Anonymous

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

Gortschakoff clings to Sebastopol—Inactivity of the Allies—D'Allonville's Expedition to Eupatoria—Destruction of Taman and Fanagoria—Expedition to Kinburn—Description of the Fortress—Its Capture—Resignation of Sir James Simpson—Explosion of French Powder Magazine—Naval Operations—The Fleets in the Baltic—The Hango Massacre—Coast Operations—Attack on Sveaborg—Results of the Action—What the Baltic Fleet did—Russia on the Pacific Coast—Petropaulovski blown up—Insignificant results of the Campaign—The Russian Position in Asia—The Turks left to their Fate—Incompetency of the Sultan's Generals—Foreigners in Kars—Want of Supplies—Defeat of Selim Pasha—Battle of Kuruk-Dereh—Colonel Williams sent to Kars—Fortification of Erzeroum and Kars—Situation of Kars—Williams's objects—Mouravieff arrives—His Expeditions towards Erzeroum—The Blockade begins—Relief is slow—The Assault of September 29th—Kmety's success—The Tachmasb Redoubt—Attack on the English Lines—Victory of the Turks—Omar's Relief fails—Sufferings of the Garrison—Williams capitulates—Terms of the Surrender—Reflections on the Siege.

IMMEDIATELY after the fall of Sebastopol the Russians resumed the work of fortifying the north side. If, for a moment, they entertained the notion of retiring to Simpheropol, that moment must have been very brief. Prince Gortschakoff had long studied the habits and customs of an allied army under two or three Commanders-in-Chief. He knew well the benefits he derived from a divided command in the camp of his adversaries. He knew also the strength of his mountain position; and if, indeed, he thought of retreating inland, that thought must have been suggested, not by any fear that he should be forced, but by a fear that he might not be able to feed his diminished host. Placing his cavalry on the Belbek, where water abounded, he took up a long line with his infantry and Cossacks, stretching from the high table-land above Fort Constantine, along the Inkermann and Mackenzie ridges to Aitodor in the heart of the mountains above the Baidar valley. New batteries sprang up by magic among these rugged bluffs, and in a few days the Russian front of defence was as powerfully organised as ever.

At this time the Allies had nearly 200,000 men in the Crimea; including upwards of 10,000 horsemen, and a very numerous and efficient force of field artillery. Having so vast an army, one is astonished to find that no effort worthy of the name was made to strike another blow at the main body of the enemy. The French did, indeed, place their right wing, 33,000 strong, with 54 guns, in the valley of Baidar, with a larger force and more guns on the Tchernaya, backed by a powerful reserve, exclusive of the Imperial Guard on the plateau. But this demonstration, made as early as the 11th of September, did not in the least deceive Prince Gortschakoff. It was manifest that no threatening movements of troops, no amount of marching and countermarching between Balaclava and the Baidar passes, would induce him to budge a foot. He knew that to reach him through the mountains his adversaries could only show a narrow front, and thus obtain no advantage from numbers; and that to assail the Heights of Mackenzie, they must advance under a terrible fire to force rugged passes and deep defiles. So he did not change his ground, much less run away. What he dreaded was a decided advance from some point of the coast upon his lines of communication—from Kaffa or from Eupatoria, or from the mouth of the Alma—but whether it was that the allied generals could not agree, or that the Governments of Paris and London thought enough had been done, or whether it was that Marshal PÉlissier did not wish to risk his laurels, or whether the season was held to be too far advanced for the accomplishment of large enterprises, certain it is that none were undertaken. For ten days after the fall of the place the only change in the relative situations of the two armies was that the French occupied more ground.

At the end of that time there was a delusive symptom of more extended activity. General d'Allonville, with his division of horse, embarked at Kamiesch, for Eupatoria, on the 18th of September. Arrived there, he took the command of the whole force, namely, 17,000 Turco-Egyptian infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 48 guns. Expectation ran high in the camp, especially as the allied fleets went to sea on a cruise along the coast, reminding observers of the experimental trips made in August, 1854. But there was very little danger in the air. General d'Allonville, with the force at his disposal, was strong enough to raise the blockade of Eupatoria on the land side, but not strong enough to move far from the place, or hazard his line of retreat for a moment. He found a well-disciplined Moslem force at Eupatoria. The Turkish general, Ahmed Pasha, had employed the summer in training these battalions, and the French general was pleased to find such excellent infantry under his orders. But he felt 20,000 men were too few for the execution of any great scheme, and it is doubtful whether, had he been disposed to march inland, his superiors before Sebastopol and in Paris would have permitted the risk involved. He therefore confined himself to the simpler task of driving away the Russians, and giving his cavalry officers the chance of winning a cross and ribbon. The expedition was brilliantly successful. The pursuit was kept up for some miles, and the French cavalry had the satisfaction, not only of routing the Russian horse, but of carrying from the field six guns, twelve caissons, a forge, 169 prisoners, and 150 horses. This brilliant operation relieved Eupatoria from the too pressing attentions of the Russian horse.

EVACUATION OF SEBASTOPOL. (See p. 127.)

At the other extremity of the Crimea an expedition, organised at Kertch, had crossed the Straits, and had occupied and destroyed Taman and Fanagoria; but it would have been more to the purpose had the allied generals seized Kaffa and Arabat, and threatened the road over the Putrid Sea at Tchongar, whence the enemy derived large quantities of supplies. Instead of this they adopted a different plan. The navy had long desired some opportunity of doing service. Now it happened that the Emperor Napoleon had invented or adopted certain floating batteries cased with iron, and was anxious to test their quality in actual war. It happened also that there was a fort isolated and exposed to attack whereon the experiment might be tried, and a further stress put upon the enemy. It was the fort of Kinburn on the estuary of the Dnieper that the Allies designed to capture. It might have been assumed that their aim in so doing was to pave the way for an advance in force either upon Kherson or Nicolaief; but Prince Gortschakoff knew as well as the Allies that it was too late in the year to make the attempt even; and thus the expedition to Kinburn only served the purpose of testing the worth of the new floating batteries, and seizing another material guarantee, which, when the time for negotiation came, would prove useful. In the first week of October upwards of 7,700 infantry embarked on board the French and British men-of-war. There were thirty-eight ships in the French squadron, and thirty-four in the British. The former included the three floating batteries, DÉvastation, Tonnante, and Lave. The British had six, the French four ships of the line; the former were under Sir Edmund Lyons, the latter under Admiral Bruat. General Bazaine commanded the French land forces. After a demonstration before Odessa, on the morning of the 14th of October the ships got under steam, and made for Kinburn, where they anchored off the spit the same evening.

