THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

Widening of the Question—The Fleets in Besika Bay—Lord Clarendon's Despatch—The Czar and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe—Nesselrode's "Last Effort"—Military Preparations—Blindness of the British Cabinet—Nesselrode's Ultimatum rejected—Occupation of the Principalities—Projects of Settlement—The Vienna Note—Its Rejection by the Porte—Division of the Powers—Text of the Note—Divisions in the British Cabinet—The Fleets in the Bosphorus—The Conference at OlmÜtz—The Sultan's Grand Council—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's Last Effort—Patriotism of the Turks—Omar Pasha's Victories—The Russian Fleet puts forth—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe refuses Support to the Turks—The Turkish Fleet Destroyed at Sinope—Indignation in England—The French Suggestion—It is accepted by Lord Clarendon—Russia demands Explanations—Diplomatic Relations suspended—The Letter of Napoleon III.—The Western Powers arm—An Ultimatum to Russia—It is unanswered—The Baltic Fleet—Publication of the Correspondence—Declarations of War.

WHEN Prince Menschikoff presented his ultimatum the Eastern Question underwent a complete change. Up to that moment the quarrel had been confined, first to Russia and France, next to Russia and the Porte; and the struggle, although supported on one side by the advance of armies, was still a diplomatic struggle. Prince Menschikoff's formal demand for a protectorate, the violence of his language, and his imperious request for an answer in a limited time, converted the question at once into a European question of the first magnitude.

The earliest news that the Prince had presented an ultimatum to the Porte created a profound impression in the Courts of Paris and London, and even in the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, where Russia had so many friends. The British Government heard of it with "extreme surprise and regret." They had been wronged by the conduct of the Czar, and a strong revulsion followed from confidence to mistrust. The Emperor had broken his word.

The intelligence of the last violence offered to the Porte by Prince Menschikoff reached England on the 30th of May. The British Cabinet took a decisive resolution. On the 31st of May a despatch went forth from the Foreign Office, placing the fleet under Admiral Dundas at the "disposal" of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to be ordered whithersoever he would, but not to be allowed to enter the Dardanelles, except on the express demand of the Sultan. Two days afterwards, by a direct order, Admiral Dundas was instructed to proceed at once from Malta to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; and three days later, the French Government learning this, and being desirous of acting in concert, the Emperor sent orders to his squadron to quit Salamis, and proceed to Besika Bay. It was not possible—it was not, at that stage of the question, desirable—to do more. The two fleets were placed within call of the Sultan, and the treaty of 1841 was not broken or strained.

The temper of the British Government now underwent a great change. Its trust in the Emperor Nicholas was gone. On the same day that Lord Clarendon entrusted the fleet to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he wrote a despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, recapitulating, with trenchant brevity, those "most solemn assurances" which the Czar had given over and over again. It is a long catalogue; there are no less than sixteen distinct pledges that the question of the Holy Places, and that alone, required to be resolved. Yet at this very time the Czar was urging on Prince Menschikoff to extort from the Porte a treaty which would have laid that independence at his feet. The "explicit, precise, and satisfactory assurances" which came day by day from St. Petersburg were day by day proved to be worthless at Constantinople. The assurances of the Czar, and the language and acts of his Minister at the Porte were in flagrant contradiction. This flagrant "discrepancy," as the British Secretary of State mildly called it, he did not fail to set forth as the ground of a demand for explanations; nor did he fail to remark that Prince Menschikoff had been supported by a display of force, with what object he desired the Russian Government to explain. At the same time Lord Clarendon distinctly informed the Russian Government that England was determined to abide by that policy which held the preservation of Turkish independence and integrity to be essential to the peace of Europe. Sir Hamilton Seymour had already confronted Count Nesselrode with his promises. Nothing can exceed the cool effrontery with which the wily old Chancellor maintained that he had concealed nothing. His language, he averred, had always pointed to the exact reparation which Prince Menschikoff had demanded, and against which the Turkish Ministry and the British Ambassador had raised such "unaccountable" objections. Well might Sir Hamilton remark that "a long-cherished object" had been "sought by a tortuous path." Indeed, few finer specimens of treacherous diplomacy can be found than those which are furnished by the authentic records of the correspondence between the Czar and the British Government in the first five months of 1853.

