TWO outstanding features marked the history of Spanish political institutions in the era of the House of Hapsburg, or Austria: the absolutism of the kings; and the development of a modern bureaucratic machinery. The Hapsburgs did not introduce absolutism into Spain, but, rather, succeeded to a system which the efforts of their predecessors, especially the Catholic Kings, had made possible. Nevertheless, it was in this period that the kings, aided by greater resources than former Spanish monarchs had possessed, by the prestige of ruling the most extensive and powerful dominions in the world, and by the predominantly royalist ideas of the age, including the theory of divine right, were able for the first time to direct the affairs of state much as they chose. To be sure, they were still supposed to respect the laws and to rule for the good of their subjects, but in practice it was left to them to interpret their own conduct. Instances have already been given of Charles I’s infringements of the law,—for example, in his employment of Flemish favorites. He also introduced a system of personal rule, making himself the head and centre of all governmental action. It was Philip II, however, who carried the ideal of personal rule to the greatest extreme. Suspicion and direct intervention in state affairs were the basic principles of his government, wherefore he gave no man his full confidence, but tried to do as much as he could himself. If the methods of Philip II, the most bureaucratic king in history, often had unfortunate results,—for example, in the case of preparing the famous Armada,—those of his successors were far more disastrous. Under Philip III and Philip IV the royal authority was granted to favorites, while the power of Charles II had necessarily to be exercised most of the time by some other than the feeble-minded king himself. Thus these reigns were a period of continual intriguing by different factions for the king’s confidence, in order that the victors might rule Spain for their own enrichment.

At first sight it would seem that the kings were not successful in their policy of centralization. It was hardly to be expected that the dominions outside the peninsula could be brought under the same system of law and custom as governed in Castile, and the case was much the same as regards Portugal when that kingdom was added to the monarchy. With respect to the rest of the peninsula, however, Olivares expressed what was at least a desirable ideal, when he wished to bring about an amalgamation on the Castilian pattern, both in law and in common sentiment, of the dominions of the crown. Some changes were in fact made which tended to promote legal unification, but in essentials the ancient customs of Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and the Basque provinces were left undisturbed. It is possible that the merger might have been attempted with safety at almost any time before 1640, when Olivares tried it,—quite probably so in the sixteenth century. That it was not undertaken may have been due to the attention given to foreign wars, but in any event the autonomy of the non-Castilian kingdoms of the monarchy was more apparent than real. The nobility and many of the people were intensely royalist, and even when they were not so in principle they supported the kings because, like them, they were profoundly Catholic. Furthermore, the organization representing the old rÉgime had declined internally to such an extent that it was a mere shadow of its former self. Centralization had in fact been going on without process of law, and for that very reason it was easy in the next period to make it legally effective.

Nowhere was the absolutism of the kings more manifest than in their dealings with the Castilian Cortes. The principal functions of this body had always been to grant or withhold subsidies and to make petitions, which the kings might, or might not, enact into law. In this period the deputies were so submissive that they never failed to grant the required subsidy, despite the exhaustion of the country, while their petitions received scant attention. Under the circumstances, since the grant of a subsidy by the representatives of the towns was now the only reason for calling a Cortes, the nobles and the clergy were not always summoned. Charles I encountered some resistance of the Cortes in the early part of his reign, but in later years the kings experienced no serious difficulty. The deputies themselves lost interest, and not infrequently sold their privilege of attendance to some individual who might even be a non-resident of the town he was to represent. The kings procured the right to appoint many of the deputies, or else issued orders to the towns, directing them how to instruct their delegates, and also gave pensions to the deputies, thus insuring the expression of their own will in the meetings of the Cortes. It is not strange that the Cortes was called frequently,—forty-four times down to 1665. In 1665 the function of granting subsidies was given directly to the towns,—with the result that no Cortes was held in the entire reign of Charles II. The various other Cortes of the peninsula were more fortunate than that of Castile. Those of the kingdom of Aragon (Aragon proper, Catalonia, and Valencia) had always participated more than that of Castile in legislation, and had been more prone to voice their grievances. The calling of a Cortes in these regions involved difficulties, especially in Valencia, where the king was obliged to be present, in order to constitute a legal meeting. The need for funds was such, however, that a number of Cortes were summoned,—seventeen in Aragon, thirteen in Catalonia, fourteen in Valencia, and seventy-three in Navarre,—but the kings did not obtain a great deal from them. Often the delegates refused to make a grant, or else gave so little that it hardly covered the expenses of the king’s journey to the place of meeting. No effort was made to join these bodies with that of Castile to form a national Cortes; the force of particularism was as yet too strong to attempt it.