Kinburn, as we have said, stood on the southern shore of the estuary of the Dnieper, and formed, with Oczakov, the defence of those waters. It was a regular fortress, built almost on a level with the sea. The northern face looked up the spit, the southern along the road that led to Kherson and Perekop; the eastern looked on to the estuary, and the western on to the Black Sea. Thus it presented four strong casemated faces, and north and south were deep ditches, supplied with sea water. It mounted fifty-one guns, but they were only 18-pounders and 24-pounders. To the southward there was a small village, and some large stacks of wood. To the north there were two batteries—one called the Point Battery, mounting eight, the other called the Middle Battery, mounting eleven guns. These were connected by a deep covered way, and their guns commanded the channel, which, inside the spit, ran along near the shore. There were in these works some 1,500 men, under General Kokanowitch.

The Allies had arrived, determined to capture the place. Their plan was to land their soldiers to the south, thus investing the fortress on that side, and preventing any force from Kherson from relieving the besieged; then to place their ships, gunboats, and floating batteries on both sides of the fortress and its outworks, and thus overwhelm them with a concentrated and concentric fire. The troops landed on the 15th, the British being the first to step ashore. As soon as they were assembled, lines of defence were marked out, and working parties began to ply the spade and throw up entrenchments in the sand. The British were entrusted with the task of showing a front on the Kherson road, which ran along the spit, while the French moved up towards Kinburn. The guns of the enemy at once opened upon the French, who replied with musketry and field artillery. This combat continued. The fleets could not take part because the sea was too rough, and night fell upon the scene, leaving the fleet in the offing and the troops ashore. On the 17th the wind had fallen; the sky was clouded, but the sea was calm. Then a movement began in the fleet. The gunboats and mortar vessels steered for the positions assigned them, some going southward to fire on the south-westerly angle, others steering northward to double the point and range along the inner side. The floating batteries were carried in nearer to the fort, until they were within about 700 yards of the south-west angle. The frigates went forward towards the batteries on the spit, one line on the Black Sea side, the other in the estuary. The Hannibal, line-of-battle ship, took position opposite the extreme northern end of the spit, and raked its defences. The Russians defended their post with energy; but they were overmatched. The interior of the fort was soon in flames. Part of the garrison ran out into the dry ditches for shelter, but here they were exposed to French musketry and grape-shot. In order to terminate the contest the gunboats went closer in, and the line-of-battle ships, steaming up in line abreast, brought their guns to bear upon the torn and shattered and smoking ramparts. The Russian guns were now completely silenced. The batteries on the spit continued to fire a gun here and there, but five hours' cannonade and bombardment had placed Kinburn fort hors de combat. Seeing this, and not wishing to prolong a useless engagement, Admirals Lyons and Bruat made the signal to cease firing. They then summoned the garrison to surrender. General Kokanowitch complied. The next day the Russians blew up the fort at Oczakov, thus leaving the Allies in full possession of the estuary of the Dnieper and of the mouth of the Bug. But the capture of Kinburn was the only solid piece of work done by this expedition.

Thus the pleasant autumn weather passed away. All was quiet round Sebastopol, beyond the Tchernaya and around the Baidar Valley, and the only activity displayed was in those expeditions we have described on the extremities of the Crimea—at Kinburn, at Eupatoria, at Kertch, and in the Sea of Azoff. The reasons for this inactivity may be safely traced to differences at Paris and London touching the conduct and field of war, and to the desire of making peace, which the Allies were resolved should be honourable and satisfactory to them, and which the Russians were anxious should involve the minimum of sacrifices on their side. But there was another reason of great weight. General Sir James Simpson had sent home his resignation immediately after the fall of Sebastopol. He was a brave and able soldier, but he had passed the prime of life, and not knowing the French language, he was in a false position, and unable to struggle with success against the natural self-assertion of Marshal PÉlissier. He had also been unjustly assailed because a few hundred British soldiers had not been able to wrest the Redan from thousands of Russians, supported by heavy flanking batteries. The Government accepted his resignation. That was easy. Whom should they put in his place? They were at a loss for an answer. The fittest man was Sir Colin Campbell—old, it is true, but still as hardy and active and vigorous as ever. But a report had been industriously spread that Campbell would quarrel with the French, and he did not, besides, belong to the privileged few. Perhaps the Cabinet wanted a safe man, one who would not propose or urge decisive action. At all events, they found one. Sir William Codrington—a guardsman who had not seen a hundredth part of Campbell's service, who had not a hundredth part of Campbell's ability, but who was an average soldier, a brave leader in battle, and one of the "right set"—was selected to command the Anglo-Sardinian armies.

Three days afterwards a great calamity befell the French, and inflicted several losses upon us. On the 14th of November the powder magazines in the park of the French siege train, containing 250,000 pounds of gunpowder, blew up; not powder only, but an immense quantity of shells, carcasses, rockets, and cartridges. Happily all were not panic-stricken. General van Straubenzee, calling for volunteers from the gallant 7th, Lieutenant Hope and a number of men stood forward. These brave fellows headed by their officer, quickly joined by others, ascended the walls of the roofless mill used as a powder magazine, and by great labour succeeded in covering up the powder with wet blankets. It was a service where the risk was awful, for all around were conflagrations; the air was full of fleeting flames, and there stood the great magazine without doors, windows, or roof; all had been blown in or torn off. Yet the daring deed was well done, and the place saved. By this calamity we lost ten men killed and sixty-nine wounded. One of the killed was Deputy-Assistant Commissary Yellon. The French lost six officers killed and thirteen wounded, and 166 men killed and wounded. The cause of this catastrophe was never discovered.

We must now leave the Crimea to narrate the operations of the British fleet in the Baltic and Pacific. The naval operations of the Allies in 1855 were again entirely confined to encounters between ships and forts. The war seemed to be made on purpose to furnish illustrations of the superiority of a well-designed scheme of coast and harbour defence over a navy, be it ever so powerful. It is further remarkable as a war between Maritime Powers unmarked by a single naval action. The Russians, of course, outnumbered everywhere, except in the Gulf of Tartary, were not bound to fight, and they were, except in the Pacific, shut up in narrow seas. These are and must be their only legitimate excuses for yielding up their waters to the Allies without striking or attempting to strike a blow.