The anger and violence of the Emperor Nicholas at his defeat were augmented by the fact that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was the British Envoy at the Porte. In spite of the evidence pouring in upon him from day to day, the Czar would believe that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, overawing the Ministers, and coercing the Sultan, had alone been the cause of the rejection of the treaty. The Czar writhed at the thought. Count Nesselrode—and in reading his words we read, no doubt, the words of Nicholas—imputes the failure of Menschikoff to the vehemence of, "the Queen's Ambassador." Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was accused of displaying an "incurable mistrust, a vehement activity." Russia was aware of the efforts he employed with the Sultan and the Council, and how deaf he had proved to the prayers of Reschid Pasha. No; the rupture had been brought about by "passion," by "a blind obstinacy," by forcing the Porte "to brave" Russia by "distrust as unfounded as it was offensive." In short, the Czar believed, or affected to believe, that he had suffered a moral defeat at the hands of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and that he would not endure.

Lord Clarendon's catalogue of Count Nesselrode's worthless promises was crossed on its way to St. Petersburg by a despatch from that Minister to Baron Brunnow, quite as insolent as any Prince Menschikoff had addressed to the Porte. In the most haughty style of the Russian Foreign Office Britain was warned not to drive the Porte, by a policy of mistrust, to the verge of an abyss in which the moderation of the Emperor had alone prevented her from being swallowed up. This heated language, this avowal that the Czar regarded himself as the destiny of Turkey, did not open the eyes of Lord Aberdeen, did not enable him to see that the Czar was resolved, cost what it would, to have his will obeyed. Nor did the ultimatum addressed to Reschid Pasha, insolent and peremptory as it was, reveal to Lord Aberdeen the true state of the case. Declaring that the Czar had been always friendly and generous and moderate, and that by opposing his intentions, by showing distrust without cause, by giving refusals without excuse, a serious offence had been committed against "a sincere ally and well-disposed neighbour," Count Nesselrode had the tact to appeal, not only to the wisdom, but to the "patriotism" of the Turkish Minister, and almost ordered him to surrender without delay, under penalty of seeing a portion of the dominions of his master taken, and held as a "material guarantee." Such was the character of the "last effort" made by this moderate, this conciliatory, this generous potentate, this "sincere ally and well-disposed neighbour," to extort from a weak Power the essence of sovereignty over twelve millions of subjects.

The fiery ultimatum went on its way to Constantinople. The force to back it received fresh marching orders. Baron Manteuffel told Lord Bloomfield that Prince Gortschakoff had been appointed to command the Russian army on the frontier of Turkey; and that his horses and baggage had, on the 5th of June, already reached headquarters. A strong force of gunboats went up the Danube to Ismail to prepare a means of crossing the river, and the merchants at Odessa were warned to wind up their affairs. The Turks also were bent on making ready for the worst. The small squadron of Turkish men-of-war took up a position in the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus. A flying camp was established between the Black Sea and Kilia, and Omar Pasha was ordered to Shumla. But Varna was defenceless, and the works at the mouth of the Bosphorus were out of repair, and the guns worthless; and except the resistance which the Anglo-French fleet might offer, there was none which the navy and army of Nicholas could not overcome. The whole disposable force of the Sultan consisted of 80,000 men, mainly militia. In the face of the menacing preparation of Russia, the British Government did nothing but form a camp for 10,000 men at Chobham!

For they did not believe in the outbreak of war. Lord Clarendon's despatches breathed of nothing but peace. The British Government could not shake off its old confidence in Nicholas, although he was in arms at the threshold of Constantinople. The policy of England, it was said, was "essentially pacific." No hostile feelings were entertained towards Russia, but every allowance was made for the difficulty in which the Emperor "had been placed"—by his own acts, in the main, the Foreign Secretary should have said. The British Government seemed to regard the threatened occupation of the Principalities as something inevitable, and while they still hoped to bring about a peaceful settlement, they did nothing and said nothing to prevent this further violation of right. It was a matter of course that they should appeal to the German Powers, telling them that France and Britain, in sending their fleets to Besika Bay, and in approving of the stand made by the Porte, were actuated by the sole desire to uphold Turkish independence, and begging them, especially Austria, to exert their influence upon the Czar in favour of peace. It is strange, indeed, that the British Ministers did not see the drift and persistency of Russia; and that, from the temper of the Czar, war was so probable that they could not do too much to place themselves in a position to bear a part becoming Britain. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe saw more distinctly. He told the Ministers that the master view of the Czar was to obtain a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, as a means of securing, if not hastening, its downfall; and he said rightly that if Turkey were to be left to struggle single-handed, the sooner the Porte were apprised of its helpless condition the better. But the British Government had taken up the weak position of desiring, almost resolving, to defend the Sultan, yet of neglecting to provide the means lest that very act should precipitate war. And so, while they went on the road to war, by thwarting the Emperor's designs over the Ottoman Empire, they prevented themselves from making war with effect by abstaining from preparation.