Just as in the case of the Castilian Cortes, so also in that of the towns, the absolutism of the kings made itself felt to a marked degree, for the way had been prepared in previous reigns, and in this instance the royal authority was equally as noteworthy in Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca as in Castile. This was brought about principally through the decline of the towns in political spirit, a movement which had been going on since the fourteenth century. As a result the ayuntamientos had usurped the powers which formerly belonged to the general assembly of citizens, and now their functions became absorbed more and more by the kings through their officials in the towns, such as the corregidores and others. So great was the authority of the kings that they were able to make a profit for the treasury by the sale in perpetuity of local offices, and when the evils which resulted became too pronounced they gave orders abolishing all such positions acquired before 1630. Furthermore, all local legislation of an important character had to receive the sanction of the Consejo Real. Much the same local officials as in the past administered the affairs of the municipalities, and the methods of their acquisition of office continued to be diverse, being in some towns by election, in others by lot, in still others by inheritance, and in yet others by royal appointment; but in all of the large royal towns (realengos) the king’s authority was paramount. In fine, local autonomy was virtually dead, although the forms of the period when the towns were a virile political factor still persisted. In two classes of municipalities the royal victory was not complete. One was that of the small villages, where the system of the medieval villa, or concejo, obtained, but since these units were of small consequence the retention of their earlier liberties had little or no effect on the general situation. The other was that of the seigniorial towns, most of them in Aragon, Catalonia, and Navarre, where the struggles of past eras, of the citizens against the lords, were repeated in this.

With the advance both in royal authority and in the scope and extension of government it was inevitable that the new bureaucracy, which had made its appearance in the modern sense under the Catholic Kings, should increase in the number of its officials and in power until it absorbed a great part of the functions which the kings themselves had formerly exercised in person. Aside from the royal secretaries, the governor-generals (during the absence of the king), regents, and members of the various administrative groups there were often individuals without portfolios who exercised great power as private counselors of the king. Some of the members of the Consejo Real were also prominent in this extra-official way. The importance of the royal secretaries, of whom there were always more than one, was notably great in this period. Whenever one of them became the favorite, the others were nevertheless retained, grouping themselves around the one who had the ear of the king. The office of the latter became a universal bureau and secretariat of state (SecretarÍa de Estado y del Despacho Universal), presiding over the others.

Meanwhile, the Consejo Real advanced in power, and new councils were added. The most notable reform in the Consejo Real was its division in 1608 into four sections, or salas, respectively of government (Gobierno), justice (Justicia), “fifteen hundred” (Mil y quinientos), and the provinces (Provincia). The last three had to do with affairs of justice, while the Sala de Gobierno, the most important of the four, was supposed to concern itself mainly with politics and administration. Nevertheless, the variety of functions which had always characterized the Consejo as a whole applied in like manner to each of the salas. Thus the Sala de Gobierno handled such widely divergent matters as the extirpation of vice and sin, the economic development of the country, the decision in cases of conflict of laws or jurisdictions, cases of recourse of fuerza, the cleaning and improvement of Madrid, questions of peace and war, together with a great number of others. Moreover, many of its functions were judicial in character. Important affairs, especially those on which the king requested advice, were taken up by the Consejo in full (en pleno),—that is, by a joint meeting of the four salas. While the Consejo had been in origin a purely consultive body, it now acquired the privilege of making suggestions to the king of its own volition and of indicating its objections to any measures he might have taken. It was natural that the decisions, or autos, of the Consejo should have great weight, both as affecting matters of justice, and as concerned government and administration in general, since the Consejo might make new laws and annul or dispense with old ones, although of course consulting with the king before publishing its decision. The autos of the Consejo became, therefore, an important source of legislation, and in 1552 it was decided that they should have the same force as the laws of the king himself. Late in the sixteenth century it became customary to call the Consejo the Consejo de Castilla (Council of Castile), by which name, henceforth, it was more generally known.

In like manner other councils were formed (in addition to those dating from the era of the Catholic Kings) which relieved the monarch of many of his responsibilities. The most important was the Consejo de la Real CÁmara (Council of the Royal Chamber), more often called the CÁmara de Castilla, or simply the CÁmara. This was founded by Philip II in 1588 to assist him in handling such matters as the kings had always retained for themselves, apart from the Consejo Real, such as questions arising in connection with the patronato real, or royal patronage, of the church and appointments generally to the various councils, audiencias, and other important posts in Castilian administration. Men of the highest character were chosen to compose the CÁmara, and secrecy as to their discussions was imposed upon them. In 1616 the CÁmara advanced a step further, in that certain affairs—such as pardons for crime, authorizations for entailing estates in primogeniture, the naturalization of foreigners, and the removal of civil and political disabilities from individuals subject to them—were left for it to resolve without consulting the king. The king still intervened in the more important matters. Among the new councils of the era were those of finance (Hacienda), war (Guerra), and indulgences (Cruzada), all of Castilian origin.

