by one army on another posted in a strongly entrenched position, the Russian engineer saw the great assistance he would derive from solid outposts, as by that method he would not only anticipate the Allies in the occupation of commanding points, but would seriously injure and annoy them. Knowing also the importance of the Mamelon, which was higher than the Malakoff Hill, the Russian general caused the Mamelon to be occupied in greater strength, and began to dig and delve upon its crest. First making rifle-pits and then connecting and enlarging these, he soon raised the nucleus of a very formidable work right in the path of the French advance on the Malakoff. Had the army been under one commander, this hill would have been seized in October. Now the French could not even sap up to it, much less assault it, because the enemy had been allowed to become so strong on our right of the Malakoff Ridge. The British immediately framed a battery with guns bearing on the Mamelon; but although they obstructed the working parties by day, at first, their fire at night was little heeded, and this outpost, set up in the face of the Allies with great hardihood, grew into a stronghold.

Having plenty of men—for they, too, had been reinforced—the Russians supported their system of counter-approaches by energetic sorties. In the month of March these fell principally upon the French. In addition to the redoubt on the Mamelon, the enemy had formed his rifle-pits in advance, like skirmishers in front of a column. The riflemen within them were very troublesome; and two or three nights in succession the French assaulted these pits. Two or three companies of Zouaves would leap out of the trenches, dash into the pits, and drive off the defenders. Then the supports would hurry up on the Russian side, and the Zouaves would have to fly before they could make good their hold. From the French trenches more men would issue. The rattle of musketry would raise the camp; horses would be saddled at headquarters, and aides would stumble hither and thither in the gloom. Suddenly the firing would die away and cease. The French had been frustrated. Determined to succeed, they began to sap towards the rifle-pits and took the outworks on the 21st. This led to something like a general action on the night of the 23rd of March.

It was about eleven o'clock when the Russians, issuing from both flanks of the Mamelon, dashed into the lodgments held by the French. They came on in such numbers and with so much resolution that the French were forced out of the pits and chased into the parallel. The Russians followed, leaping over the parapet and forming up within the trench, and continuing the fight. At the same time the batteries of the place opened a hot fire upon our lines, by way of diversion, and the right of Chruleff's heavy column of counter-assault burst in on the extreme right of our line. Then the French supports, coming down with suddenness and decision, drove the enemy over the parapet. Surprised, but not discouraged, the Russians charged again, and deadly hand to hand combats followed along the whole front. This fierce combat, lighted up by the incessant flashes of opposing musketry, and rendered bloody by the free use of the bayonet, was maintained for nearly two hours. The French not only kept the Russians at bay, but perceiving signs of yielding, they assumed the offensive and, charging, forced their foes to retire into the Mamelon. Towards the close of this fight the second and third Russian columns fell suddenly, one on the left of the right, the other on the left of the left attack. In both cases they forced their way into the British trenches. After a rough contest the enemy was driven out of our lines. This was the most severe action that had yet been fought in the trenches. The Russians lost 1,500 men killed and wounded, according to their own returns. The Allies lost 727, of whom 85 were British, so that the French must have borne the brunt of the fighting.

After the fierce combat on the 23rd of March the Allies busied themselves with preparations for a second bombardment of Sebastopol. Enormous masses of shot and shell and powder were brought up from Balaclava and Kamiesch, and deposited in the magazines. The forwardness of the railway had greatly diminished the labours of the British, and the French were so numerous that they found no difficulty in getting fatigue parties to carry on the works of approach, and to supply their guns with ample store of munitions. It was about this time that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert began to disagree on essential points. The French commander, naturally afraid of responsibility, was also much embarrassed by the perpetual interference of the Emperor Napoleon in the conduct of the war. That potentate, newly seated on the throne, was ambitious of commanding an army in the field. He had formed the plan of proceeding himself to the Crimea. The news thereof was bruited abroad throughout Europe, and of course it was known in the camp of the Allies, where, creating a state of expectation, it did not tend to impart vigour to the proceedings at the French headquarters. General Canrobert leaned to his master's views, and was afraid of doing anything which might be disapproved of at Paris. The Emperor wanted to operate in the field, and the French general, apparently desirous of keeping the army in a high state of numerical efficiency, was indisposed to thorough measures before the place. So from day to day the opening of the bombardment was deferred; sometimes at the instance of the French, sometimes at the instance of the English general. The first would be desirous of reinforcing the army by bringing up 14,000 Turks from Eupatoria, and the second, having acquiesced in the necessary delay, would begin fresh batteries, and then require further time to complete them. At length, on the 8th, Omar Pasha and his troops landed at Kamiesch, and Lord Raglan, although two of his newest and most advanced batteries were not complete, willingly gave his consent to the opening of the second bombardment on Easter Monday, the 9th of April, exactly six months from the date of the first bombardment.