The British fleet was more powerful in 1855 than in 1854. Government had built several gun and mortar boats, and destined for the Baltic a larger force of frigates and ships of the line. Sir Charles Napier had pushed his quarrel so far with the Admiralty that it was impossible to give him the command again. The officer selected was Rear-Admiral Richard Saunders Dundas, with Rear-Admiral Michael Seymour as second, and Rear-Admiral Baynes as third in command; and Captain Pelham, who distinguished himself in the attack on Bomarsund, as captain of the fleet. A light squadron, under Captain Watson of the ImpÉrieuse, consisting of six ships, started for the Baltic on the 19th of March, and on the 4th of April Admiral Dundas sailed from Portsmouth with thirteen sail of the line and four frigates; Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort being present on board the royal yacht. The Russians did not show a sail in the Baltic. The frigates, as soon as the ice permitted, scoured the narrow seas, capturing some prizes, and establishing a blockade. The Gulf of Finland was closed in May, when the main body of the fleet lay off Nargen, where they could watch Revel and Helsingfors. The French fleet, under Rear-Admiral Penaud, did not sail till later. They were not in the Baltic until the 21st of May. The British fleet had gone up the Gulf of Finland towards Cronstadt, and it was here on the 1st of June that the French joined them. The British ships lay across the gulf, and as the French came up, out of compliment to their allies they formed a second line, and after communication with Admiral Dundas, the two fleets formed combined squadrons, showing both flags in front line to the enemy. But the Russians, who had not been tempted by the smaller, showed no disposition even to look at the larger force. All their ships, except a few steamers, were dismantled, and lying under the protection of the forts. There was nothing to be done but reconnoitre, fish up "infernal machines," and engage in small operations. For three weeks the fleet lay off Cronstadt. On the 14th of July part sailed for Nargen, leaving Admiral Baynes with a powerful squadron to watch Cronstadt.

While the allied fleet was off Cronstadt an incident had occurred which showed that the enemy, irritated by his losses, could descend to acts of revenge and treachery. At Inkermann the wounded had been slain in cold blood, and the parties gathering up the wounded had been shelled by the war steamers. At Odessa, in 1854, a flag of truce had been fired upon by the shore batteries; and now a party, from H.M.S. Cossack, bearing a flag of truce, were massacred at Hango on the coast of Finland. Six sailors were killed, and the event, which was cynically defended by the Russian Minister of War, Prince Dolgorouky, aroused universal reprobation. A thrill of horror and indignation ran through the British people.

During the month of July the lighter craft performed some smart actions on the enemy's coasts. Captain Storey had already destroyed 20,000 tons of shipping near Nystad, in the Gulf of Bothnia. On the 4th of July Captain Yelverton, with the Arrogant and two other vessels, appeared off Swartholm. Here the enemy had abandoned and blown up a fort of immense strength, commanding the approaches to Lovisa; and on the 5th, Captain Yelverton, shifting his flag to the Ruby gunboat, and accompanied by the boats of the squadron, went up to Lovisa, landed, and made search for Government stores. He found they were in the town, and therefore he spared them, lest in burning the stores he should burn the town—a magnanimous answer to the Hango massacre. Nevertheless, Lovisa was burnt down, not by the British, but by accident. On the 20th, Captain Yelverton, with three frigates and a gunboat, attacked, and in one hour silenced, a six-gun battery at Frederiksham, between Sveaborg and Lovisa. His loss was three men wounded. On the 26th, with three frigates and four mortar vessels, Captain Yelverton made a successful descent upon the island of Kotka, drove out the garrison, and, landing the marines, burnt the Government buildings and immense stores of timber. Thus the whole coast, from Viborg on the east almost up to Sveaborg, had been visited, and the enemy harassed; while Rear-Admiral Baynes, steaming up the channel north of Cronstadt, showed his flag to the inhabitants of St. Petersburg, and from the yards of his ship looked on the Russian capital. The remainder of the fleet, except the flying squadrons and blockaders, was at Nargen, preparing for an attack upon Sveaborg.

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL.

(After the Portrait by Sir Francis Grant, P.R.A.)

This is the bulwark of the south coast of Finland, and, if the enemy's soldiers did their duty, it was quite beyond the reach of any fleet, no matter how powerful or numerous it might be. Built on rocky islands, facing a shallow and treacherous sea, it was plain, even to the eyes of a tyro in military science, that Sveaborg, though it might be bombarded, could not be taken without the aid of a land force. The allied fleet arrived off Sveaborg on the 6th and 7th of August. Admiral Dundas and Admiral Penaud had no troops under their orders. They had determined not to assail the place with ships of the line, but to rely upon their gunboats and mortar vessels to set fire to the buildings and blow up the magazines of the enemy. The British had sixteen, and the French five gunboats. The British had sixteen, and the French five mortar vessels. Beside these there were several ships of the line, frigates, and corvettes; but, on the whole, it will be seen that the gun and mortar boats did the work. Two days were spent in preparations. The small vessels with which it was intended to fight were placed in position. They were ranged in curving lines, the French in the centre. The mortar vessels were anchored; the gunboats were directed to protect them, and to keep constantly in motion. On an islet Admiral Penaud constructed a battery for four mortars, nearly opposite Gustavswert, and this formed the centre of the line. Two gunboats, armed with Lancaster guns, were directed to fire at the three-decker barring the channel into the harbour. Two ships of the line and a frigate were detached to cannonade Sandham, and a frigate and two corvettes were sent to occupy the attention of a body of troops on the island of Drumsio, on the extreme west.

The action began about seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th of August. The fire of the guns and mortars was to be pressed to the fullest extent deemed proper by the officers in command; and as soon as the accuracy of the range was tested the whole mass of ordnance afloat began and sustained a most rapid fire. The Russians estimated that thirty shells per minute fell into their batteries. At first they replied with great spirit, but although the range of their heavy guns extended far beyond the allied lines, yet they were unable to do any damage, either to the passive mortar vessels or the restless gunboats. While the action was raging in the centre the detached ships were busy on the flanks, especially off Sandham, where the liners were engaged in a combat with earthen batteries, on which they could make little impression. Within three hours after the beginning of the bombardment in the centre the incessant hail of shells within the fortress had told with effect. The fire, so brisk before, now began to slacken. The Russian gunners could not hit the small boats of the Allies, while they were exposed to a crushing fire. About ten o'clock the Russian buildings were on fire. Soon a loud report showed that a magazine had been pierced, then another and another. The third explosion, about noon, was very destructive. When it grew dark, and the gunboats had been recalled, and the mortars ceased to fire, the boats of the fleet, fitted with rocket-tubes, ran in nearer to the fortress, and poured forth their incendiary missiles till the flames rose to the height of a hundred feet, swaying to and fro in a brisk breeze.

The mortars and guns went nearer to the place at daylight on the 10th, and resumed their destructive labours. It was observed that the three-decker had been removed from the channel between Gustavswert and Bak Holmen. Three times she had been on fire. Although the garrison were beset by the flames of their burning barracks and stores, yet on the 10th they opened a more sustained fire than on the preceding day. The operations, however, were of the same character, and they produced the same effects, except that the explosions ceased. Again at night the rocket-boats were called into play, and this time the mortars were steadily active all night. By the morning of the 13th the admirals considered that enough had been done—that, in fact, they could do no more; neither destroy the forts nor touch the squadron they sheltered. The place was gutted, but "the sea defences in general were little injured," as the admiral reported. We had inflicted this loss on the enemy at a cost to ourselves of one officer, Lieutenant Miller, and seventeen men wounded. The enemy, on the contrary, lost heavily in men and material. According to the British Minister at Stockholm, the loss in men was not less than 2,000. Every magazine in the place was destroyed; also immense stores of rope, cordage, tar, and other naval supplies. The incessant activity of the admirals and captains had swept the enemy's commercial marine from the sea, had taken many ships, had destroyed vast stores, had kept a large body of troops employed, had harassed all the accessible parts of the coast, had shown the British and French flags to the enemy in his capital, and had gutted a first-rate fortress, with an insignificant loss to themselves. To do more—to take Cronstadt, and conquer Sveaborg—would have required an army equal to the reduction of Finland, an enterprise which would have put a severe strain on the resources both of France and Britain, and one that might yet have failed: for the seasons in those regions fight on the side of Russia, and if these heavy blows could not have been struck in six months, the fleet and army must have decamped, under penalty of being frozen up and destroyed.

