THE Bourbon kings aimed to complete the long evolution, dating from centuries before, toward the personal authority of the monarch in a pure absolutism. This movement had gone farther in other countries, although the current had set the other way in England. France under Louis XIV, if not the most extreme example of an absolute government, was certainly the most influential, and the phrase “I am the state!” attributed to the great French monarch, was (whether in fact uttered by him or not) symbolic of his ideal. It was in the atmosphere of the court of Versailles that Philip V spent his youth, wherefore it was the most natural thing in the world for him to desire the establishment in Spain of a system which he had always been accustomed to believe was the only true method of rule. Even had Philip ever doubted it, Louis XIV took care to inculcate in him the concept of absolutism. Philip showed on various occasions that he understood the French ideal of kingship,—as in his opposition to the calling of the Castilian Cortes, his denial of the right of the Consejo to share in certain governmental functions, and his habitual employment of such phrases as “for such is my will” in royal decrees. The same criterion was followed by his successors. Charles IV ordered certain laws which were inconsistent with the absolutist ideal to be stricken out of the NovÍsima RecopilaciÓn, or Latest Compilation of the Laws (1805), before he would allow that code to be published, stating that those acts (which had been incorporated in the Nueva RecopilaciÓn of 1567) were representative of a time when the weakness of the monarchy had compelled the kings to make concessions which were inconsistent with their sovereign authority. The laws referred to concerned the intervention of the Consejo in royal donations, the obligation of the king to consult with the three estates of the Cortes in dealing with momentous affairs, and the injunction that no new taxes should be levied without the grant of a Cortes. In the statement of their ideal the kings met with little opposition, for this view was generally supported by all classes of society. Men who were liberal reformers in other ways were rigid in their maintenance of the principle of absolutism, and the people themselves, not only Castilians, but others as well, even including the Catalans, were intensely royalist.

Nevertheless, the Bourbons were more democratic in their manner than the less autocratic kings of the House of Austria. It is said that Philip V was the first to inaugurate the practice of allowing his higher government officials to be seated while talking business with him, whereas the Hapsburg custom had been to require them to remain on their knees. The kings’ advisers now became veritable ministers, with a more frank participation in government than had been the case with the secretaries and favorites of the preceding era. Furthermore, the Bourbons represented the “enlightened despotism,” which had so many remarkable manifestations in eighteenth century western Europe. In keeping with this ideal the kings showed marked interest in social, economic, and intellectual reforms of a philanthropic character, without yielding an iota of their political prerogative. A great revolution took place, having a fundamental groundwork of democracy in it (which was to find expression at a later time in the field of politics), but which was accomplished wholly from above. The idea might have been expressed: “Everything for the people, but nothing by them.” The only exception to this rule was the royal program whereby the popular element gained an entrance to the ayuntamientos, or municipal governing bodies.

Naturally, all machinery of a democratic character was viewed with suspicion, and such was the case with the Cortes. Only at the accession of Luis I was a Cortes called to swear in the new king, although that body was several times asked to acknowledge the princes of Asturias. The Cortes of Castile was summoned four times by Philip V and once each by Charles III and Charles IV, but in two of the meetings under Philip not all of the elements were called, and in the dismissal of the Cortes of Charles IV it was made apparent that the nobles and clergy had no necessary inclusion in that body. Furthermore, the Cortes was called to perform some specific act,—such as the recognition of the princes above-named, the making and later the revocation of the so-called Salic law, and the approval of Philip’s renunciation of his rights to the French throne,—after which it was dismissed, without having an opportunity to discuss other matters. When the Cortes of 1789 was retained in session to treat of certain economic questions, some of the deputies formulated petitions concerning affairs of government,—whereupon the authorities hastened to bring the sittings to a close. The Cortes of other regions were equally lacking in importance. The Cortes of Aragon met once, and that of Valencia not at all; both were incorporated into the Castilian Cortes in 1709. The Cortes of Catalonia met twice, but after 1724 it followed the course already taken in the case of Aragon and Valencia, and the same was true of the representatives from Majorca. The Cortes of Navarre continued to meet separately, being called eleven times, but it took no action of conspicuous importance. Nevertheless, the memory of the former power of the Cortes was not dead, and many persons saw in its restoration, possibly with new functions, a means for the reform of the country. In addition to having rendered the Cortes completely innocuous the kings took other steps to check popular intervention in national affairs. It had been the custom for the municipalities to send special commissioners to the capital to negotiate for them with the crown. This practice (which reminds one of the colonial agent of American history) was forbidden by a law of 1715 (repeated in 1804), on the alleged ground of avoiding unnecessary expense to the towns. A law of 1777 allowed the sending of special agents, however, for one purpose,—that of witnessing the births of royal children! Thus did the kings contribute both to the security and to the glamour of royalty.

