THE eighteenth century in Spain was of intense import as affecting the ultimate interests of the Americas. It was an era of regeneration, of a somewhat remarkable recovery from the decadent state which Spain had reached by the time of the reign of the last Hapsburg monarch. It was accompanied, however, by Spain’s engaging in a series of wars, due in some cases to unwise ambitions of an imperialistic character in European affairs and in others to unavoidable necessity as a result of the aggressions of foreign powers. It was a period when international morality with its attendant diplomatic intrigue and unprovoked attacks was in a low state, and Spain was often a sufferer thereby; indeed, many interesting parallels might be drawn between European diplomatic practices in the eighteenth century and those of William II of Germany in the twentieth. England, Austria, and France were at various times the opponents of Spain, but the first-named gradually emerged as the most persistent, aggressive, and dangerous of her enemies. If the prospects of wars were the principal motive force which induced the life-giving reforms,—so that Spain might acquire wealth and efficiency which could be converted into military strength,—the wars themselves tended to increase the needs of the state. Thus in the case of the Americas the very improvements which were introduced were to contribute to bring about the eventual separation of Spain from her colonies, in the first place because they occasioned a development in resources and capacity which gave prospects of success when the revolts should come, and in the second because Spain drew too heavily upon the colonies in promoting European objects without giving an adequate return, wherefore discontent was fostered. Nevertheless, her efforts were at least to have the merit of saving those colonies to themselves, thus conserving the influence of Spanish-speaking peoples in the world, with indirect effects on the history of the United States.

With the exception of Austria, whose candidate for the Spanish throne, the Archduke Charles, was unwilling to recognize the validity of the document which had chosen the grandson of Louis XIV, the European nations were disposed to view the accession of Philip V (1700-1746) with favor, especially since the French monarch consented to the conditions imposed in the will of Charles II that the crowns of France and Spain should be independent and never be united in a single person. This seemed to insure a maintenance of the equilibrium in Europe almost more certainly than the crowning of the Archduke Charles would have done, wherefore most of the powers recognized Philip V. It was at this time that the autocratic Louis XIV, whose many victorious wars had given him an undue confidence, made one of the serious mistakes of his life. In certain formal letters he recognized in Philip V such rights of succession to the French throne as he would ordinarily have had but for the terms of his acquisition of Spain, and caused these documents to be recorded before the Parlement of Paris. Other events also tended to show that Louis XIV meant to dispose of Spain as if that country belonged to him. When he presented the Spanish ambassador at Versailles to Philip V the Castilian envoy exclaimed: “God be praised! The Pyrenees have disappeared! Now we are all one!” This remark was indicative of the opinions which by that time had become current. This new element in the situation, together with certain other impolitic acts of the French king against the interests of England and the Protestant Netherlands, caused the countries just named to join with Austria and the Holy Roman Empire in 1701 in an alliance for a war against Louis XIV and Philip V. Austria wished to acquire the crown of Spain for the archduke, while the English and the Dutch were primarily desirous of avoiding a Franco-Spanish union, wherefore they insisted on the dethronement of Philip V, accepting the pretensions of Charles. England was particularly inspired by a fear that her commerce and expansion in the new world would be prejudiced, or even crushed, by the joint power of France and Spain. Furthermore, the profits of contraband trade with the Spanish colonies were likely to be cut off under the energetic rule of the king of France, then the most powerful monarch in Europe, and direct indications to that effect occurred in 1701, when the asiento (contract), or right to introduce negro slaves into America, was granted to a French company and several South American ports were occupied by French ships.