On the Pacific coast there was an important, although to a great extent an ineffectual, campaign. Russia, driven on by a desire to reach the open sea somewhere, had pushed her settlements from Siberia down the great river Amoor, which enters the Gulf of Tartary opposite the northern end of the Japanese island of Saghalien. At Castries Bay, on the coast of this tract, they had built a town called Alexandrovsk, and still farther south they had a settlement, named after Constantine, at Port Imperial, or Barracouta Bay. In short, before 1854, and still more so afterwards Russia was bent on making a solid establishment on the Pacific, as an outlet to Siberia and as the base of a Pacific fleet. She had also a town and forts at Petropaulovski on the coast of Kamschatka, and, before the war, in Aniwa Bay, at the south end of the island of Saghalien. Here was the nucleus of a strong position on the Pacific, and it gave Russia great influence both in Pekin and Yedo. More than this, it threatened British supremacy in the Eastern seas.

No attempt on the mouth of the Amoor was made in 1854. But in 1855 the allied squadron was strengthened, both on the China and Pacific stations. There were five steamers—one French, the others British—and twelve sailing vessels, four of which were French. The total guns of the squadrons amounted to 480. Admiral Bruce and Admiral Fournichon commanded the Pacific squadron, Admiral Stirling the China squadron. On their side the Russians had augmented the fortifications at Petropaulovski, and had erected new works, and assembled a strong garrison, on the Amoor. But their naval force was of no value; they had only seven vessels, mounting ninety guns; of these four were in the beginning of the year at Petropaulovski. Two British steamers arrived off this place on the 14th of April, but while they were waiting for the squadron the Russians cut a channel through the shore ice, and, favoured by a fog, escaped on the 17th and reached Castries Bay. When, at the end of May, the allied squadron arrived, the place was found to be abandoned; there were only three Americans there. They consequently destroyed the batteries and burnt the Government stores. Admiral Bruce sent one ship to join Admiral Stirling, and with the rest returned to the American coast.

Admiral Stirling, in the meantime, had detached Commodore Elliot with three ships—a frigate, and two steamers—into the Gulf of Tartary. He found the Russian vessels which had escaped Admiral Bruce, in Castries Bay; but he did not attack them, judging the disadvantages to be too great. Yet the weight of metal was in his favour; his ships were free to fight, being unencumbered, while the enemy was deeply laden with the garrison, the inhabitants, and the stores of Petropaulovski. However, Commodore Elliot decided not to risk an action. Instead of that, he sent a steamer for reinforcements, and while he was waiting for them, the enemy got away. At the time it was supposed he had escaped by some inner channel leading to the Amoor, but no such channel exists. The Russians went by the sea under the noses of their opponents. Commodore Elliot returned to the southern shore of Saghalien, where he found two British and two French ships. After some delay Admiral Stirling, taking with him five British vessels, steered for the Sea of Okhotsk. Although the British ships remained cruising off the Russian coasts until late in October, they effected nothing remarkable. The opportunity of striking a blow at the colonisation of the Amoor was lost.

Meanwhile, what was the position of Russia in Asia? "The cession of the Asiatic fortresses, with their neighbouring districts," wrote Lord Aberdeen in 1829, in commenting on the Treaty of Adrianople, "not only secures to Russia the uninterrupted occupation of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, but places her in a situation so commanding as to control at pleasure the destiny of Asia Minor. Prominently advanced into the centre of Armenia, in the midst of a Christian population, Russia holds the keys both of the Persian and the Turkish provinces; and whether she may be disposed to extend her conquests to the East or to the West, to Teheran or to Constantinople, no serious obstacle can arrest her progress." Assuming that the Western Powers did not interfere with the execution of the march to the West, every year sufficed to show the soundness of the conclusions to which Lord Aberdeen came in 1829; and although the presence of the allied fleets in the Black Sea did offer a serious obstacle in 1854-5, yet that was an accident, which only for a time diminished the value of the Russian position in Armenia. Without the aid of a fleet the Russians were still very formidable. The strong fortress of Gumri not only barred the road to Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, but commanded the plain of Kars. The fort of Akalzik shut out the Turks in Kars from direct communication with the seaport of Batoum. The tracing of the frontier of the province of Erivan placed Russia within a couple of marches of Bayazid. Both sides in 1854 knew the value of the prize for which they were contending. The Turks owed the preservation of Anatolia to the energy and courage of a Hungarian and a few Englishmen. The Russians sent one of their best generals to command on that frontier, and had not the European officers stopped him by holding Kars until they were on the brink of famine, that general would have carried the flag of Russia to Trebizond.

Such being the importance of the frontier, it is not surprising that the British Ministers watched with anxiety the progress of hostilities in that quarter; and with all the more anxiety because they were comparatively powerless to render aid. It required all the energies of Britain to maintain an army in the Crimea. She could not send troops, but she could send officers. France might have spared a force, but France had no wish to protect the Turks in Armenia, and had she done so we should have looked with jealousy on her efforts. There was the Turkish army under Omar Pasha, which, after the Austrians entered the Principalities, was, at least in the spring of 1855, comparatively useless. But here again France stepped in, and would not consent to the employment upon the Armenian frontier of the only efficient general in the Sultan's service. Therefore the struggle in Asia Minor was carried on by the Turks alone, with the aid of a few European soldiers.