If the Spanish kings were so careful to avoid any diminution in their authority through the restoration of the former powers of the Cortes, it may well be imagined that they were alarmed over the political ideas of the French encyclopedists of the later eighteenth century and still more so over those of the French revolutionaries after 1789. The works of such French writers as Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Mirabeau, or of the Englishmen Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and others were in many libraries of Spain, and some of them were translated. The Encyclopedia itself found its way into the peninsula. High Spanish officials, like Aranda, maintained correspondence with some of the French reformers, as did also some of the great Spanish nobles,—for example, the Duke of Alba with Rousseau, and the Marquis of Miranda with Voltaire. It was the fashion, too, for Spaniards to get part of their education in France, or for French professors, French laborers, and, later, French revolutionary propagandists to cross the Pyrenees. Thus the new ideas gained a footing in Spain, where they were taken up at educational institutions, especially at the University of Salamanca, and by some newspapers (for that type of periodical had begun to appear), although expressions were naturally somewhat guarded. With the outbreak of the French Revolution, Floridablanca sent troops to the northern frontier to prevent the entry of political agitators. The Inquisition issued edicts against the introduction of prohibited books, and published a new index in 1790, followed by a supplement in 1805, for the rationalist ideas of the French reformers were not in accord with those of the church. The civil authorities took similar action; the Encyclopedia was barred in 1784, and many other works at other times; in 1792 officials were placed at customs-houses to examine all writings, whether printed or manuscript; and in 1805 a tribunal of printing (Juzgado de Imprenta) was created, independent of the Consejo and the Inquisition. These measures failed to prevent the dissemination of French literature and thought, but were successful in checking any effective expression of democratic or republican ideals during this period. While men of influence approved the philanthropic side of the new ideas, very few of them accepted their political tenets. It was quite the usual thing for men to say that the contract between monarch and people was equally binding on both, or to express admiration for the freedom of thought permitted in England, while they opposed the forming of deliberative assemblies in Spain, and stood solidly behind the principle of absolutism. Some of the younger men went completely over to revolutionary ideas, and in 1795 some republican clubs were discovered, while many of the inhabitants of GuipÚzcoa gave substantial aid to the French army of invasion in 1794. The reaction came quickly, as a result of the tyrannical conduct of the French military authorities. Thus the spirit of democracy in Spain seemed crushed, but it was not in fact destroyed, as was amply proved a few years later in the radical outburst of the Cortes of CÁdiz.