During the morning of the 9th, while it was yet dark, the batteries and trenches were manned. There were in the magazines 500 rounds per gun, and 300 per mortar. The orders were to fire as soon as the enemy's works became visible. At half-past five the officers in command decided that the moment had come, and five minutes later the report of a solitary gun gave the signal so eagerly desired. In a moment the whole of our guns were in action; and in another the French began to fire; so that by a quarter to six on that dreary morning, the missiles of five hundred guns, showing a line of fire from the head of the Quarantine Bay to Inkermann, were pouring into the defences and the town of Sebastopol. No second elapsed without a shot or shell. Day after day, night after night, for a whole week, the bombardment went on with a dreadful monotony; and although our fire inflicted evidently serious damage upon the enemy, he managed to repair his works and mount fresh guns at night. The Russian writers admit a loss of fourteen guns disabled every day; yet this was comparatively of little moment to him, as he had such a boundless store of artillery. Besides the guns in the arsenal, there were all the guns of the fleet, and these resources were used unsparingly. On our side the resources of the Allies in guns and ammunition were limited. The object of the bombardment was definite. It was to reduce the fire so far as to permit of an assault. Very early in the week this effect had been produced to the utmost extent possible. Still the assault was delayed. The British alone had fired 47,000 projectiles into the enemy's works, and the French must have fired three times that number. Yet the enemy, though shattered and weakened, was unsubdued, and it was plain that this duel of opposing ordnance might go on till doomsday without a decisive result. Lord Raglan, from the first, had always proposed a heavy bombardment to be followed by a prompt and unflinching assault. To this the French general could not be got to agree.

In the meantime the British had pushed on towards the Redan. There were three large rifle-pits on the left of the third parallel of the right attack, whence the enemy annoyed our working parties and our gunners. Colonel Egerton, with a party of the 77th, was directed to carry these pits, and on the night of the 19th he moved his men out of the parallel, followed by some companies of the 33rd in support. Egerton was a very fine soldier; and although his movement was detected by the enemy, he did not give his own men time to reply to their fire, but led them on with the bayonet. The Russians, surprised, turned and hurried away; and our working parties at once began to turn the faces of the pits towards the Redan, and to connect them by the sap with the third parallel. This labour was carried on under a smart fire of shot and musketry, but it was quite successful. Colonel Egerton unhappily was killed. We retained one pit, and the next night destroyed the other two, carrying a demi-parallel in rear of them through Egerton's pit. Equally brilliant was the storming on May 1st of the pits in front of the central bastion by a French force under General de Salles. Both sides lost many hundred officers and men; but the gain of ground on the part of the French was the more important to them because it put a limit to the daring system of counter-approaches on that side. The Russians showed great jealousy of the progress of the British attacks, and on the 9th and 11th of May they made two sorties upon our parallels. The first was directed against the right attack, the second against the left. On both occasions they were met stoutly by the British troops on guard, and after a good deal of firing, driven away. In the second sortie, however, they got into one battery, and had to be expelled by the bayonet. These sorties presented splendid pyrotechnic spectacles, as they usually finished with a boisterous cannonade. They cost both sides many men, but did not stay the advance of the assailants.

We have now cleared the way for the narration of a series of very remarkable facts which occurred between the last week in April and the middle of May, and ended in a change of the chief command of the French army.