The Turkish Pashas on the Russian frontier drew supplies and pay (when they could get it) for 40,000 men, but they never commanded a force so large. The difference they put in their own pockets. Corruption and peculation and frauds of all kinds characterised the conduct of the greater part of these Turkish officers quite as much—and that is a high estimate—as their incapacity and cowardice. The true policy of the Turks in Armenia would have been to wage a defensive war. In that course they would have found in the nature of the country a great ally; and if they had preserved the frontier intact, they would have done the Sultan and the common cause good service. But the Turkish leaders had that kind of impetuosity which accompanies incompetence. As soon as the war broke out they began to assail the enemy. A party from Batoum captured Fort Nicholas, just across the frontier, by surprise. This was not a bad move, for it stimulated the ardour of the soldiers. Unfortunately, the ambition of the Pashas was stimulated also. The commanders on the Kars frontier took the offensive, and began to engage the Russian outposts. The Commander-in-Chief was Abdi Pasha. He had been educated in the military schools of Austria, and had some talent and knowledge, yet this was marred by constitutional inactivity and slowness. His second in command was Ahmed Pasha, an incompetent man, who shone in the intrigues of the Turkish ante-rooms. The Russians were posted at Baindir and Akisha. Learning the amount of their force at the former place, Abdi Pasha sent against them a body of troops superior in number, who, falling upon them unawares, routed them and drove them headlong into Gumri. At the same time Ahmed Pasha had moved upon Akisha. His movements were slow, and the enemy, being prepared, inflicted upon him a severe repulse. Learning this, Abdi Pasha ordered his subordinate at once to retreat upon Kars. Ahmed Pasha would not obey nor disobey. It is a convincing proof of his stupidity that he divided his forces, sending part back to Kars, and remaining with the rest within reach of the enemy. Prince Andronikoff, who commanded the Russians, saw his opportunity, and seized it with great spirit. He quitted his entrenchments and offered battle. Nothing loth, the Turk stood to fight. He was still superior in numbers. He was able to show an equal front, and at the same time to outflank his opponent. Nevertheless the Russians utterly routed their foes. The troops hurried back to Kars in confusion. They were "a mere rabble." The Russians did not pursue, otherwise Kars might have fallen in 1853. The untoward conduct of Ahmed ruined the whole campaign. Nor were the destructive powers of the Pashas limited to action in the field. In the winter they allowed the army to rot in Kars.

It was now the spring of 1854, and the Western Powers were just sending troops to the East. Through the long winter there had been a few Europeans at Kars, and to these the army owed everything. There was the Englishman Guyon, who had carved himself a name on the records of the Hungarian War of Independence. There was George Kmety, a Hungarian leader of valiant Honved battalions in 1848-9, and, like Guyon, driven into Turkey when Russia, throwing her sword into the scale, turned it in favour of Austria. Kmety was an excellent soldier, and although an infantry officer, he took in hand and made great use of the Turkish irregular horse, with which he covered the front, and guarded Kars for months from all chance of falling by a coup de main. These two, until the arrival of Zarif, the new commander, were the principal supports of Turkish power.

It was a great fault of the Turkish Government that it had established no depÔts in Armenia. Everything, except wood and grain, had to be transported from Constantinople. The Russians had been allowed to purchase the grain crops in the two preceding years; another instance of the long-sighted policy of Nicholas, and his wilful determination to break up the Turkish Empire. Had the Turks formed a large magazine at Erzeroum, and constructed a strong camp at Kars, supposing an honest and capable Pasha could have been found, the disasters and sufferings of 1853-4 might have been avoided. On the contrary, nothing having been done in time, all that was needed had to be done in a hurry, and the army had to be supplied from Constantinople, first by sea to Trebizond, then by execrable roads over rugged mountains to Erzeroum, and thence by roads equally difficult to Kars. It was by this route that supplies and reinforcements reached the front in the spring of 1854.

Neither side as yet showed any activity. The Russians were not in great strength, and the Turks had only just recovered from the evils of the winter. But in June the enemy showed that he was capable of striking a blow. On the 8th he made a simultaneous advance along the whole line. On the 8th of June the Russians threatened Ardahan, and the Turks reinforced the post, but no action took place. At the same time a body of Cossacks appeared near Bayazid; these were utterly routed by the Turkish irregulars. In the meantime, Prince Andronikoff had pushed forward towards Urzughetti. Selim Pasha, alarmed at his approach, retreated in haste over the frontier. Compelled at length to stand, he took up a strong position, and received battle on the 16th of June. He was totally defeated, with the loss of all his guns and baggage; and he hurried with the wreck of his army to Batoum. The Russians had opened the campaign with a fruitful victory.

In July, having nothing more to fear from the army of Batoum, Prince Bebutoff resolved to try the mettle of the Kars army, marched out of Gumri, and crossing the Arpa-Chai, encamped on Turkish territory within a few miles of the Pasha's camp at Soobattan and Hadji Veli Khoi. For weeks Zarif declined action, and the Russian boldly sent a detachment which beat the Turks at Bayazid. In this exigency, as soon as he learned the news of the defeat, Zarif resolved to fight Bebutoff. There was still time. The detachment was still on the march from Bayazid. But when he should have acted with decision, the Turk wavered and hesitated; and before he decided, the Russian army was again united in his front. It was on the 5th of August that he made up his mind to fight the next morning. He should have acted on the 2nd, when the enemy was still looking for his coming troops. It was now too late. The Bayazid detachment had rejoined Prince Bebutoff. The spies in the Turkish camp had informed the Russian of an intended movement. The result was that Zarif was defeated after a stubborn contest. The Turks lost 3,500 in killed and wounded, 2,000 in prisoners, and 15 guns. More than 6,000 men went home, but many of these returned, and for days the irregular cavalry were bringing in stragglers. Nearly all the Turkish officers ran away, and thus only one regimental commander was killed, and one general of brigade slightly wounded. The Russian loss was very great. They admit that upwards of 3,000 were killed or wounded, including no fewer than 111 officers, of whom 21 were killed. In truth, the Russian officers were obliged to expose themselves in order to stimulate the men, and had the Turks been as brave, the day might have had a different ending. The loss inflicted on the Russians is a terrible testimony to the efficiency of the Turkish artillery. The Turks lost the battle, because they were commanded by an intriguer who had never been a soldier; because the troops were undrilled, and had no officers worthy of the name; because, with such troops and such officers, they were directed to make so perilous a movement as a night march; because their cavalry ran away, and because they fought in fragments. Such was the battle of Kuruk-Dereh. It took its name from a village within the Russian lines, and it tended to increase vastly the influence of the Russians in Asia.

The campaign in Armenia ended with this battle. On the 17th of August, eleven days after his victory, Prince Bebutoff deemed it prudent to return to Gumri. The fruits of the campaign, besides the three victories, were many. The Turkish army was diminished and demoralised; the road from Turkey to Persia was rendered unsafe, and the Kurds were induced to revolt. Russia might well be proud of successes in Armenia, which were some compensation for losses on the Circassian coast of the Black Sea.