When the second Russian ultimatum arrived, the Turkish Government did not hesitate a moment respecting the answer which it should receive—they determined at once to reject it. But being now assured, by the coming of the fleets, of the support of Britain and France, they betrayed no anxiety in so doing, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had no difficulty in obtaining the assent of the Sultan to the suggestion that he should protest, but not declare war, and should, on the contrary, offer to open fresh negotiations by sending an Ambassador to St. Petersburg. It was not supposed that the Emperor would assent to this, but the offer was in unison with the policy of the friendly Powers, and placed the aggressor still further in the wrong. On the 16th of June, the date of the answer to Count Nesselrode, when the step taken by the Porte was irrevocable, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe waited on the Sultan. His ostensible object was to present a letter from Queen Victoria announcing the birth of Prince Leopold, and to offer her Majesty's condolence on the severe affliction the Sultan had sustained in the loss of his mother, the Sultana ValidÉ. Having accomplished this, he gave the Sultan more substantial comfort, by informing him with what friendly sentiments and "eventual intentions" the powerful fleet of Admiral Dundas, then at anchor in Besika Bay, had been placed at the Ambassador's disposal. At the same time, and in obedience to his instructions, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe told the Sultan that peace was the great object of British policy, and that the fleet would be used only to protect the Sultan from foreign aggression. On the 17th of June M. Balabine quitted Constantinople, carrying with him to Odessa the answer to Count Nesselrode's ultimatum, and the whole of the archives and correspondence of the Russian Legation. The answer was received in St. Petersburg about the 25th of June. It had been anticipated by the Russian Court, and orders were at once issued for the troops to cross the Pruth and occupy the Principalities.

Between the 1st and 30th of July, while the Russians were settling down in the Principalities and acting like proprietors, projects of settlement grew and withered apace. The Four Powers were endeavouring to find out what each thought and what each would do. The idea of a Conference at Vienna occurred to several persons at once. Lord Clarendon started a scheme, based on the project of a Convention between Russia and Turkey, which he drew up. M. Drouyn de Lhuys framed a note to be signed by Turkey, and accepted by Russia. There was Count Buol's project of a fusion of Russian and Turkish ideas. Independently of all this, the representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople got up a scheme of their own, which proved to be distasteful to everybody but the Turks. Peace projectors abounded, while Russia steadily went on with her design, occupied the Principalities in a military fashion, seized on the post-office, intercepted the Sultan's tribute, sent gunboats up the Danube, and when the Porte recalled the Hospodars, induced them to disobey the Sultan's mandate, and forced him to dismiss them. Nor did Russia stop here. She sent emissaries into Servia and Bulgaria; she scattered her manifesto broadcast; she strove to raise a spirit of disaffection; and she replied with haughtiness to the complaints of the Western Powers. In the dominions of the Sultan a corresponding spirit arose. The Czar's manifesto had been read in all his churches; the Ulemas answered by sermons calculated to raise a spirit of counter-fanaticism. It was manifest that Turkish ardour was not extinct. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe began to fear more from the rashness than the timidity of the Divan. Military and naval preparations went on briskly, and by the middle of August the Sultan had the satisfaction of knowing that he could defend Shumla, the Balkan, and the Bosphorus, if pressed by the Czar. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe did not fail to lay before his Government the real issues at stake, nor did he disguise his doubts of the possibility of coming to a settlement without resort to war.

