CHAPTER XX
RECAPITULATION OF POSITIVE DOCTRINE
The chapters which have gone before have been, in considerable degree, concerned with the analysis of unsuccessful efforts to solve the problem of the value of money, as the quantity theory, or the attempts to apply the notions of supply and demand, marginal utility, and cost of production, to the problem. Not all that has gone before has been, even in form, primarily critical. The chapter on "Economic Value" lays the foundation for the main constructive theory of the book, and in virtually every chapter some portion of our positive doctrine has been developed. In the doctrines criticised, elements of truth have been noted, and in showing the errors of the doctrines considered, constructive doctrine has been presented by way of contrast. The theories criticised, moreover, even where they have gone astray in solving problems, have at least the merit of stating problems, and so have aided in clearing the way for theories better based.
It is the task of the present chapter to present, in a series of theses, the main constructive results so far attained. No effort will be made to follow the order of the exposition which has preceded. A summary of that will be found in the detailed analytical table of contents. Rather, we shall seek to draw from what has preceded the positive doctrine which is scattered through the preceding chapters, and to present it by itself, as a basis for the more systematic formulation of constructive theory which the following chapters are to contain.
1. The theory of the value of money is a special case of the general theory of value.
2. Value is a phenomenon of psychological nature. Not physical quantities, but psychological significances, are relevant when the problem of value and price causation is involved.
3. Value is not a ratio of exchange, or "purchasing power," but is an absolute quantity, prior to exchange. It is the fundamental and essential attribute or quality of wealth, the common or homogeneous element present amidst the diversities of the physical forms of wealth, by virtue of which comparisons may be instituted among different kinds of wealth, and different items of wealth may be added to make a sum, put into ratios of exchange, and so on.
4. Economic value is a species of the genus, social value, coÖrdinate with legal value, and moral value. It is part of a system of social motivation and control.[454] Psychological in character, it none the less presents itself to an individual as an objective, external force, to which he must adapt himself.
5. Individual prices have two coÖperating causes: (a) the social economic value of the money-unit, and (b) the social economic value of the unit of the good in question.
6. The average of prices, or the "price-level," is a mere mathematical summary of the particular prices. The causation involved in the average of prices is nothing more than the causation involved in the particular prices.
7. The value of money is to be distinguished from the "reciprocal of the price-level," or the "purchasing power of money." The value of money is an absolute quantity, one of the factors, determining each particular price. Particular prices and general prices may change because of changes in the values of goods, with no change in the value of money. Or, particular prices and general prices may change because of changes in the value of money, with goods remaining constant in value.
8. The absolute value of money, assumed constant, is presupposed by the great body of present day price theory, as supply and demand, cost of production, and the capitalization theory. These theories are, therefore, inapplicable to the problem of the value of money.
9. But supply and demand, cost of production, the capitalization theory, and other laws concerned with the concatenation and interrelations of prices, being applicable to the problem of particular prices, are also applicable to the problem of general prices. (Chapter on "The Passiveness of Prices.")
10. The general price-level, as a consequence of changes in particular prices, growing out of changes in the values of goods, may rise or fall, without antecedent changes in the value of money, or the quantity of money, or the volume of credit, or the volume of trade, or in the "velocities of circulation" of money or credit. (Chapter on "The Passiveness of Prices.")
11. The general laws of prices, supply and demand, cost of production, the capitalization doctrine, the imputation doctrine, etc., conflict with the quantity theory. In the cases where they conflict, the first named doctrines are correct, and the quantity theory is wrong. (Chapter on "The Passiveness of Prices.")
12. The value of money, being a special case of economic value, is subject to the same general laws. This means, from the standpoint of my theory, that the theory of social value is applicable to the problem of the value of money.
13. This is not the same as saying that the whole value of money is to be explained by the social value of gold bullion, conceived of as a mere commodity. A hypothetical case was constructed in the chapter on "Dodo-Bones," in which gold is the standard of value, but is not employed as a medium of exchange or in reserves, where the whole value of money is to be explained by the value of gold bullion, conceived of as a commodity.
14. But, in general, money gets part of its value from its monetary employments. (Chapter on "Dodo-Bones.")
15. The additional value which comes to gold bullion as a consequence of its employment as money, is itself to be explained on social value principles. It grows out of the social value of the services which money performs.
16. The functions of money remain to be examined in detail. And the relation between the value of particular services of money and the capital value of money, has not yet been analyzed. There is a relation between the two—a relation which varies under different conditions—even though it has been shown in the chapter on the "Capitalization Theory" that the relation is not the simple one which holds between the values of services and the capital value of ordinary income-bearers. There must be an increment to the value of gold bullion as a consequence of its being coined, however, since otherwise there would be no force leading it to be coined.
17. This increment in value to bullion, as a consequence of coinage, becomes evident when free coinage is suspended. An agio of coin over uncoined bullion may easily appear.
18. But this is not to assert the doctrine of the quantity theory. Because
19. The money service presupposes the existence of value for money from some source other than the monetary employment (chapter on "Dodo-Bones"); and
20. Hence the monetary employment can explain only a differential portion of the value of money.
21. The proposition that money must have value from some source other than the monetary employment does not mean, necessarily, that money must be made of precious metals, or be convertible into precious metals. The value of money is, indeed, most stable and best sustained when such is the case. But it is possible for money made of paper to have value apart from the prospect of redemption—though no clear case has been made, in the writer's opinion, for the view that this has historically occurred. But as a hypothetical possibility, my theory holds that paper money may attain a value of its own, growing out of various factors which a social psychology can explain, including law, patriotism, and custom. Social values in every sphere are imperfectly rationalized. Values which in their origin are secondary and derived may become substantial and independent of their "presuppositions." This is true of legal and moral values. It is true of the capital value of land. It may be true of paper money. This matter has been discussed in the chapters on "Economic Value" and on "Dodo-Bones." The social value theory has not the limitations of the utility theory in dealing with such cases, nor is it tied to a metallist or bullionist interpretation. Legal, moral, and patriotic factors, and the influence of social custom, all fall readily into the social value doctrine.
22. The "measure of values" function, and the "standard of deferred payments" function, need not require the actual use of money, and need not add to the value of money. The function of "medium of exchange," and other functions to be analyzed in a later chapter on that topic, do involve the actual employment of money, and are sources of value for money.
23. The quantity of money and credit are matters of high importance in economic life. They affect vitally the smooth functioning of production and exchange. While not accepting the extreme view of those writers who see in scarcity or abundance of money the primary cause of the ebb and flow of civilization, I maintain that the quantity of money and credit does make a vast difference, and that the quantity theory contention that, after a transition is effected, the only consequence of a change in the quantity of money is a proportional change in the price-level, is wholly indefensible. (Chapter on "Volume of Money and Volume of Trade.")
24. Very much of economic theory has been developed in abstraction from money. For economic statics, with its delicate marginal adjustments, on the assumption that friction is banished, that the market is fluid, that labor and capital and goods are mobile, etc., money does appear a needless complication. But the static assumptions are only possible because money and credit have smoothed the way. It is the business, the function, of money and credit to overcome "friction," to effect "transitions," to make it possible for "normal" tendencies to manifest themselves. (Chapter on "Volume of Money and Volume of Trade.")
25. The main work of money and credit is in effecting "transitions," bringing about readjustments, enabling society, with little shock, to adapt itself to dynamic change. The great bulk of the actual exchanging that takes place is speculation, and would not occur if economic life were in static equilibrium. This is true both as a matter of theory and as a matter of statistics. More than half of the checks deposited in the United States are deposited in New York City, where "wholesale" and "retail" deposits are a small factor. Bank clearings fluctuate in close conformity with stock exchange transactions. Great banks, and the bulk of banking transactions, are everywhere found in the speculative centres. (Chapters on "Volume of Money and Volume of Trade," and "The Rediscovery of a Buried City.")
26. Hence a functional theory of money must be essentially a dynamic theory: must rest in a study of "friction," "transitions," and the like. And,
27. Hence a theory of money like the quantity theory, concerned with "long run tendencies" and "normal equilibria" and "static adjustments" touches the real problem of the value of money not at all.
28. An increase of money tends to increase trade. (Chapter on "Volume of Money and Volume of Trade.")
29. An increase of credit tends to increase trade. (Same chapter.)
30. An increase of trade tends to increase the volume of credit, and, where the money supply is flexible, tends to increase the money supply also. (Chapter on the "Volume of Trade and the Volume of Money and Credit.")
31. Production waits on trade. The problem of marketing in the modern world is often more important than the problems of production in the narrower sense. Selling costs are probably greater than strict "costs of production." "Volume of trade," far from being dependent on "physical capacities and technique," is almost indefinitely flexible, with changing tone of the market, with changing values, and with other changes, including changes in the volume of money and credit. (Chapter on "Volume of Money and Volume of Trade.")
32. The relation between the volume of money and the volume of credit is exceedingly flexible. The relation between the world's volume of credit and the world's volume of gold is likewise exceedingly loose, uncertain, and flexible. (Chapters on "Volume of Money and Volume of Credit," and "The Quantity Theory and World Prices.")
33. "Velocity of circulation" is a blanket name for a complex and heterogenous set of activities of men. It is a passive resultant of many causes, and is itself a cause of nothing. The safest generalization possible concerning it is that it varies with the volume of trade and with prices.
34. Barter remains an important factor in modern economic life, and is a flexible substitute for the use of checks and money, increasing when the money market "tightens." It is greatly facilitated by the "common measure of values" function of money.
35. The general criticism of the mechanistic scheme of causation involved in the quantity theory has, as its positive corollary, the doctrine that psychological explanations must be given—that the phenomena are intricate and complex, as intricate and complex as the play of human ideas and emotions, and the network of social relationships.
36. This means that the theory of value, and of the value of money, as here presented, cannot assume the simple form, or the mathematical precision, which have made the quantity theory so alluring. It means, further, that the present study, as in part pioneer work, will lack finish and definiteness in many places, will contain errors and gaps, and will leave many problems unsolved, and many distinctions undrawn. At many points, the analysis is confessedly incomplete, and the problems imperfectly thought through—often inadequately stated, if seen at all.
In what follows, these theses, with doctrines yet to be developed, will be woven together into a systematic theory of money and credit.
The study of the functions of money, in relation to its value, will best be approached, I think, through a study of the origin of money. In this, I shall base my conclusions chiefly on the work of Karl Menger and W. W. Carlile, who seem to me to have done most in this field.
On the basis of the general theory of value developed in the first chapter, and the results of the two chapters which are to follow on the origin and functions of money, I shall reach my main conclusions as to the laws of the value of money. On the basis of this theory of value, and of the theory of the functions of money, I shall also try to develop a psychological theory of credit, and to assimilate credit phenomena to the general phenomena of value. The development which the theory of credit has had, at the hands of men whose chief interest was that of the jurist or accountant, is valuable and important. I do not wish to discredit what has been done. Many important doctrines concerning credit have been developed. The general theory of elastic bank-credit, worked out in the controversy between the "Currency" and the "Banking" Schools, is of the highest importance. This theory I have discussed in the chapter on "The Volume of Trade and the Volume of Money and Credit." I still feel, however, that there are gaps in the prevailing ideas on credit which only a social psychology can fill. I shall undertake to construe credit as a part of the social system of motivation and control, and to differentiate it from other parts of that system by an analysis of its functions. I think, too, that the theory of the relation of credit and money is in especially unsatisfactory shape, particularly with reference to the factors governing reserves.
A final chapter, in Part IV, will undertake to bring together the various points in our discussion which deal with the theory of prosperity, and will seek to bring the notions of "theory of prosperity vs. theory of wealth," "statics vs. dynamics," "normal vs. transitional tendencies," and certain other similar contrasts, into a higher synthesis, which will, to be sure, not rob these contrasts of their significance, but will rather find certain generic principles which they share, and so make it possible to measure considerations in one sphere in terms of considerations in the other sphere. In very large degree, students of dynamics and students of statics have been talking at cross-purposes, missing the force of one another's arguments, and have been quite unable, even when understanding one another, to come to agreement, precisely because they have lacked principles by means of which they could compare in any quantitative way the forces which each studies. A higher synthesis, which would give static and dynamic theories common ground, would seem to be a desideratum of high importance. Such a synthesis would go far toward unifying the science of economics. I believe that the theory of money and credit, approached from the angle of the social value theory, will meet this need.
CHAPTER XXI
THE ORIGIN OF MONEY, AND THE VALUE OF GOLD
This chapter is not concerned with history or anthropology for their own sake. The present writer has made no independent historical or anthropological researches, in connection with the question of the origin of money. The chapter is primarily concerned with giving an exposition of the theories of two writers, Karl Menger and W. W. Carlile.[455] It is not important, for my purposes, whether either writer has presented a theory which anthropology will accept as a correct account of actual origins. The theories do throw light on present functioning, and seem to me to be correct as analytical theories, whether historically adequate or not. There are two main questions with which the chapter is concerned:
(1) How did money come to be?
(2) Why should gold and silver have passed all rival commodities in the competition for employment as money?
Viewing these questions from the standpoint of present functioning, rather than from the standpoint of historical origins, we may restate them as follows:
(1) Why should men accept small disks of metal, or paper representatives of these metal disks, for which, as metal, they have no use, or at all events far in excess of the amount which they can make use of as metal, in return for economic commodities which they can use? The social utility of a money economy may well be granted, without giving an answer to this question. Granting that social economic life works better by far when men do accept these disks of metal in payments, the question still remains not merely as to why the practice started, but also as to why it continues. Granted that it is to the individual, as well as to the social advantage, that each individual should accept these metal disks in excess of his personal need for the metal, if he is assured that he can pass them on to others at will in return for the goods he wishes to consume, the question still remains as to why the individual should have this assurance, as to why the general practice should continue. Menger quotes Savigny as holding that the thing is downright "mysterious," and the Aristotelian answer of social convention (sometimes interpreted as "social contract") is, in effect, a confession that the thing does baffle explanation on the ordinarily understood laws of exchange. The convergence of individual and social advantage, which English economic theory has done so much to emphasize, is less clear by far in connection with money than with the case where A trades a sheep (of which he has a surplus) to B for a quantity of grain (of which B has a surplus), while A has not enough grain, and B has not enough sheep. This exchange is clearly to the advantage of both A and B, and the practice of making such exchanges is clearly to the general advantage. But in the case of money, A trades sheep (of which he may not have an excess, so far as his capacity to consume is concerned) for disks of metal which he probably does not intend to consume at all. The social advantage of a general practice of the sort is easily established, but it is not clear that it is to A's advantage, unless we assume the practice general. But there are many practices which could be shown to be socially advantageous if all men practiced them, and, indeed, individually advantageous, if generally practiced, which can, none the less, not be made a general practice. If thieves would cease stealing, we could dispense with a vast expense now incurred in police and safe deposit vaults and heavy locks, etc., and with a small fraction of the savings could give pensions to the thieves which would surpass by far their present incomes! Individual and social advantage would converge. But for many reasons the practice could not be instituted, and would break down quickly if instituted. Very powerful social pressure indeed is needed to make an advantageous social institution—like morality—work, so long as individuals sometimes find advantage in breaking the general practice, even though the general practice, on the part of other people, is of advantage to every individual. Now it is clear that the institution of money is to the social advantage. It is clear that it is to the advantage of every individual who has money that everyone else should be ready to accept it in unlimited amount, in return for his goods and services. But it is not clear, on the surface, why everyone should be ready to take metal disks in unlimited amount in return for goods and services. People will not take coal or horses or hay or land or white elephants in unlimited amount in return for goods and services. Why should there be such a general practice regarding metal disks or pieces of paper?
This question, to one who has always lived in a money economy, may seem childish. Such questions regarding anything to which we have grown accustomed seem childish to those who have not been used to raising them. Why does the sun rise? Why does seed-corn sprout? But these also are proper scientific questions, the answer to which is of high practical importance! The answer to the question just raised regarding money will go far toward explaining the functions of money, and the theory of the functions of money, together with the general theory of social value, will give an answer to the question as to how the money function adds to the value of money. The answer which I shall give on the first question will in large measure follow the lines laid down by Menger.
(2) The second question needs little revision, when stated from the standpoint of present functioning, rather than of historical origin. We have more recent history to deal with in connection with this question, and Carlile, in his answer, offers substantial historical and anthropological proofs. It is still, however, present functioning that is important, and the question may be restated thus:
Why are gold and silver, and particularly gold, the standard money of the great part of the world to-day? The principles of social psychology which Carlile employs in explaining the historical development, are also important in explaining the present attitude of mankind toward gold and silver, and will serve, together with the general theory of social value, to answer the question as to the value which money receives from the employment of the money metal as a commodity.
It is worthy of note that neither of these questions has been seriously raised or discussed by most recent writers of the quantity theory type. Professors Kemmerer[456] and Fisher give no attention to them at all. Both assume money as circulating, as the starting point of the argument, without noticing how much is involved in the assumption. Neither, moreover, gives an analysis of the functions of money. Considerations drawn from the question as to the origin and functions of money are hard to bring into the quantity theory scheme. If money circulates, there are causes for it. Fully to understand those causes, would be to understand also the terms on which money circulates, that is to say, the prices. But then a quantity theory would be superfluous! And if the quantity theory answer should not be obviously in harmony with the answer already given by the theory of origin and functions, then doubt would be cast on the quantity theory explanation. The quantity theorists do well to avoid mixing up with their discussion considerations drawn from the general theory of value, and from the theory of the origin and functions of money.
The answer to the first question rests primarily in the fact that there are differences in the saleability of goods. Value and saleability are not the same thing. A copper cent has high saleability; a farm has low saleability.[457] Some valuable things cannot be exchanged at all. The Capitol at Washington cannot be exchanged, yet has value. Under a communistic or socialistic rÉgime, exchange, as we now know it, would largely or wholly cease. An entailed estate cannot be sold, yet has value. If society should really come to the stable equilibrium of the "static state," most of the exchanges of lands,[458] securities, and other long-time income-bearers would cease, but they would still be valuable. I have developed these notions in my article on "Value" in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug. 1915, and have referred to them again in the chapter on "Value" in the present book, and so need not expand the discussion here. Exchangeability and value are different characteristics of goods. Value is an essential precondition of exchangeability, but can exist without it. Value is, however, commonly increased by exchangeability. But the theory of exchangeability is a separate matter, and cannot be deduced from the theory of value alone.
Menger points out the difference between "buying price" and "selling price." You can buy a piano for $400. If you try the next minute to sell it for $375 you will probably fail. You may pay ten thousand dollars for a farm. The income of the farm may increase. The tax assessment may increase. The capital value of the farm may increase. And yet, you may have to wait for a long time before you find a buyer who will pay you ten thousand dollars for it. One buys pianos or farms, as a rule, only when one wishes to use them, or when one has such special knowledge of the market that one knows pretty definitely where purchasers can be found for a resale, at a profit. Even in such highly organized markets as the stock and produce exchanges, one cannot usually buy in quantity and sell immediately without some loss. "Buying price" and "selling price" of such a stock as Industrial Alcohol Preferred are sometimes five points apart, at a given time. The forced sale of land in bankruptcies, or for taxes, notoriously often bring prices far below the price which would correctly express the value of the land. It is only in the ideal fluid market assumed by static theory, where adjustments are instantaneous, where causal-temporal relations have become timeless logical relations, that values are perfectly expressed in prices.[459]
All these difficulties were enormously greater in days of primitive barter, before money and organized markets had been evolved. The difficulties of barter have been much elaborated in the literature of money. I shall recur to the topic in my chapter on the "Functions of Money." Part of the trouble arises from the "want of coincidence" in barter—the failure to find the man who has what you want, and who at the same time wants what you have. Goods have high or low saleability, depending, in considerable degree, on the universality of the desire for them. They may have high value if only a few rich men desire them, provided they be scarce. The paintings of old masters would be a case in point. Incidentally, the difference between buying price and selling price is often enormous in this case, and the making of a sale may well involve long and expensive negotiations. The difficulties of exchange here arise not alone from the limited market, however, but also from the fact that each painting is a unique, and a unique of high value. A good might have high saleability despite the fact that the ultimate demand for it comes from only a few rich men, if it could be easily subdivided and standardized.
Menger enumerates a number of circumstances connected with a good which increase its saleability. Among them are the following:
1. Widespread and intense desire for the thing (to which should be added, adequate wealth on the part of those who desire it).
2. Scarcity of the commodity in question.
3. Divisibility of the commodity.
4. Considerable development of the market.
5. That the demand for the article should be more than local.
6. That it be cheaply transportable.
7. That commerce between localities in the article be unrestricted.
8. That demand for the article be constant, not fluctuating, in time.
9. That the article be durable.
10. That it be uniform in quality, so that standardization is easy.
In general, Menger's list meets the requirements often laid down for a good medium of exchange. In general, to the extent that any commodity meets these tests, it will be saleable. Commodities will vary indefinitely in the extent of their saleability.
Starting with the distinction between value and saleability, and with the analysis of the circumstances affecting saleability, we may now undertake to see how money tends to develop out of a barter economy. Suppose that a man, in a barter economy, has a good of low saleability, which he wishes to trade for some other specified commodity. He finds no one who possesses the commodity he wants who is willing to trade with him. But if he can trade his article of low saleability for some other commodity of higher saleability, still not the thing he wants, he has yet made progress, he has got one step nearer the object which he does want. It will be possible now, perhaps, to trade the new article, of higher saleability, for the commodity he wants. If not, he can trade it for some article of still higher saleability, which he can finally trade for the article he wants. By several indirect exchanges, he finally reaches his object. Incidentally, it is erroneous to distinguish money and barter economies as economies based on direct and indirect exchange. The barter economy may well involve much more indirection than the money economy, in many cases.
If there be in the market some one commodity which has a conspicuously higher degree of saleability than any other, the more sagacious men in the market will make it a point to get hold of it and accumulate it in excess of their anticipated consumption of it. They will do this, because they will see that they can thereby get other things which they do need more easily than in other ways. With the accumulation of a given kind of highly saleable goods, in excess, by a few men in the group, in the expectation that the surplus will subsequently be used to buy other goods,—as yet perhaps not specifically determined—we have, not money, but a big step toward money. At first only a few grasp the great idea. They succeed and become wealthy. Then others see the advantage of the thing, and imitate them. The prestige of the wealthy and successful men would induce imitation even if the advantage were not clearly seen. Then a tradition and a custom grows up. With the growth of tradition and custom, picking out one or a small number of things as particularly desirable objects to accumulate because of their saleability, with the practice of accumulating these articles in excess of intended consumption, money becomes an accomplished fact. There is no need for agreement or legislation. Money is not, in its origin, certainly, a matter of law or conscious public planning.