The French Emperor desired to take the most conspicuous place in the allied camp. He desired to command the allied army, and to try his skill in strategy. Early in the year he sent part of his Guard to the Crimea, and later, giving out that he intended to join the army, he directed the whole of the Guard, except the depÔts, to proceed to Maslak, near Constantinople, and hold themselves ready for active service. The dominant idea in the mind of the Emperor at this time was sound enough in principle. He thought that Sebastopol could best be taken after an army operating in the field had driven the Russians beyond the Putrid Sea, and enabled the Allies to invest the place on all sides. There can now be no doubt he designed to lead that army in person. General Canrobert was allowed to have some, perhaps not very complete, glimpse of this plan. He was warned not to neglect a favourable moment, but not to risk anything. The knowledge that the Emperor was planning and scheming in Paris how he could compass the command of the Allies, weighed upon the mind of Canrobert, and greatly increased his natural shrinking from responsibility. Lord Raglan was decidedly for a general assault of Sebastopol. For a moment, on the 24th of April, Canrobert gave way before his arguments, and General PÉlissier, nothing loth, received orders to prepare a force sufficient to storm the principal works, and the British plan of attack was decided on in detail. But no sooner had this been settled in council, than Canrobert recurred to his secret instructions; his doubts began as soon as he left the presence of Lord Raglan. Moreover he got fresh news from Paris that the Emperor would certainly arrive in the Crimea early in May. On the 25th, therefore, he sent two generals to Lord Raglan, to tell him that he no longer agreed with the plan of an assault, and, in consequence, all the orders given were withdrawn, and the siege relapsed into its ordinary posture.

While General Canrobert was in this dubious and painful frame of mind, Lord Raglan proposed a subsidiary project. He asked his colleague to join in an expedition having for its object the capture of the town and straits of Kertch, with the ulterior aim of naval operations in the Sea of Azoff. This project had the hearty support of Admiral Bruat and Admiral Lyons. General Canrobert unable to resist the force of the arguments addressed to him, yielded his assent, then recalled it, then, on the 1st of May, once more fell in with Lord Raglan's views. It was arranged that General d'Autemarre should take 8,000 French, and that the British should furnish 3,000, including a troop of horse, with one British and two French batteries; the whole under Sir George Brown, who was nominated for the command by Canrobert himself. These troops were collected, marched to Kamiesch, and embarked on the 3rd. They sailed away with great ostentation, going north, to bewilder the enemy; and, at night, or when out of sight of land, they went about and steered for Kertch. But, in the evening, just as our headquarters were congratulating themselves on the fact that the expedition was well on its way, General Canrobert appeared, and said he must recall the French troops at once. Why? Because he had received a peremptory order from the Emperor's Cabinet, direct by electric telegraph, to concentrate his troops. Lord Raglan said that the Emperor, when he gave that order, was not aware that the expedition had sailed, and for a moment the French general consented reluctantly to take the view it implied. But two hours later, that is, about midnight, he sent Colonel Trochu, the chief of his staff, to say that, on considering the dispatch once more he must recall and had recalled the French part of the expedition by a special steamer. Lord Raglan was vexed at this vacillation, but he could show no resentment. The expedition, if it returned, would reveal its object. The enemy might prepare to parry a similar blow. Feeling this, in his despatches to Admiral Lyons and Sir George Brown, he informed them of the falling off of their allies; but he told them they might go on alone, if they deemed it expedient, and he would shoulder the responsibility. The French steamer caught up the fleet just as it sighted Kertch, and General d'Autemarre, with some chagrin, found he must desert his comrades. Then the British steamer came up, and Lyons and Brown, considering Lord Raglan's hardy offer, thought it inexpedient to go on alone. So, to the amazement of both armies, and the profound astonishment of the Russians, the expedition returned, after revealing its object.