It was in these circumstances that Count Buol exerted himself at Vienna to frame a plan of conciliation. He took the draft of a note drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and by the aid of the representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, and after frequent communication with London and Paris, he constructed out of this draft a note which he hoped would prove acceptable alike to Russia and Turkey. The design was to ascertain whether the Czar would accept the note, and if he agreed to do so, to send it to Constantinople, accompanied by urgent recommendations from the Four Powers to the Porte advising its acceptance. In taking this course, Austria acted as mediator at the request, or at least with the assent, of Russia; but the Russian Ambassador at Vienna would not attend the Conference, and his master was only represented there by a sort of friend. After great labour the note was framed, and a copy sent to St. Petersburg. The Powers took steps immediately to ascertain whether the Czar would accept the note, and they found that, although it did not give him satisfaction, he was content to accept it in a spirit of conciliation, as an arrangement devised by a friendly Government; and he was willing to take it from the hands of a Turkish Ambassador, provided it were not altered in any way. This was the famous "Vienna Note" which attracted so much attention, and raised so many hopes in the summer of 1853. But while Austria and the other Powers had consulted Russia and learnt her views, they had forgotten Turkey, for whose benefit the thing was supposed to be devised. They had not ascertained whether Turkey would or could sign it, and, indeed, in framing it, the Powers seemed more anxious to devise a form of words satisfactory to the Czar than safe in the eyes of the Sultan. And so, when it reached Constantinople, although backed by strong advices from all the Powers, and not least by England, the Porte declined to sign it, except in an amended form, which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe drew up, and to which the representatives of the Four Powers at the Porte agreed. The note, indeed, was found to confer rights on Russia almost as extensive as those she claimed through Prince Menschikoff. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, although he saw this, scrupulously executed the instructions of his Government, and pressed the note on the Porte. But the Sultan, the Ministers, and the Grand Council were firm. After much deliberation, the Grand Council, of sixty members, comprising the most distinguished statesmen of the capital, adopted a form of note embodying their views, but rather deferring to the plan suggested at Vienna. "If the decision," wrote Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the 20th of August, "does not completely represent the feeling of this country, it only fails in being framed with too much forbearance and moderation."

The news that the Porte would not sign the note, except in a modified form, vexed both Austria and England. Count Buol was chagrined, Lord Clarendon was angry. What the Four Powers most interested in preserving Turkish independence regarded as securing that independence, was surely, they said, a form of words which the Sultan might accept. They did not object to the changes made in the note as unreasonable in themselves—M. Drouyn de Lhuys, indeed, thought they were decided improvements—but they objected to them as unnecessary. The Four Powers would have assented to the interpretation put upon the note by the Porte, and Lord Clarendon had no doubt that Russia would have agreed with the Four Powers. But the Porte seemed to desire war, and had certainly made peace more difficult by the course it had pursued. In short, the friends of the Sultan were very angry with him for exercising his undoubted right, and looking sharply after his own independence. But if the Powers were angry, the Czar was enraged. He was beside himself when he thought on the fact that the Porte had refused what he had accepted. He would not at first discuss the modifications themselves. He would not think about them. What he objected to was, "any alteration—to the principle of alteration, to the fact of the Porte having done that which, out of regard to the wishes of the Allied Powers, his Imperial Majesty had refrained from doing." Count Nesselrode expressed his master's views with such asperity as polite diplomatists permit themselves to indulge in. If the Turks, he said, had had "the faintest perception of their own interests, they ought to have clutched at the note with both hands. That which the Emperor received without change or hesitation in the course of twenty-four hours, should unquestionably have been received by the Turks with the same expedition." The Emperor again saw in this defeat the hand of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and felt sure that the Turks had not been "made sufficiently sensible" of the dangers they incurred. The Emperor would concede no more. "Concession had reached its term." Further, a memorandum of Count Nesselrode's to his master was allowed to find its way into a Prussian paper, from which it appeared that the Czar placed an entirely different interpretation on the note to its authors'.

Nothing shows more clearly how far, although still professing identical views, the German Powers were separated from England and France, than the fact that Count Buol and Baron Manteuffel, after they were aware of the interpretation put on it by Russia, moved by the emphatic language of Count Nesselrode, did once more urge the Porte to sign the original note, and thus to sign away its independence. Far from being in real concert in August, they were less in concert with the Western Powers in the middle of September. The only Power which acted straight through with Britain was France, and the only divergence of policy apparent was this—the French Government did not seem to think the pace of the alliance fast enough, and were constantly urging the transmission of orders to the admirals to enter the Dardanelles. The plea was that the anchorage at Besika was unsafe. But this was seen to be absurd, and twice Lord Clarendon resisted the appeals sent by Louis Napoleon with the view of forcing the fleets upon the Sultan, and depriving Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of any discretion in the matter. This occurred during the negotiations on the new aspect imparted to affairs by the Russian acceptance and the Turkish rejection of the note. The German Powers, knowing what was the interpretation put upon the note by Russia, persisted in pressing it upon the Sultan. The Western Powers, always more respectful to Turkey, would not take part in this move: indeed, they could not do so. Count Nesselrode's comments on the modified note, showing that the Emperor of Russia did desire to seek new rights and extended power in Turkey, had proved to Britain and France that the apprehensions of the Porte, so far from being groundless, were justified by the Russian construction. Instead of asking the Porte, as they were disposed to do before they were in possession of the Russian views, to reconsider its decision, they now asked the Emperor to reconsider his. Austria, on the contrary, declared that if the Porte again disregarded her counsels, she should consider her efforts to effect a reconciliation at an end: further, that if Britain and France would not support her in this step, there would be an end to the conference at Vienna. In this opinion Britain and France agreed, and the conference at Vienna came to an end accordingly. The German Powers went one way, the Western Powers another; both professed to be hastening towards the same goal, but the German Powers went astray, whereas the Western Powers kept in the straight path. The secret of this was the personal ascendency which the Czar exercised over the German Courts, and which diverted them from their true course on the Eastern Question.