With the development of a highly saleable article into money, moreover, we have further a great increase in that saleability itself. The quality which made the practice possible becomes greatly enhanced by the practice. Menger thinks that this leads to an absolute difference between money and goods, the money article, which formerly was merely superior to other goods in saleability, now becomes absolutely saleable. The absoluteness of this distinction, which would make it a distinction in kind, rather than in degree, seems to me not to be sound. I think that the distinction remains a distinction of degree. For one thing, the development of money, while it adds to the saleability of the money-commodity, also adds to the saleability of other goods. Two things must be exchanged, in order that one may be! It is the business of money to facilitate exchange, to overcome the difficulties of barter, to bring about the fluid market. And it does this not merely by acting as a medium of exchange. The fact that goods can be priced in terms of money, can have a common measure of value, makes barter itself easier, as I have shown in my chapter on "Barter" in Part II. There are many articles in trade at the present time whose saleability is not much less than that of money, in ordinary times. Wheat in the grain pit is surely highly saleable. Stocks and bonds are. If it be objected that in the wheat market there is always some difference between buying price and selling price, if considerable quantities are involved, it may be answered that the same is true in the "money market" The man who has just negotiated a three months' loan of five hundred thousand dollars at 3½% may well have trouble in turning that loan over to someone else immediately without shaving ¼% from the money-rate! Besides, it is not true that values remain unchanged when a big buyer shifts from the bull to the bear side of the market. Buying price is higher than selling price in that case partly because his economic power has ceased to sustain the value of the wheat, and the price would not correctly express the value if it remained uninfluenced by that fact.
Further, as we shall see when we come to the analysis of credit, one chief function of modern credit is to increase the saleability of goods, and to enable men to use the value of their goods in effecting exchanges without actually alienating their property in the goods. It seems to me that the drift of modern systems of exchange is toward closing up the gap between money and goods, in respect of saleability, rather than to widen it.[460] But this is to anticipate later discussion.
It is not necessary, in answering our second question, as to the reasons why gold and silver have become the standard money of the world, to go far in the study of primitive moneys. Wheat has almost never been money. The value of wheat sinks rapidly with increase in supply, and is very unstable. Wheat meets some other tests that fit it for money, as easy divisibility, ease in standardization, and even has some degree of durability, though subject to deterioration and waste with keeping, and involving expense in keeping. Carlile and Ridgeway think that wheat was used to some extent among the Greeks in Southern Italy as money, at one time.[461] But this was possible because there was a regular export trade in wheat—the same thing that made tobacco available as money in Virginia. In general, however, commodities which minister to easily satiable wants are ill-adapted for money. And that is especially true of current stocks of goods currently consumed.
The accumulation of money, moreover, implies a stage of human development where the accumulation of capital is possible. It implies foresight, the suppression of present wants in the interest of future wants, and almost always money has been a commodity well suited to serve as provision against future contingencies. Cattle, slaves, knives, fish-hooks, cooking implements, and similar things have been money. The "store of value" function manifests itself early.
But very early a different sort of commodity comes in. Articles of ornament early begin to take the place of articles that minister to more animal wants. It seems strange that articles meeting wants which are commonly counted frivolous and fanciful should distance those obviously necessary in the race for a place as money. It seems strange that the nations now at war should seem more concerned about their gold supplies than about their wheat supplies.[462] But it is none the less a fact that men in all ages have been enormously concerned about ornament. In warm regions, ornament has commonly preceded clothing. Very early, necklaces, bracelets, rings, earrings, nose-pendants, etc., became objects of exceedingly great desire. And very early, gold and silver were used for such purposes, and men made long expeditions for them and fought wars for them in very early times, before the money economy was developed far. Other ornaments than those made of gold and silver have also become money. Wampum, polished shells, iron ornaments, etc., have all been money. The Karoks of California were accustomed to use strings of shell ornaments as money. When this was supplanted by American silver, they used strings of silver coins as ornaments, dressing their women lavishly with rows of silver dimes, quarters, and half-dollars! Ornament and money are freely interchangeable in primitive life. To-day, in the Western world, the thing is more specialized and differentiated, and the interchange of money and ornament is largely confined to jewelers, bankers, especially international bankers, gold brokers, and the mints, through whom the rest of society make the interchange. In India, however, the peasant's hoard takes the form of bracelets, bangles, and earrings for his wife and daughters, and the peasant himself seems to regard them in the double light of provision for future needs, and as conferring social distinction. They are both ornament and savings bank, and are superior to a savings bank from the standpoint of effective saving, since the natives would spend what they put in the bank, but only famine can make them dispose of the ornaments of their women.[463] Saving is a practice not easily started. There are powerful motives in human life making for prodigality. Social prestige comes to the man whose hospitality is lavish. Social expectation, which is the most powerful steady motive power in human life, makes powerfully for prodigality. Thrift is a virtue little esteemed among primitive men, and none too highly esteemed among the masses in most countries. The grudging person, the tightwad, the man who fails to do his share of the treating, the woman who entertains her guests with inadequate fare—none of these enjoy high social esteem. To offset this, a motive equally powerful must manifest itself. It would be considered mean and contemptible for the Hindu to put money away instead of spending it on feasts at marriages and funerals, and in hospitality on other festive occasions. But he gains, instead of losing, in social esteem and prestige, if he decorates his women with gold and silver. Later, the advantage of such a practice as a matter of provision against future wants would get into men's minds, and would become an added incentive to maintain and increase the practice. Thus the frivolous and fanciful side of men's nature furnishes a powerful lever for the development of both money and capital. In the store of value function we find one of the earliest and most significant functions of money. Carlile offers a wealth of evidence to show this interchangeability of money and ornament among many peoples, at different stages of culture.
Three powerful elements of human nature work together in sustaining the value of the metals which become widely used as ornament:
(1) love of approbation;
(2) the sex impulse;
(3) the spirit of rivalry, or competition.
In these three we have, perhaps, the firmest basis which it is possible to construct for the value of anything! When religion is added, as has often been the case with the precious metals, the basis becomes solid indeed! Modern social psychology has increasingly made clear the power of the first. Social expectation can take the raw stuff of human nature, and mold it into almost any form it pleases. Original, hereditary differences remain. Some raw stuff is so inferior that no high social organization can be built out of it. Some stuff cannot respond very effectively to the social stimuli. But qualitatively, the tendency is for men to become what society expects. Individuals succeed more or less in meeting social expectation. But the very elements of individual aspiration and ambition, the very self of the individual, are molded to the social pattern, and, with the same racial stock, vary almost indefinitely from time to time and from place to place, with the mores. If ornament confers distinction,—and almost everywhere it does—men will seek to possess ornaments.
Commonly it is for the sake of the other sex that men seek ornaments. Ornaments are an aid in wooing! Men gain wives by being able to give them ornaments.—Not that this is the whole story!—And social expectation, almost everywhere, requires that men decorate the wives that they have won. Wives usually reinforce social expectation in this matter.
Further, the desire for ornament is competitive. One's women must be better ornamented than the women of one's neighbors, if distinction is to be gained thereby. But this sets a faster pace for the neighbors, and the standard of social expectation is raised as to the necessary amount of ornament. It is the same sort of competition that arises among armed nations. A new battle-ship for one requires that all increase their naval strength. New armies in Germany call for new armies in France. A vicious circle is created. The desire for ornament, unlike the desire for food, becomes insatiable. And hence, the value-curve for the metal used as ornament sinks very slowly, being reduced, not by satiation of want, but by limitation of economic resources. I need not elaborate these notions further. They are of the same sort that Veblen has developed in his Theory of the Leisure Class. They rest on fundamentals in human nature, however much they differ from the psychology of the "economic man." They give assurance, I think, that, unless radical change in tastes and fashions come in, which displace gold and silver from their position as ornaments and as means of display, we may expect the value of gold to maintain itself at a high level regardless of great increase in quantity. I do not share the view which Carlile himself seems, at times, to express[464] that gold does not sink in value with the increase in quantity. It seems to me easily demonstrable that it has sunk, and does sink. But I should expect the value of gold to survive the shock that might come if gold were entirely displaced from monetary use vastly better than any commodity which serves wants of a different character could stand a similar shock. The demonetization of silver has, of course, not entirely displaced silver from the monetary employment. It has, however, made it necessary for the arts to absorb a greatly increased proportion of the new silver,[465] and not a little of the old silver. The demonetization of silver, moreover, was accompanied and followed by a great increase in silver production. But silver has stood the shock amazingly well.[466]It is, of course, thinkable that the attitude of mankind, under new social conditions, and with new tastes and fashions, may change, with reference to gold and silver. Love of approbation and distinction, the sex impulse, and the spirit of rivalry, are eternal elements in human nature. But their manifestations may change. There have been times when love of distinction gratified itself in poverty and filth and asceticism. Almost anything may be exalted into a social ideal. Society may even reach ideals of such a sort that a man may gain social approval and the love of woman in high competition with his fellows in the service of mankind! But even here gold and silver may have a place. They are beautiful, as we now see beauty, and beauty itself is good! The world is better if it has beauty in it.
It is just as well to conclude at this point what I shall have to say regarding the value of gold as a commodity.[467] The same quantity of gold and silver may have widely varying values, depending on the distribution of wealth and power. It is not alone intensity of individual desire that controls values, but also the social weight of those who manifest the desire. And this depends on the legal and other institutional values concerned with social organization. The point is strikingly illustrated by Walker's[468] account—designed for another purpose—of the effect on the values of gold and silver of the conquests of the great Eastern empires by Alexander the Great and the Romans. The production of gold and silver, for the great Eastern empires, was like the rearing of the pyramids in Egypt. All power was centered in the hands of a few despots. Control of vast masses of laborers was in their hands. The social values—it is difficult to classify them as legal, economic and religious, since all three are blended—gave little weight indeed to the desires of the masses, and tremendous weight to the slightest whims of the despot. Thus, since the love of gold and silver was intense in these despots, and since religious considerations also called for the accumulation of great treasuries of gold and silver, enormous numbers of laborers, living miserably, toiled in the mines to produce them, and amazing stores of gold and silver were accumulated. The precious metals had, in these Eastern empires, a high value per unit, since so large a portion of the social energy of motivation attached itself to them. With the conquests by Greeks and Romans, however, a great change came. The old, gold-loving despots lost their power. The conquerors had vastly less love for gold and silver for their own sake. Moreover, the leaders among the conquerors had very much less power in their own social systems than had the oriental despots. Their soldiers were in considerable degree free mercenaries, who had a right to a share in the spoils, and who cared much less for hoards of precious metals than for many other things. In the new rÉgime, the social centre of gravity was changed. There remained few who loved great stores of precious metals who had power enough to accumulate them. Mining on the old basis was impossible. Though slavery persisted, more and more of the labor of slaves went into the production of things that the masses of men could consume. Gold and silver sank enormously in value.
Radical readjustments in the distribution of wealth in our own day, might well make substantial changes in the value of gold, without any change in its quantity. That a more equal distribution of wealth and power, however, would lower the value of gold now, as in the case just discussed, is not so clear. The masses in the Western countries are already fed and clothed, as a rule, even in times of adversity, and usually increasing income for them means increasing expenditure to satisfy less pressing wants, and particularly to satisfy wants connected with social esteem. The laborer's wife gets an expensive cab for her baby when she can afford it. The negroes have gold fillings put in their front teeth—sometimes when the teeth are sound! The practice of giving wedding rings, and even engagement rings, is spreading among the poor. Our American rural poor, of pioneer stock, have had less concern for gold and silver ornament than the masses of the Asiatics and recent European immigrants. But among the rural poor in America, as city standards spread, the tendency to use gold and silver ornaments seems to be increasing, while we may with considerable confidence expect, I think, that the rise of the immigrant to better economic conditions will mean a larger use of gold and silver on his part. Gold leaf on ceilings and radiators would cease, doubtless, except for public buildings, if great fortunes disappeared, and the use of gold, at least, for plate, would be impossible in an economic democracy.[469] Silver might well gain in value at the expense of gold if there were radical changes in the distribution of wealth. It is notorious that prosperity among the agricultural masses of India is promptly followed by absorption of gold in that country. I venture no concrete conclusions on this point, beyond the general conclusion that a redistribution of wealth, with no change in the quantity of gold, might well be expected to alter the value of gold.
It may be added that the general impoverishment of Europe, growing out of the present World War, will probably lower the marginal value of gold in the arts (and hence as money) in considerable degree. From this cause alone, to say nothing of causes growing out of the money-employment of gold, and growing out of the values of goods other than gold, we might expect higher prices after the War than before the War, for articles of consumption.[470]
CHAPTER XXII
THE FUNCTIONS OF MONEY AND THE VALUE OF MONEY
In preceding chapters, I have spoken of the "money-service" as a source of additional value of money, under certain conditions. Before money can function as money at all, it must have value from some non-monetary source.[471] But, given this prior value, money performs valuable services. These valuable services, in certain cases, add to the value of money. Moreover, the fact that money, when made of a metal used in the arts, lessens the amount available for use in the arts, raises the marginal value of that metal there, and consequently raises its value in monetary form as well. It is now necessary to analyze the money-service, and to see in precisely what ways it does affect the value of money. And first, we must notice that the money-service is not simple, but compound; that in fact there are several services of money, in many ways distinct from one another; that not all money can perform all of these services; that most of them may be performed by things other than money, that these services are not all equally important as sources of the value of money, and that the same service varies, from time to time and from place to place, in its significance from this angle; and finally, that one of these services which is of the greatest social importance, namely, the "common measure of values" function, does not add to the value of money at all.
I shall not now undertake a history of theories of the functions of money. Many of the points which follow are common property of many writers.[472] The nature of some functions has been more clearly explained than that of others. I have not found in the literature of the subject any very clear statements, moreover, as to the relations of different functions to the value of money. I shall try in what follows, by a series of hypothetical cases, to isolate each function of money, as far as may be, and shall try, by varying my hypotheses, to indicate variations in the influence of the different functions on the value of money.
The functions of money have been variously described and named. The following list seems most satisfactory to me:
1. Common measure of values (standard of value).
2. Medium of exchange.
3. Legal tender for debts (Zahlungs- or Solutions-mittel).
4. Standard of deferred payments.
5. Reserve for credit instruments, including reserve for government paper money.
6. Store of value.
7. Bearer of options.
The common measure of value function rests in the intellectual needs of man. It grows out of the necessity for calculation, for bookkeeping, for understanding what is going on. Any object of value may be used to measure the value of anything else, just as any object of weight—say an irregular mass of iron—may be put in the balance against some other object, and the relation between the absolute weights of the two objects thus more or less definitely ascertained.[473] But it helps little, in getting at the aggregate weight of a collection of objects, to know that A among them is heavier than B, while D is lighter than F. To get a knowledge of the situation adequate for quantitative manipulation, it is best to compare all of the objects with some one object, chosen as the standard of weight, or common measure of weights. Thought is thus immensely simplified. If we may imagine the calculations of a dealer in a rural region, where no common measure of values is used, it will help to make clear the nature of this function. Let us suppose that he deals in nails, wire, cotton cloth, eggs, butter, hams, sugar, and moonshine whiskey, and that his customers also make and use most of these things, using him as a central clearing house in their rude division of labor. Without a common measure of values, it is necessary for him to keep in mind the price of every commodity in terms of every other commodity. If there are twelve commodities, this means 66 ratios which he must remember, according to the formula for permutations and combinations. In general, in such a situation, there would be the following ratios: (n - 1) + (n - 2) + (n - 3) + ... (n - (n - 1)). Let him choose, however, one of his commodities, say eggs, as the common measure of values, and he needs to bear in mind only eleven prices, namely, the prices of each of the other eleven articles in eggs. Thinking is immensely simplified. In general, with a common measure of values, dealers need bear in mind only (n - 1) prices. Suppose that at the end of the day, after considerable trading, our dealer finds the following changes in his stock:
He has gained | He has lost |
8 doz. eggs | 12 lbs. nails |
3 gallons whiskey | 8 lbs. wire |
4 hams | 13 lbs. butter |
5 yards cloth | 10 lbs. sugar |
Has his trading been profitable? How can he tell? Reduce all the items in both columns to their equivalents in eggs, however, and the answer is very easy. No complicated business is possible without this common measure, and common language, of values.
Be it noted that this common measure of values does not necessarily involve the use of a medium of exchange. The practice of thinking in a common measure is what is involved. If the article chosen be eggs, which all are accustomed to use, the service of a common measure might easily be performed without the practice of indirect exchange, assuming that other physical difficulties of barter to which I shall shortly refer, were absent. Indeed, as I have pointed out in the chapter on "Barter" in Part II, a great deal of barter goes on in modern life, made very much easier by the fact that we have a common language of values, a common measure of values. For the easy working of the system, it is important that the common measure of value be an article with whose value the group is well acquainted. The frequent testing of this value in actual exchanges vastly facilitates this. But actual exchange is not necessary for the performance of the measure of value function. We have cases where the measure of values and the medium of exchange are different. Thus, in the Homeric poems, we find indications that cattle served as a measure of values, even though payments were made in gold. The Virginians commonly thought in pounds, shillings and pence, even when using tobacco as a medium of exchange. The need for a common measure of values would manifest itself in any complex socialistic society, even though exchange were largely dispensed with. No systematic plans for utilizing the resources of such a society would be possible, no bookkeeping would be possible, without some such device.
For this function, I prefer the term, "common measure of values," to the term often used instead, "standard of values." The latter term, as used in connection with the expression "standard money," sometimes carries the connotation of "money of ultimate redemption," and its main function is thought of as serving in reserves. The reserve function is a separate function, however. It is common to have money made of the standard metal in reserves. But this need not be the case. I would refer once more to the hypothetical illustration developed in the chapter on "Dodo-Bones": gold, not coined, as the "standard of value"; paper as the medium of exchange; silver bullion, at the market ratio with gold, as the reserve for redemption of the paper. This may suggest that a distinction may properly be drawn between measure of values, and ultimate standard money. The paper money, in this case, would be the thing of which the masses would ordinarily think, so long as the system worked smoothly. And the paper could serve as a measure of values. The case is not unlike the case where a "standard yard," or "standard pound" is kept for ultimate reference in a government bureau, while yardsticks or pound weights in the shops and warehouses do the actual measuring. The cases do not, indeed, run on all fours. The measurement of weights and lengths involves physical manipulation; the measurement of values is an intellectual operation, made by comparing two objects of value. The comparison may be made in actual exchanges; it may be made by an accountant's estimate; it may be made by comparing the results of several exchanges, in sorites form, only one of which involves the ultimate standard measure. The yardsticks actually used may vary more or less, by accident or design, by variations of temperature, etc., from the standard yard. The paper dollars, under a smooth working of the system described, would be held closely to the ultimate standard, and would, in any case, not vary as compared with one another at the same time and place.
When the medium of exchange diverges in value from the ultimate standard, as in the case of the American Greenbacks during the period from 1862 to 1879, we have, sometimes, shifting relations among the functions. The Greenbacks were the measure of value most commonly in use. They were legal tender for debts, except where gold was specified in the contract. They were commonly the standard of deferred payments. To a considerable extent, however, gold was used in reserves, and even as a medium of exchange. People thought in both standards. And finally, gold remained an ultimate standard to which the Greenbacks were referred, and by which variations in their value were measured. The terms, "primary standard" (gold) and "secondary standard" (Greenbacks), have been employed to aid in straightening out this confusion.[474] I think, on the whole, that the term, "common measure of values" describes the function which I wish to emphasize more clearly than the term, standard of values, and I shall, in general, employ it for that purpose.[475]
The medium of exchange function grows out of the physical difficulties of barter, rather than out of intellectual needs. The discussion in the preceding chapter of the origin of money has emphasized the nature of the difficulties which a medium of exchange meets. A has an ox, which he wishes to trade for shoes, sugar, and a coat. Neither shoe-maker, tailor nor grocer cares to take the ox, however, and, besides, no one of them could supply A with all three of the things he wishes to get. Moreover, even if A should meet a man who had all three things, he would not care to give up the ox for them, since the ox is worth more than all three. If there be a medium of exchange, however, A may sell his ox to the butcher, and take his pay in that medium, which will be something easily and minutely divisible, buy coat and sugar and shoes, and take the surplus of his medium of exchange home, waiting for another occasion. The medium of exchange function overcomes the difficulties arising from low saleability of many goods, due to limited number of possible buyers, lack of divisibility, etc., etc.
The common measure of values aids greatly in determining the prices, the terms, at which exchanges may be made; the medium of exchange makes possible exchanges which could not be made at all in its absence.
The measure of value function does not add to the value of money. The medium of exchange function is commonly a cause of additional value for money. The source of this extra value is the gains that come from exchange.
Exchange is an essential part of the productive process, where you have division of labor with private ownership of the instruments of production, and private enterprise. Values[476] may be created by changing the forms, the time, the place, or the ownership of goods. All these operations are necessary in an economic system like our own. Those who possess money are in a position to take toll, in values, from those who wish to get rid of the goods which they have produced, and to get hold of the goods which they wish to consume. The holders of money do this by means of the money, and under the laws of economic imputation, these gains are attributed to the money itself, first in the form of a rental value, and sometimes, under conditions later to be discussed, as increments to capital value.
Before giving full discussion to this topic, it will be well to consider certain other functions, which are, or may be, sources of value for money.
The reserve for credit instruments function cannot be fully discussed till we take up credit. Provisionally, it may be said that it is a source of absolute value for money, per se, even though the effect on prices may be that, owing to a rise in the values of goods, the prices rise. The fact of credit may even tend to lessen the absolute value of money itself, by lessening the value that comes to money from the medium of exchange function. On the other hand, credit increases exchanges, making possible a vast mass of transactions which without it would not occur at all. Of course, in our hypothetical case above, where the reserve for credit instruments is silver bullion, the reserve for credit instruments function does not add to the value of money at all.
The "bearer of options" function of money is also a source of value for money. It is a valuable service. The man who holds money, waiting his chance in a fluctuating market, anticipates a gain which justifies him in holding his capital without return upon it. Money is not alone in performing this service. High grade bonds also perform it. They bear a lower yield per annum to compensate. The service of bearing options is itself a part of the yield, and is itself capitalized, in their case. Two 5% bonds, each equally secure, but one of which has a wide market, while the other has a restricted market, will have a very unequal value.
