CONTENTS

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PART I
ECONOMICS OF THE CASE
CHAPTER PAGE
I. STATEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR WAR 3
II. THE AXIOMS OF MODERN STATECRAFT 14
III. THE GREAT ILLUSION 28
IV. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONFISCATION 50
V. FOREIGN TRADE AND MILITARY POWER 68
VI. THE INDEMNITY FUTILITY 88
VII. HOW COLONIES ARE OWNED 107
VIII. THE FIGHT FOR "THE PLACE IN THE SUN." 131
PART II
THE HUMAN NATURE AND MORALS OF THE CASE
I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR WAR 155
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR PEACE 168
III. UNCHANGING HUMAN NATURE 198
IV. DO THE WARLIKE NATIONS INHERIT THE EARTH? 222
V. THE DIMINISHING FACTOR OF PHYSICAL FORCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS 261
VI. THE STATE AS A PERSON: A FALSE ANALOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 296
PART III
THE PRACTICAL OUTCOME
I. THE RELATION OF DEFENCE TO AGGRESSION 329
II. ARMAMENT, BUT NOT ALONE ARMAMENT 341
III. IS THE POLITICAL REFORMATION POSSIBLE? 353
IV. METHODS 368
APPENDIX ON RECENT EVENTS IN EUROPE 383

PART I
THE ECONOMICS OF THE CASE

CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR WAR
PAGES
Where can the Anglo-German rivalry of armaments end?—Why peace advocacy fails—Why it deserves to fail—The attitude of the peace advocate—The presumption that the prosperity of nations depends upon their political power, and consequent necessity of protection against aggression of other nations who would diminish our power to their advantage—These the universal axioms of international politics 3-13
CHAPTER II
THE AXIOMS OF MODERN STATECRAFT
Are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?—Some typical statements of them—German dreams of conquest—Mr. Frederic Harrison on results of defeat of British arms and invasion of England—Forty millions starving 14-27
CHAPTER III
THE GREAT ILLUSION
These views founded on a gross and dangerous misconception—What a German victory could and could not accomplish—What an English victory could and could not accomplish—The optical illusion of conquest—There can be no transfer of wealth—The prosperity of the little States in Europe—German Three per Cents. at 82 and Belgian at 96—Russian Three and a Half per Cents. at 81, Norwegian at 102—What this really means—If Germany annexed Holland, would any German benefit or any Hollander?—The "cash value" of Alsace-Lorraine 28-49
CHAPTER IV
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONFISCATION
Our present terminology of international politics an historical survival—Wherein modern conditions differ from ancient—The profound change effected by Division of Labor—The delicate interdependence of international finance—Attila and the Kaiser—What would happen if a German invader looted the Bank of England—German trade dependent upon English credit—Confiscation of an enemy's property an economic impossibility under modern conditions—Intangibility of a community's wealth 50-67
CHAPTER V
FOREIGN TRADE AND MILITARY POWER
Why trade cannot be destroyed or captured by a military Power—What the processes of trade really are, and how a navy affects them—Dreadnoughts and business—While Dreadnoughts protect British trade from hypothetical German warships, the real German merchant is carrying it off, or the Swiss or the Belgian—The "commercial aggression" of Switzerland—What lies at the bottom of the futility of military conquest—Government brigandage becomes as profitless as private brigandage—The real basis of commercial honesty on the part of Government 68-87
CHAPTER VI
THE INDEMNITY FUTILITY
The real balance-sheet of the Franco-German War—Disregard of Sir Robert Giffen's warning in interpreting the figures—What really happened in France and Germany during the decade following the war—Bismarck's disillusionment—The necessary discount to be given an indemnity—The bearing of the war and its result on German prosperity and progress 88-106
CHAPTER VII
HOW COLONIES ARE OWNED
Why twentieth-century methods must differ from eighteenth—The vagueness of our conceptions of statecraft—How Colonies are "owned"—Some little-recognized facts—Why foreigners could not fight England for her self-governing Colonies—She does not "own" them, since they are masters of their own destiny—The paradox of conquest: England in a worse position in regard to her own Colonies than in regard to foreign nations—Her experience as the oldest and most practised colonizer in history—Recent French experience—Could Germany hope to do what England cannot do 107-130
CHAPTER VIII
THE FIGHT FOR "THE PLACE IN THE SUN"
How Germany really expands—Where her real Colonies are—How she exploits without conquest—What is the difference between an army and a police force?—The policing of the world—Germany's share of it in the Near East 131-151