It may here be proper to describe in more detail the Vienna Note, on the terms of which, and on its modification, and the circumstances attending and following both, the preservation of peace depended. This note began by setting forth the desire of the Sultan to re-establish friendly relations between himself and the Czar; and then went on to state the terms of the proposed compromise. A difference arose on the first practical clause. As worded at Vienna, the note implied that immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Church existed as something independent of the Sultan's will, and declared that the Sultans had never refused to confirm them by solemn acts. The Turks could not subscribe to this. It was not historically true. It impeached the sovereign power of the Sultan. It implied that the Czar was protector by right of the Greek Church. Accordingly, the Porte, in modifying the note, took care to use words showing that these immunities and privileges had been "granted spontaneously," and confirmed spontaneously from time to time by the Sultans. This was the first amendment. The second practical clause, the origin of which was referred to the complaints of Prince Menschikoff, needed other corrections. The Vienna Note made the Sultan say that he would remain faithful "to the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion." Here was established an active protectorate. Now the Treaty of Kainardji applied only to one church in existence, and to one that was to be built, and gave Russia no rights to protect the Christian religion. This clause in the note would then have actually given an extension to that treaty. The Porte demurred, and rightly, modifying the clause by undertaking to remain faithful "to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion." No one who knows the meaning of words can fail to see the practical distinction existing between the two forms of expression. In the Vienna Note the Sultan was made to declare that he would cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement. The Porte substituted the words, "granted or which might be granted to the other communities, Ottoman subjects," for the last words of the note. This was also an important and a needful change. Under various treaties Austria enjoyed large rights of interference respecting the Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan. The terms of the original note would have conferred similar rights on Russia. "Such a concession," wrote Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the 20th of August, "when practically claimed by Russia, would leave her nothing to desire as to the means of exercising a powerful influence on all the concerns of the Greek clergy, and interfering even on behalf of the Greek laity, subjects of the Porte.... Confined to Austria, the privilege in question may be exercised with little inconvenience to the Porte; but in the hands of Russia, applicable to twelve millions of the Sultan's tributary subjects, the same right becomes a natural object of suspicion and well-founded apprehension." In fact the original Vienna Note was as huge a diplomatic blunder as could possibly have been devised; Count Nesselrode's comments confirmed the view taken of it by the astute Turks; and combined with the temper displayed by Russia, convinced Britain and France that they had been flagrantly in the wrong when they assented to Count Buol's note and pressed its acceptance on the Porte.

There was, indeed, a peace party in the British Cabinet, prominent among whom was Lord Aberdeen, who still urged that the discrepancies in the two drafts were immaterial, and that the note in its original form might well be pressed on the Porte. They were, however, overruled by the advocates of a bolder policy, of whom Lord Palmerston was the most prominent, backed up by Lord John Russell, who, dissatisfied with his subordinate position, was in a discontented and captious frame of mind. In fact, the Cabinet became disunited on more than one question. Lord John Russell was pledged to introduce a Reform Bill, and Lord Palmerston, who disliked the re-opening of the question particularly in a time of foreign complications, resigned. He was induced to withdraw his resignation, but the breach thus made was not easily healed.

In the middle of September matters had come to a crisis. On the 22nd news arrived at Paris, in the shape of a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour, stating that the Porte was apprehensive of a "catastrophe," in consequence of the excitement among the Turkish population. The lives and properties of Europeans, and even the throne of the Sultan, were, in the opinion of the Grand Vizier, in danger. M. de la Cour also reported that he and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in order to afford protection to the Europeans, had ordered up four steamers from Besika Bay. This was very vague and indefinite news. It was alarming, because it was indefinite. No account of the affair was sent by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and the British Government, to whom the news was reported, were compelled to rely upon the view of M. de la Cour. What should they do? The French Government, always eager for a movement of the fleet, at once proposed that in addition to the four steamers the whole of the united fleet should be directed to proceed to Constantinople. Count Walewski was instructed to request from Lord Clarendon an immediate decision, and was further to state that the Emperor's Government regarded the advance of the fleets as "indispensably necessary." The British Government agreed "without hesitation" to a course which Lord Palmerston had been urging for weeks, and orders went out at once from both capitals to Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin. This was undoubtedly a serious step, as by the treaty of 1841 the Powers were prohibited from sending fleets within the Bosphorus in time of peace. Had the Government waited for the usual despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, they would have seen that the danger reported by M. de la Cour disappeared very rapidly, and that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in describing the circumstances, took a cooler view of the dangers and did not even suggest the advance of the fleet. It may be doubted whether the British Government did not act with as much precipitation as M. de la Cour. For it cannot be denied that this fresh move of the fleet—a move so decisive, so completely pledging the two Powers to the defence of Turkey, and so irritating to Russia—lessened the chances of peace, if any were remaining.