The War of the Spanish Succession, as the great conflict beginning actively in 1702 has been called, had Spain as one of its principal battle-grounds, since both Philip V and the archduke were there. The struggle was one of great vicissitudes, as evidenced by the number of times Madrid itself changed hands. Most of the people in the peninsula favored Philip V, but the Catalans early displayed a tendency toward the other side. Their resentment over the injuries received at the hands of their French allies in the revolt of 1640 had not yet cooled, and they especially objected to being governed by a king who represented the absolutist ideals of the French Bourbons, for it was logical to expect that it might mean a danger to their much cherished fueros, or charters. Certain conflicts with royal officials seemed to indicate that the government of Philip V intended to insist on the omnipotence of its authority, thus increasing the discontent, to which was added the encouragement to revolt arising from the greatness of the forces aligned against the Bourbons, for in addition to the powers already mentioned Savoy and Portugal had cast in their lot in 1703 and 1704. An allied attempt of 1704 to land in Catalonia having proved a failure the Bourbon officers employed rigorous measures to punish those Catalans who had aided in the movement. The principal effect was to rouse indignation to such a point that in 1705 a determined outbreak took place. Henceforth, Catalonia could be counted on the side of the allies. In the same year an alliance was contracted with the English, who made promises to the Catalans which they were going to be far from fulfilling. Meanwhile, the allied failure to get a foothold in Catalonia in 1704 had been compensated by an incident of that campaign which was to be one of the most important events of the war. On its way south from Catalonia in that year the English squadron, under the command of Admiral Rooke, seized Gibraltar, which happened to be poorly defended at the time. Numerous attempts were made to recover it, but neither then nor since were the Spaniards able to wrest this guardian of the strait from English hands. In 1708 the island of Minorca was captured, to remain in the possession of England for nearly a century. In 1711 the Holy Roman Emperor died, as a result of which the archduke ascended the imperial throne as the Emperor Charles VI. This event proved to be decisive as affecting the war, for it made the candidacy of Charles for the Spanish crown almost as unwelcome as had been the earlier prospect of a Franco-Spanish union. Other factors contributed to make the former archduke’s allies desirous of peace, chief of which was that Louis XIV had been so thoroughly beaten that there was no longer any danger of his insisting on the rights of Philip V to the crown of France.

England (in which country a new government representing the mercantile classes and the party of peace had just come into power) took the lead among the allies in peace negotiations, and was soon followed by all the parties engaged, except Charles VI and a few of the German princes. Between 1711 and 1714 a series of treaties was arranged, of which the principal one was that of Utrecht in 1713. As concerned Spain the most noteworthy provisions were: Philip V’s renunciation for himself and his heirs of any claim to the French throne; the cession of Gibraltar and Minorca to England; the grant of the negro slave-trade asiento in the Americas to the English, together with accompanying rights which made this phase of the treaties a veritable entering wedge for English commerce in the Spanish colonies; and the surrender of the Catholic Netherlands, Milan, Naples, and Sardinia to Austria, and of Sicily to Savoy. In 1720 Austria and Savoy exchanged the two islands which had fallen to their lot, and the latter took on the official title of the kingdom of Sardinia. On the above-named conditions Philip V was allowed to retain the Spanish dominions of the peninsula and of the Americas. If Spain could have but known it, the treaties were altogether favorable to her, but ambition was to undo their beneficial effects. One troublesome point in the various peace conferences was the so-called case of the Catalans. It had been generally believed that England in accordance with her earlier treaty with the Catalans would insist on the preservation of the much mooted fueros and that Philip V would make the concession, as had Philip IV before him. Philip V showed himself to be obstinate on this point, for, not once, but several times, he positively refused to yield. Furthermore, the English government, desirous of peace, the prospective advantages of which for England were already clear, repeatedly charged its ambassadors not to hold out for the Catalan fueros. Some attempts to secure them were made, but when they failed to overcome the persistent objections of Philip V provision was made for a general amnesty to the Catalans, who were to enjoy the same rights as the inhabitants of Castile. The rights of Castilians, however, together with the duties which were implied, were precisely what the Catalans did not want. The conduct of Charles VI was equally unmoral. He did, indeed, make repeated attempts to save the fueros, and declared that he would never abandon the Catalans. Yet he signed a convention withdrawing his troops from Catalonia, and left the people of that land to their fate. The latter were not disposed to yield without a struggle, and sustained a war against Philip V for more than a year. The fall of Barcelona in 1714 put an end to the unequal conflict.