The French Emperor, finding he had unwittingly spoiled a fine design, sent another telegraphic message, ordering Canrobert to resume the expedition, if Lord Raglan assented. Lord Raglan, thinking the enemy, apprised of the intended attack, might have strengthened the place, said it would now be prudent to employ a larger force. To this Canrobert demurred. The fact was, he had lost a good many men in the trenches, and he was employing a whole division in perfecting the lines at Kamiesch, that essential prelude, according to Imperial views, of the Imperial plan of campaign. Omar Pasha was willing to spare 14,000 of his best troops for the Kertch expedition, but Lord Raglan did not deem it expedient to accept this offer. About this time the Sardinian contingent, under General la Marmora, landed in the Crimea. The far-sighted policy of Count Cavour had led him to join the Western League. Austria, who had not fulfilled her qualified pledge to engage in active war, was now less inclined than ever to do so. By sending her contingent to the Crimea, under the flag of Italian unity, Sardinia took rank among the effective Powers of Europe, and won that place in the general councils of Europe which Cavour knew so well how to use for the profit of his country. The Sardinian troops were under the orders of Lord Raglan. The British force now numbered 32,600 men, effective; the arrival of the Sardinian troops raised it to 47,600 men, not counting the sick.

The troubles of General Canrobert now reached a climax. His Emperor found that he could not go to command the allied army in the Crimea. The "voice" of the French people, the "prayers" of the French people, and we suspect something more potent than either, showed the Emperor that he must abandon this dream of ambition. But he was eminently gratified by the realisation of another. Louis Napoleon, Emperor of the French, and EugÉnie, his Empress, became the guests of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert at Windsor Castle—recognition of royalty more precious than the glory of commanding a huge army in the Crimea.

When it was decided that his Imperial Majesty must refrain from his projected adventure in the East, he sent an aide-de-camp with a grand plan of campaign; and poor General Canrobert, already harassed by Imperial interference, had to submit this scheme of operations to Lord Raglan, and press it upon his acceptance. This he did about the 12th of May. The Emperor's proposal was to divide the armies into three. One he proposed should consist of 60,000 men, half French and half Turks. This, under PÉlissier, was to hold Kamiesch and the trenches, not with the object of continuing the siege, but of blockading the south side. The French were to guard their own batteries; the Turks were to hold ours. The second army, 55,000 strong, composed of the British, with the Sardinians and certain French and Turks, the whole under Lord Raglan, was to hold the Tchernaya in front of Balaclava. Behind these, 40,000 Frenchmen were to gather ready to pour into the valley of Baidar, while 25,000 from Maslak landed at Alouchta, forced the pass of Ayen, and being joined by the 40,000 men from the valley of Baidar, moved in a compact body upon Simpheropol. Then, if the Russians advanced towards Batchiserai, Lord Raglan was to storm the heights of Mackenzie, and seize the "position" of Inkermann; but if the Russians awaited an attack on the north side, then Lord Raglan was to file through the Baidar valley, and joining Canrobert at Albat, the combined force was to advance and throw the Russians into Sebastopol or into the sea. If the pass of Ayen could not be forced, the 25,000 men sent to Alouchta were to return to Balaclava, and in that case the whole disposable force of 65,000 men was to enter the Baidar valley, and break through the mountain chain by Albat. Such was the pretty paper plan sent by the Emperor. The alternative plan was an advance from Eupatoria upon Simpheropol; but this he only discussed to destroy by numberless objections. Napoleon early in his reign acquired the habit of meddling in matters of which he was ignorant.

When General Canrobert unfolded his scheme before Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha, both the English and the Turkish chief deemed it impracticable. The immense extent of the works before Sebastopol rendered it impossible of execution in their eyes; for they rightly judged that 60,000 men, one-half Turkish, could not hold the trenches, now crowded with artillery. Lord Raglan would not entrust British guns to the guardianship of the Turks. He preferred to go on with the siege; but if he adopted any plan of field operations, he would have chosen an advance from Eupatoria or the mouth of the Alma, and, failing that, an attempt to turn the heights of Mackenzie by Baidar and Albat. The council of war broke up without coming to any decision. On the 16th, unable to face the difficulties that beset him, General Canrobert resigned; the Emperor accepted his resignation, and General PÉlissier was appointed to the command of the army of the East. By carrying out the will of the Emperor, Canrobert felt, as he said, that he had got into a false position, and he withdrew, much to his credit. But, more to his credit, he begged that he might remain with the army and that he might be reinstated in the command of his old division. This request was granted. From the 19th of May to the end of the siege, PÉlissier commanded the French army in the Crimea and Canrobert resumed his position of general of division.