This "bearer of options" function is often identified with the "store of value" function. The two are properly distinguished. If a man has in mind a definite contingency, at a definite future time, for which he wishes to hold a store of value, he may well find that a high yield bond, or a loan upon real estate, or many other productive investments, will serve him better than money or bonds with wide market. So far as money is concerned, the "bearer of options" function is much more important than the "store of value" function to-day. The reserve of value in liquid form, for undated emergencies (like the War Chest at Spandau, or the big reserve accumulated between 1900 and 1913 by the Banque de France), would, from the point of view of this distinction, come under the "bearer of option" function, rather than the "store of value" function. The important thing about the distinction is that for one purpose a high degree of saleability in the thing chosen is necessary, while in the other, such is not the case. The most common case of the "bearer of options" function arises when men hold money, liquid securities of low yield and stable value, short loans, call loans, or bank-deposits, waiting for special opportunities in the market.
The medium of exchange function would exist in a society where business goes always in accustomed grooves, where uncertainty is banished, and where most of the assumptions of static economic theory are realized. If we push static assumptions to the limit, and assume "friction" of all sort gone, assume that all goods can flow without trouble or expense to the places and persons where their values are highest, etc., even the medium of exchange function would disappear. But if we make our static assumptions a bit more realistic, leaving the "friction" of barter, but banishing the need for readjustment, and the uncertainties that grow out of dynamic changes (whether caused by growth of population, or changes in laws and morals, or in fashions and tastes, or in technical methods, or by accidents of various kinds), then the medium of exchange function will still remain. Given dynamic changes, we have need for a vast deal more of readjustment, and a vast deal more of speculation. I have shown in the chapter on "The Volume of Money and the Volume of Trade" that the great bulk of trading in the United States to-day is speculation, which increases or decreases with the amount of dynamic change, with its accompanying uncertainty and need for readjustment. The major part of the medium of exchange function arises from this. The whole of it arises from factors which purest static theory is accustomed to abstract from. The whole of the "bearer of options" functions arises from dynamic change. This is the dynamic function of money par excellence. It is commonly treated by economists as an unusual and unimportant function. Merged with the store of value function, it is frequently treated as of historical, rather than present, importance. In my own view, it is of high present importance.[477] I should count it as in considerable degree a function (using function in the mathematician's sense) of "business distrust"[478] waxing and waning in importance as business distrust increases and decreases. In past ages, this function was primarily concerned with consumption, money and other goods being held, at the loss of interest, as a safeguard against personal danger and as a means of subsistence in emergency. Increasingly to-day, it is concerned with acquisition of wealth in commercial transactions. When war and domestic violence were the main cause of social disturbance, the consumption aspect was most prominent. That aspect came strongly to the fore at the outbreak of the present war. The heavy selling of securities, which closed the bourses of the world, grew out of men's efforts to get money and bank-credit as a "bearer of options" for the old reasons. The old reasons explain in large measure the accumulation of gold by the Banque de France, and by the German Government, referred to above. But to-day, in general, the main purpose of those who use money, or other things, as a "bearer of options" is to make gains, or avoid losses, in industry and trade. The man who, in a given state of the market, is afraid to lend, or afraid to invest, foregoes the income which lending and investing promise, and holds his money. The man who sees uncertainty and fluctuation in the market, and expects them to give him bargains in time, foregoes income for a time, and holds his money. The man who has investments of whose future he is uncertain, and who fears to try any other investment for a time, sells what he has, foregoes income, and holds his money. It is not always possible, in discussing the money functions, to preserve the distinctions between money and credit, or money and "money" in the money-market sense. How much difference is made by these distinctions will best be discussed in our chapter on "Credit."
The significance of the "bearer of options" function is especially manifest, I think, in connection with call loans. The "call rate" is commonly well below the regular "discount rate," or rate for thirty-day, sixty-day, or ninety-day paper. The explanation is to be found, I think, in the fact that the lender of call money does not entirely dispense with its service. He reserves a part of the "bearer of options" function. To be sure, he will, in practice, have to wait an hour or two, or even more for it,[479] and this may well mean that he cannot take full advantage of an option. But the right to demand money on even twenty-four hours' notice is more available than a high-grade bond, as a means of meeting rapidly changing situations. This principle will explain, too, I think, why money-rates in general, including even ninety-day paper, are usually lower than the long-time interest rate on safe farm mortgages, or on real estate mortgages in a city. The thirty-day rate will commonly be lower than the sixty- or ninety-day rate—though exceptions can easily be found, if the thirty-day period is to cover a time of active business, which is expected to grow less active during the second or third month. The influence of the bearer of options functions is not the only influence at work on the rates. If it be objected that the long-time interest rate on high grade railroad bonds or government securities is sometimes lower than current money-rates, or just as low, the answer is that these bonds also share the "bearer of options" function, and that the interest rate on them is, like the money-rate, lower than the "pure rate" of interest. Writers[480] have been accustomed to look for the "pure rate" of interest, i. e., an interest unmixed with insurance for risk, in the highest grade of government securities. I think that this is a mistake. I think that the "pure rate" should be sought in long-time loans, of assured safety, which lack a general market. Such loans, at the time they are made, should represent the "pure rate" for that time.[481]
I shall recur to the question of the money-rates, and the question of the relation of the money-rates to the general rate of interest, in the chapter on "Credit."
For the present I would call attention to the interesting case of Austria, where the money-rates are normally very low, because the volume of commerce and speculation is small, and the volume of banking capital, politically fostered, is large; and where, on the other hand, the general rate of interest on long-time loans is high, owing to the scarcity of capital in industry and agriculture, as distinguished from commerce.[482] This case may illustrate, incidentally, that even as a "long run" or "normal" tendency, an excess of currency in a country may lead, not, as the quantity theorists contend, to high prices, but rather to low money-rates. Austria presents simply a striking case of what I should regard as the general tendency. The money-rates and the interest-rates tend to approach one another to the extent that paper representatives of many different industries get into the "money market"—to the extent that industrial investments in general become saleable enough for it to be safe to finance them by means of short-time banking credit. When banks lend on collateral security of corporation stocks to the buyers of those stocks, they are, in effect, financing the corporation itself.[483] Industries differ widely in the extent to which they depend on the money market for their finances. The difference depends often less on the nature of the industry than on the type of the industrial organization. An individual farmer cannot get the bulk of his credit that way! But there is no reason why a well-organized corporation, assuming it successful in agriculture, might not draw on the money market, even if not so freely as a manufacturing corporation does.
For the contention that the money-rates for short periods are lower on the average than the rates on longer loans, and that the call rates are, on the average, well below all time rates, there is abundant statistical evidence. From 1890 to 1899 in New York City, the average rate on 4- to 6-month paper was 5.99%; the average rate on 60- to 90-day paper was 4.58%; the average call rate was 3.29%. In the same city, for the period from 1900 to 1909, the averages were: 4- to 6-month paper, 5.61%; 60- to 90-day paper, 4.78%; call rate, 4.05%.[484] This last figure for call loans represents an average of quotations at the "Money Post" at the Stock Exchange. While normally the call rates are well below this, occasional high figures, like those in 1907, pull this average up. The high rates at the "Money Post," however, are not always representative. Banks frequently do not charge their regular customers as much as the quoted rates.
Even more detailed evidence for our thesis is to be found in W. A. Scott's investigation of New York money-rates, for the period, 1896-1906.[485] He studies two sets of quotations for call loans, those at the Stock Exchange "Money Post" and those at the banks and trust companies; seven sets of quotations (five of which appear regularly) under the head of "time loans," namely, 30-, 60-, 90-day, and 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7-month; and three under the head of "commercial paper," namely, double name choice 60- to 90-days, and two varieties of single name paper.
He finds a clear tendency for the rate to vary with the length of the loan, although noting many exceptions. "The difference between these quotations rarely exceeds one-half of one percent, and the general rule seems to be that the influence of time in raising the rate grows less as the length of the loan increases. For example, there is apt to be a greater difference between the quotations of 60- and 90-day paper than between 90-day and four months. Likewise there is a greater difference between 90-day and four months than between 4-months and 5-months paper."
The call rate, though much more variable than all time rates, and sometimes high above them, is, on the average, well below them. For the period, 1901-06, the averages are: call loans, 3.3%; time loans, 4.5%.
The declining influence of differences in time as the length of the loans increases, is what our theory would require. If the "bearer of options" functions of short loans is the explanation of the lower rate on them, it is a factor which would count for less and less as the length of the loan increases. A month's difference is all-important, when the month involved is proximate, say the difference between 10 and 40 days. But it is of virtually no importance, from the standpoint of the man who wishes to meet sudden and indeterminate emergencies, whether the note he holds matures in eleven months or twelve months. The difference between a one-year loan and a five-year loan might, on the other hand, still be important from the angle of bearing options. The factor should cease to have any meaning at all, or at least any appreciable meaning, when the difference is between, say, twenty and twenty-five years.
I have no statistical evidence that the one-year loan can normally expect a lower rate than the five-year loan. At times, short time financing may be even more expensive than long time financing. But such study as I have given to quotations of short-term notes of corporations, as compared with the longer term bonds of the same corporations, would leave the distinct impression that short-term notes fare better in the security market, and yield less return. A complication arises, here, of course, that the short-term note may often lack the safety which a first mortgage bond of the same corporation would have.
The legal tender for debts function calls for a brief discussion. Whatever gives legal quittance from contract obligation, or from legal obligation as for taxes, performs this function. "Legal tender" money, in the strict sense, is not alone in performing this function. Usually a government will by law or administrative practice with the force of law, bind itself to accept forms of money which it will not compel other creditors to accept. Thus, silver certificates, without being "legal tender," are a means of legal quittance from obligations to the Federal Government. Sometimes governments will receive only gold at the customs house. This was true in the Greenback period, when Greenbacks were "legal tender," but not good for payments of customs duties. The reader who is interested in refinements of the legal distinctions among different kinds of money will find the thing elaborately worked out by G. F. Knapp, in his Staatliche Theorie des Geldes.[486] But "legal tender" money is not always an adequate means of quittance. If the contract calls for corn, or wheat, or Northern Pacific stock, the best legal tender money is a poor substitute! Witness the "Corner" in Northern Pacific in 1901. It is doubtless true, as Davenport[487] points out, that all contracts, whatever they call for, may be ultimately met, under the common law, by money damages, but that does not mean that a man can maintain his solvency or position in business by offering money when Northern Pacific is designated in his contract. Doubtless even there money will free him, at a price, but Northern Pacific stock is at least more convenient for the purpose! A man does not need money to get free from debts, even when money is required by the contract. He can turn in whatever he has in an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, and get free via the bankruptcy court. In other words, the legal tender function of money, while it does distinguish money from other goods as a matter of degree, does not erect an absolute difference of kind.
Under a smoothly working monetary system, where all forms of money are kept at a parity by constant and ready redemption, and where people have no doubt that this redemption will occur, the legal tender quality which attaches to part of the money is a matter of no consequence. It adds nothing to the value of the money. In times of stress, the legal tender quality may be a source of a considerable temporary value. This is especially likely to be true of an inconvertible money. The legal tender quality of the Greenbacks led to a very considerable fall in the gold premium in the Panic of 1873. I have mentioned this point in the chapter on "Dodo-Bones," where part of this discussion has been anticipated. In general, the legal tender quality may be recognized as a factor in sustaining the value of money, if as a consequence of this quality men take the money when they would not otherwise take it, or take it on terms which they would otherwise not agree to. Where, however, the money is money which they are glad to get in any case, the legal tender quality is a matter of supererogation.
The standard of deferred payments function, as distinguished from the legal tender function and the medium of exchange function, does not add to the value of money. Of course, if the standard of deferred payments is actually used in making the deferred payment, then it finally becomes assimilated to the other two functions. But it is quite possible to divorce them completely. Suppose, for example, that the standard named in a contract in the Greenback Period was gold, but that payment was made in Greenbacks at the market ratio. Or, suppose that the standard of deferred payments should be a composite of commodities, the tabular standard, with the understanding that the index number on the day of payment should determine the amount of money to be paid. In neither of these cases does the standard of deferred payments function supply any reason for an increase in the value of the thing which serves as the standard.
In general, the standard of deferred payments and the measure of value functions do not, per se, add to the value of money. The legal tender function may or may not do so. The medium of exchange function, the store of value function, the reserve for credit function, and the bearer of options function, normally do occasion an added value which is to be attributed to money, either as a capital increment, or as a rental.
The question remains, however, as to the relation of the rental value, and the capital value, of money. This question is not easy to answer. As I have already shown, in the chapter on "Capitalization" and elsewhere, various complications present themselves in the case of money. (1) In the case of money, the rental, and the prevailing rate of interest at which rentals are discounted to make a capital value, are not independent variables, but tend to vary together. Thus, whereas increased rentals would in the case of most income-bearers tend to give a higher capital value, this is offset, in the case of money, by the fact that rentals are subject to a higher discount. (2) In the case of income-bearers generally, the magnitude of the income, or rental, is causally prior to the capital value. The capital value, in our illustration of the candle, the disk and the shadow on the wall, is the shadow, while the rental is the disk. This is the general relation insisted upon by the BÖhm-Bawerk-Fetter-Fisher line of capital and interest theory. Productivity theories of capital have been criticised on the ground that capital value is not productive, that only concrete capital-instruments are productive, and that they produce, not value, but goods, that these goods receive value from the market, which is reflected back, but discounted, to the capital instruments which produced them, so that, in value-causation the line of causation is precisely the reverse of the line of technological causation. Capital instruments produce consumption goods, but the value of the consumption goods is the cause of the value of the capital instruments. In the case of money, however, this is not true. It is the value of the money, the capital value, which does the work that makes a rental value. The value of the money is a precondition of the money-function. So far as money is concerned, both "productivity theories" and "use theories" seem vindicated. There is a "use," an "enduring use" in addition to the "uses."[488] (3) The capitalization theory, as hitherto formulated, assumes money and a value of money. It is a part of the general body of price theory for which this assumption has been shown to be needed.
With reference to the second, at least of these points, however, it has been shown that money is not unique. Diamonds, and all other goods which have as part of their function the conspicuous display of wealth, likewise perform this function because they have value. This gives them an additional value. Diamonds are bought for this purpose, when they would not otherwise be bought, or when they would not otherwise be bought in such quantity. This additional value makes diamonds still more effective as a means of displaying wealth, with a further increment in their value, etc. We seem, here, to have an endless, and vicious, circle in value causation, the value mounting indefinitely, building upon itself, a sort of "pyramiding" process. But the limitation comes from several angles. In the first place, as diamonds rise in value, from whatever cause, a smaller and smaller number of diamonds is required to display a given amount of wealth! The increase in the value makes each diamond so much more effective for the purpose in hand that it tends to cut under the cause of the increase. These two tendencies come into some sort of equilibrium. I suppose that by making strict enough assumptions, and limiting the problem rigidly, it would be possible for the mathematician to work out a formula for this equilibrium, letting the increment in value grow feebler with each rebound, till at last it is dissipated in infinitesimals. In the second place, diamonds are not alone in performing this service. They must compete with other precious stones, with the precious metals, with limousines and Turkish rugs, with servants and livery, with houses and lots in restricted neighborhoods, with opera boxes and memberships in clubs which confer prestige, with a very wide range of goods, for the detailed discussion of which I would refer again to Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class. The differential advantage of diamonds, when it is borne in mind that the conspicuous display of wealth is not the only purpose, as a rule, for which any of these things are bought, that the concrete diamond, or other good bought, is a bundle of valuable services,[489] of which the displaying of wealth is only one, is not, necessarily very great. For many people, other forms of wealth do better. And, as a rule, diamonds would not perform that service satisfactorily alone. A large number of diamonds, without proper "setting," in clothing, servants, house, opera box, etc., would excite ridicule, and fail[490] in their purpose of gaining social prestige. They must be part of a complex of goods of the same sort, to accomplish their purpose.
Now it is the differential advantage of diamonds which makes possible the extra value, in this use. If all wealth were equally serviceable in conspicuous display, if cattle and barns and shares in a coal mine or slaughter-house or glue factory could display themselves as well as diamonds can, and if possession of these things conferred prestige as much as possession of diamonds does, this differential advantage of diamonds would disappear, and with it all extra value from that cause. Diamonds are members of a class of goods, a restricted, but still large class, which possess this advantage. We may apply the old Ricardian rent analysis here, arranging goods in a series from the standpoint of their capacity to perform this additional service. Bread would, for the purpose in hand, be a "no-rent" good. Ford automobiles are probably nearly no-rent goods now! That the differential factor is a cause of value in land, as the Ricardian doctrine seems to hold, is not, I think, true. If all land were of equal quality, and of equal accessibility to the market, all land would still bear a rent, if it produced goods which had value, and if the land were sufficiently restricted in quantity.[491] But here is a case where the differential factor is an actual cause of value. If all wealth were equally effective in displaying itself, no form of wealth could gain in value as a means of display.
This proposition calls for one important qualification. The fact that wealth, in general, confers prestige is, undoubtedly, a source of stimulus in wealth creation and acquisition, and a big source of the value[492] of total wealth. It is probable, however, that it is so great a stimulus to production that it defeats itself so far as the values of units of goods are concerned. It stimulates production, which reduces the marginal values that arise from other causes. Thus, while a source of additional value to the aggregate of wealth, it probably reduces the values of given items.
I have dwelt at length on the case of diamonds, because principles applying there will give us important clues to the case of the value of money.
Money, by being valuable, is so far equipped to perform the money service. But its differential advantage over other valuable things comes from its superior saleability. Its original value comes from non-monetary causes, and has been sufficiently explained in the chapter on "Dodo-Bones" and in the chapter on the "Origin of Money." The extra value which comes from the money functions rests chiefly in its superior saleability. Saleability is itself a cause of additional value. But here again we may arrange goods in a series, starting with the least saleable, and ending in money. Money has an advantage, but its advantage is not absolute. Under a system of free coinage, gold bullion is virtually on a par with coin, and even without free coinage, bullion is for many purposes as good, and for foreign exchange may be better. Modern credit, moreover, as has been indicated before, tends to add to the saleability of all goods, and so to lessen the differential advantage of money.
Here, again we may see the principle that the extra value that comes from the differential advantage tends to limit itself. As the money-use adds to the value of money, a smaller amount of money is required to do the money work, and hence the source of the increment of value is cut under. This principle will partly explain why the rental of money cannot be capitalized in the same way that the rental of land can be. Increasing the capital value of land is not the same as increasing the productive power of land. But increasing the capital value of money does mean an addition to the power of a dollar to do money work. It tends, moreover, to lessen the work that there is for money to do, both by reducing the total amount of trading, and by increasing the incentive to the use of substitutes for money. Only a part of the value of the services of money, thus, can be added to the capital value of money. There is a further point which is important, as differentiating money from diamonds: much more of the value of the services resting on the value of diamonds can be added to the capital value of the diamonds than is the case with money. The reason is that diamonds may give forth a continuous flow, in the same hands, of the service of conspicuous display of wealth. Money, however, can perform most of its services for a given owner only once. For a given owner, it can serve only once as a medium of exchange. For one owner, it can serve only once as legal tender for debts. It can serve indefinitely as a store of value, or as "bearer of options." In these cases, however, the relation between value of service and capital value does work out in accordance with the capitalization theory. The money thus held brings in no money income. It is held thus only if the services which it performs are equivalent to the income which would come if it were alienated, and something which would bring in a money income were purchased in its place. Money may have added to its capital value the value that is created by one marginal exchange, but the whole series of values which a dollar may create in exchanges cannot be capitalized, if only because the same owner cannot get them all. This holds strictly true only so long as no credit arrangements exist. If loans of money can be made, then the lender can take toll on successive exchanges, and get an income which may be capitalized in part, subject to the limitation already discussed, that increasing capital value of money cuts into the rental, and so, in large measure, destroys its own source.
Where money is not freely coined, there may be an increment, growing out of the capitalization of the money-services, in the value of the coin. The coin may be worth more than the uncoined bullion. This need not be true. If the amount of money work to be done is not increasing, it will not be true, unless the value of the bullion declines, and need not be true then. But an agio on coined over uncoined metal is quite possible, and has frequently occurred. Such an agio has limits, however. In the first place, the bullion may be used as a substitute for coin, so lessening the amount of work there is for coin to do, and lessening the source of the agio. Bullion would tend to rise in value from being thus employed, and coined money would lose in value from a reduction in the services it performed. Further, anything which has more than ordinary saleability may be used as a substitute, in one or another capacity. Again, the agio, if it appeared in a country where men are accustomed to thinking about money, might well arouse distrust, lessen the scope of the coin still further, and so cut into its own source. But such agios have appeared, and while a pure case, where the sole source of the agio is the values created in the money-functioning, is hard to find, I think it is not to be questioned that cases where this is part of the explanation have arisen. I should be disposed to find part of the explanation of the rise of the rupee in India after the closing of the mints in 1893 in this factor. There seems to be evidence, however, that Laughlin is right, in part, in ascribing the rise to an expectation of the adoption of the gold standard.[493]
Modern money, in general, however, rests on a system of free, even where not strictly gratuitous, coinage. Coined metal thus rarely gets, save to a limited extent or temporarily, an agio over uncoined bullion. Uncoined bullion is acceptable in a host of places where coin would otherwise be used, particularly in reserves for credit instruments. Bullion is even superior in international trade as a medium of exchange. Credit paper (particularly bills of exchange), is superior to both in international exchange, as a medium of exchange, because of various reasons of economy. Such paper is even used in reserves in many places, particularly by the Austro-Hungarian Bank.
The fact of free coinage means, substantially, that the state has made the money form a free good. How much value is thereby destroyed we may best see if we ask precisely how much the money form could mean at the limit. Initially, the money form means simply the certification of weight and fineness by a trusted authority. It saves, therefore, the delay and expense of testing the weight and fineness by assay, etc. It saves the trouble and delay of subdivision of a formless metal. It averts many difficulties. For small retail transactions, indeed for retail transactions in general, the conveniences of coined over uncoined metal are very great. Small transactions do not justify the trouble and expense of assaying and weighing and subdividing gold! In a country, therefore, where the bulk of the money work is in effecting small transactions, we might expect a considerable agio for coined over uncoined metal. This would be especially true if that country had few facilities for credit substitutes for the coin, particularly for small transactions. In a country like the United States, however, where checks are often drawn for amounts less than a dollar, and where the bulk of the gold, or standard money, is to be found, not in circulation but in reserves, one need not anticipate that the medium of exchange function would give a big agio to gold coin, even if free coinage ceased. So long as coinage means merely a certification of weight and fineness, this conclusion will hold. For purposes of large transactions, the item of weighing and assaying would not be serious. Indeed, American banks are accustomed to weigh even gold coin, in quantity. It goes by weight, rather than by tale, and if light-weight, it counts for less than its nominal value. The writer knows a bank which has a considerable store of light-weight gold coin that has been in its vaults for over twenty years. Such coin may be counted at par in reports by the bank to the Government.[494] It might be paid out through the window to customers, who would not weigh it, in case of a "run" on the bank. But it cannot be used in dealings with other banks without loss.