One of the interesting factors of the era of the war was that of the French influence in Spain, which was to have a pronounced effect on the internal development of the country, and, by extension, on that of the colonies. Philip V was seventeen years of age when he ascended the throne, but, though he many times proved his valor in battle, he was in other respects a weak and irresolute character, without striking virtues or defects, fond of hunting, and exceedingly devout,—in fine, of a type such that he was inevitably bound to be led by others. These traits fitted in with the policies of Louis XIV, who fully intended to direct the affairs of Spain in his own interest. He charged Philip V never to forget that he was a Frenchman, and, indeed, with the exceptions presently to be noted, Philip was quite ready to submit to the will of his grandfather. From the first, Louis XIV surrounded the Spanish king with French councillors, some of whom occupied honorary positions only, while others filled important posts in the government of Spain, and still others, notably the French ambassadors and French generals, exercised actual authority without having any official connection with the country. One of the most important of all was Madame des Ursins, maid of honor to the queen, sent to Spain by Louis XIV because as the widow of the Duke of Braciano, a Spanish grandee, she was familiar with the customs of the country. This lady won the complete confidence of the queen, who in turn was able to dominate her husband. It may be said for Madame des Ursins that she was faithful to the interests of the Spanish monarchs, though promoting the entry of French influences, at that time much to be desired in Spain. Indeed, she not infrequently sided with Philip V against the wishes of Louis XIV, which on one occasion led to her recall by the French monarch. Finding, however, that he could not control Spanish affairs without her aid, Louis allowed her to return to Spain. Despite the enormous pressure exercised against him in favor of France, Philip V occasionally rebelled. One instance of his obstinacy has already been cited respecting the case of the Catalan fueros. A more important issue arose out of the presumptions of Louis XIV to dispose of Philip’s crown, as an avenue of escape for himself. In every year from 1706 to 1712 Louis XIV endeavored to sacrifice the interests of Spain or of Philip V in order to propitiate the allies into a grant of peace. In particular he was desirous of procuring the resignation of Philip from the throne of Spain in favor of the House of Austria, saving to Philip the Spanish dominions in Italy. Philip was obdurate when suggestions were made of his abandoning Spain, and more than once, even when the situation looked hopeless, declared his intention of dying at the head of his troops, rather than abdicate the throne to which he felt divinely entitled. Louis XIV was even disposed to compel him by force of arms to acquiesce, and several times withdrew his military support, but the Spanish king would not yield. Fortunately for Philip the allies played into his hands by demanding too much, with the result that Louis XIV on such occasions would renew his support of Philip. Nevertheless, it was the urgings of Louis XIV which prevailed upon Philip to surrender the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Low Countries as well as to renounce his claim to the throne of France. In all of these tribulations of the Spanish king credit should be given to MarÍa Luisa of Savoy, the spirited young queen of Spain. Not yet fourteen at the time of her marriage, in 1701, she at all times displayed a courage and ability which endeared her to the Spanish people. Though her father, the Duke of Savoy, joined the allies against France and Spain, she did not waver in her attachment to the land of her adoption. Inspired by her the Spanish people (except the Catalans) displayed an ardent spirit of nationalism for the first time in history, and were loyally devoted to the king and queen. Nevertheless, despite Spanish patriotism and Philip’s obdurate resistance to Louis XIV’s plans concerning the peninsula, there was the underlying truth of a profound French influence over Spain. This was best represented by men who, like Orry and Amelot, were responsible for far-reaching reforms, the effects of which will be discussed in the chapters on institutions.

Unfortunately for Philip and for Spain the queen died, early in the year 1714. A young Italian abbot named Alberoni happened to be at court in that year and he suggested to Madame des Ursins that a certain Isabel Farnesio (Elizabeth Farnese) of Parma would make a suitable wife for Philip V. According to him the sweet gentleness of her character would enable Madame des Ursins to maintain her power at the Spanish court. In December of the same year the wedding took place. Thus did the lady who has received the sobriquet, the “Termagant of Spain,” become the wife of Philip V. On her first meeting with Madame des Ursins she dismissed her, and proceeded to become herself the dominant influence near the crown. Isabel Farnesio was in fact a woman of extraordinary energy and force of character, besides being so attractive as to be irresistible to the weak king, who was so violently and capriciously attached to her that he even chastised her with blows, at times, in a kind of jealous fury. Nevertheless, she submitted to anything, provided she could retain a hold on her husband, for she was ambitious for her children and for Italy, and meant to utilize Spanish power in furtherance of her aims. Early in 1715 she procured the elevation of Alberoni (soon to become a cardinal) to the direction of affairs in the Spanish state, as the instrument to procure her objects. The chief tenets in her policy were the breaking of the intimate relation with France and the recovery of the Italian possessions, based on the twofold desire of throwing the Austrians out of Italy (a patriotic Italian wish, possibly more attributable to Alberoni than to the queen) and of creating principalities for the children of her own marriage with Philip. These aims were furthered by playing upon the wishes of Philip to recover his rights to the French throne. Philip V had not willingly renounced his claim at the time Louis XIV had persuaded him to do so, and many of the events for the next few years are explained by his aspirations to obtain that crown for himself or for one of his sons. The Italian ambitions of Isabel Farnesio, however, were the enduring keynote of Spanish policy for some thirty years.

