February 10, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
I hope you will master and remember the principles which govern the problem I am setting you to-day. Although very simple, it requires a little more thought than most of those which have preceded it.
The Germans have broken through our front line. Your company, with its four Lewis guns and with four Vickers guns which have been placed under your command, has been hastily thrown into the trench B, which is well constructed and well concealed, and has a good field of fire to the east. Four 18-pounder guns were in action at a hundred yards north of the trench B, but two of these guns have already been put out of action by the enemy’s artillery. The Germans are advancing in great numbers regardless of sacrifice and are now about a mile distant. Their object is evidently to take the ridge AC, and it is of the utmost importance that they should be frustrated in their endeavours. The front allotted to you to defend runs from Z Clump on the north to U Farm on the south. Other troops are responsible outside these limits. You have in the trench B 50,000 rounds of ammunition besides that which the men have on them. You are senior to the officer in command of the remaining two 18-pounders.
What action would you take? and give your reasons.
Comments on the Situation and Action adjudged Correct.
Let us first of all consider how many rounds a minute you could expect the troops under your command to fire in the following circumstances:
(a) If the fire were only to be continued for two minutes.
(b) If it were to be kept up for half an hour.
| Rounds. |
| (a) If it were to be kept up for two minutes only, you might expect 100 infantrymen to fire from fifteen to twenty rounds a minute (let us say) | 3,200 |
| Four Lewis guns to fire 600 rounds each in the two minutes | 2,400 |
| Four Vickers to fire 750 rounds each in two minutes | 3,000 |
| 8,600 |
| (b) If the fire were to be kept up for half an hour you might justly expect infantry to fire at an average rate of five rounds a minute | 15,000 |
| It would be unwise to attempt to exceed this average rate of fire, for even if your men were muscularly able to continue firing at a greater rate, it is a known thing that the nervous strain of firing is such that there are but few men who can fire 200 rounds consecutively without breaking down, and it is of paramount importance that you should keep a certain amount of reserve force in hand in case the enemy gets to a really close range. |
| Four Lewis guns would during the half-hour be able to fire 600 rounds each, and if these rounds were fired at fairly long ranges would still be in a position to fire 600 rounds rapid when the enemy got to close quarters. The platoon commanders would, however, be well advised to regard these Lewis guns as their reserves and to do nothing to risk their being ready to fire 600 rounds at the critical moment. They should, therefore, use them very sparingly at medium ranges | 2,400 |
| Four Vickers Maxims should be able to fire at an average rate of 200 rounds a minute | 24,000 |
In other words, in the two minutes you could fire at the average rate of over 4,000 rounds a minute, but for half an hour could only keep up an average rate of about 800 rounds a minute. Another thing to be considered is that your average of hits at the closer ranges would be greater than they would be at the farther ranges. There is, however, no reason why you should not inflict as much loss as possible on the enemy at medium and long ranges, provided you know at what distance to fire. We used to consider in South Africa that when we were advancing against a position held by the enemy, he used to shoot straighter at 500 yards than he did at 200, for, fine shots as the Boers were, their excitement at our near approach disturbed their accurate shooting. You may therefore expect that your men will shoot comparatively better when the enemy is at medium ranges than when he is very close, provided that they know the distance.
It cannot be expected that you will go in for such a long disquisition at a moment when you are called upon to act, but you should have considered these points beforehand, at all events to such an extent that you would have decided to open fire when the enemy was still at comparatively long ranges, but to increase this fire as he got closer and to reserve the maximum rate of fire until you can pour it in with deadly effect. You must always remember that you are dealing with human beings who have nerves and not with machines. As I have previously said, the above principles should be those on which you decide to act, but the first thing you should do would be to send to the officer commanding the section of guns and inquire from him the ranges of any objects within rifle shot which he has ascertained, and you should at the same time desire him to obtain for you the ranges of any other prominent objects near which the enemy must pass, so that if his remaining guns are knocked out you will know what sights to use. Whilst this is being done, you should divide your front between your platoon commanders. The Lewis guns should remain with their platoons, but you would be wise to keep the Vickers Maxims under your own special command, so that you can turn them on to any portion of the advancing line which seems especially to threaten you. In fact, you should look on these as your reserve. Having thus considered the situation, you should issue the following orders:
“Fire fronts are allotted as under:
No. 1 Platoon to the right of Farm U.
No. 2 Platoon from farm U to Y tree.
No. 3 Platoon from Y tree to farm W.
No. 4 Platoon to the left of farm W.”
Order No. 2.—“Ranges are being ascertained from the artillery and will be passed to platoon commanders. Platoon commanders can open fire at their own discretion, but must bear in mind the enormous importance of being ready in all respects to use the full power of their fire should the enemy succeed in getting to close ranges. The four Vickers Maxim guns will, under my orders, fire at any portion of the enemy’s advance which appears to be especially threatening.”
The majority of regimental officers now serving do not at all appreciate the enormous effect of rifle and machine-gun fire at medium and long ranges, nor the importance of taking every step in their power to obtain the accurate ranges as soon as they have taken up a position. The effect of the fire of a fairly good company in such circumstances as those above depicted and acting on the above carefully considered fire orders would be enormous, whereas if the fire fronts were not properly allotted and if ranges were unknown, it would be of comparatively little value.
Your affectionate father,
“X.Y.Z.”