Does the legal tender aspect of coin count for more? Under a smoothly working system of free coinage, where moreover, all forms of money are kept at a parity by ready redemption, we have seen that the legal tender feature makes no difference. Would it make a difference where coinage is restricted? If we assume that the use of checks for small payments, and the use of bullion in reserves, in a given case, prevents the existence of an agio growing out of the other functions of money, I think it clear that the legal tender feature alone will not create one. But suppose that there is an agio from other causes, will not the legal tender aspect of money tend to increase it? Will not men demand coin, which bears an agio, rather than bullion, when they have the right to demand either? And will not the agio then, in a way, grow out of itself, a bigger agio appearing, because an agio has already appeared? It does not seem to me that this need follow. If there be an agio, then creditors will demand either coin, or bullion on a different basis from coin. But so long as they get the benefit of the agio, either in the form of coin, or of a larger amount of bullion, particular circumstances, rather than a general rule, will determine which they will demand. The banker might well prefer bullion. The international banker would prefer bullion. The man who wishes money for retail transactions will take coin. Men will use the legal tender quality of money as a means of getting the benefit of what agio there is (though contract right, where the contract calls for coin, would accomplish all that a legal tender law would accomplish), but whether they take 23.22 grains of coined gold, or 25.5 grains of gold bullion, will depend on which they prefer in the circumstances. I do not see that the legal tender feature adds anything to the case of restricted coinage that it does not add to the case of free coinage.[495] In either case, there will be temporary emergencies, when panics arise, when legal tender money gets an agio over any possible substitute. Solvency may depend on it. This might arise under free coinage, if the panic were acute, and if settlements had to be made immediately. But as long as there is time for men to work things out, I should not expect the legal tender feature, per se, to add to the agio of coined metal even under restricted coinage.
In general, the possibility of an agio for coined metal, under restricted coinage, rests on the extent to which coin has a unique function. In so far as substitution is possible, there is no room for an agio. For many purposes, bullion may be substituted. To the extent that credit is developed, and is flexible, various other substitutes are possible. To the extent that barter can be used, still other substitutes are possible.
Among an ignorant people, little accustomed to developing new expedients, having an economic life that is not flexible, having an economy based on petty economic units, having little development of credit, accustomed to the use of money in most transactions, money might well be, in many connections, highly important if not indispensable. In England, before the War, where no bank-notes under five pounds were in circulation, and where small checks were little used, an agio on coin might appear if coin got so scarce as to be inadequate for retail trade, but for bank reserves bullion would have served virtually as well as coin, and with the stock of coin she had at the time England could have gone on for a long time indeed with no more agio than just enough to prevent the melting down of the coin. In the United States, where checks can be used for very small transactions, and where a high percentage (very conservatively estimated by Kinley at from 50 to 60%) of retail business is done with checks, the agio on coins of a dollar or over growing out of retail trade might be expected to be very slight. On the other hand, the legal requirements for reserves in specified types[496] of money might, in time, lead to some agio. I do not think that the reserve function in England would ever do so. If we could combine our use of checks in retail trade with England's absence of legal reserve requirements, I should think that the agio would have little chance indeed of growing great! If to this could be added Canada's extensive use of small elastic bank-notes, the chance would be still less. If bank-notes of one dollar could be issued, the agio would be less still.
It is in the case of coins of very small denomination that the agio might appear most readily. Such coins, if limited in amount, and if given the usual restricted legal tender,[497] do not need redemption to circulate at face value, even when made of baser metals. It is quite thinkable that such coins should, even when redeemable, circulate at an agio over the redemption money. In small retail transactions the need for money to do business is most imperative. Even here, however, there is large flexibility. The present writer, during the period of money stringency in the Panic of 1907, made much larger use of checks in very small payments than was his usual practice, and the same was true of various of his acquaintances.
I think that the quantity theorist, with his doctrine of an unlimited agio through the restriction of coinage proportionate to the restriction, is best understood if we say that he has taken an exaggerated estimate of the imperativeness of the need for formed money in the smallest retail transactions as typical of the whole situation.[498] I have elsewhere shown, however, that, in so far as Kinley's figures for 1909 give us a clue,[499] the total retail trade of the United States is less than one-eleventh of the total of all transactions calling for the use of money and checks. Of that total retail trade, the part in which money is actually used is, on Kinley's high estimate, between 40 and 50%,[500] and the part in which money is imperative is much lower still. Small retail transactions do not give the type for the pecuniary transactions in the United States! They more nearly do so in India, and the possibility of agio is, doubtless, greater there. For our larger transactions, there is an almost indefinite possibility of substitutes for coined money, if profits can be made by making the substitutions. Beating the agio would be a source of profits.
I repeat what was said in the chapter on "Dodo-Bones" differentiating this doctrine of the agio from the quantity theory doctrine: (1) This doctrine presupposes value for the money article from some non-monetary source. It relates only to a differential portion of the value of money. (2) This doctrine denies the law of proportionality even for this differential portion. (3) This doctrine is concerned, not with the general level of prices, but with the absolute value of money measured in the ratio of coin to bullion.
Under the system of free and gratuitous coinage, no agio of coined over uncoined bullion is possible. Where small brassage charges are made, as in France (or as in England, where the interest lost during the period of coinage is charged to the man who exchanges bullion for coin at the Bank of England) there may be an agio of this amount, though it often happens that this agio disappears, particularly in England. So perfectly is bullion a substitute for coin in England, that the Bank of England will often forego its privilege of taking the slight toll in interest, and will credit men depositing bullion with as much as if they had deposited coin. From what has gone before, as to the possibility of an agio, I conclude that the United States, England, Canada, and possibly France, would be unable to make large brassage charges. If the brassage charge were much larger than the charges made by reputable and well-known jewelers for assaying and weighing, etc., there would be a large substitution of bars for coins, and the mints would have little to do. However, it needs no arguing that with free coinage, and either very low or no brassage charges, the value of bullion and of coin will, quality for quality and weight for weight, be virtually identical, within a narrow range of variation.
What, then, shall we say of the way in which the forces drawing gold from the arts into money manifest themselves?
How describe the equilibrium between the value of gold as money and the value of gold in the arts? How construct intersecting curves, presenting a marginal equilibrium? The problem is baffling, and I frankly confess that what I shall have to say does not satisfy me. I hope that some critic may solve the problem better. I can point out the difficulties of the situation, and can indicate reasons why the sort of solution which the economist's training in marginal analysis leads him to desire are not easily found. But I fear that I shall fail to satisfy the demand for an application of curves to the problem!
The first difficulty is that we are barred from the use of our yardstick. Money is the measure of all things in economic theory—except money and gold bullion! Of course there are economic values other than those of gold which do not actually come into the market, but even there we can commonly, by the accountant's methods, make use of the money measure. In very high degree, our conventional curves of all sorts run in money terms, and assume a fixed value of money. Clearly the money curve of diminishing value for gold would tell us nothing. The value of gold might sink as its quantity increased, but then the value of the money-unit would sink pari passu, and so the curve, with ordinates expressed in numbers of dollars per ounce, would not sink. The value-curve of gold, expressed in money, is a straight line, parallel to the X axis. Possible substitutes in the form of abstract units of value,[501] or of composite units of goods, of an assumed fixed value, will have to be used if anything is used, but they are less satisfactory in the application, and leave the analysis a good deal less realistic.
If this were all, the problem would be easy! But there is a second difficulty. We find the factors requiring gold as money, if summed up in a curve, presenting themselves as a call for the temporary rental of the gold. The money functions are performed, in general, not by keeping gold, and getting an endless series of uses from it, as in the arts, but by passing it on, sooner or later. Even in the case of the reserve function, the bearer of options function, and the store of value functions, it is not expected to hold the gold indefinitely—always there is the anticipation of some time when it will be passed on again. A curve for gold in the monetary employments, therefore, would be a curve showing the diminishing values of rents, or particular services rather than a curve for capital values. The curve for gold in the arts, however, would be a curve showing the diminishing capital values of units of gold, as the supply in the arts is increased. The two curves do not run in common terms. But another and more fundamental difficulty. In the case of wheat, we may construct our curve free from complications, in idea, at least. On the base line, we lay out quantities of wheat. For each quantity of wheat, we erect an ordinate, a sum of money, or a number of abstract units of value, as the case may be. Connecting these ordinates, we have a curve, showing how the value (or the money-price) of wheat descends as the quantity of wheat increases. Given the shape of the curve, and given the number of bushels of wheat, the marginal value of the wheat is given. In idea, at least, it does not matter, for the shape of the curve, whether the amount of the wheat is great or small, whether the marginal value of the wheat is low or high. If there are ten thousand bushels only in the market, wheat will be worth $5 per bushel. With 100,000 bushels, it is worth 40c. The fact that there are 100,000 bushels does not lessen the magnitudes on the higher portions of the curve. The nature of the services which wheat performs is not affected by its value. This is not true of gold, either in the arts or as money. In the arts, I have already shown that one function of gold is as a means of conspicuously displaying wealth. Gold is like diamonds in this. Because gold is a valuable, it gets an additional valuable service. This additional valuable service enhances its value. The thing is checked, however, before an endless circle is created, by the fact that as gold rises in value a smaller amount of gold will display a given amount of wealth. The value-curve for gold in the arts, therefore, is not a simple thing like the curve for wheat. It turns upon itself, in ways that I see no graphic device for presenting. This is even truer for money. Men wish to have, when they seek money, a quantum of value in highly saleable form.[502] The curve for the value of the services of money presupposes a fixed capital value of money. It is the capital value of money which does the money work. Given a value of money, and given the values of goods, we may see how much money is required to effect a given exchange or perform some other money service. Then, knowing how much value will be created by each exchange, or other money service, we may arrange the services in a series, a scale of descending importance, and get a curve. This curve is, in fact, the curve which presents itself in the money market. There we find a curve, running in terms of money itself, so much money for the use of money for such a length of time. But this is a curve of demand for money funds, rather than for gold as such. The "supply" that corresponds to this "demand" is, not gold, but all manner of credit instruments, chiefly bank-deposits, expressed in terms of gold. Such a curve is clearly not to be put into equilibrium with the value-curve for gold in the arts, (1) because it assumes a fixed value for money (2) because it is concerned with temporary rentals, and not capital values, and (3) because the demand it expresses is not for the use of gold alone.
We may get some aid in reducing these complexities to familiar terms if we employ the device of assuming an equilibrium between gold in money and gold in the arts, without trying to explain in quantitative terms how that equilibrium is arrived at, and then see what causes will lead that equilibrium to shift. In getting the laws of change, we may get closer to the causes of the phenomenon itself. The effort to reduce the thing to precise mathematical form requires a degree of simplification which seems to me likely to rob an answer of much significance.
Assuming that the equilibrium is reached, we may see what factors would tend to cause gold to go into the money-use, and what factors would tend to draw gold into the arts use. We may also see how these changes from one side or the other would modify the value of gold.
Assume that a manufacturing jeweler has extra demand for his products. His products, of course, are composites of gold, labor, and other raw materials, etc., but part of the extra value that comes to his products attaches itself to the gold that is in them. He now has an incentive, which was lacking before, to melt down full weight gold coin in his possession, or to buy gold bars which might otherwise have been coined. To buy the gold bars, however, probably means that he must have accommodation at the bank. He borrows from the bank the amount he needs, giving a short-time note, since he expects to make up his gold and market it in a fairly short time. The paper of manufacturers of gold will commonly stand well in the "money market," and this is especially true of those in whose hands the gold is not worked up into such specialized forms that the value of the bullion is a minor matter. (I find it necessary to refer frequently to the money market, though a full analysis of money-market phenomena cannot come till after our discussion of credit.) If he must borrow to get the gold, then the money-rates will come into comparison with the profits he expects to make from working up the gold. This will usually be true even if he melts down gold coin already in his possession. He might deposit that gold, and so reduce his expenses at the bank, either buying back his own discounted paper, or getting interest on daily checking account. If he has to borrow to get the gold, he may get it either by drawing gold from the bank directly, or by giving a check on the bank to a bullion dealer, which may ultimately lead to a diminution in the bank's supply of gold. However he gets the gold, there is bound to be some reaction, (1) on the bank's supply of gold, (2) on the supply of loanable funds in the money market, and hence (3) on the money-rates themselves. If he borrows from the money market, he affects the money-rates directly (even though probably, in a given case, not noticeably); if he melts down coin, instead of depositing it (or paying it out to others who may ultimately deposit it) there tends also to be less gold in the bank's vaults; if he buys gold with his own funds in the bullion market, the supply of current bullion for which the banks also compete is reduced. In any of these cases, the banks have less gold than would otherwise be the case. The relation between gold reserves and the supply of money-funds has been partly discussed already. We have seen that there is no proportional relation, as Fisher, and other quantity theorists contend. Loanable funds, on a given gold reserve, are highly elastic. But the elasticity calls for higher money-rates, and higher money-rates tend to reduce the volume of trading, and check the demand. Borrowings from the money market by workers in gold, therefore, are much more significant than borrowings by other manufacturers or merchants, because the latter are content with credit devices, for the most part, while the workers in gold withdraw gold itself from the money market. It is, moreover, harder for the money market to resist extra demand from the jewelers than from many other interests. The assets of the jewelers, especially from those who do not work the gold up in highly specialized forms, are exceedingly liquid. Their paper, therefore, is exceptionally good in the discount market. Usually, too, the larger jewelry houses have specially good general credit and high reputation. There is, then, less disposition for the market to look askance at an unusual supply of their paper than would be the case with many other sorts of paper. They tend to get about as low rates as anyone else in the market. A money market under centralized control seeking to protect its gold, might tend to raise discount rates on jewelers' paper, but a competitive money market is very unlikely to do so.
An increase in the value of gold in the arts would, thus, reflect itself pretty quickly in the money market, first in the form of added value for the services of money, and then, secondly, in an increase in the capital value of money. Indeed, an increase in the value of a single rental is an increase in the capital value also, since the value of the single rental is one portion of the capital value. Not only does it mean a higher capital value for gold, but it consequently tends to mean a higher "price." It does mean a higher "price" for present money as compared with future money. It tends, also, to mean a higher "price" of money in terms of other goods. Meeting higher money-rates, all borrowers tend to borrow less, and to buy less, to offer less money for goods. It need not follow, however, that the rising value of gold reduces prices. The rise in the value of gold in the arts may well be a manifestation of a general rise of values. General prosperity, rather than causes affecting the value of gold in the arts alone, may have occasioned the increasing demand for gold in the arts. This would mean rising values for goods at large. It might well be, therefore, that the rise in the values of goods would offset the rise in the value of money, and that prices of goods would rise at the same time that gold is being withdrawn from the money market to the arts.
Business in general, as well as the jewelers, may be making increased demands on the money market. This would tend still further to raise the money-rates. It would also, however, tend to increase the supply of money-funds. Commercial and industrial paper, in a time of buoyancy and expansion, is particularly acceptable to the banks, and they are likely to expand their loans despite the failure of gold reserves to keep pace. They simply get along with smaller reserves. Higher money-rates in such a case tend to reduce the volume of business, but need not actually reduce it, if there are bigger profits than before anticipated in business transactions. Not absolute money-rates, but money-rates in relation to anticipated profits from the use of money, are significant. There is large room here for flexibility, elasticity, etc. There is much slack to be taken up by the money-rates, much slack in the fluid substitutes for money in various functions, and much slack to be taken up by the volume of trade. But all this will best appear after our discussion of the money market.
I have said enough to indicate the character of the factors immediately determining the equilibrium between gold in the arts and gold in the money employments. In the preceding discussion, also, I have discussed the more fundamental factors governing the value of gold in both employments. The problem of translating the fundamental theory of value into money market terms, and of translating the phenomena of the money market into terms of fundamental values is not easy. Most of our value theory in the past has been concerned with individual psychology, Crusoe economics, trading in small markets with a few buyers, barter transactions, etc. It has been abstract and unrealistic. The practical students of the money market, who are immersed in the facts of modern money, have got little help from it, and have often been scornful of it. I hope to be able to contribute something to bringing the two methods of approach to common terms. They are correlative aspects of the same problem. Each gives highly important clues to the understanding of the other. Neither can be understood without some understanding of the other. A theory of value which cannot be applied in the money market, the stock exchange, and the great field of modern business generally, has small raison d'Être.
In the next chapter I shall take up the problems of credit, and the money market.
CHAPTER XXIII
CREDIT
Analysis and description are much more important than definition. Definition at the beginning of a study is frequently a fetter, rather than an aid to thought. This is especially true in a field where phenomena overlap and interlace, and where the "pure principle," "essence" or "Wesen" of the thing defined never presents itself, but is only to be reached by violent abstraction. To pick out one element—as "futurity"[503]—as marking off credit from other things would be an illustration of this. Or to take the notion of promise, or contract obligation, in connection with futurity, is likewise to limit the field unduly, on the one hand, and to include things which do not belong there on the other. Thus, a contract whereby A is to build a house for B by the end of a year, receiving at that time, or in instalments as the work proceeds, a sum of money, is not a credit transaction. We have, however, promise, futurity, and a future payment of money all called for in the contract. On the other hand, if A sends B a telegraphic order for money, which B receives three minutes after the money is entrusted by A to the telegraph company, we have a credit transaction, with no element of futurity in it. Certainly there is less of futurity there than in the case where a laborer, working all day, is paid only at night for work done in the morning. Futurity enters into the values of all goods which are not destined for immediate consumption—capital values of long-time goods are discounted present worths of future values. Contracts, promises, and beliefs in promises run through the whole range of economic life,—the domestic servant, paid weekly, illustrates all three. Yet only a special class of these economic activities are commonly counted as credit transactions. Credit is really a part of the system of economic value relations not easily marked off in economic nature from the rest. Its clearest differentiÆ are juridical rather than economic. It will be the purpose of the present chapter, in part, to blur, rather than to make precise, the line between credit and non-credit in economic phenomena, and to assimilate the laws of credit to the general laws of value.
This will involve, however, a careful analysis and precisioning of certain phenomena commonly counted as credit phenomena. Buying and selling on the one hand; borrowing and lending on the other: the distinction seems clear. It is in law. But what is it in economic nature? When a merchant discounts his own note at the bank, it is borrowing. When he discounts the note of another, his debtor, it is selling. If he writes before his endorsement of the note, "without recourse," (unusual at a bank, but common enough with real estate mortgage-notes) he has made a perfect sale, and is entirely out of the transaction. Is it, however, in economic nature a different transaction from the original one in which he got the note from a borrower? Legally bonds are credit instruments, and stocks are not. Stocks represent ownership. But practically, as an economic matter, both represent the alienation of control, on faith, to a small group of men, and practically, too, the difference between preferred stocks and bonds is often very slight. Whatever the legal rights of a bondholder, under the terms of his contract, the legal fact itself often is, under the growing practice of receiverships, that he cannot exercise his right to foreclose without such difficulty that it doesn't pay to do it. Very frequently indeed the junior bondholder will come out of a reorganization as simply a preferred stockholder—which is what he practically was all the time. He couldn't vote as a bondholder, but his voting rights as a stockholder commonly mean little! As a bondholder, if he held enough bonds, he might even have more influence on the affairs of the corporation than as a stockholder. The market is moved by other forces than the legal distinctions in corporate contracts! And market facts are not necessarily correctly told by the accountant's categories either. I shall trouble myself little, in what follows, with the juridical and accountancy problems of credit, save in so far as these bear directly on the more pertinent economic aspects of the matter. I am interested in the question of credit as a part of the problem of value and prices—and particularly from the standpoint of the problem of the value of money.
What difference is made in values and prices by lending and borrowing? What kinds of lending and borrowing are there? What shall we say of bank-notes, of bank-deposits, of bills of exchange? What difference is made by the money market? Behind the legal forms and the technical methods, what are the psychological forces at work? How are these psychological forces modified by the technical forms and methods? What are the economic differences between long and short time loans? How shall we draw the distinction between the "money-rates" and the long time interest rate on "capital?" Why can some things serve as collateral in the money market when others cannot? What sorts of credit are appropriate to commerce, to manufacturing, to agriculture? Is credit capital? Is an increase in credit an increase in values? The last two of these questions imply that we have a definition of credit. Perhaps the answers to some of the other questions may have given us such a definition. But analysis and description will precede definition.
The etymology of "credit" has sometimes been taken as the clue to the meaning of the word for economics, and the idea of confidence, or belief, has been made the heart of the matter. A man has good credit when others have confidence in his integrity, etc. Men lend to others when they can trust them to repay. Doubtless something of this sort was responsible for the original choice of the word. But when loans are made on good mortgage security, or on collateral security, the personality of the borrower may count for little or nothing. Confidence there is, but not confidence in the intentions of the borrower. The confidence is in the "goodness" (i. e., the value and marketability) of the collateral. The same questions are raised by the lender here which he would raise if he were going to buy the thing, instead of lending with it as security. None the less, I think that in the etymology of the word we have an important clue. We must generalize the notion, however, beyond the limits of confidence in personal intentions. It involves confidence in the general economic situation, in the future of business, in the permanence of values, in the certainty of future incomes, etc. Thus viewed, the element of confidence, though important in highest degree, is not peculiar to the phenomena which we call credit phenomena in economics. It appears wherever there are values which depend on future events. One does not need much confidence in buying potatoes or apples or meat—though in the case of meat quite a lot of confidence may be involved—and misplaced! But whenever the future is involved, whenever capital values of any kind are involved—lands, stocks, bonds, houses, horses, manufacturing equipment, etc.—the element of belief, confidence, hopeful attitude toward the future, is quite as much present as in the case of a loan. Nor is the element of personal confidence less present, often, in these things than in the case of a loan. Very often the value of a horse may depend in considerable degree on the integrity of the man who offers it for sale; the value of a piece of land may be much enhanced if a trustworthy owner makes certain statements as to the yields he has got from it; the values of stocks (really credit instruments, from the angle of economic analysis) may depend very much on the personality of the organizers and managers of a corporation. Personal prestiges may count for much more in these cases than in the case of a collateral loan.