The break with France was not long in coming. In 1715 Louis XIV died, and, contrary to the expectations of Philip, not Philip V, but the Duke of Orleans, whom the Spanish king regarded as a personal opponent, was named as regent for the sickly Louis XV, who was not expected to live very long,—though in fact he was to reign for fifty-nine years. The breach was widened by a series of treaties between England, the Protestant Netherlands, and France in the next two years with a view to the execution of the treaty of Utrecht. To assure the peace of Europe it was necessary to procure the adhesion of Philip V and Charles VI, who alone of the parties to the War of the Spanish Succession had not made peace with each other, although no hostilities had taken place for some time. Such a peace did not fit in, however, with the plans of Isabel Farnesio, and when the emperor furnished a pretext in 1717 for the renewal of hostilities a Spanish army was suddenly dispatched to Sardinia which overran that island. England as guarantor of the neutrality of Italy protested, and endeavored to effect a peace between the two contestants by an offer to Philip of Charles’ renunciation of his claims to the Spanish crown, together with a promise of the duchies of Parma and Tuscany and a vague suggestion of England’s willingness to restore Gibraltar and Minorca. The English proposal was rejected, and in 1718 an expedition was sent into Sicily (then in the possession of Savoy, although the already mentioned exchange with Austria had been discussed). The Spaniards were received with enthusiasm, and soon had a mastery of the island. Meanwhile, Austria entered the triple alliance, which thereby became quadruple, on the basis of the emperor’s offers to renounce his pretensions to the throne of Spain and to consent to the succession of Charles, son of Isabel Farnesio and Philip V, to the duchies of Parma, Plasencia, and Tuscany in exchange for Philip’s return of Sicily and Sardinia and his renunciation of all dominion in Italy and the Low Countries. These terms were offered to Philip, who refused them, despite the English ambassador’s insinuation of his country’s willingness to return Gibraltar and Minorca if Philip would accept. While the British government was thus negotiating for peace through diplomatic channels it also took steps in another way to insure Spanish acquiescence in the allied proposals. An English fleet under Admiral Byng was ordered to attack the Spanish fleet without previous announcement of a warlike intent, managing the affair, if possible, so as to cast the blame on the Spanish commander. Byng found the Spanish fleet in Sicilian waters, destroyed it, and landed Austrian troops in Sicily. Several months later, in December, 1718, England declared war on Spain, which was followed in January, 1719, by a declaration of war against Philip V on the part of France. Hopelessly outnumbered, Spain nevertheless displayed a surprising capacity for resistance. Defeat was inevitable, however, and late in 1719 Alberoni, whose extraordinary web of intrigues was deemed responsible for the existing situation, was dismissed from power, a condition exacted by the allies, and in 1720 peace was made on the basis of the earlier proposals of the quadruple alliance. Philip was ready to comply with these terms, but the emperor was now unwilling to grant what had been required of him. The result was a new alliance in 1721 of England, France, and Spain, of which the most noteworthy terms were England’s definite promise to restore Gibraltar to Spain and an agreement for a double matrimonial alliance between the French and Spanish courts; a Spanish princess aged three was betrothed to Louis XV, then eleven years old, while a French princess was to marry Philip’s eldest son, Luis. In addition the rights of Isabel’s son Charles to the Italian duchies were reaffirmed. The marriage of Luis and the French princess was duly celebrated in 1722, and the Spanish princess was sent to the French court to be educated.