PART II
THE HUMAN NATURE AND MORALS OF THE CASE

CHAPTER I
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR WAR
The non-economic motives of war—Moral and psychological—The importance of these pleas—English, German, and American exponents—The biological plea 155-167
CHAPTER II
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR PEACE
The shifting ground of pro-war arguments—The narrowing gulf between the material and moral ideals—The non-rational causes of war—False biological analogies—The real law of man's struggles: struggle with Nature, not with other men—Outline sketch of man's advance and main operating factor therein—The progress towards elimination of physical force—Co-operation across frontiers and its psychological result—Impossible to fix limits of community—Such limits irresistibly expanding—Break-up of State homogeneity—State limits no longer coinciding with real conflicts between men 168-197
CHAPTER III
UNCHANGING HUMAN NATURE
The progress from cannibalism to Herbert Spencer—The disappearance of religious oppression by Government—Disappearance of the duel—The Crusaders and the Holy Sepulchre—The wail of militarist writers at man's drift away from militancy 198-221
CHAPTER IV
DO THE WARLIKE NATIONS INHERIT THE EARTH?
The confident dogmatism of militarist writers on this subject—The facts—The lessons of Spanish America—How conquest makes for the survival of the unfit—Spanish method and English method in the New World—The virtues of military training—The Dreyfus case—The threatened Germanization of England—"The war which made Germany great and Germans small" 222-260
CHAPTER V
THE DIMINISHING FACTOR OF PHYSICAL FORCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS
Diminishing factor of physical force—Though diminishing, physical force has always had an important rÔle in human affairs—What is underlying principle, determining advantageous and disadvantageous use of physical force?—Force that aids co-operation in accord with law of man's advance: force that is exercised for parasitism in conflict with such law and disadvantageous for both parties—Historical process of the abandonment of physical force—The Khan and the London tradesman—Ancient Rome and modern Britain—The sentimental defence of war as the purifier of human life—The facts—The redirection of human pugnacity 261-295
CHAPTER VI
THE STATE AS A PERSON: A FALSE ANALOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Why aggression upon a State does not correspond to aggression upon an individual—Our changing conception of collective responsibility—Psychological progress in this connection—Recent growth of factors breaking down the homogeneous personality of States 296-325

PART III
THE PRACTICAL OUTCOME

CHAPTER I
THE RELATION OF DEFENCE TO AGGRESSION
Necessity for defence arises from the existence of a motive for attack—Platitudes that everyone overlooks—To attenuate the motive for aggression is to undertake a work of defence 329-340
CHAPTER II
ARMAMENT, BUT NOT ALONE ARMAMENT
Not the facts, but men's belief about facts, shapes their conduct—Solving a problem of two factors by ignoring one—The fatal outcome of such a method—The German Navy as a "luxury"—If both sides concentrate on armament alone 341-352
CHAPTER III
IS THE POLITICAL REFORMATION POSSIBLE?
Men are little disposed to listen to reason, "therefore we should not talk reason"—Are men's ideas immutable? 353-367
CHAPTER IV
METHODS
Relative failure of Hague Conferences and the cause—Public opinion the necessary motive force of national action—That opinion only stable if informed—"Friendship" between nations and its limitations—America's rÔle in the coming "Political Reformation" 368-382
Appendix on Recent Events in Europe 383-406
Index 407-416

PART I

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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