Side by side with the development of absolutism there had been an effort on the part of the kings for many centuries to promote the centralization of political and administrative authority in the state as represented by the crown, and to bring about uniformity in the law. These tendencies were accelerated by the Bourbons, whose first opportunity came as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, when Philip V was opposed by many of the non-Castilian parts of Spain. In 1707 the special statutes and privileges of Aragon and Valencia were abolished and their place taken by the laws and practices of Castile. In both regions a royally appointed audiencia and captain-general were set up. This action was not taken for Catalonia until 1716. In that year it was provided by the so-called decree of the “new plan” (Nueva Planta) that the laws and customs of Castile were to apply in Catalonia; that the Catalan language was not to be used in the administration of justice; that an audiencia and captain-general of royal selection were to serve as the principal governmental agencies of the region; that Catalonia was to be divided into twelve districts, over which corregidores named by the king should rule; and that the twenty-four regidores (councilmen) of the ayuntamiento of Barcelona, which city had been deprived of its former type of government, should also be royally appointed. The decree of 1716 did not attempt to establish complete unification with Castile, however. Many former Catalan rights continued to exist until the nineteenth century,—such, for example, as the Catalan system of criminal law and the issue of Catalan coins. Furthermore, there was no appeal from the decisions of the audiencia to the central government,—an exceptional case. Nevertheless, the principles of centralization and unification had been in the main attained, and later measures tended to secure these ends still more completely. Philip’s opponents in the War of the Spanish Succession were persecuted, and the royal ideas were furthered by the acts of the influential partisans of the king; in 1717 the bishop of Gerona, Taverner, summoned a provincial council with a view to “threatening with the wrath of God and the excommunication of the church” whoever should be unfaithful to Philip V and to ordering confessors to treat such infidelity as a sin. In Majorca the king placed an audiencia and a commandant-general, appointing also the local councillors of Palma and Alcudia, while the audiencia named those of the other towns. The special privileges of the Basque provinces were respected in theory, but, without apparent change in the laws, the central government gradually obtained control through the inspection or the intervention of ministers of state and the Consejos. Much the same course was followed with Navarre, in which the former agencies of government were left apparently undisturbed. The policy of centralization was also manifested in other respects than those of a purely regional application. Thus exemptions from military service were limited; the reversion of seigniorial rights to the king was facilitated; and, in fine, the tendency was to reduce all forms of jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise, to the king or his representatives in the central administration. Many regions continued to have at least the vestiges of their former institutions, but enough was done so that the Spanish kingdom may fairly be said to have become unitary for the first time in history.

The most notable change in the machinery of government concerned the development of the secretariats. There got to be five of them, corresponding to the more important of the Consejos under the Consejo de Castilla, as follows: state (Estado); grace and justice (Gracia y Justicia); war and finance (Guerra y Hacienda); navy (Marina); and the Indies (Indias). There were variations from this arrangement at different times; for example, the navy and the Indies were often a single secretariat in the first half century of the era. Gradually it became the custom to call the secretaries ministers, and these officials began to absorb the powers formerly confided to the Consejos, presaging the disappearance of the latter and the development of modern ministries. As already pointed out, they also acquired a greater liberty and initiative in the performance of their duties, especially in the reigns of Ferdinand VI and Charles III. It was customary for them to consult with the king every morning, however. No new Consejos, or councils, were added in this period, and the Consejo de AragÓn, last of the councils of the former crown of Aragon, was suppressed in 1707. Essentially, the Consejos continued to exercise the same functions as formerly, although losing ground to the rapidly advancing secretaries, or ministers. The Consejo de Castilla retained its importance, however, and its president, or governor, was the leading officer of state. It is to be noted that both the Consejo and the CÁmara, despite their retention of the name Castile, dealt with the affairs of other regions of the peninsula, quite as much as did the councils with more general names. Except for Navarre, which continued to be a viceroyalty, the other regions of Spain apart from New Castile (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Granada, Andalusia, Old Castile, Galicia, Asturias, Extremadura, and the Canary Islands) were placed under captain-generals or commandant-generals with military and administrative powers. A number of audiencias were added, until now there were eleven such bodies (Valladolid, Granada, Galicia, Seville, the Canaries, Majorca, Valencia, Saragossa, Barcelona, Asturias, and Extremadura), exercising both civil and judicial functions. In 1718 the institution of the intendancies was created to take over financial administration in the various regions, although this reform was not put into effect definitely until 1749. There were twenty-three intendants, of whom six were military. Under the captain-generals there were smaller districts ruled by corregidores, most of whom were civilians. The judicial functions of the corregidor were gradually taken over by alcaldes mayores, who ranked under the corregidores, leaving the executive power in the hands of the latter. In some cases these lesser districts were ruled over by officials called military governors. The term “province” was applied to districts of very unequal size. While there were only eight in the combined realms of Aragon, Navarre, and the Basque provinces, there were twenty-four in Castile. Charles III planned to divide Spain into a number of provinces of about the same size, but did not carry out his idea.