Further, in connection with the element of belief, or confidence. Borrowing is expensive, and men do not borrow for amusement. That borrowing and lending may increase, it is not enough that lenders have confidence in the ability of borrowers to repay. Borrowers must also have confidence in the future of their businesses, in their ability to make enough out of the loan to pay the expense involved, and have a surplus left over. I abstract here from consumption loans. They play a very minor rÔle.[504] The analysis in an earlier chapter, based on Kinley's figures, showing that retail trade is less than one-eleventh of the total pecuniary transactions in 1909, and that the percentage of credit instruments used in retail trade is much lower than in other transactions, will justify us, when quantitative questions are involved, in abstracting from consumption loans. Since such loans will be chiefly employed in retail buying, and since we know that most retail buying does not result from loans for consumption purposes, we may conclude that modern credit is overwhelmingly of a different sort. Most of it arises from business activities of one kind or another, and rests on expectation of profit and loss.[505] Such loans are not made when borrowers, as well as lenders, have not confidence in the transactions they mean to put through.
So far the thing has run in terms of individual calculation of profit and loss. But even the most sagacious business men do not play a lone hand. No one is uninfluenced by the expectations and feelings of others. In general, business confidence is in large degree a matter of social psychology, resting on suggestion, contagion, etc., as well as on cool calculation of profit and loss. Even where men are able in considerable degree to free themselves from the prevailing optimism or pessimism, they must take it into account. The man who extends his business when nobody is in the mood to buy, when no one will make contracts with him, runs a very fair chance of bankruptcy, even though there be, in the technical facts of industry, no reason for the prevailing pessimism. A man with large resources, which are not fully employed, seeing that the prevailing "bad business" is "largely psychological" may, indeed, take advantage of the fact, get his labor and raw materials cheaply, and produce some staple in advance of his market. If he can afford to hold his surplus, he may make large profits by so doing. But usually business men will not, in such a situation, have the surplus resources to enable them to put through such an undertaking, and hence, even though they may recognize that the rest of the business world is irrational, they must, perforce, conform to its irrationality, and their sober estimate of the prospects of a given undertaking may be just as much adverse as if they shared the feeling of gloom which all about them feel. They meet it from the banker from whom they wish to borrow. Even if able to borrow, they meet it from the dealers to whom they are accustomed to sell their products. The prevailing gloom is as much a fact with which they must reckon as is the price of their raw materials, or the technical qualities of those raw materials.
Further, business confidence is not a matter in which each man counts one! There are centers of prestige, men and institutions whose attitude toward the future counts heavily indeed in determining the attitudes of others. These prestiges may arise from various causes. Recognized wisdom and probity may give a man great prestige in economic matters. There are financial writers and students of the market, not necessarily men of great wealth, whose opinions are exceedingly influential in making business confidence. The wisdom without the probity is not enough. Some men, known to be sagacious students of the market, have been known to succeed in their plans by telling the truth, with the result that everybody else did the wrong thing! They made business confidence, but not the sort that was complimentary to them. Other men have prestige, influence in making business confidence, by virtue of possession of large wealth. They are, first, in position to lend largely. Their decisions count directly for more than the decisions of thousands of other men. The very fact that they have confidence in the future, apart from anything else, means a tremendous increase in effective business confidence—which we are here concerned with. The optimism of a man who can neither buy nor sell nor borrow nor lend, because he himself has no economic resources, and no prestige, is like the desire of a penniless beggar for an economic good—its effect on the market is not great! But further, the fact that a rich man is lending makes possible activities which would not otherwise be possible, and so justifies confidence on the part of those who wish to deal with those to whom he lends. Such a man may, on the other hand, borrow. His borrowing, for business activity, justifies confidence on the part of those who would deal with him. Quite apart, therefore, from any influence on the opinions of others growing out of respect for his judgment, or less rational reaction to him, he can do much to make or unmake business confidence. But commonly, also, such a man is a center of prestige, as well as a controller of economic power by virtue of his wealth. Men look to him for their cue. If he has confidence enough in the future to risk his great wealth, surely smaller men with smaller interests need not be afraid. Vitally important centres for the making and controlling of business confidence are the banks. Having intimate knowledge of the affairs of many business men, of business men in many different lines, they are in a position to judge wisely of business prospects. Having great power to make or refuse loans, they can encourage or chill the enthusiasm which business men may independently develop. The whispered word of a banker may well count for more than the half-page advertisement of a promoter. But the banker is not all powerful. His influence is much greater, often, in restraining than in evoking business confidence. Bankers may during long periods be quite unable to increase their loans, though they tempt borrowing by easy rates.
Business confidence is a fact of social psychology. It is an organic phenomenon, with radiant points of control. It is a matter of inter-mental activity, rather than a thing in which each man makes an independent choice.
But this is to say nothing of credit phenomena that is not true of all value phenomena. All economic values are social values. The values of wheat or sugar or bicycles are social values. There are centers of power and prestige, growing out of the distribution of wealth, or various other social factors, which have a dominating influence on economic values, as a rule. Credit phenomena are merely part and parcel of the general system of economic motivation and control.
In Social Value (pp. 102-103) I have denied the doctrine of Meinong and Tarde that explicit belief, existential judgments, are essential to the existence of values, taking value in the generic sense, which includes Æsthetic value, religious and patriotic value, legal, moral, and other values. I have pointed out that we do, at times, value ideal objects, the creatures of our imaginations. The dead sweetheart, or the Beatrice that never was (or that never was what she was imagined to be) may have tremendous value. Not merely things hoped for, but things hopelessly gone, as "The Lost Cause" to the Southerner, may be objects of value so high that other things, known to be real, may sink into insignificance beside them. Even in these cases, however, there must be a "reality-feeling" an unconscious presumption or assumption that the object valued is real. Indeed, belief, as distinguished from mere ideation, is an emotional "tang," an essentially emotional, rather than intellectual, fact. If it be present, the ideation and explicit judgment may be dispensed with.
It is, however, characteristic of economic values, particularly of the values of instrumental goods and of the goods with which business men make profits, that the tendency to raise the question of reality, to require explicit judgment, is strong. The successful business man is necessarily the man who does this, who does not too highly value the creatures of his imagination, when he imagines a vain thing. One need not, perhaps, seriously raise the question as to the reality of the loaf of bread he buys. Explicit judgment there would be superfluous. But very serious questionings come in whenever lands or houses or securities or bills of exchange come in. One needs to know what the facts are, and to make judgments based upon them. Hence, for all values of capital goods and income-bearers, for the values which pass in wholesale and speculative trading in general, the matter of belief is vitally important. Here, again, then, we have nothing in the psychological principles underlying credit phenomena to mark them off from the general field of value phenomena.
The general laws of value, then, apply in the case of credit phenomena. We find nothing unique in essence in them. The juridical relations, also, in so far as they have economic significance, shade into one another. To buy a bond from a bondholder is purchase and sale. To pay a borrower money for his personal note is lending. But from the standpoint of the theory of value and prices this distinction may be ignored. We may extend the idea of buying, selling, and price to cover all contracts where values are balanced against values, and expressed in terms of each other. Future money has its price in present money, just as much as present wheat has its price in present money. Really it is not future money against present money. It is a case of rights, which involve the payment of money in the future, sold for money, and priced in money. In general, it is rights, rather than things, which pass in economic exchange. Physical delivery does not constitute selling. Delivering a load of wheat to a railroad does not constitute sale of the wheat to the railroad; selling a farm does not involve any physical moving of the farm. Rights, in personam or in rem, are objects of economic value, and the exchange of these rights makes up the bulk, if not the whole, of economic exchange. (Exchange may be limited to the transfers of juristic rights, without value being so limited. I have discussed the relations of value and exchange in the chapter on "Value," above.) Property rights are commonly conceived of as the proper objects of buying and sale. Contracts involving the future services of free men stand legally on a different footing from contracts regarding physical goods. But economic analysis is not greatly concerned with these distinctions, except in so far as they affect the values of the things exchanged, and so the terms of the exchanges. I do not believe that the legal distinctions can be made to run on all fours with any significant economic distinctions, and shall not undertake to make them do so. In the phenomena we have simply cases of buying and selling (in a generalized sense of those terms) of rights, at prices (by a very slight extension of the term, price, to which the market is well accustomed). The terms of these exchanges, the prices, are governed by values, social economic values, in no wise different from the values which govern the prices in exchanges which we do not class as credit transactions. I say that credit phenomena are exchanges of rights. This is true of all exchanges. We do not exchange rights for money. We exchange rights to other things for rights to money. The mere physical transfer, even of money, does not give rights to the money. I may merely be giving you the money for safe keeping, or for use for my purposes. While the law makes the rights to money that has left the hands of its owner less lasting, as against innocent third parties, than in the case of other objects, and while the right to money is always, or almost always, met by returning other money of equal amount, even in the case of money it is a right, and not a mere physical transfer, that is significant.
Our problem regarding credit is, then, much simplified. We have simply to pick out certain economic exchanges to which the name of credit transactions has been applied,—a various and heterogeneous set of exchanges, in many ways—and study them, to find their peculiarities. These peculiarities will not make them exceptions to the general laws of value. They will make them merely special cases. To find essential principles marking off credit transactions, at large, from non-credit transactions is an exceedingly difficult thing. There are more differences among credit transactions themselves, than there are between the genus, credit transactions, and the class of things not called by that name.
Thus, monthly payments of rent, of wages, of college professors' salaries, are not commonly called credit transactions. The monthly payment of grocery bills, or of telephone bills, involves credit. Where is a real difference to be found? On the other hand, between book credit between grocer and patron on the one hand, and a bank-note or deposit credit on the other, the difference is large, in many practically important ways. Between a call loan and a ten year agricultural mortgage-note, the differences are even greater.
One may be disposed to find the differences between credit transactions and non-credit transactions in the fact that the former stipulate a definite sum of money, due at definite times. This would partly differentiate a bond, say, from a stock. The bond not merely calls for stipulated yearly payments, but also calls for a definite payment at the end. This would, however, exclude British Consols from the list of credit instruments! British Consols differ from safe preferred stocks in legal, rather than in economic, ways. Legally they are alike in that no terminal payment is called for. Practically they are alike in that annual regular sums may be expected. It may at least be said of credit transactions that stipulated money payments, either at a different time or a different place, are called for. This would include the telegraphic transfers of funds, and would exclude the case where A, a farmer, does a day's work for B, a neighbor, for the promise of a day's work in return at a later season. The latter transaction involves many of the elements that definitions of credit have included, but I think that we may at least limit our conception of credit transactions to transactions within a money economy, where money, as a measure of values, functions in the calculations. Shall we, however, limit credit transactions to cases where a stipulated amount of money is named in the contract, for a stipulated time?
Shall we exclude contracts where the payment of money is made contingent on anything? By contingency here I mean legal contingency. This test would exclude the highest grade preferred stock. It would include the shakiest bonds that contained, in the terms of the contract, no contingency. But where, then, would one place such an instrument as the Seaboard Airline Adjustment 5% Bonds, which may default in a given year half of the interest, if it is not earned,[506] and which yet call for the payment of the principal at a stipulated time?
What shall we say of "borrowing and carrying" transactions on the stock exchange? Is not the loan of stocks a real credit transaction? Ordinarily, when stocks are put up as collateral, one thinks of the money as being lent, and the stock merely as a pledge. But in the case of borrowing stocks by a bear to deliver next day, the transaction is definitely thought of as a loan of stock. It is sometimes paid for, the bear paying the bull a premium, instead of receiving interest on the money he has turned over to the bull as a "pledge." The more usual thing, is, of course, for the bull to pay the bear interest. But in a contract like this, there are many contingencies. As the stock rises in value, the bear must lend more money to the bull; if the stock falls, the bull must return part of the money to the bear. Both times and amounts are here contingent, even though in the end the amounts lent and repaid balance. Call loans, of course, do not call for payment at a stipulated time, and the same is true of bank-deposits and bank-notes, and of many other forms of credit. Interest on deposits in mutual savings banks is contingent, legally, as to amount. Are insurance policies credit instruments? What of endowment policies?
It is easy to draw legal distinctions in all these cases, but to show that definite and uniform economic consequences flow from these legal distinctions is quite impossible. Rather, it is easily possible to show that uniform or certain economic consequences do not, in general, flow from them.
I shall refrain from the effort to give a general, fundamental definition of credit. I shall rather discuss certain of the more important types of what have been called credit, with a view to seeing what bearing they have on the problems with which this book is concerned; the value of money, and prices. The general class of transactions to which the name, credit transactions, has been applied may be roughly designated as transactions in which the consideration on one side, at least, is the assumption of a debt, running in terms of money (though not necessarily to be paid in actual money), payable either at a future time or at another place. Objections can be found to this definition. It does not meet the fundamental test of a definition that, for the purpose in hand, it should seize upon the essential and unique characteristic of the things marked off. I am not sure that it meets the tests of inclusiveness and exclusiveness even for those transactions which we call credit transactions. Thus, if A and B go to the bank together, and A there buys B's horse, standing in front of the bank, giving B in return a check, which B immediately cashes in the same room where the check is drawn, the idea of different time or different place is not realized in any but a technical sense. A, in drawing the check is, of course, assuming a debt. The check, if repudiated by the bank, becomes a note, which A must pay. A, moreover, is paying B, not with money, but with the transfer of a claim on the bank, and the fact that his check, if unpaid, becomes a note is not the main fact about the check. Understanding our definition of credit to cover this case also, however, and attaching no fundamental importance to the definition save as a means of marking off a class of more or less related phenomena which we mean to discuss, the definition will serve.
Thus defined, we have in credit a concept susceptible to quantitative treatment. Debts, in terms of money, can be summed up, and we may have the concept of the "volume of credit" as the sum of such debts at a given time, or through a given period of time, or as an average through a period of time. We may distinguish credit transactions from credit, defining credit as the volume of debts, and credit transactions as transactions in which the debts are passed in exchange. This would be to broaden the notion of credit transactions beyond the usual conception, since it would include transactions in which A sells ("without recourse") B's note to C. It would also include cases where bonds are sold. It would exclude cases where stocks are sold, since they are not legally debts. Some would prefer to limit the notion of credit transaction to transactions in which there remains some contingent responsibility on the part of the one who uses the credit instrument, but this would be to deny the name, credit transaction, to cases where bank-notes or government paper are used in payments, as well as to deny it to the case where bonds are sold. It is not important, for my purposes, to draw a sharp line about the concept, credit transaction, however. And about the concept credit itself I have drawn a line resting on a legal, rather than an economic, distinction.
Within the field of credit, thus defined, we may single out for especial consideration certain forms of demand or short time credit, particularly bills of exchange, bank-notes and bank-deposits, and merchants' book-credit. We shall also have something to say regarding long-time credit, including bonds, and mortgage-notes that have no general market.
All these debts in terms of money, to which, in the aggregate, we have given the name, volume of credit, have grown out of exchanges. Exchange is here used in a wide sense, and is not confined to the case where goods or services are bought and sold. It is an exchange, if a man gives his note to a banker in return for a deposit credit. But, on the assumption that exchanges are made only when gains are to be realized, it follows that all debts, and so all credit, have been created in view of anticipated gains (or to avert anticipated losses). In a society where everything is in equilibrium, a "static state," where there are no "transitions" to be effected, where there is no occasion for speculation, and where exchanges of lands, etc., are negligible, the volume of all exchanges, including those where debts are passed in exchange, would be small. The occasion for the creation of the debts which make up the volume of credit would not be nearly so numerous as under dynamic conditions. The volume of credit, in other words, is largely a function of dynamic conditions, even though credit would exist in a static condition of economic life. The bulk of credit, as the bulk of exchanging, grows out of dynamic conditions, transitional changes, and the like.
This will be clearer when we raise the question as to why debts are created, as to what function debts perform in economic life. Why should a man borrow? Let us suppose that a farmer has 600 acres of land. He wishes to sell 100 acres, and use the proceeds in buying equipment for his farm. But he finds it difficult to sell the 100 acres. There is no ready market. He can sell it immediately only at a great sacrifice. By waiting, and looking industriously for a customer, or by engaging a real estate dealer to do so, he could finally find a buyer, but the thing is slow and uncertain, and he wishes to get the equipment at once. He borrows, therefore, giving his farm as security, or a part of the farm as security. He exchanges a claim on the future income of the farm for present money, and with this he can buy the equipment he needs. The net result has been that the credit transaction has transformed his unmarketable quantum of value into a marketable form of value. He has been able, by an indirect step, to do what he could not do directly—to trade a part of the farm (which in its economic essence is a prospect of future income) for the equipment. In this illustration, credit has functioned as a means of increasing the marketability or saleability of non-pecuniary forms of wealth. Credit is primarily a device for effecting exchanges that could not otherwise be effected, or for effecting exchanges more easily than they could otherwise be effected. This means that credit transactions are a part of the productive process, and that they increase values. It is the function of credit to universalize the characteristic of money, high saleability. It is the function of credit to "coin," so to speak, rights to goods on shelves, lands, etc., etc., into liquid rights, bearing the dollar mark, which are much more highly saleable than the rights in their original form were, and which often become as saleable as money itself, functioning perfectly as money.
Credit thus tends to universalize that characteristic which Menger[507] considers the unique characteristic of money. By means of credit transactions, a man borrows up to 50% of the value of the farm, makes his farm in effect, 50% saleable or fluid. The man who owns livestock may not be able, on a given day, to market them without loss, but he can use their value in the market, up, say, to 75%, by a loan. The man who owns a hundred shares of United States Steel may not be able, at a given time, to market them to his satisfaction—though in the case of articles and stocks dealt in the speculative markets saleability is very high indeed, and in the case of United States Steel, in particular, the "spread" between "buying price" and "selling price" is very narrow—but he can borrow, with the stock as security, up to 80% of its value. On a bond of the United States government, he may borrow up to 100%.[508] The process of creating credit is a process of transforming rights from unsaleable to saleable form. Often this means the subdivision of rights, preferential rights to a portion of the value of a piece of wealth being more saleable, because of greater certainty, than the total right to the whole. Another reason why partial rights may be more saleable is that the value represented by each partial right is smaller. It is easier to market things worth a thousand dollars than things worth fifty thousand, as a rule. In any case, a chief economic function of credit is,—the chief function for our purposes—to make fluid and saleable articles of wealth other than money; to universalize the quality of saleability.
This justifies us in our contention made before that all corporate securities, whether stocks or bonds,[509] are, in economic nature, alike. Driven to a legal concept for a definition of credit, we were obliged to exclude stocks from our rough definition. But corporate organization does precisely what the various other transactions that we have called credit transactions do. Lands and buildings and machinery, or the roadbed and rolling stock of a railroad, are highly specialized, often unfit for use in any form other than that in which they now appear. As concrete instruments of production, they would be highly unsaleable. In their totality, as a going concern, they are highly unsaleable, because in the aggregate so very valuable. Grouped together, however, but still subdivided, the objects of many thousands of partial rights, represented by stocks and bonds, they become saleable in high degree.
As objects other than money gain in saleability, they tend to gain in value, also. This is not necessarily true, always. If wealth is already in the best place, at the proper time, and in the proper hands, no point is involved in further exchanges. Additional saleability—or an increase in the qualities that make for saleability—could make no difference. But when objects could be employed to greater advantage if in different hands, if, in other words, there is occasion for exchange, then whatever adds to the saleability of a good adds to its value. What would otherwise have gone into the trouble and expense of marketing now is saved. In general, items of wealth tend to gain in value as they gain in saleability—though not in any definite proportion.
Further, as objects of value other than money gain in saleability, money tends to lose its differential advantage in this respect, and so tends to lose that part of its value which comes from the money-uses. If all things, including gold, were equally saleable, there would be no raison d'Être for money, and gold would have only the value that comes from its commodity functions. In so far as credit-arrangements give to partial rights to wealth the capacity to serve as a medium of exchange or for other money purposes—and this is true to a high degree of bank-credit—this tends to cut under the sources of value of money. Credit thus, from two angles, tends to raise prices; it raises the values of goods; and it tends to lower the value of money. The limits on this, however, are reached when gold ceases entirely to function as money, and when all items of value are perfectly saleable. Then credit has done its perfect work for prices, and can do no more. No incentive remains for further borrowing, if all items of value that need to be exchanged are perfectly saleable.
These theses will meet objection, particularly from those who are accustomed to quantity theory reasoning, and who look upon the volume of credit as something independent of the volume of trade. On the logic of the quantity theory there is no reason why prices might not mount indefinitely, if only credit could increase indefinitely. The causes controlling the volume of credit are, on this view, quite independent of the volume of trade. I have given this line of thought sufficient criticism, perhaps, in Part II, but shall find occasion to recur to it at a later point in this chapter. However, writers not bound by quantity theory ideas, may still find reason to question these theses, and it is necessary that I should take account of various complications, and make what may well be called substantial qualifications and modifications, before the theses are acceptable.
First, objection will be offered to the doctrine that all credit is merely rights to wealth, that credit rests on wealth. It will be urged that many loans are made without collateral, or mortgage security, that the "personal credit" of the borrower is the only security, and the only basis of the loan. This objection is not serious. There are, doubtless, loans which are disguised benevolences, where the lender gets nothing good in return for his loan. I abstract from such cases. Quantitatively they are not important, and qualitatively they are not really commercial transactions. In general, when a good merchant borrows at the bank on his personal note, the bank knows very well what goods he has in stock, what prospects he has for marketing them, what other debts he has, what his "net worth" is. And the bank knows that it has legal claims, even though not preferred claims, on his wealth. When a young business man borrows capital from a neighbor, giving no security because he has no marketable wealth which would serve as security, he is, none the less, exchanging a valuable right for the loan. He is giving the lender a right to a preferential share in his future income. The lender has considered the young man's abilities as sources of income, in conjunction with the capital lent. Incidentally, the lender retains rights, preferential rights as against the young man himself, in the quantum of value he has turned over to him. If a young man borrows the resources with which he buys a farm, the lender takes a mortgage on the farm itself. Transactions of this sort frequently have in them the element of benevolence, and the considerations are not always strictly commercial. In the case of a young man of unusual ability, however, who insures his life for the benefit of the lender, such transactions may be perfectly good commercial transactions, value balancing value in the exchange. The thing traded is commonly present money (or its equivalent) for rights to future money income.
Public loans present no exception to our rule. They represent the transfer of present wealth for the future income which the government, by virtue of its public domain, or, more commonly, its taxing power, may expect to receive. With a strong government, this future income may be a very substantial part of the total income of the people. Public loans may often be for commercial purposes, as when municipalities borrow to build or extend municipal enterprises. In cases of this sort, the market frequently will consider the prospects of commercial success of the enterprises in fixing the value of the municipal bonds. Where the proceeds of the loan are for non-commercial purposes, as war, the question of the future income of the government will still, ordinarily, be a dominant factor in determining the value of the securities. Often, however, there is the direct action of patriotic fervor, etc., enhancing the values of government securities. We have seen this in the case of government money. It is no part of our theory to maintain that men's calculations are always rational, or that the whole of the value of a long-time income-bearer rests on the anticipated income. But this is no peculiarity of credit phenomena. The same thing is true of lands, for example. Capital values often get independent in part of their "presuppositions," as we have seen in the chapter, supra, on "Economic Value." War security issues often represent the effort of the government—as at the present time—to bring into the present every possible bit of future values, as a means of increasing their power in a desperate struggle. The high prices of goods in such a situation represent the concentration of future values into the present, an increase in the motivating power which stimulates the people to unwonted exertions. In war time, moreover, many ideal values,—those whose fate is dependent on the outcome of the war—enter into and increase the values of those goods which are needed for carrying on the war. This leads to larger sacrifices of future income than would ordinarily be tolerated. It is not so much a case of present goods rising because of extra credit, as of extra credit because present goods are more valuable.