At this time there were two contemporaneous sets of incidents going on which influenced largely the course of events. The scene of the one set was OlmÜtz; that of the other, Constantinople. Throughout the summer the Czar had not neglected to court the German Powers of all dimensions. At some of the smaller Courts his influence was supreme. At the larger, after the first shock occasioned by the discovery of Prince Menschikoff's designs, he attempted to recover the ground lost, and did recover it in a great degree. September afforded him an opportunity of exerting his direct personal influence upon the Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. The Austrian Emperor, ambitious of military distinction, had assembled about 50,000 men in a camp at OlmÜtz, for purposes of field exercise on an extensive scale. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia resolved to be present on the occasion, not only to witness what they had seen before—a fine military display—but to discuss the affairs of the East, the Czar hoping to gain thereby. It was here that the Czar disclosed a new plan of action. The Four Powers were to take upon themselves to transmit to the Porte "a declaration founded upon assurances given by the Emperor of Russia." Count Buol and Count Nesselrode drew up a draft of the note, and sent it to the other Powers. This was a very notable document. The Czar wished to make the Four Powers his sponsors at the Porte; and, in fact, as Lord Cowley observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, convert the Four Powers into the advocates of Russia. But it was open to more serious objections. In the first place, its terms were ambiguous. In the second place, its value, as far as it had any, was neutralised, if not quite destroyed, by the famous interpretations placed by Count Nesselrode upon the Vienna Note. The plan gave Russia the advantage of two documents, contrary to each other, which she might use as she pleased. When the project was submitted to the French Government the Emperor would not decide what he would do. He thought it might be sent to the Porte; but he could hardly recommend it, and he desired first to know the opinion of the British Government. No one could be more careful than the Emperor Napoleon not to commit himself to any course alone. The British Government decided at once. They rejected the project, because in no circumstances would they recommend the Porte to accept the Vienna Note; because it would be useless, as the Turks would not accept it; because Count Nesselrode's analysis of that note left no doubt that Russia intended through the note to establish rights and influences she never before possessed in Turkey; because "no settlement was possible by notes requiring explanations, and accompanied by vague assurances." Thus this last Russian scheme fell through, and Austria again, now siding with Russia, advised the Western Powers to abandon Turkey. The fruit of the Czar's visit to the Emperor at OlmÜtz was this further separation of Austria from the Western Powers.

For another incident had occurred during those momentous five days. It was about the time when the conferences at OlmÜtz began, and when, at the urgent request of the French Government, Britain agreed to issue orders for the fleets to enter the Dardanelles—that is, about the 23rd of September—that the Porte learnt the refusal of Russia to accept the modifications of the Vienna Note. The Sultan could bear the suspense no longer. Notwithstanding the advice of the envoys of the Four Powers, he summoned his Grand Council to meet on the 25th and 26th and determine the question of peace or war. Hearing this, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe made a last effort to prevent war. He begged Reschid Pasha to prevail on the Council, whatever might be its decision, to allow time for one more appeal to the Four Powers, on the basis of their concurring in the Porte's interpretation of the Note. It was in vain. The Porte saw no safety but in war. The Council met. One hundred and seventy-two distinguished Turks obeyed the summons of the Sultan, and unanimously agreed, on their first meeting, that the Vienna Note could be by no means accepted without modifications; and at their second, they adopted a report to the Sultan, recommending that Omar Pasha should be directed to summon Prince Gortschakoff to quit the Principalities within fifteen days from the receipt of the summons, that a refusal should be regarded as a declaration of war, and that thereupon war should be declared. Within three days the Sultan assented to the report, and the necessary instruments for executing the measures resolved on were prepared by the 4th of October. A form of summons was forwarded the next day to Omar Pasha, a manifesto to the Empire was issued, and a formal appeal for aid was sent to the Western Powers. Thus the irrevocable step was taken, and war was certain.