While municipal life as a virile factor which might withstand the king had long since been dead, there was too much local authority still in existence to please the autocratic Bourbons. Furthermore, abuses in administration had developed which caused the kings to be philanthropically desirous of a remedy. To accomplish these ends they aimed at a more complete subjection of the towns to the royal authority and the democratization of the ayuntamientos. The principal difficulty in the way of these objectives was the fact that many municipal offices were held as a perpetual right by specific families, especially in the case of the regidores,—for which state of affairs the kings of the House of Austria had not infrequently been responsible by their sales of such privileges. This resulted in an aristocratic control of the municipalities, with consequent usurpations of land by the rich and the placing of the burdens of taxation on the poor. Unable to buy up these hereditary rights the royal government chose to follow what was in effect a policy of legal confiscation. This was easily accomplished for Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca; as already pointed out, the king took advantage of the outcome of the War of the Spanish Succession to take all of these appointments into his own hands or into those of the audiencias. As for Castile, laws were passed requiring the approval of the central authorities before an heir to municipal office could succeed to such an inheritance. As a result the government was enabled to refuse its assent in a number of cases. Meanwhile, the alcaldes continued to be appointed by the king or by the lord, according as they were royal (realengos) or seigniorial (seÑorÍos) towns. Even the seigniorial towns were attacked, for a law of 1802 provided with regard to them that the servants or dependents of the lord could not exercise jurisdiction in his place; that the royal institution of the residencia was never to be dispensed with; and that the alcaldes mayores of the large towns must be lawyers who had been licensed to practice by the royal consejos or audiencias. No attempt was made to disturb the composition of the ayuntamientos of Navarre and the Basque provinces, although these regions, like the rest of Spain, were subject to laws of a general character concerning municipalities. One such general law, in 1751, required all municipalities to send their accounts annually to the CÁmara de Castilla for inspection, and this was supplemented by a law of 1764, ordering them to deposit their surplus funds with the royal intendant of the province. Another decree, dated 1760, assigned the direction of municipal finance to the Consejo. Yet other laws were enacted, the total effect of which, together with those just mentioned, was to place the whole question of municipal income and expenditures in royal hands. The initiative for the democratization of the ayuntamientos came in the reign of Charles III. In 1766 he created the post of deputy of the common people (diputado del comÚn), which official was empowered to examine the financial accounts of the towns. These officers, of whom there were to be two in the smaller towns and four in the larger, were chosen by a body of men who had previously been elected by the people. In like manner a popular syndic (sÍndico) was elected who represented the masses before the ayuntamiento, with a right to take part in deliberations and to propose reforms. At the same time, the office of regidor was thrown open to plebeians. This law was a blow at the caballero class of the nobility, which had monopolized the holding of municipal office. There was much dissatisfaction over the enactment, and the Basque provinces went so far as to protest. Nevertheless, there was no outward resistance; the aristocracy of the towns limited itself to opposing the election of plebeians and to hindering their action in office.

Despite the thoroughgoing nature of the Bourbon absolutism, it is fitting for the first time to award special credit to the secretaries of state, or ministers, although the kings were responsible for their selection as well as for their acts. This was an age of great reformers. The initiative came from France on the accession of Philip V, and the first great name is that of a Frenchman, Orry. When he came to Spain, in 1701, he found that the income of the state was about 142,000,000 reales ($8,875,000) while expenditures were 247,000,000 ($15,437,500). The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession made the situation still worse. Yet he displayed such ability that national receipts actually advanced in course of the war, and were some 160,000,000 ($10,000,000) at its end. Amelot, another Frenchman, was an even more remarkable figure. He coÖperated with Orry to increase the revenues, and reorganized and bettered the administration of the army. The Italian Alberoni and the Dutchman RipperdÁ were less notable as reformers. With the fall of the latter in 1726 there began an era of great ministers of Spanish birth. First of these was PatiÑo, who, though born in Italy, was of a Galician family. He was especially prominent for his financial reforms, but was also noteworthy for his measures to develop commerce and improve the army and navy. In an age when graft was general, and in a country which has rarely been backward in this particular, PatiÑo was able to achieve the distinction of dying poor; his death occurred in 1736. The next notable financial reformer was Campillo, an Asturian who had been born poor, though of hidalgo rank. More important, however, was Somodevilla, a Castilian of very humble birth who became Marquis of Ensenada, by which name he is more generally known. The period of his power was from 1743 to 1754, and his reforms covered the same matters as those mentioned above in the case of PatiÑo, although he was especially remarkable in his endeavors on behalf of the Spanish navy. His fall in 1754 (as a result of his disagreement with Ferdinand VI with regard to the treaty with Portugal concerning Sacramento and Paraguay) was received with rejoicing in England; the English ambassador reported exultingly that Spain would build no more ships. Ensenada was responsible, also, for the construction of important public works, and once suggested the idea of single tax as worthy of trial in Spain.