As it was foreseen that Russia would make fresh efforts in Asia, the British Government, moved by the reports of the British Consuls, who faithfully described the unhappy condition of the Kars army under its wretched and criminal commanders, appointed, on the 2nd of August, Lieutenant-Colonel Williams to be Her Majesty's Commissioner at the headquarters of the Turkish army in Asia. He was to place himself in communication with Lord Raglan and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to keep them informed of all matters connected with the state of the Asiatic army, and to correspond with Lord Clarendon. Colonel Williams arrived at Constantinople on the 14th of August, and on the 19th he saw Lord Raglan at Varna. Returning to Constantinople, he was in constant communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe until the 31st, when he sailed for Trebizond. On the 24th of September he reached Kars. With him went Lieutenant Teesdale, Dr. Sandwith, and Mr. Churchill. Throughout his journey he had kept an eye on the state of affairs, and long before he arrived at Kars had complained seriously to Constantinople. As soon as he had quitted Trebizond he encountered two siege guns deserted in the snow. On arriving at Erzeroum he found that no provision had been made for the troops who were to winter there, and no adequate measures taken to defend the place. But it was on reaching Kars that the truth burst upon him in all its grossness—that the Sultan's army was a mere rabble in rags. The muster-rolls of the Turkish army showed on paper a force of 22,754 men. The number actually existing, including sick, was 14,600—a clear proof of the peculation practised by the Pashas. The clothes of these men were ragged and thread-bare. Their trousers, shoes, and stockings were not fit to be seen. They subsisted from hand to mouth, and in October there were only provisions for three days in the magazine.

In November Colonel Williams returned to Erzeroum in order that he might thence enforce the measures necessary for the supply and reinforcement of the army. Captain Teesdale was left at Kars to look after the feeding, accommodation, and drill of the troops. In executing the laborious task of fortifying Erzeroum, preparing barracks, obtaining transport, making arrangements for supplies of grain and forage, pressing for reinforcements, pay, clothing, arms, accoutrements, the British officers at Kars and Erzeroum passed the winter. Besides contending with jealous Pashas, General Williams found himself obliged to use his influence in Kurdistan to put an end to a dangerous insurrection. He was well known to the Kurds, and when he proposed terms they not only trusted to British honour, but the leader surrendered. In the spring General Williams found it necessary to ask for additional help, and the British Government sent him from the Indian army, Colonel Lake, Captain Olpherts, and Captain Thompson, the whole of whom reached Kars in March, 1855. Under the direction of Colonel Lake, and with the aid of these officers, the rough, dilapidated, and badly placed entrenchments about Kars were rectified, and new works were constructed. It was known that the enemy was collecting a large force in Georgia, under General Mouravieff, an officer of skill and experience. There was, therefore, no time to lose, and as soon as the snow melted, and work became practicable, Colonel Lake began his task.

The town of Kars stands in the midst of mountains, on a plateau, some 7,000 feet above the level of the sea. It has been a place of strength for centuries. But its defences proved to be too weak to resist a skilful soldier, and Prince Paskiewitch took it from the Turks in three days in 1828. In fact, the fortress was commanded by the Karadagh on the east, and by the mountains across the river on the west. Therefore, when the European officers reached the town in 1854, they set about remedying these defects by fortifying the Karadagh, surrounding the town suburb with low entrenchments, and throwing up two or three works on the high ground upon the left bank commanding the place. Pontoon bridges were thrown over the river to facilitate the passage of troops from one bank to the other, saving time in the transit. On the left bank, the heights immediately commanding the town were entrenched. Three redoubts, named after Colonel Lake and others, and called the English Lines, stretched from an eminence due west of the Karadagh to the river below the town; and above the town, and commanding it, the river, and the bridges, there was a large redoubt, named after Vassif Pasha. These works, as events showed, were still insufficient. The English Lines, though commanding everything eastward, were not the true key of the place; but that fact had to be demonstrated by the enemy. At the end of May, 1855, the place was secure from an assault on the east—that is, on the side of Gumri—and on the south; but not yet on the west—that is, on the side of Erzeroum. In the entrenched camp, at the beginning of May, there were 10,000 infantry, 1,500 artillerymen, and 1,500 useless cavalry. Afterwards this force was largely increased, but it never exceeded 20,000 men of all arms.

The great object of General Williams was to create a strong and impregnable camp at Kars, and to store up provisions there to such an extent that the garrison would be able to hold out until the winter, when it was assumed the enemy would be compelled, by stress of weather, to quit the bleak highlands, and seek shelter in Gumri. Erzeroum was in like manner made strong, so that it might serve as a base for the Kars army, should that army be able to keep open its communications; and as a place where a force might assemble in safety to relieve Kars, or at least to harass the enemy, and make his position intolerable. But these long-sighted views were frustrated by the wretched organisation of the Turks, the corruption and sloth of the Pashas, and the inability of their regulars to act in the open field. The stores intended for Kars never reached that place, and it is a marvel how it held out so long. Turks, however, will live where other troops would starve.

The Russians were very well informed of the state of things on the Turkish side; they knew that the Allies, engaged so deeply in the Crimea, would not spare any European troops for service in Asia; and that, for reasons of his own, the French Emperor would not consent to the employment of the best Turkish troops and Omar Pasha, the best Moslem general, in Armenia. This made them bold. At the end of May General Mouravieff had assembled 35,000 men and sixty-four guns at Gumri; and in the beginning of June he crossed the Arpa-Chai, and encamped on Turkish territory. General Williams, hearing this, set out at once from Erzeroum, and on the 7th of June arrived at Kars. He did not appear a moment too soon. Vassif Pasha had proposed a retrograde movement on Erzeroum, and Mouravieff had pitched his camp on the Kars-Chai, eight miles north-east of the town. The presence of Williams inspired the garrison with fresh courage, and ended all doubts in the mind of the Pasha. The Kars army was destined to stand by Kars to the last.

The Russian general was a skilful soldier. As soon as he moved out of Gumri and took post at Zaim, about eight miles north of Kars, he halted, and sent out strong detachments to Ardahan and Tchildir among the mountains on his right flank, with the double object of collecting or destroying stores and ascertaining whether the Turks at Batoum were preparing to assist their comrades at Kars. He soon found that the Batoum army was not likely to trouble him, and such was his correct estimate of its value, that for the rest of the campaign he scarcely troubled himself about the doings of that force. Accordingly, on the 14th of June, he drew nearer to Kars, and being powerful in cavalry, he, on that day, drove the whole of the Turkish horsemen watching the valley back upon the entrenched camp.