There was scant time for further negotiations. Nevertheless, although Lord Stratford de Redcliffe regarded the chance of averting war as hopeless, so desirous was he of preserving peace that he proposed another mode of extricating all parties from their difficulties. It embraced the alternative of a new note or arbitration. But although looked upon favourably in England, the Austrian Government would not take it into consideration. As the Cabinets of London and Paris, said Count Buol, had not thought proper to support the Austrian plan—that is, the Czar's astute scheme—the Austrian Government could not support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's plan, especially at a moment when the Porte was declaring war against Russia. There was, for the time, an apparent breakdown in the whole diplomatic machinery; but nevertheless the British Cabinet still persevered in the work of framing notes, and Austria and Prussia did not fail to give advice which could not be accepted, while Russia and Turkey prepared for war.

At this period the conduct of the Turks made a favourable impression on Europe. The manifesto of the Sultan was sensible and temperate, and still left open a door to negotiations. A spirit of self-devotion, unaccompanied by fanatical demonstrations, showed itself among the highest functionaries of the State. The Ulemas offered a large sum of money, and the Sultan, with reluctance, gave consent to the raising of a loan. The Egyptian Viceroy prepared to send ships and troops; the Grand Vizier and the leading Ministers gave many horses for the service of the artillery; men were forthcoming, and troops were constantly on the march for the Danube and the Georgian frontier. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, taking a comprehensive view of the merits of the quarrel, and of the interests at stake, justified the Turks in having recourse to arms. "Having," he wrote on the 28th of September, "witnessed the whole course of pretension and intimidation to which the Sultan and his Ministers have been subjected, and the conciliatory though firm consistency with which so many vexatious proceedings have been met, I may be allowed, while lamenting the necessity for war, to admire the gallant and orderly spirit which has prevailed, with slight exceptions, in all the proceedings of this Government." On the 9th of October the summons of Omar Pasha reached Prince Gortschakoff at Bucharest; and on the 10th he answered that he was not empowered to treat of peace or war, or the evacuation of the Principalities. This reply the Porte considered as constituting a state of war. The Anglo-French fleet was in the Dardanelles, and the admirals had instructions to defend the territory of the Sultan, but their power to operate in the Black Sea was limited. The Western Powers were as yet committed only to a policy of resisting any aggression of Russia. The German Powers declared themselves neutral, and Austria, deeply interested in the issue, assumed for herself the character of mediator.

The first anxiety of the British Cabinet when they learnt that the Sultan had determined on war, was to prevent the outbreak of actual hostilities. But this was no easy task, though the Russians professed moderation. On the 14th of October, Count Nesselrode, in these words, described the then position of his country:—"War," he said, "has been declared against us by Turkey; we shall, in all probability, issue no counter-declaration, nor shall we make any attack upon Turkey; we shall remain with folded arms, only resolved to repel any assault made upon us, whether in the Principalities or on our Asiatic frontier, which we have been reinforcing; so we shall remain during the winter, ready to receive any peaceful overtures which, during that time, may be made to us by Turkey: that is our position." On no account would he take the first step. That, Turkey must do. But if Austria thought she could induce the Turks to take it, and the Maritime Powers to accept an Austrian proposition, Austria might proceed. Acting on this suggestion, and finding the British Cabinet eager to negotiate once more, Count Buol renewed the lapsed conference at Vienna. But while these industrious diplomatists were engaged in their work, and had even prepared bases of negotiation which were formally embodied in a protocol, to which the Porte agreed, events had occurred, followed by acts on the part of the Western Powers, which helped to frustrate their benevolent designs, and put an end, for a time, to their abounding use of the pen. The Turks had won victories; the Russians had exacted vengeance; the Western Powers had determined to occupy the Black Sea.