The greatest reformers, however, belonged to the reign of Charles III and the early years of Charles IV. Earlier ministers had increased the national revenues and cut down expenses, but the deficit had not been wiped out. One of the great names of both of the above-named reigns was that of the Count of Aranda, of a distinguished Aragonese noble family. Aranda was obstinate, brutal in speech, aggressive, and energetic, but a man of vast information and clear foresight,—as witness his prediction, in 1775, of the future greatness of the yet unborn United States. Aside from his connection with Spain’s foreign policies he particularly distinguished himself while president of the Consejo de Castilla by the reforms, already referred to, whereby Madrid became a clean and acceptable city. Yet more famous was JosÉ MoÑino, son of an ecclesiastical notary of Murcia, who was ennobled as the Count of Floridablanca. An honorable man in every sense of the word, just, intelligent, and solicitous for his friends, he was hot-tempered, and unbending in his hostility to his opponents. His action made itself felt in the improvement of the means of communication in the peninsula and in his economic reforms of a commercial nature, such as the great free trade decree of 1778, which abandoned certain phases of the narrowly monopolistic policy which Spain had always followed in her trade with the colonies. Campomanes was an Asturian and, like Somodevilla, of very humble birth, but he rose to be, many hold, the greatest of the men who labored for the social and economic regeneration of Spain in the eighteenth century. He was also the most representative of his age, for, in addition to his measures to develop a better system of internal communications and to foster industry, commerce, and technical popular education, he was a determined royalist,—the embodiment, therefore, of the ideal of the enlightened despotism. Like Aranda and Floridablanca he served for a time under Charles IV, although his greatest work belonged to the reign of Charles III. Three names deserve mention for the reign of Charles IV. Jovellanos was an Asturian of an illustrious family. He distinguished himself by his reforms in finance in conjunction with one Saavedra, but both were early deprived of their posts, as a result of the hostility of Godoy. The third name is that of Godoy, who introduced notable reforms in public instruction and in the organization of the army and navy,—whatever may be the judgment with regard to his foreign policy. The names of some of the great ministers of the Indies are also worthy of record. In addition to PatiÑo and Ensenada the most noteworthy were JuliÁn de Arriaga (1750 or 1751-1776) and JosÉ de GÁlvez (1776-1787), especially the former. The results, in terms of revenue, of the activities of the great ministers may serve to give some indication of the effectiveness of their work. In 1766, receipts exceeded expenditures by about 133,000,000 reales ($8,312,500). In 1778 revenues amounted to 630,000,000 ($39,375,000); in 1784 to 685,000,000 ($42,812,500); and in 1787 to 616,000,000 ($38,500,000). Though annual expenditures were much less, the government was never able to overcome the deficit, although the national debt reached its lowest point in the reign of Charles III. In 1791 revenues were some 800,000,000 ($50,000,000), but they fell to a general level of about 600,000,000 ($37,500,000) in the years 1793 to 1795, while expenditures, which had reached 708,000,000 ($44,250,000) in 1793, were 1,030,000,000 ($64,375,000) in 1795. Thus the deficit began to increase again, and in 1808 it was over 7,200,000,000 reales ($450,000,000), an enormous sum as national indebtedness went then.

The efforts made by the great reformers appear the more commendable when one considers the difficulties they had to overcome. Great changes always run counter to vested interests, but this was more than usually the case in Spain.

