December 1, 1917.

My dear Dick,—

It is now nearly nine months since I wrote the last of my letters of advice to you, and since then you have yourself been in France and have had many experiences and hairbreadth escapes.

I am very thankful that your wound is only a slight one, and am glad that within a couple of months you will probably once more be able to take your place in the fighting-line, for that is where your country demands your presence. It behoves you, in the meantime, to seize every opportunity of studying your profession and familiarising yourself as far as possible with the different positions in which you may be placed, so that when you meet a similar situation in the field you may recognise it for what it really is, in spite of the surroundings in which it is dressed, and may thus be more likely to solve it properly than would be the case if you were dealing with a problem which you had never thought over before. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the results which may depend on your correctly answering the questions put to you on the field of battle. These questions become more complex and more varied as the responsibility of an officer’s position increases, but in the case of a junior officer they are seldom very difficult, and all that is required to deal with them properly is a little common sense and a cool head combined with courage and determination.

It is on the result of the many little fights of which an action is composed that the result of a battle depends. The brilliant strategy of a commander-in-chief and the fine tactics of a divisional commander cannot bear fruit unless the troop-leading of the companies is well carried out, and in the same way good troop-leading will prevent a defeat being turned into a rout. Individual gallantry, valuable as it may be, is bound to be thrown away if unaccompanied by skill. The experiences you have undergone should render you more capable of assimilating the requisite knowledge than you were nine months ago.

Before I proceed further, I will mention a few axioms which can seldom be neglected without bad results accruing. Some of these seem so self-evident that it would appear to be unnecessary to state them, nevertheless they are all of them continually transgressed.

1. Impress on your men the importance of adjusting their sights correctly. On a peace field-day this axiom is sometimes neglected, and in the excitement of action it is often entirely forgotten.

2. Keep your men together unless there is some very definite object for not doing so, and only detach them for protective services, i.e. advance guards, etc.

3. Infantry mounted officers are apt to forget that their horses are given to them in order to give them more mobility. There are many occasions on which, by cantering on and making arrangements previous to the arrival of the unit which they command, they can save a great deal of valuable time and often much marching and counter-marching.

4. Never allow the pace in front to be hurried on a march. It is much easier to march at the head than at the rear of a column.

5. Before opening fire, carefully consider the situation. If you feel certain of being able to deal with the enemy, let him approach close before disclosing yourself, and then destroy him. If, on the contrary, he is so much superior to you that you cannot hope to be able to do this, you should open at a long range, but in these circumstances do not hurry the rate of fire to begin with. It takes an exceptional man to fire more than 200 rounds in a short space of time without being shaken.

6. It is a sound rule always to pursue the line of action which your opponent does not wish you to pursue. If, for instance, in the circumstances mentioned in the above paragraph the enemy open fire on you at a long range, you may presume that he does so in order to keep you at arm’s length, and if you halt you are probably doing what he wishes you to do.

7. However small your party may be when acting independently, it is responsible for its own protection, and it should always have an advance guard or its equivalent.

8. Whenever you have an opportunity of doing so, and the tactical situation allows of it, check your ranges by firing at an auxiliary mark where you can see the splash of your bullet, such as a dusty road or water.

9. When you have ascertained the correct distances of the object, make a range-card and pass on your information to neighbouring troops.

10. If you see a good opportunity of inflicting loss on the enemy, but it is impracticable to check the range, use combined sights.

11. Remember that if the target you are shooting at is large enough and you know the range, you can inflict heavy losses with rifle and machine-gun fire at ranges well over 2,000 yards. 12. Do not forget to make use of the map when estimating a range.

13. Although the secret of success in an engagement is the proper co-operation of the different arms of the service, the platoon commander must not cry out for artillery assistance when he has the means of carrying out his task in his own platoon, which, with its riflemen, its Lewis gunners, its bombers, and its rifle bombers, is, in itself, a miniature division. In an action where telephonic communication has broken down this rule applies with special force.

14. Above all things, impress on your men the enormous power of their rifle. I have heard many stories of men not firing at all because they hoped the enemy would come within bombing range. I have also heard of bodies of German troops streaming across the open unfired at because no order was given. I have also heard of machine guns stopping a German advance, whilst infantry who were lying down beside them did not fire a shot.

15. Rifle grenades and bombs both have their proper uses, and in trench fighting it would be difficult to get on without them. The former are also excellent for giving covering fire whilst a post is being rushed; but if the infantryman’s worth be 100, of this 100, 85 per cent. belongs to his rifle and bayonet, 10 per cent. to his rifle grenade, and 5 per cent. at the outside to his bomb.

16. Never miss an opportunity to reorganise your company or platoon, as the case may be, ready for the next emergency.

17. After capturing a trench or work, get your Lewis guns into position without any delay. From a small front they can bring a great fire to bear, and they must be given the best position. Under the protection given by them, the remainder of your command must consolidate.

(For consolidation, see note to Scheme 7.)

18. Your duty towards the enemy is your duty towards your neighbour reversed. Think how he could make himself most objectionable to you and act in this manner towards him.

19. Always be certain that you understand your orders, and if you are in doubt never hesitate to ask and make certain, even should your commanding officer have a short temper.

20. If you are detached for any specific purpose you should always rejoin your unit when you have accomplished what you were told to do.

21. Do not fail to give negative information. Young officers are very apt to neglect this. It may be of great importance to a commanding officer to know that a certain place is not held by the enemy, and this is just the kind of information that his patrol leaders are apt to forget to send him.

22. Always insist on any verbal order you may give being repeated to you by the recipient before he leaves your presence.

23. In a retirement you send men to the rear with orders to take up another position to protect your retirement; always see that they are accompanied by a competent leader, or when the last party falls back they will very likely find that their retirement is unsupported. Try to remember these axioms. My subsequent letters will be founded on their application.

Your affectionate father,
“X.Y.Z.”