For several years Philip had been expressing a desire to abdicate. In January, 1724, he carried his previously announced intention into effect, declaring that he proposed to consecrate the remainder of his life to the service of God and the important work of maintaining his own health. There has been much speculation as to whether these were his real designs,—all the more so, since the ambitious queen at no time protested against this step. Although there is no direct evidence to that effect, it is more than probable that Philip and Isabel wanted to be ready to take advantage of the situation which might arise if Louis XV should die, as was expected. At any rate Philip’s eldest son was proclaimed king, as Luis I, but the reign was of brief duration. In the same year 1724 Luis contracted smallpox and died. As there was a general disinclination to the succession of Philip’s second son, Ferdinand, then a minor, the former king was asked to accept the crown again, and despite certain compunctions he felt in the matter he at length agreed to do so.

The second reign of Philip V was dominated as before by the Italian ambitions of Isabel Farnesio, with the French aspirations of the king remaining a factor. By this time the Baron of RipperdÁ, an adventurer who had previously been the Dutch representative at the Spanish court, had become the agent through whom Isabel hoped to achieve her ends. Few more unconscionable liars and intriguers are recorded in history than this audacious courtier, who was able to deceive even Isabel Farnesio. It occurred to the queen that the vexed question of the Italian duchies might be settled through an embassy to Vienna. Accordingly, RipperdÁ was sent, with the principal object of procuring the betrothal of two Austrian archduchesses to Isabel’s sons, Charles and Philip. RipperdÁ found Charles VI disinclined to consent to the betrothals, but lied both to the emperor and to Philip, telling each that the other accepted his petitions. His deceptions would certainly have been unmasked, had it not been for an unexpected turn in events. In 1725 the French regent, fearful lest Louis XV might die without issue, sent back the Spanish princess who had been betrothed to him, because she was still too young to marry. The natural consequence was a rupture between France and Spain, facilitating a treaty between Charles VI and Philip V. The matter of the marriage was now secondary to the political need of support. Charles and Philip agreed to the terms proposed to the latter in 1718 by the quadruple alliance. In addition Philip guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, whereby the succession of Charles VI’s eldest daughter to his Austrian estates was to be secured, and gave extensive commercial privileges to Austria, particularly to the Ostend Company of the Catholic, or Austrian, Netherlands, enabling that company to secure trading rights in Spain and the Americas. A defensive alliance was arranged, one feature of which was the emperor’s agreement to use his good offices to cause England to fulfil her promised restoration of Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain. Finally, Charles VI definitely abandoned his oft-repeated demand for the recognition of the Catalan fueros. For his triumphs of 1725 RipperdÁ was made a grandee of Spain, owing his promotion, in part at least, to his assurance that the marriage alliances were practically secure. He became first minister at the Spanish court, a post which he asked for, falsely asserting that Charles VI desired it. Such a tissue of lies could not be sustained indefinitely. His duplicity having been discovered he lost his position in 1726, and was imprisoned when he seemed to confess guilt by taking refuge in the English embassy. Escaping in 1728 he went to northern Africa, where he passed the remaining nine years of his life.

The Austrian treaties of 1725 were to have important consequences. England, France, the Protestant Netherlands, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark immediately formed an alliance, and war seemed imminent. Spain desired it, but Austria declined to engage, much to the resentment of the Spanish court. Spain made a fruitless attempt to recapture Gibraltar, however, in 1727, but consented to peace in the same year without attaining her ends, although the definitive treaty was not signed until 1729. One factor in the agreement was the desire of Isabel Farnesio to avenge herself on Charles VI, not only for his failure to join in the recent war, but also to requite his refusal to accept the marriage projects she had proposed. Even when the emperor consented to the attainment in 1731 of Isabel’s ambitions for her son concerning the three duchies of northern Italy, she did not put aside her vengeful plans. Charles of Bourbon in fact landed in Italy in that year to take possession of the duchies. A fresh step in the plans of Isabel was the treaty of 1733 with France, often called by analogy with the later treaty of 1761-1762 the “first Family Compact.” The opportunity to strike at Austria, which both France and Spain desired, was now at hand, for Austria was in the meshes of a war over the Polish succession. Spain declared war on Austria late in 1733, and in the next year overran Naples and Sicily. In 1734, too, Prince Charles was brought from his duchies to be crowned king of Naples, or the Two Sicilies. Thus had Isabel Farnesio restored the questionably desirable Italian inheritance to Spain, but the duchies were lost. France was ready to make peace in 1735; so she calmly offered Charles VI the three duchies in exchange for a recognition of Spanish Charles as king of the Two Sicilies. Spain protested, but could do nothing more than submit. These terms were accepted in 1735, although peace was not signed until three years later. It is interesting to note that the Catalans had not yet given up hope of their fueros. A body of Catalan patriots visited England in 1736 to ask for the fulfilment of the earlier English promise to maintain the fueros, but the British government paid no attention to the petition.