The nobles and the church were the most powerful elements in opposition; even though their authority was but little, as compared with that of earlier years, they were still able to hinder the execution of laws which damaged their interests. Nearly everyone seemed to have an exemption from taxation, or desired it, but the reformers set themselves resolutely against that state of affairs. Their success against the force of vested interests was only fair, for that element was too great to overcome; the very bureaucracy itself displayed a weakness in this particular, for it insisted on the maintenance of a custom which had sprung up that government officials might buy certain articles at a fixed price, whatever the charge to others. This calls to mind the overwhelming evil of graft, which it seemed impossible to eliminate; indeed, high officials were altogether too prone to regard it as a more or less legitimate perquisite, and did not hesitate to accept large gifts of money from foreign diplomats. Difficulties over questions of etiquette, inherent in a centralized bureaucratic government, also stood in the way of the proper execution of the laws. For example, a serious dispute arose in 1745 between the bishop of Murcia and the Inquisition, when the latter claimed that the members of that body should have a better place in church than others. It was at length decided that they should not. In 1782 the commandant-general of Majorca complained that the wives of the oidores of the audiencia had not called on his wife on the occasion of the king’s birthday. He was sustained, and the regente (regent, or president) of the audiencia was imprisoned for a number of months by way of punishment. Several years later the ladies of Palma complained that the wife of the commandant-general was in the habit of going out in the street with an armed escort and demanding a military salute. This time the ladies were upheld, and the escort was prohibited. These are only a few instances out of thousands, and if there was so much stir over such trifling matters it can well be imagined how much more serious the problem was in the case of disputes between officials as to jurisdiction. Official etiquette is an important matter in all countries, but Spaniards have always been insistent on the letter of their rights and very sensitive over the omission of any act to which their position entitles them. Furthermore, these controversies carried in their train vast files of papers, of charges, answers and countercharges, and the evidence of witnesses. These questions had to be resolved, causing great expenditure in both time and money. No country was ever more diligent than Spain in the multiplication of state papers over affairs which ranged from those of vital importance to the most trivial incidents. The historian may have cause to rejoice over the existence of so much material, but the nation suffered,—although it is difficult to see how its contemporary accumulation could have been avoided in an absolutism like that of the Spanish Bourbons.

One of the principal objects of the reforms was the rehabilitation of the army and navy so that Spain might be in a better position in international affairs. In the army the volunteer system was employed for a while, but it was effective only in procuring contingents of foreign mercenaries and in filling the ranks of the royal guard. Gradually the idea of the draft came into favor, and it was tried several times, becoming a definitive law in the reign of Charles III. The law of Charles III provided that one man in every five—hence the term quinta for this institution—should become subject to military service for a term of eight years. This system was resisted in all parts of the peninsula, but was allowed to stand, although it proved impossible of enforcement. Through graft or favor, whether of the local officials charged with administering the law or of doctors who examined the individual drawn, practically nobody was required to serve except those totally lacking in influence. It was customary to seize tramps and petty criminals and send them instead of the legitimately drafted men. The government itself adopted the principle of forced levies, or impressment, of vagabonds and bad characters, but these men proved to be poor soldiers and deserted frequently. Thus the number of troops was not great, but in any event it would have been difficult to support more numerous contingents, owing to the lack of funds; even as matters were it was customary to grant a four months’ furlough at the season when crops were gathered. In times of war, rigorous methods were used to get the needed men, or else they came forward voluntarily, out of patriotism. The reserve was formed by regional bodies of militia, which did not draw back when their services were needed in war. At the beginning of the era it is said that there were 20,000 poorly equipped soldiers in the Spanish army; in 1737 the total of infantry and cavalry was 42,920; in 1758 the total of all arms, 108,777. Numbers increased under Charles III, but declined under Charles IV. In 1808, at the moment of the outbreak against Napoleon, there were from 136,000 to 147,000 but only about 100,000 effective troops, and even these were badly armed. The situation becomes clear in the light of the expense involved; the army of 1758, in a time of peace, cost some 205,000,000 reales ($12,812,500), a saving of 34,000,000 ($2,125,000) over the expenditures required prior to the enactment of certain reforms by Ferdinand VI. It will be seen that a considerable portion of the annual revenue was needed. In this period the hierarchy of officials (from the captain-generals down through the various grades of generals, colonels, captains, and lieutenants) and of military units (such as brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies) was established in, broadly speaking, the form it has retained ever since. The gun with the bayonet had now become the principal infantry weapon, and artillery had been developed to a high point as compared with the previous era. Flags and uniforms varied; the latter were picturesque, but adapted more to encouraging the soldier’s morale than to developing his freedom of action. A number of military schools were founded for the different branches of the service,—the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