A second objection would be raised that in many cases, the values pledged by the borrower could not exist if the lender did not make the loan. This would be particularly the case with credit granted for the starting of a new or novel enterprise, which as yet exists only in idea. The established merchant, with goods on his shelves, or with a bill of lading for goods which he has sold, has a very tangible, concrete basis for a loan, whose value is independent of the decision of any given banker. If my doctrine is to be taken as holding that all credit rests on concrete physical goods, very many exceptions indeed could be found. But this is not my doctrine. It is that credit rests on valuable rights. These rights may be rights to existing concrete goods; they may be rights to future incomes. In any case, it is the values, rather than the physical quantities, that are significant. Witness cotton before and after the outbreak of the World War. Ultimately, in general,[510] economic values come from the "primary values" or "first order" values of consumption goods and services. These values are reflected back, by the imputation processes, to the various "factors of production" which have made the existence of the goods and services possible, in accordance with well-known laws which need not be here elaborated. But the category of "factors of production" is far from exhausted when we have named land, labor, and produced instruments of production! Some writers have rejected the notion of "factors of production" largely or altogether, and prefer such a term as "agents of acquisition."[511] I certainly have no intention to give to the term, factor of production, any ethical connotation. Even though a factor of production be, like land or labor, a sine qua non of production, it does not follow that the owner of that factor gets his proper, or ethically just share, under the laws of economic imputation. Many of the "factors of production," in the sense of factor which derives a value from the economic laws of imputation, may well be parasitic from the angle of ultimate social welfare. The only test is as to whether, under existing social arrangements, a portion of the income of a given establishment would cease to exist if that factor should disappear, or be reduced. From the angle of this test, monopoly power, trade-marks, established trade connections, the big idea of an entrepreneur, a dynamic personality, capacity for winning other men's confidence and good will, and sometimes that brutal selfishness which makes other men shrink from conflict, or the reputation of being a dangerous and vindictive man, may be equally "factors of production" with land, labor, and produced instruments of production. In Part IV of this book, "The Reconciliation of Statics and Dynamics," we have discussed the "intangible capital items" of this class, and have indicated that many of them perform really important and necessary social functions. Others are doubtless pernicious. Production involves leadership, organization, the making and maintaining of "interstitial connections," as well as the technology of muscle and machine. But credit is based on values, rather than on concrete goods as such, and if these "intangibles" have value, they may have credits based upon them.[512]
That some of these values exist only by virtue of the fact that credit is granted is no marked peculiarity. The granting of credit is an exchange of the rights of the creditor for rights to the future income of the borrower. If the exchange were not made, in certain cases, the borrower would have no future income to which he could give rights. The entrepreneur with a big idea cannot actualize that big idea unless he can bring it into conjunction with land, labor, capital, and a market for the products. The exchange of rights to the value of the products for the banker's deposit-currency, or the private lender's money is merely one of many necessary exchanges required to bring about the combination which will create the products. If there were no possibility of marketing the products, he would be equally helpless, and his idea be equally valueless. The general range of values, under our present system of division of labor, private property, private enterprise, etc., depend on the possibility of exchange. Men produce for the market, rather than for their own consumption, or for the consumption of a communist society. Without exchange, many values would persist, but most values would at least be diminished. Exchange is part of the productive process. The only peculiarity in the case under discussion is that the man getting credit for the exploitation of a big new idea commonly has a very limited market—is dependent on the decision of one bank or lender, or at most of one out of a few possibilities. The narrower the market, the more dependent are the values of things that must be exchanged upon the decisions of a few men. Wheat is free, virtually, from individual caprices, though even there a big operator may organize a pool and temporarily affect the value very greatly. But the immediate power of a few men on values is increasingly great as we get closer to those things which are unique, which are capable of only specialized employment, and which call for the coÖperation of elaborate and expensive systems. And, of course, the influence of individual caprice, or individual decisions, on all values grows greater as wealth and power are concentrated. Economic social value is an institutional value, specially weighted and controlled by individuals, classes and institutions.[513]
Joseph Schumpeter, in his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, has made much of the rÔle of the banker in economic evolution. He sees in the banker a creator of "Kaufkraft," by means of which an entrepreneur, a dynamic man who has a new idea which he wishes to actualize, is able to wrest from the unwilling "static economic subjects" their land, labor and instrumental goods for the purpose of putting his new plan through. This new Kaufkraft is the true Kapital which the new enterprise requires. Capital, thus defined, is not an accumulation of goods, is not embodied in goods. It is an agent, a power, which the banker creates. It makes dynamic change possible. Schumpeter is particularly anxious, in clearing the way for his new theory of interest, to get rid of all the notions of saving, accumulations of stocks of goods, etc., which have commonly been made prominent in the discussion of capital and interest. We need not here discuss his theory of interest.[514] He maintains that the new dynamic credit, credit granted by a banker for a really new enterprise, as yet not concretely in existence, represents something new in the world, anomolous from the angle of static values, and static credit. Indeed, he regards credit as unessential for the static analysis, and banishes it from the "Wesen" of his static state. But this new credit is different from such credit as there may be in the static state, because, he holds, the new credit does not rest on goods, and has no Deckung. Schumpeter himself calls these doctrines "heresies." They become less dangerous, however, when we learn that by "saving" Schumpeter means mere trenching upon accustomed expenditure, so that the entrepreneur who saves part of unusual profits is really not saving at all, and when one discovers that his contention that there need be no accumulation of goods prior to the starting of a new enterprise means merely that there need be no special accumulation of goods ad hoc. Of course if saving means trenching upon accustomed expenditure, it is banished by hypothesis from the static state, but there may still be plenty of capital (in the ordinary sense of accumulated produced means of production) for Schumpeter's entrepreneur to get hold of by means of his new Kapital. His contentions that the new credit does not rest on goods, that it has no Deckung, and that we have a new thing in the world since in dynamic credit we have a case of temporal discrepancy between the making of obligations and the ability to pay them, calls for further analysis.
It is true that there is a time during which the new credit has no basis in concrete goods. Very speedily, however, the new credit is exchanged for concrete goods, and the enterprise is started. Further, the banker commonly insists on a margin at the start. Further, the claims of the borrower on the banker are themselves, prior to their expenditure for the things needed in the enterprise, assets to which the banker may look as a basis for his confidence in the goodness of the entrepreneur's promise to pay him. There is never a moment when the new credit does not rest on values. The loan by the banker to the borrower is, essentially, like the case of the purchase of any bearer of future incomes, say a machine, or a factory. The machine is, after all, in economic nature, merely a "promise" of future goods and future values, as an Austrian economist should be quick to recognize, and machines are almost as frequently poor performers as borrowers—indeed, most commonly, the borrower's inability to repay comes from the failure in the value of the goods which his physical equipment produces. The raison d'Être of the new credit is the new values which have come into existence: the new plan of the entrepreneur, validated by the banker, attains a value equal to the present worth of the extra products which it promises. I repeat that it is values which are significant as the basis of loans, that values are not all embodied in physical goods, and that value is essentially a psychological thing.
The banker's validation of the plan may be an essential factor in its value. Belief is often an essential factor in values. The new value, and the new credit, have a large element of belief in them. The value of the new plan rests proximately in the belief of the banker, manifested by his granting of credit. But the value of the bank-credit rests ultimately in the prestige of the banker, which is a fact of social psychology, resting in a massing of belief on the part of the public in him, in the validity of his bank-notes and deposit-currency, coupled with support from legal and other institutions. But this is to anticipate the discussion of the nature of bank-credit. The point involved is sufficiently illustrated by the case where a man who is not a banker lends his money to an entrepreneur of a new undertaking. Here again the enterprise is impossible without the loan. Here the loan is made on the basis of an anticipated income. Here again the anticipated income is made possible only by the loan; one of the values that enters into the exchange exists only because the exchange is possible. None the less, the credit rests on value. It is a right to an anticipated income. The man who has made the loan has his security in the value which he has lent, plus the present worth of the extra income which the new idea is expected to create.
Now a great practical difference is made in the course of economic life by the decisions of lenders to lend to men who plan new things, instead of to men who plan old things. It makes an enormous difference whether or not new plans appeal to the imaginations of those who control the economic resources of society. It makes a great difference whether static values (the capital values of incomes to be created in familiar ways) or dynamic values (capital values of incomes to be created in novel ways) win out in the competition for loans from those who have loans to make. But as values, the two are of the same psychological stuff and substance: futurity and belief are essential elements in both of them.
Stable belief, and strong belief, are easier to evoke in the case of the established and the familiar. New ways of creating wealth must promise larger returns, and make more dramatic appeals to the imagination, than old ways. Schumpeter indicates that it is the essential function of the banker to give preference to the new ways, that the mass of men are "static" in their attitude, and that, for some reason which he does not clearly indicate, the banker is not. This has not been our American experience, on the whole. The contrast which Schumpeter makes between the timid, static masses, and the few highly important dynamic entrepreneurs, holds very much less true in America than in Continental Europe. There it is doubtless true that new industrial enterprises have had their main encouragement from bankers. Here, such enterprises have appealed largely to the mass of men, to the investing and speculative public. Our commercial banks have lent largely upon stock exchange collateral, which means that, indirectly, bank-loans have gone to finance industry. The extent of this is enormous, as will later appear. However, the banks, as banks, have not been large buyers of stocks. They have guarded themselves by requiring "margins" from those to whom they have lent on such collateral. Seasoned bonds have been bought in great volume by our commercial banks, but few stocks. Even the underwriters and investment bankers have been primarily intermediaries, expecting to pass on to private buyers the securities they hold temporarily. My point here is, merely, that there is nothing in the distinction between static and dynamic credit, when by that is meant the distinction between credit for new enterprises and credit for old enterprises, to mark off a peculiar or essential province for bank-credit. The need for bank-credit does arise out of dynamic conditions, primarily, but it is not the need for credit to start dynamic changes, even though bank-credit may do, and does do, that. The chief reason for bank-credit is to enable economic society to readjust itself quickly and readily to dynamic changes, by putting through without friction the necessary exchanges that such readjustment requires, and by holding in liquid form a fund of rights which can meet the emergencies and unexpected occurrences which dynamic conditions involve. To this we now turn.
Bank-credit is the debt of responsible institutions, payable on demand in money. It may take the form of notes, or of the right to draw checks. Long evolution has begot a system of legal relationships, and of banking technique which makes these promises easily performed. The same process of development has led to social reactions toward banks and bankers which give them enormous prestige. Legal regulation, in the case of many banks, requiring adequate capital, and, in this country, requiring minimum cash reserves, have added to that prestige. The promise of the bank is commonly so liquid and saleable that the banks are not called upon to fulfill it by the actual payment of money—the promise alone is an object of value which is perfectly saleable, which runs in terms of money, and which functions as a perfect substitute for money in almost every use except for very small retail transactions. Even there, it is very much used.
Among the features of banking technique to which we must give especial attention are the following: (1) the banker has substantial resources of his own, his "capital," which constitutes the "margin" of protection which he offers to those who give him valuable things in return for his promises to pay money on demand; (2) the banker exchanges his promises to pay on demand, as far as possible, for those things which have a high degree of "liquidity," i. e., for those things which he can quickly dispose of for cash, or for the promises of other bankers which are the equivalent of cash. Farm mortgages are not good assets for a banker to hold in large amount. They are long-term obligations, with a very limited market, and they will not help him in emergencies to meet his obligations to pay on demand. Agricultural loans, and other mortgage loans are made in considerable volume by our State banks and trust companies. All classes of commercial banks make many non-liquid loans, as we shall later see. But all of them get as high a proportion of liquid loans as they can. Bills of exchange, running ten, thirty, sixty or ninety days, growing out of commercial transactions which automatically terminate themselves in the payment of cash or the promises of other bankers, constitute admirable assets. In return for these, the banker may give his promises freely. This is especially true where there is, in the banking practice, a wide "rediscount market," in which he can sell these bills before maturity if he wishes to get even more liquid assets. Promissory notes, for short periods, thirty, sixty, or ninety days, growing again out of commercial transactions, which, like those for which the bills of exchange were drawn, automatically bring in cash or the promises of other banks, are in many respects like the bills of exchange, even though the rediscount market for such notes has not been so highly developed as the market for bills of exchange in Europe. Whether such notes are as available for rediscount as bills of exchange is a question of technical banking which we need not here discuss in detail, though I venture the opinion that bills of exchange are superior decidedly for this purpose, especially "documentary" bills. The element of personal credit is commonly larger in the promissory note, and that limits the market. Banking organization, and particularly our new Federal Reserve System, may greatly reduce the disadvantages of the promissory note from this angle, but it seems not unlikely that the bill of exchange may be a factor of increasing importance in our internal banking arrangements. The general test, however, of what is available for a banker's assets depends on varying conditions, and is not to be answered by a simple formula. A bank in a rural region which loads up heavily with the safest local bonds is little better off than with farm mortgages. For neither is there a quick market in an emergency. A city bank, near the stock exchange, may very safely buy in large amounts highly saleable as a profitable substitute for part of its cash reserve. Even country banks may, and do, safely own such bonds. Short loans on stock and bond security, constitute the most important single type of bank-loan in the United States, as we shall later see. (3) The third feature of banking technique to which attention must be given is the reserve policy. The banker must keep some actual money on hand (how much we have in part considered in Part II, and shall again discuss).
I shall give attention to these points in what follows. The first point needs little discussion. Large "capital" for a bank gives prestige and security. Some capital is a sine qua non for a bank which expects its notes or deposit currency to have general acceptability.
It will be well to consider further the circumstances determining the form which a bank's assets shall take. Though commercial banks own enormous quantities of high grade bonds, it is rare for commercial banks in America to buy stocks of corporations.[515] They will often lend to owners of such stocks with the stocks as collateral, up to a high percentage of the value of the stocks, but they will rarely trade their demand obligations for the stocks directly. In general, a bank wishes to have its assets in the form of obligations of other people, expressed in terms of dollars, and having a definite term to run (or callable on demand).
One reason for this is a bookkeeping reason. "Par value" of stocks has little meaning any more. Market-prices of stocks, even the best stocks, are not absolutely fixed. They fluctuate, even though within narrow limits. This fact presents complications to the bookkeeper! Of course, the bank's buildings and fixtures, listed among its assets, fluctuate also, in value, and in the price that could be obtained on a given day, but the bookkeeper can abstract from that, since the bank has no intention of selling its buildings and fixtures. The notes and bills held in the bank's portfolios also in fact fluctuate in value, and in the price at which they might be sold on a given day, but they are expressed in terms of dollars, and the bookkeeper commonly has no need to look beyond the figures written on them. At irregular intervals, a small percentage of them may be marked off the books as "bad," but usually the minor fluctuations are abstracted from. The bank does not like to have assets whose published prices fluctuate. But this is, I suppose, not the main objection which banks have to stocks as assets since it does not prevent their buying bonds. I abstract from the legal restrictions that prevent many banks from buying stocks. The fundamental reason is to be found elsewhere. The point is to be found here: the transaction whereby property rights in roadbed, rolling stock, etc., were collected into property rights in a going, organic whole increased the saleability of all these rights; the further subdivision of these rights into many thousands of equal parts enormously increased the saleability of these rights, especially when coupled with listing in an organized market; the further transaction, by which a preferential claim upon these subdivisions of rights is embodied in a collateral note still further increases the saleability of the value of these rights. The whole of the value embodied in a share of stock has not the certainty and saleability which a banker wishes for his assets. It might not be possible to market the stock on a given day without loss. But a collateral note, embodying 80% of that value, with provision for additional collateral in case the margin is reduced, is highly liquid and the banker has no doubt that, with watchfulness, he can always realize the full face value of such a note. It becomes saleable enough for his purposes. The transaction by which this note is exchanged for the banker's demand obligation gives the drawer of the collateral note a perfectly saleable form of value with an almost universal market, which he can convert without loss into practically anything that money can buy. We have here a series, a scale, saleability of rights growing steadily greater, through a series of transformations and exchanges, till at last the virtually perfect saleability is reached. Again we are reminded of Menger's analysis[516] of the methods of primitive barter, whereby the man who possesses a good of low saleability, through successive exchanges, gradually gets goods of higher and higher saleability, until he finally reaches his goal. Bank-credit, this most highly saleable of all forms of rights except the rights to actual money in hand, and in general not inferior to money, cannot usually be had by direct offer to the bank of crude property rights. These must be refined and distilled, till a central core of highly saleable value emerges, and then they may enter the bank's assets in return for bank-credit. The best bonds likewise offer such a central core of highly saleable value.
A further point is to be noticed about this scale of saleabilities. At each stage of the exchanges of less saleable for more saleable rights, the holder of the less saleable rights must make concessions to the holder of the more saleable rights. And the degree of his concession is, in general, correlated with the lack of saleability of what he offers. Commonly this takes the form of giving up a right which has a higher yield for one which has a lower yield. Or, viewed more fundamentally, from the angle of the capitalization theory, income-bearers of low saleability are capitalized at a higher discount rate than income-bearers of higher saleability, with the same yield. Farm lands may be capitalized on a 10% basis. (There will be great differences between regions in this, depending in considerable measure, often, on the activity of farm sales. I would refer here to the facts mentioned in my chapter on "The Quantity Theory and International Gold Movements," contrasting Cass Co., Iowa, with Yazoo Co., Mississippi. Of course, the risks of agriculture count heavily, also, and the prestige of owning land as compared with other forms of property.) The farmer's mortgage note may bear 7%. A merchant who holds that note may use it as collateral, with a margin, backing his own note, and get accommodation for three months at 6%. The bank may rediscount the note of the merchant, giving it its own endorsement, on a 4½% basis. The coal mine owned by a small company may yield 12%; sold to a large iron company, which combines mining and smelting and manufacturing, that mine may be represented by 7% stock; a collateral loan, for sixty days, based on 80% of the value of the stock may be had for 4%; the demand liability of the bank given in exchange for the collateral note will either yield nothing at all, or else yield a low per cent, one, one and a half, or 2%, on large checking accounts. If the collateral note be a call note, the rate will be lower, in general, than on a time note. I here refer to what was said in the chapter on the functions of money with reference to the relation of short loans, especially call loans, to the "bearer of options" function of money. Part of the yields of these loans is in the bearing of options. This function grows out of the uncertainties of a dynamic market. It would disappear if uncertainties, "friction," and dangers disappeared.
The importance of liquidity and saleability in the assets of a banker needs little discussion. It has been reiterated by virtually every writer on the subject. Its connection with the need for meeting demand obligations is obvious. The point that I would here emphasize is, however, that this, too, grows out of dynamic changes, uncertainties, etc. An economic life in "normal equilibrium," in static balance, with all things going smoothly, in anticipated ways, could dispense in large measure, or wholly, with such liquidity. Obligations which matured at the time that the holders of the obligations had maturing obligations, would serve their purpose perfectly. Again I would emphasize the fact that the theory of money and bank-credit is essentially a dynamic theory, and that the notion of "normal equilibrium" which underlies the quantity theory has no bearing whatever on these fundamental matters.
The market where fluid bank-credit is exchanged for less fluid rights has been given the name, "the money market." The prices fixed in this market are "money-rates," figured as percentages on the amounts of bank-credit exchanged for the less fluid rights. It is, of course, strictly speaking, not a money market. Money, as the term has been used in this book, has been taken to mean gold coin, subsidiary coin, government paper, and for the United States, bank-notes. In a country where much bank-credit is elastic bank-notes, it is better to distinguish money from bank-notes. The term, money, is not one easily defined in a logical manner. A good logical definition should seize on some essential characteristic of the object defined, should include all the objects of that class, and should exclude all others. We can meet the tests of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in a definition of money, but we can hardly meet the first test. The differences between gold money, for example, and gold bullion are less than the differences between gold money and government paper. The differences between bank-notes and bank-deposits are less than the differences between bank-notes and government paper, or bank-notes and gold. The term, money, covers a group of more or less miscellaneous things, concerning all of which few general laws are possible. Gold, or other standard money, in particular, may obey different laws from other forms of money. I have been careful, in the foregoing, to avoid the danger of letting the argument rest on any ambiguity in the meaning of the term, however, and for the present shall not attempt further definition. For the present, we shall use the term, "money market," in its familiar sense, as meaning that market in which bank-credit is exchanged for less fluid rights. An organized money market commonly appears only in larger cities. In smaller places, relationships between banks and customers are much more personal, and indeed, even in larger cities, regular business houses have particularly intimate relations with special banks. A fluid, impersonal market, to which men may repair without reference to anything but the marketability of the collateral they have to offer, is a distinctively metropolitan affair. Only large dealers commonly have relations with more than one or two banks. Larger houses in the big cities often do sell their "commercial paper" through brokers, and some of the big New York mercantile houses have had their paper scattered a good deal throughout the country. The lack of protection which houses which sought such credit faced during the Panic of 1907 tended to check the practice in some measure, but it has revived, and even increased.[517] In the matter of a wide market for commercial paper, however, an impersonal market, with great fluidity, we are well behind not only England, but also Continental Europe. The London acceptance house has especially contributed to an impersonal market. The American money market is par excellence a New York market, and the primary type of paper discounted in the American money market is stock exchange paper, and foreign bills of exchange. For commercial paper, however, there are innumerable more personal, more restricted, markets, and commercial paper constitutes a very considerable part of banking assets, though much less than is often supposed. But this we shall discuss in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XXIV
CREDIT—BANK ASSETS AND BANK RESERVES
In traditional discussions of banking, the impression is given that commercial paper is the normal and dominant type of banking assets.[518] To one accustomed to this view, the figures of the Comptroller of the Currency for banking investments in the United States for 22,491 banks of all kinds (State, national, private, and savings banks, and trust companies) in 1909,[519] will occasion dismay:
| (000,000 omitted) |
Loans on real estate | $ 2,505 |
Loans on other collateral security | 3,975 |
Other loans and discounts | 4,821 |
Overdrafts | 69 |
United States bonds | 792 |
State, county and municipal bonds | 1,091 |
Railroad bonds and stocks | 1,560 |
Bonds of other public service corporations | 466 |
Other stocks, bonds, etc | 703 |
Due from other banks and bankers | 2,562 |
Real estate, furniture, etc | 544 |
Checks and other cash items | 437 |
Cash on hand | 1,452 |
Other resources | 111 |
Total Resources | $21,095 |
These figures, however, call for further analysis. They include figures from institutions which should not be counted with commercial banks. The percentage of real estate loans, especially, is too high to represent the workings of commercial banks, a very high percentage of real estate loans being held by stock and mutual savings banks. The other items, however, are not much changed by the inclusion of savings banks and private banks. It will be well to draw some conclusions from these aggregate figures for all classes of institutions, before taking up a more detailed analysis of State and national banks, and trust companies.