As soon as the fifteen days of grace accorded by the Porte to Prince Gortschakoff had expired, and while Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was urging the Sultan to defer hostilities, Omar Pasha began the war. Drawing together large forces at points so widely separated as Widin and Turtukai, a place between Rustchuk and Silistria, he resolved to pass the Danube in two columns, with the apparent design of marching on Bucharest, where Prince Gortschakoff had his headquarters. On the 28th of October the Turks threw a large body of men over the Danube at Widin, and occupied Kalafat, which they at once entrenched and armed with heavy guns. This secured them a passage over the river on the flank of Prince Gortschakoff's line of occupation, and it diverted attention for a moment from operations at Turtukai. It was here that the Turks obtained their first success in the campaign, and startled Europe and enraged the Czar by beating his troops at Oltenitza. During eleven days Omar Pasha held his ground. Diplomacy forbade him to advance, and perhaps it was as veil for him that it did. Prince Gortschakoff came down with the largest force he could collect; but he did not venture to make an attack on the strong Turkish lines. Rain, however, descended, and the Danube, and the island, and low left bank became flooded and unhealthy; and Omar Pasha, without being molested, withdrew his guns and his troops to Turtukai. At the same time a small force which had crossed from Silistria, repassed the river; but Omar Pasha knew too well the value of his entrenched camp at Kalafat to give up that also. On the contrary, he reinforced the garrison, and left that thorn sticking in the side of the Czar. He also held several islands in the Danube, and jealously watched the enemy from the Dobrudscha; but his main army he put into winter quarters. Both sides were suffering from the sickness incident to all campaigns, and more especially to winter campaigns, and it is probable that at this time fully one-tenth of the troops on each side were non-effective. Nevertheless, in January, Omar Pasha won a further advantage at Zetati. The effect of the operations of the Turks on the Czar was immediate. He ordered the troops of Osten-Sacken and LÜders to march towards the Principalities; but their divisions did not arrive until the end of December.

Nor was his activity confined to the valley of the Danube. He determined to show his strength in the Black Sea. The Turks had been active on the Armenian frontier, and had greatly harassed the Russian outposts, but without obtaining any marked success. Schamyl was also spurred forward by the calamities which had befallen his old foe; and hence it was resolved to increase the army in the Caucasus and in the Transcaucasian countries to 180,000 men. The Czar seems to have believed that the Turks were reinforcing their posts on the shores of Anatolia, and sending arms and ammunition to the Circassian tribes. This he resolved to prevent. He was anxious, also, to strike some blow at sea which should hurt the Turks; and thus in November the Sebastopol fleet went forth to scour the Euxine. The Turks were indeed imprudently eager to employ their fleet. Before the allied squadrons had entered the Bosphorus, the Turkish Ministers ordered four line-of-battle ships and ten frigates to enter the Black Sea. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe becoming aware of this, set about preventing it, and he caused the Porte to be informed that until the enterprise was abandoned he would not order up the remainder of the allied squadron. He would not, he said, be drawn into the wake of the Porte; and he caused Reschid Pasha to be told that, if he wanted the support of the Allies, he must be content to respect their opinions. The Turkish Ministers appeared to comply with his earnest request, but in reality they left a light squadron between the Bosphorus and Trebizond, and hence it happened that, while the allied fleets were in Beikos Bay, ready at any moment to move into the Black Sea, the Russians were able to fall upon the Turks at Sinope.

The Russian squadron went out from Sebastopol about the middle of November, steering for the Asiatic coast, and so disposed as to intercept any Turkish ship proceeding from Constantinople to Trebizond or Batoum. On the 20th they captured a Turkish war steamer, and one or more Turkish merchant ships. The news of these captures reached Sinope, where a Turkish squadron lay, and its commander for a moment indulged in the notion that he would go out and fight the Russians. Better counsels, however, prevailed, and he remained in port. On the 23rd the enemy's fleet, seven sail of the line and two steamers, hove in sight ten miles from Sinope; and the next day part of this squadron looked in at the Turks, but did not attack. From the manner of their proceeding, it might be judged that the admiral doubted whether he should attack, and that before doing so he obtained some order from Prince Menschikoff at Odessa. Such was the case. The British Consul at Samsoun, and the Turkish admiral, sent off news of the presence of the hostile squadron to Constantinople, but it did not reach the Porte in time to prevent the calamity which followed. On the 29th Nachimoff had received his orders, and had rallied the whole of his squadron. On the 30th, while the Porte and the ambassadors were consulting, Admiral Nachimoff sailed into the port of Sinope, and signalled the Ottoman squadron to surrender. The superiority of the Russian force would have justified compliance, but the Turks answered the summons by opening fire. Thereupon the Russians ranged up, and firing shot and shell, not only into the ships but into the town, soon set both on fire. The seven poor Turkish frigates and three corvettes, whose heaviest guns were only twenty-six pounders, were no match for the line-of-battle ships which poured in broadside after broadside of heavy shot and Paixhan shells. Nearly 4,000 men had perished! One steamer alone escaped and fled to Constantinople. Having completed the task of devastation, and repaired damages, the Russian fleet sailed back to Sebastopol.

THE RUSSIAN ATTACK ON SINOPE. (See p. 28.)