The eighteenth century marked the birth of a real Spanish navy. At the outset, and during the great war which opened the era, there was virtually none at all, but in 1714 Orry took steps, which were later furthered by Alberoni, PatiÑo, and especially by Ensenada, to develop an effective fleet. In 1761 there were 49 men-of-war (navÍos), 22 frigates, and a number of smaller ships; in 1788, 64 men-of-war, 53 frigates, and 60 boats of other types, with 50,000 sailors, 20,000 infantry, 3000 artillerymen, and numerous officials of the navy department. Each war with England during the century resulted in the destruction of a considerable portion of the fleet, and the battle of Trafalgar, in 1805, destroyed it as a fighting unit, even though Spain still had 42 men-of-war, 30 frigates, and 146 other ships in 1806. The man-of-war was the principal type of vessel employed in this era, carrying from sixty to a hundred cannon, while the faster sailing frigate had from thirty to fifty cannon. Many auxiliary vessels—transports and smaller fighting ships, such as brigs and sloops of war—were used. The galley went out of service, although one was built as late as 1794. The Spanish navy suffered from a number of defects, however, which made it distinctly inferior to the English, or even to the French. The wood for the masts was fragile and the material for the sails was of bad quality, while boats were so poorly taken care of, that they deteriorated rapidly. The provision of food supplies and effects for the men was faulty, and the men on board, especially the artillerymen and the infantry, were of very poor calibre. Ensenada remarked that the Spanish navy of his day was all appearances, without substance, but set about to the best of his ability to rectify the situation. He improved shipyards, sent officers of talent abroad to study the methods employed elsewhere, gave inducements to English shipbuilders to come to Spain, built shops for the making of rigging and other equipment needed on ships of war, endeavored to improve the personnel of Spanish crews, and surrounded himself with the most competent naval men he could find. Ensenada and the other reformers did a great deal, but they could not overcome the never-ending difficulties in the way of obtaining men in sufficient numbers and of suitable quality for the requirements of the navy. The fishermen of the Spanish coasts continued to be drafted as sailors, and became less unwilling to serve than formerly when efforts were made to be punctual in payments of wages and to protect the families of the mariners. The recruiting of marine infantry and artillerymen, however, suffered from the same evil as the raising of the land forces, with one important result, which was that Spanish cannon were badly served.

Naturally, a period so rich in reforms as this was bound to have a great body of legislation. In Castile this was almost exclusively in the various forms of royal orders, recording the directions given by the king and his ministers, and the decisions of the Consejos. Thus the work of the Nueva RecopilaciÓn of 1567 got to be out of date, although five new editions were published in the eighteenth century, with the addition of some of the recent laws. Finally, a proposal for another codification was approved, and the compilation was made by Juan de la Reguera, who brought it out in twelve books, under the title of the NovÍsima recopilaciÓn de las leyes de EspaÑa (Newest, or Latest, Compilation of the Laws of Spain). Reguera claimed to have solved the problem of the concentration of legal material, but in fact his work suffered from the same defects as the earlier codes of Montalvo and Arrieta. His distribution of the laws was faulty, and he failed to indicate many important acts which were still in force. Furthermore, he reproduced the ordinance of AlcalÁ (1348), repeated in the laws of Toro and the Nueva RecopilaciÓn, according to which the laws of various earlier codes, such as the Fuero Real, remained in effect in so far as they had not been repealed by later legislation, and the Partidas was valid as supplementary law. Thus the old evils of the lack of unity of the law and lack of clearness subsisted. Nobody could be certain whether a law was still in effect or not, and it remained the practice to cite textbooks and the ancient codes of Justinian on the ground that they might have a bearing as supplementary law, unless there was something clearly stated to the contrary in the NovÍsima RecopilaciÓn. In Catalonia there was a new codification in 1704, and in Navarre in 1735. In most of the formerly separate legal jurisdictions, however, the laws of Castile applied, henceforth, as a result of the changes brought about, as already mentioned, at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession.

It remains to deal with the relations of the crown and the church, to which the next chapter is devoted, and to allude to the important reforms in the Americas. Much that was beneficial to the colonies at the time was achieved, and much else which in fact helped them to be the better prepared in the approaching combat with the mother country. In the main, however, the policies of subjection and of the development of the revenues in the supposed interests of Spain were followed, with the result that resentments were kept alive and ultimate disaster invited.