Where, among these items, does one find "commercial paper"? In the reports of the metropolitan papers, giving daily variations in interest rates, it is usual to find "commercial paper" listed as a separate category, coÖrdinate with "sixty day paper," "ninety day paper," etc. Recent periodical discussion has gone elaborately into the question as to what should be called "commercial paper," from the standpoint of the policy of the Federal Reserve Banks. I think it safe to say that no two markets, at present, in the United States will use the term in precisely the same way, and that all would restrict the term to a small portion of the "other loans and discounts" listed above. The most general definition of "commercial paper" would be paper bought through note-brokers. Despite the decided increase in loans and discounts which our war prosperity has involved, there has been very frequent complaint of the scarcity of "commercial paper." I shall use the term, "commercial paper" in a much more liberal sense than the American money market does, and shall mean by it all loans of a really liquid character, made by banks to merchants and others to pay for the purchase of goods in anticipation of a resale within the term of the loan which will enable the loan to be repaid at maturity. From this should be excluded, however, loans made to speculators. With this liberal, and not very precise, definition of commercial paper, we raise again the question as to where it may be found in the items above given.
Virtually all of it, I think, must be found in the item, "other loans and discounts"—an item which, in all, is slightly less than 23% of total banking assets.[520] But not all of this "other loans and discounts" is commercial paper. Very much indeed represents loans of a non-liquid character, regularly renewed, which manufacturers and others have put, not into moveable goods, but into fixed forms of capital-goods, as machinery, and even buildings. One case in New York, which the writer is informed by a business man well acquainted with both banking and business in many sections of the country is typical of many cases, is as follows: a New York bank is at present lending to a small manufacturer of automobile supplies about $30,000. Of this, about $10,000 is liquid, periodically covered by "bills receivable," and if the bills receivable should fail, in the period in question, to cover the $10,000, the bank would insist on a reduction of the loan. The remaining $20,000, however, is not liquid. It was spent for non-moveable equipment; the bank expects to renew the notes for this loan periodically, and is well aware that it could not force collection without bringing the business to a close—or else forcing the factory to get accommodation elsewhere. The $10,000 that is liquid is by no means all spent for goods, but is spent, in part, for wages. None of the $10,000 is spent for goods which are to be resold without being transformed by manufacture. None of the $30,000, therefore, is, in the strict sense, "commercial paper." It is manufacturer's paper. Part of it is virtually as liquid as commercial paper; two-thirds of it is not liquid.
A very large part indeed of bank-loans are of this character. A large part of the loans made to farmers are in no sense liquid: when the loan is made, for, say, six months,[521] it is perfectly understood by both bank and borrower that a renewal will be asked for and granted. It is impossible to say what fraction of this $4,821,000,000 of "other loans and discounts" is really liquid commercial paper, or liquid paper of any kind, in the sense that it can be automatically paid off at maturity. I venture the statement with entire confidence, however, that the proportion of liquid paper is not one-half of the amount. I should question if more than one-fourth of it is truly liquid, in the sense in which that term is commonly used: meaning that the loan is made to put through a transaction which will be completed during the term of the loan, and permit the loan automatically to be paid off. I do not mean by this merely that the banks could not reduce this item by one-fourth suddenly. Even in a market made up wholly of highly liquid paper, an arbitrary refusal to renew one-fourth of the loans, with the effort to reduce loans and discounts by one-fourth, would occasion great embarrassment and even disaster. The test of liquidity here applied relates to the items separately, on the assumption that other things are not radically changed. Even in this sense, however, viewing each loan transaction separately, it may well be questioned if the banks in the United States could find among their "other loans and discounts" items exceeding a fourth of the total (in value) which they could refuse to renew, at least in large part, without disappointing reasonable expectations, and embarrassing good business men.[522]Of this paper, not truly liquid, no doubt a good deal is advanced to wholesale and retail merchants, and is, in this sense, commercial paper. The terms, "liquid paper" and "commercial paper" by no means run on all fours! As will later appear, the bulk of liquid banking assets are not commercial paper at all. And only that part of a bank's loans to a merchant may be called "liquid" which can be paid off by the merchant without disappointing his reasonable expectations,—causing him to seek other banking connections.
There is, however, another item in which we may find some commercial paper, and this is the item, "loans on other collateral security." This has commonly been supposed to be virtually all stock exchange loans. Thus, Conant[523] cites the growth in this item in New York as evidence of the growth of loans on stocks and bonds. For New York, loans on stocks and bonds do make up the great bulk of this item. Even in New York, however, there are other factors in it, absolutely, even though not relatively, important, and in the country outside, the other elements are not at all negligible, even though for the outside country the part secured by stocks and bonds is the major part, and even though the growth of this item in our total banking assets is, in general, fairly indicative of the growth of loans secured by stocks and bonds. Figures for the other items are not available for State banks, trust companies or savings and private banks. They are not till very recently available for national banks. In 1915,[524] however, the Comptroller separates the item, "loans on other collateral security," for national banks, into two parts, (1) loans "secured by stocks and bonds" ($1,750,597,273), and (2) loans "secured by other personal securities, including merchandise, warehouse receipts, etc." ($882,749,812). Is there any commercial paper in this last, not inconsiderable, item?
Let us locate the item, in the effort to find out. The percentage runs highest in Chicago, where this class of collateral loan exceeds the loans on stocks and bonds. The inference is strongly suggested, therefore, that much of it, there, at least, represents advances to live-stock, grain and produce traders and speculators on the Board of Trade, at the stock yards, etc. The inference is strengthened by the fact that St. Louis, where there is a good deal of grain and commodity speculation, shows more than twice as much of this kind of paper as does Boston, where this kind of speculation is unimportant—despite the fact that Boston's aggregate collateral loans of all kinds greatly exceed such loans in St. Louis. In New York, where there is a great deal of coffee and cotton speculation, and some other commodity speculation, the amount of this paper, though relatively small, is absolutely greater than in any other city. No doubt, in New York, which is the country's centre for foreign commerce, a fair amount of the paper secured by "other personal securities, including merchandise, warehouse receipts, etc.," is really commercial paper, representing advances to importers and exporters—though the difficulties of giving this kind of security where goods are in transit would prevent most of our foreign trade being financed in this manner. The total of this kind of paper in New York—all these figures are for national banks alone—was only 113 millions on June 23, 1915.[525] It may be doubted if very much of this paper, in the great cities, represents goods in transit. With the caution that the view here expressed is based on inference, and not on actual knowledge of what the large city banks are doing, the writer concludes that probably the bulk of this paper, in large cities, represents loans to speculators rather than to merchants. It is liquid, but it is not commercial paper.
What of such paper in the country districts? Nearly one-half—$436,000,000 out of $882,000,000—of these national bank-loans on "other personal security, including merchandise, warehouse receipts, etc.," are in the country, outside the Reserve and Central Reserve Cities. Much of it is in the South. Much of it in the grain and live-stock producing regions. What do such loans mean?[526] Much of it is loans to farmers and planters. In the South, much of it is on crop liens. The loans on cotton warehouse receipts, at least in the country parts of the South, are not as great as is commonly supposed. In the North and West, there are a great mass of farmers' chattel mortgage loans, including loans on horses, grain in cribs, hogs, sheep, cattle, mules, etc. The use of this type of paper for financing the breeding and feeding of live-stock, particularly hogs, cattle and sheep, is very extensive. Virtually all loans to farmers and feeders for these purposes are secured by such chattel mortgages. It seems improbable that a great deal of this paper could represent ordinary commerce. Neither wholesalers nor retailers can easily handle merchandise on which chattel mortgages have been given. The usual method of granting credit to them is to advance loans on one and two name paper, unsecured. Not many loans to retailers and wholesalers will fall in the category under discussion.
To what extent are the loans of this type to farmers liquid? Well, the crop lien loans in the South have a natural term, and, though commonly longer loans than bankers have in mind when speaking of liquid paper, are liquid in the sense that they are automatically paid off at maturity. Loans on work-animals need not have a natural term. Loans on animals being fed for the market have such a natural term, and are truly liquid. Loans, however, on breeding animals are not thus liquid, such loans are commonly regularly renewed at maturity, and the banks do not count on them in emergencies. It is the opinion of Dr. J. E. Pope that fully two-thirds of the aggregate loans on live-stock chattel mortgage security are to breeders rather than to feeders, and hence are not liquid. Of course, none of these loans are commercial paper.
I conclude, therefore, that the thesis with which we started that the overwhelming bulk of commercial paper is to be found in the item, "other loans and discounts" is correct. I see no reason to suppose that an analysis of the loans of State banks and trust companies would show a different conclusion. We lack the figures for breaking up the collateral loans of State banks and trust companies into the two classes, "secured by stocks and bonds" and "secured by other personal securities, including warehouse receipts, merchandise, etc." We have merely the gross figures for collateral loans. As the State banks are in large degree country banks, it is probable that the percentage of commodity collateral as compared with stock exchange collateral for State banks would be larger than for national banks. However, the total of collateral loans for State banks is relatively small—559 millions, for 1909, as against "other loans and discounts" for State banks in that year of 1,112 millions, and as against a total of collateral loans of all banks reporting in that year of 3,975 millions. On the other hand, the collateral loans of the trust companies are very large: 1,222 millions for 1909, as against "other loans and discounts" for the trust companies in the same year of 460 millions. As the trust companies are chiefly city institutions, and as the concentration of trust company loans and capital in New York City is relatively very great, it would seem pretty clear that taking both State banks and trust companies into account would substantially lessen the percentage of loans "secured by other personal security, including merchandise, warehouse receipts, etc.," to total collateral loans. As the amount of commercial paper in this class of loans for national banks is probably small, it may be expected to be still smaller in the aggregate of collateral loans.
The following figures, for State and national banks, and trust companies, only, will, in the light of the foregoing, give us basis for some further conclusions regarding the character of banking assets in the United States. As before, the year 1909 is chosen:
| (000,000 omitted)[527] |
Resources | State Banks | National Banks | Trust Companies | Aggregate |
Real estate loans | 414 | 57 | 377 | 848 |
Collateral loans | 559 | 1,939 | 1,222 | 3,720 |
All other loans | 1,112 | 2,966 | 460 | 4,538 |
U. S. bonds | 5 | 740 | 3 | 748 |
State, county and municipal bonds | 65 | 156 | 155 | 376 |
Railway stocks and bonds | 75 | 351 | 362 | 788 |
Bonds of other public service corporations | 50 | 148 | 168 | 366 |
Other bonds, stocks, etc. | 95 | 208 | 769 | 1,072 |
Total of items here listed | 2,375 | 6,565 | 3,516 | 12,456 |
Total Resources | 3,338 | 9,368 | 4,068 | 16,774 |
This table makes clear that the figures for real estate loans given in the table for all banks, a few pages preceding, were much too high. It leaves the relations among the other items, however, not greatly changed. "All other loans" increase from slightly less than 23% of total assets to 27%. If we concede that one-half of the "all other loans" represents liquid "commercial paper"—a very liberal estimate, as we have previously concluded—we get about 13½% of the assets of these institutions in the form of "commercial paper," an increase over the 11½% to be assigned on the basis of the other table. The figure is the roughest sort of approximation. I attach little importance to the exact percentage, and the argument which follows is not dependent on any exact figure here. The proportion of collateral loans to total resources is changed also, and even more: collateral loans are 18% of total bank resources when all kinds of banks are included, and are over 22% of total bank resources when only State and national banks and trust companies are counted. If the foregoing is correct within very wide limits of error as to the amount of commercial paper, collateral loans very substantially exceed commercial paper. If all the "all other loans" should be counted as commercial paper, collateral loans are still not far behind them—22% as against 27½%.
What is the significance of this? We have seen that for national banks, the great bulk (over 66%) of the collateral loans were secured by stocks and bonds in June, 1915. We saw reasons for supposing that a higher percentage of stock exchange collateral would be found when State banks and trust companies are included. Suppose we assume that 75% of the collateral loans of all three classes of institutions here in question are based on stock exchange collateral.[528] This would mean 16½% of the total resources of these institutions in stock exchange loans—still well above the 13½% we have assigned to "commercial paper." In any case, it is at least justifiable to contend that loans on stock exchange collateral are as great in volume as commercial loans. I think that they very substantially exceed them. But further, we have another large percentage of bank resources invested in stock exchange securities outright—chiefly in bonds. The aggregate for those investments in the institutions under consideration is 3,250 millions. This is something over 19% of the total assets of these institutions. Combining this with the loans on stock exchange collateral, we get nearly 36% of bank and trust company assets invested, directly or indirectly, in stock exchange securities, as against an assumed 13½% in commercial paper. Conceding that all the "all other loans" are commercial loans, the stock exchange assets still exceed them in the ratio of 36 to 27½.
In our second table, we have listed items which aggregate only 12,456 millions of the total resources for these institutions of 16,774 millions. The items listed, however, represent virtually all the credit extended by banks to industry, commerce, agriculture, the stock market, other speculation, and the State. The excluded items of main importance are: Due from other banks and bankers, 2,302 millions; checks and other cash items, 432 millions; and cash on hand, 1,411 millions—the three items aggregating 4,146 millions, which virtually closes the gap. These three items are of immense importance as making for liquidity in banking assets, and as making possible extensions of credit to the business world, but it is not proper to count them when an estimate of the extent of bank-credits is in question. Our second table contains, for the three classes of institutions, all the items properly counted there, except overdrafts (small in amount) and one other big item which does not get into bank statements at all, namely, overcertifications and "morning loans." Of this last item, more later. We may, then, recalculate our percentages on the basis of the credit extended by the three classes of institutions, instead of on the basis of total resources. On this basis, the percentages are:
Real estate loans, 7.4%;
Collateral loans, 30%, of which we assign to stock exchange collateral, 22½%, and to other collateral, 7½%;
All other loans, 36.4%, of which we assign to "Commercial paper" 18.2%;
Total stocks and bonds, 26%.
Adding the percentages for stock exchange collateral loans and for stocks and bonds owned, we get 48½% of all extensions of bank-credit for these three classes of institutions in the form of credits extended to the security market. If everything else except the real estate loans should be counted as "commercial loans" the stock exchange credit would still exceed the commercial credit. If my estimate of 18.2% of bank-credit based on commercial paper is high enough,[529] the banks and trust companies have extended over two and a half times as much credit, at a given time, to the security market as they have to commerce. This on the face of the record. But there is, as above indicated, a further item which does not get into the record, namely, overcertifications and "morning loans." Every day in the great speculative centres, and very especially in Wall Street, enormous advances are made to brokers, which are canceled during the day, but which, during their short life, are a real addition to bank-credit. To attempt to estimate this with any accuracy is hopeless, but the total on any ordinary day is enormous, and most of it is extended in connection with stock market transactions.
A final comparison,[530] which will conclude this perhaps too wearisome analysis of these figures, will consider the loans alone, neglecting the securities owned:
Of total loans:
Real estate loans, 9.3%;
Collateral loans, 40.8%, of which we assign to stock exchange collateral, 30.6%, and to other collateral, 10.2%;
All other loans, 49.6%, of which we assign to "Commercial paper," 24.8%.
The development of bank loans on stock exchange collateral is a remarkable feature of the three or four decades preceding 1909. The following figures, of national bank loans in New York City,[531] illustrate the tendency:
The tendency is not peculiar to America, however. The following table gives a classification of the loans and discounts of all the great European banks[533] in selected years from 1875 to 1903:
We conclude, therefore, that the great bulk of banking credit in the United States, even of "commercial banks," is not commercial credit. Much of it, in the smaller places, especially, represents in fact, whatever the form, long time advances to agriculture and industry. Most of it, in the great cities, and to a large extent in even the smaller places, represents advances to the permanent financing of corporate industry. Excluding real estate loans, more than half of bank-credit represents either ownership of bonds (with some stocks) or else advances on stocks and bonds. Another important part of bank-credit, which I shall not even attempt to measure, is employed in financing commodity speculation.
It is worth while to compare our figures concerning bank loans with Kinley's figures, which we have previously considered, for deposits made on March 16 of 1909, the year we have chosen for the bank loans figures. It is important to remember that "deposits," as used by Kinley in this investigation, does not mean what the term means in a bank balance sheet. Kinley's figures relate to the actual items deposited on the day in question, and not to the net balance after deposits and withdrawals have been compared when the bank has closed for the day. A large deposit in the balance sheet sense might show no "deposits" in Kinley's sense, in a given day; while enormous "deposits" in Kinley's sense might be so offset by incoming checks that virtually nothing is left on the balance sheet at the end of the day, for a given depositor. Kinley's figures thus give us a means of getting at the degree of activity of different classes of deposits in the balance sheet sense, and so, indirectly, of different classes of loans.
Loans and deposits (in the balance sheet sense) are, as we know, closely correlated. This is true for banks in the aggregate, and for banks individually at a moment of time. It is not generally true of a given individual deposit account at a moment of time, but through a period of time, for business deposits, it tends to be true that the items deposited offset the amounts borrowed.[534] If the items deposited are numerous, if the depositor has an "active" deposit account, receiving a large flow of banking funds, as compared with his net deposit balances, we may infer that his loans are also active, that he pays off loans frequently, that his paper, in the assets of the bank, is "liquid."
I need not give the details of Kinley's figures again, as they have been elaborately analyzed in connection with the estimate of the "volume of trade."[535] The figures show that retail and wholesale deposits between them make up about 25% of the total deposits. This would serve to show that "commercial paper," which we have allowed to be about 24.8 of total loans, is slightly more active (and hence "liquid") than the average of loans.[536] It will also suggest, however, that our figure for "commercial paper," truly liquid, is too high, since we should expect this kind of paper to be more active than the average—unless, indeed, stock exchange collateral loans are so exceedingly active as to make a tremendously high average. I refrain from trying to get a definite answer on this point, since there are many indeterminate elements: among others, uncertainty as to the extent to which wholesale deposits and retail deposits include all commercial deposits, and uncertainty as to the extent to which they exclude manufacturer's deposits. The great bulk of Kinley's deposits, however, fall into the "all other" class, and the great bulk of the "all other deposits" are located in the great financial and speculative centres, particularly New York. We have concluded that they represent chiefly (a) transactions in securities; (b) other speculation; (c) loan and other financial transactions, particularly the shifting of call loans on stock exchange collateral. It is, then, the deposits of those connected with the great financial and speculative markets, particularly the stock market, whose deposits are most active, and whose loans are most liquid. Stock market collateral loans thus constitute the most perfectly satisfactory sort of bank loan, from the standpoint of liquidity. Though such loans do not make up the bulk of bank loans (we have concluded that they constitute 30.6% of the loans of State and national banks and trust companies in 1909), they do account for the bulk of banking activity, and supply the greatest part of the liquidity of total bank loans.
When we consider further the item of securities (chiefly bonds) in banking assets, we find another highly important source of liquidity. The sales of bonds in the great banking centres are enormous. The figures of bond sales on the exchanges do not begin to tell the story. One big bank in New York in 1911 sold more than half as many bonds as were sold in that year on the floor of the Stock Exchange.[537] It has been frequently stated that ten bonds, of those listed on the Exchange are sold over the counter for one on the floor. This is truer of Boston than New York. The "outside market" for unlisted bonds is a very important matter. Dealings among banks in these items and in foreign exchange are exceedingly important. This is especially true of the business of the great private bankers, as Morgan, Kuhn-Loeb and others. Much of this does not appear in Kinley's figures, since neither the deposits of the great private banks in other banks, nor the deposits made in the private banks themselves (so far as New York City is concerned) figure in his totals.[538] Had they been included, the percentage of the "all other deposits" would have grown, and we should have had still more impressive evidence of the fact that modern banking in the United States is largely bound up with the security market, and that modern bank-credit gets its liquidity chiefly from that source.
The story is even more impressively told by the figures for bank clearings, which include the transactions between banks, and the transactions of the private bankers. In New York, in 1909, total clearings for the year were 104 billions, as against 62 billions for the whole country outside New York.[539] That bank clearings are closely correlated with stock exchange transactions, has been demonstrated fully by N. J. Silberling, who has shown the following correlations: New York Stock Exchange share sales with New York clearings, r = .718; total clearings for the country with New York share sales, r = .607; total clearings for the country with railway gross receipts (as representative of ordinary trade), r = .356.[540] The active deposits and the liquid loans are chiefly connected with activities in finance and speculation.
Now two important practical conclusions are suggested by this analysis. The first is that the complaint of many farmers, merchants, politicians, and even scientific writers that too much money and bank-credit are at the disposal of Wall Street and other speculators rests on a misunderstanding of causal relations. Wall Street does not, by using a large amount of bank-credit, take just that much away from ordinary business. Rather, it increases the amount available for ordinary business! Wall Street, and the other financial and speculative centres, supply the liquidity for bank assets, and so make possible loans on non-liquid paper. Banks do not need to have all their assets liquid. If they did, American banks would have long since gone under! The foregoing discussion of loans to farmers, and manufacturers and even merchants should have made that clear. But banks do need a substantial margin of liquidity, to protect the rest. They get it from stock exchange collateral loans, and from ownership of listed and easily marketable bonds, primarily. They get part of it from true commercial paper. Thus, the director of a country bank in Iowa told the writer that banks in his section—where banks owned in large measure by farmers, and dealing largely with farmers, are very numerous and important—make a regular practice of buying, through brokers, a considerable amount of notes of outside merchants. They do this to protect themselves. Their other loans, to farmers, while good, are slow. If pressed themselves, they cannot press their depositors. These notes bought through note-brokers, however, are impersonal. They can refuse to renew them. They can sell them again. They thus buttress the rest of their assets. They can thus lend more, rather than less, to local customers. They can safely get along with much smaller cash reserves. Similarly with the practice of country banks of sending a large part of their cash to Wall Street banks to be lent on call, for which the country banks get, say, 2% from the Wall Street banks. Their country customers would pay 6% or more for that money in some cases, but the banks dare not tie up more of their assets in non-liquid local paper. They lend more, rather than less, at home, because they send part away. Wall Street is not "draining our commerce of its life blood"![541] Wall Street is rather preventing that life blood from coagulating!