Mouravieff had inspected the approaches and defences fronting the road to Gumri, and, satisfied that he could not break in on that side, he quitted his camp on the 18th, and, marching in order of battle, crossed that road within sight of the garrison, but far out of range, and encamped on the south side, about four miles from the town. This cautious mode of going to work showed that the general feared to risk an assault. He seemed to be feeling his way about the fortress, but in such a manner, that, although he respected the Turks behind earthworks, he clearly had no fear of them in the field. Posted now close to the road to Erzeroum, his cavalry threatened the direct communications with that place, and forced the couriers of the garrison to take a wide sweep to the north through the mountains, in order to carry the despatches to Erzeroum. From his new camp his cavalry went forth and secured or wasted several small magazines which the reckless idleness of the Turks had left exposed. For a few days heavy falls of rain suspended all movement, but as soon as the rain ceased, the Russian general once more, under cover of a great display of force, reconnoitred the south or town side. The Russian officers thought their general was about to attack. The Turks were on the alert, and every parapet and battery was manned. But at the end of an hour the Russians countermarched and returned to their camp. This was on the 26th of June. Mouravieff had made up his mind that he would lose too many men in risking an assault, and knowing that the Turks could not act in the field, he determined to starve them into submission. On the 29th he divided his army into two parts, leaving one to watch Kars, and proceeding with the other himself over the mountains towards Erzeroum. The movement of Mouravieff on to the Erzeroum road had already induced Vely Pasha to retire from Toprak-Kaleh to Kupri-Keui, so as to place himself between Mouravieff and the capital of Armenia. The Russian general's object, however, was not Erzeroum. He had learned that there was a Turkish magazine in an exposed situation at Yeni-Keui. It was of the last importance to the garrison of Kars, and its stores ought long before to have been moved into that camp. There were two months' supplies at Yeni-Keui. Upon these Mouravieff pounced with the swoop of an eagle, and what he could not carry away he destroyed. A second expedition, which caused great alarm, followed in August.

During this expedition of General Mouravieff towards Erzeroum, General Brunner, commanding the besieging army, advanced against the town defences on the 8th of August. He brought up large masses of infantry, cavalry, and guns, with the object of enticing the Turks out of their lines. Not only did he fail, but he managed to get within range of the ordnance in the south-west redoubt, called Kanli Tabia, and suffered a severe loss in killed and wounded, including a general. This was the last experiment on the plain; the enemy thenceforth turned his attention to the western heights; and, seeing this close scrutiny, Colonel Lake completed his defences on that side. At the end of August Mouravieff returned to the camp. The approaches to Kars were more closely watched than ever. Desertion began in the garrison, and was not stopped until some men, caught in the act, were shot. The garrison now began to be pinched for food. The men were on three-quarter rations in the middle of August, on half rations in the first week of September. Forage could no longer be cut outside. The stores of barley had come to an end. All the cavalry were, therefore, sent away, and many scores managed to pass the Russian pickets, but some hundreds were taken. The plan of capture by blockade was slowly securing success. The Russian grasp grew tighter; the garrison weaker. The appeals of General Williams for aid were in vain.

Not that they were unheeded; not that generals, diplomatists, ministers, emperors did not write and talk about the straits of the Kars army, and about plans for its relief. As early as June—but that was a thought too late—we read of plans for the relief of Kars. The British Government felt all the importance to British interests of a stout defence at least of Armenia. They knew that Russian success would diminish their influence in Persia, and possibly shake their power in India. Precisely for that reason the French Emperor was indisposed to aid in or consent to any timely or reasonable plan. As early as July it was proposed that an expedition should sail for Redout Kaleh, on the Mingrelian coast, and landing there, should so threaten Kutais and Tiflis that Mouravieff, alarmed, would be compelled to quit Kars in order to defend the heart of Georgia. But the British Government did not approve of this plan, preferring the direct advance of a relieving army from Trebizond upon Erzeroum. The British had raised a Turkish contingent under British officers; but Lord Clarendon would not consent to its employment, on the ground that it was not fit to cope with Russians in the field. Omar Pasha proposed to take his own troops from Balaclava, and others gathered up from Bulgaria and Batoum, and land at Redout Kaleh. To this the French Emperor would not consent, on the ground that they could not be spared from the Crimea. As the matter grew more urgent the plans for the relief of Kars increased; but the obstructions to the formation of the army were so great, Governments could agree upon so few points, that weeks—nay, months—passed, before the relieving army could be formed and sent across the Black Sea. Thus Kars and its gallant defenders were left to strive with two deadly foes—a tenacious Russian general and starvation.

General Mouravieff had heard of the projected advance of Omar Pasha's troops from Batoum, as he was told, and of another relieving army from Erzeroum, upon Kars; and believing the reports, resolved to assault Kars on the 29th of September. This led to a conflict which claims and deserves a high place among great military actions. The Russian general had the command of more than 30,000 men. He selected for attack the heights to the westward, which General Kmety occupied with a garrison of 6,450 men, whereof 5,270 were infantry. These heights he resolved to surprise by an assault at daybreak on all points, while a diversion was made on the town side. The garrison, however, were on the alert, and gave the enemy a warm reception. The Russian left column, exposed to a heavy fire of artillery, marched steadily on. Neither the round-shot, nor, as it came nearer, the grape-shot, and then the musketry, converging upon its head, and searching its flanks, nor the rocky ground it traversed, stopped the majestic march of these noble troops. For half an hour it was tormented with shot, and yet it still moved forward. When about a hundred yards from the works, the head of the column, its patience exhausted, opened fire, but still without halting. On it came. General Kmety now brought up fifty rifles of the Sultan's Guard, and formed them parallel to the head of the column. It was now enveloped in fire; nevertheless, these stubborn Russians pressed up to within ten yards of the ditch. That was the limit of their advance. Brave men as they were, they could bear no more; they slowly turned, and slowly fell back on their guns. The Turks had exhausted their ammunition, and the men were flinging stones at the retiring foe. The artillery was deficient in grape-shot. The Turks had no horsemen. The enemy was beaten; he might have been destroyed. In the track of the column lay a thousand corpses, and from the pouches of their dead enemies the Turks, leaping over the parapets, replenished their empty pouches.

At this moment of victory Kmety learned that Yarim-ai-Tabia, on his left, had been captured; that the Tachmasb lines had been turned, and that Hussein Pasha, in spite of a dogged resistance, was shut up in the Tachmasb redoubt. To rally his men, Kmety called out that the foe was in the rear; and at this call they ran back to their ranks. Sixteen Russian guns, drawn up in the rear of the extreme left of the Tachmasb lines, now came into action and pounded the Turks; but General Williams and Mr. Churchill, from Yassif and Tek-Tabias, brought a heavy cross-fire to bear upon these guns, and drove them away. At this time Kmety had reached Yusek-Tabia, and organising a column of assault, fell on with the bayonet, and cleared the breast-works of Yarim-ai. The Tachmasb redoubt was now quite surrounded. The enemy were massed on all sides, and so close that the grape from the redoubt made horrible havoc. The Russian artillery on the exterior front were throwing shells, but more burst among their own infantry in the tents than in the redoubt.