War was not long in making its reappearance on the Spanish horizon. For a long time there had been various causes of dispute with England, the most important of which arose out of the English contraband trade in the Spanish colonies. The asiento treaty had been used by English merchants as the entering wedge for British commerce, and their violations of the law had met with reprisals at times, especially when English smugglers were caught by the more faithful of the Spanish officials in the colonies. One Englishman, named Jenkins, brought home his ear preserved in alcohol, claiming that the Spaniards had cut it off. Such acts as this, whether of actual occurrence or not, fitted in with English conceptions of Spanish cruelty, and furnished a pretext for war to the rising party of British imperialists, headed by William Pitt. Indemnities were demanded by England and agreed to by Spain, but when the latter put in a counter-claim the British government threatened war, which was soon declared, late in 1739. This conflict, called in English histories the War of Jenkins’ Ear, demonstrated that the internal reforms in Spain had not been without effect. The West Indies were the principal field of the struggle, but Spain was able to defend herself,—as witness the successful defence of Cartagena, which Admiral Vernon was so sure he was going to capture that he had commemorative medals struck off in advance. In Europe the most noteworthy events were the Spanish attempts to capture Gibraltar and Port MahÓn, Minorca, both of which ended in failure. France soon came into the war on Spain’s side, and the conflict became European when it merged into the great War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).

The various princes of Europe had guaranteed Charles VI’s Pragmatic Sanction one or more times, but when the emperor died, in 1740, each of them proceeded along the line of political interest. Urged on by Isabel Farnesio, Philip V renewed his pretensions to the duchies in northern Italy and to other Italian territories in Austrian hands which had formerly belonged to Spain. France, Prussia, and other states of lesser importance also made certain claims. England’s interest lay with the opponent of France and Spain, wherefore she joined with Austria. In a military way the war was very nearly indecisive, and there was a general desire for peace by the year 1746. This attitude received a fresh impulse by the accession of Ferdinand VI to the Spanish throne in that year, for he was a determined partisan of peace. The treaty of 1748 was entirely favorable to Isabel Farnesio in that she obtained the duchies of Parma, Plasencia, and Guastalla for her son Philip; Tuscany was no longer available, having been in other hands since the agreement of 1735. The dispute with England was settled by a recognition of commercial advantages in favor of that country, especially those growing out of the asiento; two years later the asiento was annulled in exchange for a heavy payment by Spain. Meanwhile, the voyage of Anson around the world, 1739-1742, had in fact dealt a blow to Spain in America, revealing the Spanish secrets of the Pacific. The peace of 1748 marked the culminating point in the aspirations of Isabel Farnesio. After more than thirty years of effort she had almost completely attained her ends. Spain had paid the bills, with little to compensate her except glory and at the cost of losses in the colonies, which though not translated into cessions of territory were to have ultimate effects to the disadvantage of Spain.

The reign of Ferdinand VI (1746-1759) looms little in external narrative, because it was an era of peace, but on that very account it was important in institutions. The achievements of Charles III were made possible by the policies of economic regeneration which were so strongly to the fore in the reign of Ferdinand VI. Ferdinand, who may have been deficient enough in some respects, who took very little part himself in affairs of government, and who displayed tendencies to melancholia and even insanity, was firmly of the opinion that Spain needed peace, and at a time when Europe was engaging in another great conflict, the Seven Years’ War, he declined the overtures of both France and England, the leading opponents in the struggle, even when accompanied by such tempting bait as the latter’s offer of the restitution of much-desired Gibraltar and Minorca. In 1759 he died without issue, and his half-brother, Charles, son of Isabel Farnesio, came to the throne of Spain, after a long experience as a ruler in Italy. Thus did the “Termagant of Spain” achieve yet a new victory to reward her maternal ambition,—and meanwhile the Two Sicilies were not lost to her line, for that kingdom passed to her grandson Ferdinand, the third son of Charles.