A second important practical conclusion relates to the provision in the Federal Reserve Act which forbids Federal Reserve Banks to rediscount stock exchange paper. This provision was intended to keep funds from being diverted from commerce to stock speculation, and doubtless met the approval of many very good students of the subject. If the foregoing be true, however, that provision is a mistake. It is a mistake, first, because it will lessen, rather than increase, the power of the Reserve Banks to provide relief to commerce through aiding in making bank assets liquid via the stock market. It will limit the liquid assets of the Federal Reserve Banks in too great a degree to gold. It is a mistake, in the second place, because it prevents the Reserve Banks, particularly in New York and Boston, from making satisfactory profits—which is one important purpose of a bank! Even more important, however, is the third objection: it prevents, in large degree, the Federal Reserve Banks from being effective weapons against the "Money Trust." How far we have a "Money Trust" need not be here argued. The Pujo Committee, relying in considerable degree on admissions of prominent financiers that "concentration had gone far enough," and on the inability of Mr. Baker to find more than one issue of securities of over $10,000,000 within ten years, without the coÖperation or participation of one of the members of a small group, concluded that we have a "Money Trust" in the sense that there is "an established and well-defined identity and community of interests between a few leaders of finance ... which has resulted in a vast and growing concentration of control of money and credit in the hands of a comparatively few men."[542] How far this conclusion is justified is, of course, a matter that would require elaborate discussion. There seems to be evidence that there is, since the death of the elder Morgan, a decided loosening of ties. One feels the need, moreover, of discounting very considerably many of the conclusions of the Pujo Committee. The present writer feels that the case has been made, however, that there has been, and probably continues, a much greater concentration of such control than is desirable. Whether or not there is at present such a "Money Trust," it seems pretty clear that temporary, if not permanent, alignments, may give effective monopoly control when the issue of very big blocks of securities is involved. For present purposes, however, it is enough to note that if there is, or should come to be, a "Money Trust," it is a trust concerned with financing industry, through handling security issues, and not a trust in the granting of ordinary commercial credit.[543] If, therefore, the Federal Reserve Banks are to compete with it, and break its monopoly, they must do it by entering the market with funds for the financing of corporate industry. Power to rediscount commercial paper seems a feeble and hardly relevant weapon against a combination concerned with purchasing securities, and making collateral loans! No doubt, this power is worth something. If an independent investment banker wishes to compete with a "Money Trust" in financing a new enterprise, he can go to his commercial banker, and offer collateral security for a loan; if the commercial banker wishes to aid him, but is short of lending power, he may, if he has plenty of commercial paper available for rediscount, rediscount it with the Federal Reserve Bank, and so get the additional funds. But a New York bank, or trust company, with the bulk of its assets in stock exchange investments, may well not have enough commercial paper eligible for rediscount, and the Federal Reserve Bank could help very much more effectively if it could take collateral loans directly. A fourth, and even more important objection to the restriction on stock exchange collateral loans for Federal Reserve Banks relates to the power of these banks to aid in a crisis. Crises first hit the stock market. Financial panics are most acute there. The need for immediate and drastic relief is greatest there. If stock exchange loans lose their liquidity, what of the rest of bank loans? Power to lend on stock exchange collateral, in the hands of the Federal Reserve Banks, may well prove, in crises, an essential, if we wish to make our system definitely "panic proof."[544]
And now for a vital theoretical conclusion from this lengthy analysis of bank loans. For the quantity theory, and the "equation of exchange," all exchanges stand on a par. If one exchange takes place, that lessens the money and credit available for another exchange. The more exchanges there are, the less money and credit there are per exchange, and the lower prices must be, as a consequence. Nothing could be more false. Exchanges are not on a par.[545] Some classes of exchanges increase, rather than decrease the funds available for handling others. The activity of the speculative markets, making loans fluid, enormously increases the lending power of the banks for all purposes. Exchanges of securities, especially, instead of lowering prices, make it easier for prices to rise.[546] The years of extraordinary stock sales have always been "bull" years. There have been big "bear" days,[547] but never big bear years, in the record of New York Stock Exchange share sales. The selling and reselling of speculative goods of securities, and of notes and bills are especially important as making it easier for banks to expand loans. To list all manner of items, as Professor Fisher does,[548] "real estate, commodities, stocks, bonds, mortgages, private notes, time bills of exchange, rented real estate, rented commodities, hired workers," and count them all as "actual sales," all part of the "goods"[549] which make up the "volume of trade," is to put the theory utterly beyond the pale. Seasonal calls on an inelastic money supply for actual cash to move crops and pay agricultural wages may make a real difference in the value of money; scarcity of money of the right denominations for retail trade may give an agio to such money,[550] but the money and credit used by speculators, bill brokers, dealers in foreign exchange, investment bankers, etc., increases, rather than decreases, the funds available for ordinary industry and commerce.
I have made clear the distinction between the direct and indirect financing of industry by banks. Great banks in Continental Europe often buy the stocks of new corporations, hold them permanently, put bank officers on the boards of directors, and supervise closely the operations of the companies. In America, while officers of commercial[551] banks often are members of boards of directors of the companies which borrow heavily from the banks, the practice is to make short-time loans to such companies (in form, if not in fact), and to lend on their securities, rather than to buy them. Our banks own securities in enormous amount, but they are chiefly seasoned bonds, rather than stocks of new or even well-proved, enterprises.
It is commonly supposed, too, that collateral loans are chiefly or almost wholly made to speculators, who buy securities in the expectation of holding them only till investors take them off their hands, and that investors buy them, not with bank-credit derived from loans, but with money or bank-credit which they accumulate by saving out of current income. It is particularly true of the higher grade securities, which savings banks and insurance companies can buy, that this is the case. The bank-credit thus serves for temporary, rather than for permanent financing, to the extent that this is true. I think, however, that the extent to which bank-credit serves for permanently financing industry is underrated. A good many investors have learned that the short-time money-rates are, on the long time average, lower than the yield on long-time securities.[552] They have learned, too, that high-yield securities—securities high in yield as compared with the long-time average of money-rates—can be obtained which can safely be carried on margins of thirty, forty and fifty points, without danger that even such catastrophes as the slump in security prices at the outbreak of the War will wipe the margins out. The old distinction between investors and speculators, the former those who buy for the yield, and the latter those who buy for an anticipated rise in capital value, no longer corresponds to the distinction between those who buy outright and those who buy on a margin. The investor, buying a 6 or 7% preferred stock, carrying it on a forty point margin, with money from his bank or broker at 4 or 5%, is making 6 or 7% on his own forty dollars, and is making the difference between 6 or 7% and 4 or 5% on the sixty dollars lent him by his banker or broker. He substantially increases his yield thereby, and his risks, if he chooses his stocks carefully, and scatters them among a number of issues, are not great. For the banker or broker, such a loan is perfectly satisfactory. The margin of security is wider than that demanded on more speculative securities. Such a borrower will receive consideration when more speculative loans are being called, or not renewed. The investor of this type is, in effect, engaging in a form of banking business. He is lending to the corporation funds which he has borrowed from others; he has put up his own capital for the same purpose that the bank uses its capital—to supply a margin of safety to those who have taken his short-term promises to pay. Like the bank, too, he converts rights to payments at a later date into rights to payment at an earlier date. He is one of the links in the chain whereby the wealth of low saleability employed in industry becomes distilled and refined till it enters the money market. His profits come in the difference in the yield as between more saleable and less saleable forms of rights.
The extent of this practice cannot be stated, so far as any data to which the present writer has access are concerned. The writer has met the practice in a good many cases. One brokerage house, with whose operations the writer has considerable acquaintance, makes a practice of advising its more conservative customers to do this. A good many brokerage houses sell investment securities on the "instalment plan," which often means, in practice, that the initial margin put up by the investor is his only payment, and that the security is gradually paid for by letting the yield increase the margin. During the extremely easy money of the present War period, occasional reference has been made in the financial papers to the practice of buying even the highest grade bonds on this basis—the yield of the bonds being very substantially higher than the money-rates, giving a comfortable profit to those who hold the bonds on a margin.
That the practice is not wider spread is due primarily, probably, to the temperamental qualities required. The investor, proper, is commonly a very conservative person, who has an unreasoning distrust of speculation, and to whom the word, "margin," necessarily suggests speculation. That buying a stock on a margin is the same sort of thing as buying the equity in a mortgaged farm, does not occur to him. On the other hand, the man who knows the market well enough to be willing to deal on margins, frequently is not content with the slow process of accumulation which comes from annual yields, and prefers to take larger chances in speculation on capital values. But there is an intermediate class, who buy investment securities, with narrow range of fluctuation in capital values, for the sake of the yield, and who buy them on margins, margins ample to enable them to sleep at night, and to neglect the daily market reports. I think that there are indications that this class is growing larger, and more important. Doubtless much more important than individual "bankers" of this sort, however, is the enormous number of houses dealing in securities, "wholesalers" and "retailers," who find profit on their "wares" even while on their "shelves," through the differential between the yield and the charge made by commercial banks on collateral loans. A very large percentage of collateral loans is made to institutions of this type. As this practice becomes more important, the result must be to widen the money market, to increase the proportion of banking capital that goes permanently into financing industry, and to reduce the difference in yield between short-time paper and long-time securities—in other words, to bring the "money-rates" closer and closer to the long-time interest rates.
This would have seemed very strange and weird to Adam Smith. It means, in effect, that the bulk of our banking credit is, directly or indirectly, financing our industry rather than our commerce. Adam Smith thought that a bank could safely lend to its customers only so much as they would otherwise keep by them in the form of money. Perhaps this notion, as growing out of some speculations regarding the general theory of money, should not be taken as the statement of Smith's practical attitude on the matter, but that practical attitude, as clearly expressed in the paragraph[553] following, is that a bank can afford to lend only for mercantile operations that are carried through in a very moderate time, that the bank can afford to supply only the minor part of the circulating capital, and no part of the fixed capital, of a merchant, or manufacturer, no part of his forge and smelting house, etc. Such loans lack the liquidity which the bank must insist upon. Only those persons who have withdrawn from active business, and are content with the income upon their capital, can afford to lend for such purposes. The theory is sound, on the basis of the facts as Smith knew them. But modern corporate organization and modern stock markets have changed all that. Anything that is highly saleable can come into the money market, and the modern corporation organization of business, coupled with organized stock exchanges and a large and active body of speculators, has made the forge and the smelting house as saleable as the finished product.
How far can the total wealth of the country, agricultural as well as industrial, be brought into the circle of the money market? The full answer to the question would go far beyond the limits of this book. If agriculture can be brought under the control of large corporations, there is little reason for supposing that it, too, might not come in. There are some peculiarities of agriculture, special dangers of drought and flood, dangers of over-production and low prices, wide seasonal fluctuations in conditions, which make it hard to standardize in any case. But mining and even the manufacturing of such things as primary steel products have wide variations in prosperity too. So long, however, as agriculture remains a matter of families on a homestead—and for social and political reasons, we may hope that this will always be the case—it is difficult to bring it in. Bonds of agricultural associations or of agricultural banks have had limited sale on the bourses of Europe. The present writer, for example, found it impossible to find in four great libraries in New York and Boston any quotation of the bonds of the Bayerische Landwirtschaftsbank. Apparently, in general, such securities have not high saleability. While this remains true, agriculture may expect to remain under a handicap of higher interest rates than industry and commerce.
If, however, all forms of wealth could be made equally saleable, we should find interest rates rising for those loans and securities which now have the highest saleability. They would lose the peculiarity which now enables them to perform a service as bearer of options. Money-rates and long-time rates of interest would tend to come together. Long-time rates on formerly unsaleable loans would fall, and rates on highly saleable loans would rise. The present low rates in the "money market" grow out of differential advantages.
We turn now to the third important aspect of the technique of banking, namely, the matter of cash reserves. First I would point out that this is merely a part of the more general problem of liquid assets. The difference between cash and liquid paper is a matter of degree. There is large possibility of substitution of the one for the other, as it becomes more profitable to use one or the other. When money-rates are low, it may well be worth while to carry large reserves; when money-rates are higher, the gains to be made by substituting paper for cash in the bank's assets are much greater. I have pointed out the use which great European banks, notably the Austro-Hungarian Bank, make of foreign bills of exchange as "reserve," selling bills when money is "easy," and the yield on bills is small, buying bills when money is "tight," and the yield on bills is large.[555] The great Joint Stock Banks of England, the chief sources of bank-credit in the great banking country of the world, also make use chiefly of deposits with the Bank of England as their "reserves." Some cash they keep, but it is "till money," rather than reserve. They carry, also, "secondary reserves" in highly liquid paper, stock exchange loans and commercial bills. The differences are differences in degree. The Bank of England does keep a large reserve in cash (including notes of the Issue Department and gold bullion) but it denies that it has any definite ratio in mind,[556] and it protects its reserves, when they are low, not by ceasing to loan, but by raising its discount-rate. The whole thing is highly flexible.
That reserves will increase, as expanding credit, due to increasing business or rising prices, requires increased reserves, can hardly be disputed, I think, if we look at a country of small size, or (what is the same thing from the angle of economic analysis, so far as the present problem is concerned) if we take a particular part of a country. Seasonal movements of cash for reserves in this country have been obviously determined by the movements of credit, rather than the reverse. Expanding business at crop moving seasons, requiring advances of credit by country banks, and an unusual drain on the cash resources of the country banks, has regularly meant that the country banks draw cash from the New York banks. When the need for such cash in the country banks passes, when they can no longer employ it to advantage at home, they send it back to New York. New York, to meet the emergency caused by the withdrawal of cash, draws to a considerable extent on Europe for gold. It is not as easy for New York to get gold quickly from Europe as it is for France to get gold in an emergency from England. More time is required. Inelasticity, too, in the forms of currency most needed for small transactions, has made very real difficulties for us. But that, within the country, the sections whose business and credit were expanding take cash reserves from those sections where credit is less urgently demanded, needs no debating. This is seasonal. But the same thing is true in the long run. As business and bank-credit have expanded, year by year, in Oklahoma, Oklahoma's cash reserves have grown. Bank-credit in a country cannot go on indefinitely mounting, if bankers are making unsound loans, if the values on which the loans rest are based on vain imaginings, if anticipated profits are not realized. But if a country have rich resources and intelligent entrepreneurs, with sagacious bankers who can discriminate between sound and unsound business, it may, within very wide limits indeed, expand its bank-credit without check from inadequate reserves, as its business expands, and as prices, particularly prices of lands and securities, rise.[561]
If the country in question be a very large country, however,—large in the sense that its business and volume of bank-credit are very large, and particularly in the sense that bankers' assets are of such character that a large volume of reserves is desirable—restraints on the process of expansion may come. Reserves will come in, but the resistance in stiffer money-rates will be felt. Bankers in other countries will compete with the bankers in the country in question for reserves. Rising money-rates will put an end to many marginal exchanges. They will lessen the saleability of many rights which might otherwise be available as banking collateral. The extension of bank-credit will feel a drag. There is large flexibility here. But, in a long run period of many years, the volume of gold in the world will impose a maximum limit upon the possibility of expansion of bank-credit in the world as a whole. This limit is doubtless never reached. Within the limit, the variations in the volume of the world's credit are primarily determined by the other concrete factors we have been discussing. Proportionality between the world's gold and the world's volume of credit does not at all obtain. Under certain conditions, much higher proportions of reserves to bank-credit will be found in a given country than at other times, and the same will be true in the world at large.
Increasing volume of gold tends to increase the volume of trade. But there are other causes for the increase or decrease of trade as well. These causes, working in harmony with rapidly expanding volume of gold, lead to a very rapid growth of trade.[564] Working in the face of a drag from less rapidly growing gold supply, they strain the possibilities of bank-credit expansion. Various substitutes for gold in bank reserves are employed. Substitutes in the form of other forms of credit are employed. Barter is resorted to increasingly. Methods of employing other things than gold in the retail trade of a country are resorted to. "Gold-exchange" standards are devised. Countries "wait their turns " to come on the gold standard. CoÖperation, not only within countries, but among countries, seeks to economize the scanty stock of the precious metal. Very large slack is thus revealed. But the expansion of business is checked, the volume of business confidence is reduced, the values of future incomes in enterprises is lowered, production is checked, and prices are reduced, (a) because the value of money rises; and (b) because the values of goods and income-bearers is reduced. The exchange side of production is hampered. Substitutes for gold, through increased activities of bankers and other agents of exchange, are costly. Greater tolls on values are taken by those who handle the mechanism of exchange. It does make a difference whether or not the world's gold is abundant! But the difference is not made solely, or even mainly, in the price-level.[565]
Apart from dynamic changes, from frictional elements which create uncertainties, in general, apart from uncertainty and irregularity and lack of "normality," there would be no occasion for bank reserves at all! To the extent that static conditions are realized, bank cash reserves may be, and are, dispensed with. It is well known that England gets along with surprisingly little gold. The total stock in the country has been smaller than the gold reserve of the Banque de France, and much of the gold in England was in use among the people, since small paper money (before the War) was not in use in England. The gold reserve of the Bank of England has been usually only a fraction of that of the Banque de France. Some years since, the distribution of gold as between England and the United States, was, roughly, England six hundred million dollars, the United States, one billion, six hundred million. A larger proportion of gold was in reserves in the United States than in England. Yet England was doing the banking business of the world, while we had trouble in doing our own! The Bank of England carries virtually the only reserve in the country. The Joint Stock Banks, with demand liabilities vastly in excess of the demand liabilities of the Bank of England, carry only "till money" in cash or Bank of England notes, and for the rest, carry as their "reserve" their deposit credits with the Bank. A great deal of criticism, from Bagehot down (to go no further back) has been directed at the "inadequacy" of English banking reserves, and many dire predictions have been made as to the dangers that impended unless the reserves were increased. We shall probably hear less of this after the War! The Bank of England still stands! It has never failed to pay out gold over its counters, even though it has, with the aid of the government, doubtless restricted and controlled foreign shipments of gold. But it has met the unprecedented emergency better than any other bank in Europe, and to-day (Sept. 1916) is in exceedingly good shape. Sterling exchange at New York seems "pegged" at the "lower gold point," and apprehensions regarding the stability of the English financial system seem definitely allayed. It is aside from our present purpose to discuss war time conditions. I am rather interested in analyzing the features of the English money market which have made it possible, in the period preceding the War, for English bankers to get on with so little gold. As will appear, it is because English business and financial affairs have been more nearly "static," have come nearer to realizing the assumptions of static economic theory, than is true of any other country on earth.
What comes to London is fluid. Everything comes to London! The multiplicity of items dealt in gives stability to that business which deals with all—the banking business. The London Stock Exchange is no provincial affair, easily demoralized by an adverse rate decision! Securities of every country on earth are listed there, and speculated in. It must be a world catastrophe which really demoralizes the London stock market!
It will doubtless seem strange to many to say that New York cannot displace London as the centre of world finance, that the dollar cannot displace the pound sterling in financing international trade, because New Yorkers do not speculate enough! They do speculate enormously, but not in many things. A restricted list of stock exchange securities—almost wholly American; cotton—in which New York is the world centre; coffee, in which New York has the largest volume of speculative futures, though yielding precedence, ordinarily, to Havre, Hamburg and Santos[571] in spot transactions. There is extensive sugar speculation at the New York Coffee Exchange, which has, indeed, recently changed its name to indicate the fact. There is a produce exchange in New York, but it is a very small affair as compared with the Chicago Board of Trade, and its operations and scope are infinitesimal when compared with the produce speculation in London. Of course, there is a vast deal of unorganized speculation in many things in New York, as in business everywhere, particularly in America. But, while the pecuniary magnitudes of organized speculation in New York are very great, the range of items dealt in is restricted. New York banks cannot possibly get such a variety of collateral, based on standardized and readily marketable goods and securities, as can London. New York, consequently, cannot finance international trade, save as an auxiliary to London—and New York banks must have vastly more gold in their vaults than London bankers need! As goods and securities become more marketable, gold—whose services are needed because of its superior marketability—becomes less necessary.
The whole story of London's organization would be a long one. London financial institutions have a degree of expertness, growing out of specialization, in large part, which makes all manner of paper fluid in the London money market which would lack fluidity in New York. The Acceptance Houses are a sort of international Bradstreet and Dun. They know intimately the standing and business of houses all over the world. They do not give out their information, but they do put their stamp on the paper of business houses, thus standardizing it, lending, not money, but "pure credit," while the other banks, relieved of the necessity of investigating the paper, can buy it as a miller might buy No. 1 wheat. There is the extraordinary extension of insurance, so that virtually any kind of risk may be shifted to those well able to bear it. All this makes for liquidity, for "static" conditions in the money market, and dispenses with the need for gold.
As we approach static conditions, we need less and less gold reserve behind bank demand liabilities. The static law of bank reserves is that none are needed! I think we have here the real reason why writers who have sought to give us the law for a "normal" ratio have given us such vague phrases as "shown by experience to be necessary," and the like. When irregularity of income and outgo in a bank's business, non-liquid assets, business cycles, uncertainties, legislative changes affecting business, crop failures, changes in demand, new inventions, wars, are abstracted from, no reason can be given why a banker should keep any reserve at all! But these things are dynamic things. And it is characteristic of irregularities that they are irregular. To get a "normal" ratio out of them is not easy.
On the static assumptions, an "ideal credit economy" is perfectly possible. If everything that needs to be marketed is perfectly marketable, if the stream of business flows regularly and without friction in the same channels, if all contingencies are foreseen and dated in advance, a bank needs no cash reserve. All payments can be made by bank-credit. Banks bookkeeping becomes merely a refinement of barter, with money remaining as a measure of values, a unit for reckoning, but not being used as a medium of exchange, or as a bearer of options, or in reserves. The measure of values function is the great static function of money.
To the extent that static assumptions are not realized, we need money in bank reserves. This extent is a thing that varies from time to time, and from place to place. It is not the same for a given place from time to time, nor is it the same at all places at a given time. It is not the same for the whole world from time to time.
Since friction, preventing the free marketing of goods and securities and services, exists, since there are dynamic changes which require readjustments through exchanges, we need the work of the banker and he needs cash. But there are other things than money which make for the "statification" of the market. The speculator does it. And the other agencies of the sort represented in the London market do it. They are substitutes for gold. Gold has no monopoly. The services performed by gold can be performed in many other ways, and by many other agencies. There is enormous flexibility in the matter.