The chances of victory, although the enemy made no way against Tachmasb, were not altogether against him; for just about the time that Kmety recovered Yarim-ai, a strong force of infantry, cavalry, and guns appeared before the English Lines. These works were not well placed; they were weakly manned; the ground in front fell so rapidly that an advancing foe could not be seen until he came within grape range. About a quarter to seven the Russians crowned the ridge, fired three rounds, and in ten minutes were masters of the lines. The enemy's infantry piled arms, and breaking down a part of the parapet, he poured a battery through, and began shelling the town and firing into Fort Lake. It is probable that this force was directed to hold the ground won until joined by the enemy from the west. But this could not be permitted. Arab Tabia opened on them. Captain Thompson dragged a 32-pounder from the eastern to the western side of the Karadagh. Colonel Lake turned three guns from the front to the rear of his fort. This cross fire inflicted severe losses on the enemy. Yet the Russians stood gallantly for an hour and a half. At the end of that time a body of infantry sent by Thompson, and another sent by General Williams, had wound their way across the river, and, uniting with a battalion pushed forward by Colonel Lake, charged the enemy with the bayonet, and drove him out of the lines. The Russian horse essayed a charge, but fell under the fire from the reconquered parapets, and rolled over each other in the deep holes, called trous de loup, which had been dug in front of the lines. Curiously enough, however, the enemy carried off five guns.

The fighting about the Tachmasb redoubt was going on with great fierceness; but, from the moment the Russians were driven away from the English Lines, the issue of the day ceased to be doubtful. Kmety had first recaptured the right breastwork at Tachmasb, though the enemy stood firmly in the tents within fifty paces. But Kmety brought his two field-pieces into action. Within the redoubts the Turks wanted cartridges. Hussein Pasha supplied the want by heading sorties. Thus, part of the garrison was employed in stripping off the pouches of the killed and wounded, and throwing them to their comrades, who maintained the fire. The heavy guns of the forts in the second line came into play, so that the dogged enemy was in a circle of fire. To the last he was supplied with fresh troops, but these did not do more than augment the slain. At length the Turks took the offensive. The enemy stole away towards the left, and sought to escape out of the lines. So far as their slender means allowed—and they had few horses—the Turks pressed the retreat of the Russians, and drove off their remaining guns. The battle was at an end; it had raged for seven hours; and during that time a mere handful of Turks, well led, had defeated three times their own number. There are few battles more remarkable for the stubbornness of both sides than this battle of Kars. The Turks had 1,094 killed or wounded; the Russians had at least 6,500 killed, for the bodies were buried by the garrison.

Although the garrison had won a victory, their sufferings were not at an end. It was hoped that General Mouravieff would retreat, both because he had been so thoroughly beaten, and because Omar Pasha was at length afoot and troops were about to land at Trebizond. But Mouravieff did not go; on the contrary, he began to erect permanent huts. Nor did he relax the rigour of the blockade. He drew his lines more closely around Kars; for he knew the plight of the garrison. He judged that no relief would arrive; and he judged correctly. Selim Pasha did not land at Trebizond until the 11th of October; he did not make his appearance at Erzeroum until the 25th. The British officers there, and Consul Brant, plied him with every kind of stimulant to provoke him to advance upon Mouravieff's rear. He knew the state of the garrison of Kars, but he would not undertake the task. He marched a little way, when his heart failed him and he halted. All hope of aid from that side was at an end. Omar Pasha, with a really fine army, had landed at Sukhum-Kaleh at the end of October. He was an immense distance from Kutais and Tiflis. On the 5th of November he forced the passage of the Ingour, winning a brilliant but useless victory. Moving on through Mingrelia, he approached Kutais, until the rains began to fall, and the swollen streams and deep roads brought him to a halt. Then he retreated to Redout Kaleh. In the meantime Kars had fallen a prey to famine. The movements of Omar Pasha had been absolutely without any influence on the result.

The glorious garrison of Kars actually managed to maintain itself for two months after the battle of the 29th of September. The cholera appeared, and slew a thousand men in a fortnight. The rations of the troops were reduced to eleven ounces of bread, and some very weak soup, containing an ounce of nutriment. The hospitals grew fuller day by day. The people and soldiers tore up the grass to feed on the roots. Some of the grain abstracted from the magazines, and a depÔt of coffee and sugar, accidentally discovered, came in most opportunely as a relief. The horses remaining were now killed sparingly, and from the flesh broth was made. Hunger and cold—for the clothing of the troops was worn out—drove scores daily to the hospital, where they died. They never failed in duty or loyalty; neither want of food, nor hope deferred, nor the incessant night alarms of the foe, shook these patient, faithful men. Three days' provisions were collected in the batteries, for a false report had come that Selim Pasha was near, and it was thought advisable to be ready for a sortie. The hungry soldiers stood sentry over these provisions, yet did not touch a single biscuit. Then snow fell; the scanty grass was hidden; its roots were difficult to obtain. At length the people, who had borne their suffering well, cried out that they could bear no more. General Williams now received a message from Consul Brant, saying that Selim Pasha would not move; that Omar Pasha was too far off, and that the Kars garrison had nothing to depend on but itself. At first it was resolved to attempt a retreat; but this was impracticable. Then it was resolved to surrender, and General Williams and Captain Teesdale repaired on the 25th of November to the Russian camp, and, with the permission of the former, General Kmety and General Colman—Hungarian refugees—rode through the Russian outposts, and reached Erzeroum.

Mouravieff was quite prepared to treat. The terms were soon agreed upon. They were embodied in these articles, dated the 27th of November:—"1. The fortress of Kars shall be delivered up intact. 2. The garrison of Kars, with the Turkish commander-in-chief, shall march out with the honours of war, and become prisoners. The officers, in consideration of their gallant defence of the place, shall retain their swords. [This was dictated by Mouravieff himself.] 3. The private property of the whole garrison shall be respected. 4. The Redifs (militia), Bashi-Bazouks, and Laz shall be allowed to return to their homes. 5. The non-combatants—such as medical officers, scribes, and hospital attendants—shall be allowed to return to their homes. 6. General Williams shall be allowed the privilege of making a list of certain Hungarian and other European officers, to enable them to return to their homes. [This was done to save Kmety and others.] 7. The persons mentioned in Articles 4, 5, and 6 are in honour bound not to serve against Russia during the war. 8. The inhabitants of Kars will be protected in their persons and property. 9. The public buildings and the monuments of the town will be respected." With difficulty the Turkish pashas accepted these favourable terms, and on the 28th the garrison marched out and laid down its arms.

Thus ended the campaign in Asia in 1855. The Russians occupied the whole of Turkish Armenia until the peace, but made no further attempt to extend their conquests. On looking back, it becomes manifest that the relief of Kars might have been effected by an early and decisive march of Omar Pasha's army from Trebizond upon Erzeroum. To this he was opposed, as well as the Emperor of the French and the Sultan's Government; but that it was the only feasible plan might readily be shown. Kars was really sacrificed to the exigencies of the alliance and of the Crimean campaign. The French Emperor would not give his consent that anything should be risked to save Kars; nor did he want to save it; for the success of Russia in Asia was not only not indifferent, it was gratifying to him. The success of Russia was a diminution of British prestige in the East. Moreover, the Emperor, as we shall see, soon resolved that peace should be made; and that remark carries us back to Europe and the incidents of the winter of 1855-6.