The expansion of officialdom in the peninsula made its presence felt in the judiciary as elsewhere. The three judicial salas of the Consejo Real and in some cases the Sala de Gobierno as well became the fountain-head of justice, under the king. This was especially true of the full Consejo, which met weekly. This body also named special judges, such as visitadores, both to procure information for the Consejo and to inspect the tribunals of lower grade. The number of audiencias was increased until there were five in the peninsula and one each in Majorca and the Canary Islands, besides a number in the Americas.[55] Below these was the hierarchy of the lesser officials. There were still various outstanding jurisdictions, such as those of the towns, the military orders, the Inquisition, and the church, but one of the keynotes of the era was the advance of the royal courts at the expense of the others. The administration of justice left much to be desired, however. As a result of the wars and civil conflicts and the general state of misery and lack of discipline, public security was almost non-existent. Banditry and crime went unsuppressed, and legislation served for little in the face of the corruption of officials and the lack of means to make the laws effective.

Frequent references have already been made to the desperate state of Spanish finances in the era of the House of Austria and to its importance as an ultimate factor affecting Spanish dominion in the Americas. Vast sums were expended for political and military ends, the only compensations for which were extensions of territory and power and a satisfaction of the desire for glory, without reflecting themselves in an increase of public wealth, the well-being of Spaniards, or even in commercial advantage; on the contrary, economic development was checked or hindered by the continual wars in which the kings engaged. Expenditures very greatly increased over what they had been before. It will be sufficient to explain this if some comment is made on two noteworthy objects to which state revenues were devoted: the maintenance of the court; and the cost of the wars. The ordinary expenses of the royal family jumped under Charles I to about 150,000 ducats ($2,250,000) a year,—more than ten times the amount required by the Catholic Kings. To this should be added the vast sums granted to the princes; in 1550 Philip (the later Philip II) received 55,000 ducats (over $800,000) in the course of four months. The expenditures of the court constantly increased. In 1562 the ordinary court expenses amounted to 415,000 ducats (well over $6,000,000), and under Philip III they were 1,300,000 (nearly $20,000,000) annually. In addition there were the fiestas (festivities) and royal marriages, on which tremendous sums were squandered. As for military expenditures the war in Flanders alone consumed 37,488,565 ducats (nearly $600,000,000) in the space of eleven years, 1598 to 1609, and other campaigns were costly in proportion,—and this in spite of the fact that supplies were often not provided and salaries were left unpaid, leading to tumults on the part of the soldiery. To gain an adequate idea of the vastness of these sums one must bear in mind, not only the greater purchasing power of money in that day and the comparatively small population of the peninsula, especially the small number of taxpayers, but also the fact that the resources of the Spanish state then were as little, as compared with those of the present day, as they were great in comparison with those of medieval Spain.

It is no wonder that the people through their representatives in the Cortes began to ask for peace and the termination of military adventures, even in the period when victories were frequent; the nobles also favored an end of the wars,—when the kings endeavored to get them, too, to grant a subsidy. One result of the greater financial requirements of the state was an increase in taxation, both in the collection of the existing taxes at a higher rate, and in the imposition of new ones. The grants, or servicios, of the Castilian Cortes were frequent and large in amount. In 1538 there appeared the new tax of the millones, so-called because it was calculated in millions of ducats. This was an excise on articles of prime necessity,—meat, wine, oil, and vinegar. It was extended soon to powder, lead, sulphur, red ochre, vermilion, sealing-wax, and playing cards, which together were called the siete rentillas (seven little rents). Salt, gold, silver, mercury, and many other materials were the subject of a state monopoly, and to them were added in the reign of Philip IV the monopoly on tobacco, which was to prove an exceptionally profitable source of revenue. The diezmo and cruzada (otherwise Bula) continued to be collected from the church, together with several new rents which were authorized by the pope. One of these was the subsidio de galeras (subsidy of the galleys), or galeras, so-called because it was theoretically designed to assist in the expenses of the galleys used in fighting the Moslem peoples. This was granted in 1561, and consisted of an annual subsidy of 420,000 ducats (over $6,000,000). The alcabala and the various customs duties were increased. Stamp taxes were extended to new types of documents. The nobles were required to pay a tax called lanzas (lances) in lieu of military service. Various offices and titles were made subject to the media anata (half annates), a discount of a half year’s salary, or rents, in the first year of enjoyment. The transmission of a title of nobility to one’s heir was also taxed. Vanity was seized upon as likely to yield a revenue, and money was collected in return for the privilege of using the word “Don” before one’s Christian name. In like manner illegitimate children were pronounced legitimate on payment of a specified sum. Other methods were employed to obtain ready cash which tended ultimately to dry up certain sources of revenue: the coinage was debased; portions of the government rents were disposed of; public offices and royal towns were granted in perpetuity; and the title of hidalgo was sold to many persons, who thereby entered the non-taxpaying class. Other ways of acquiring funds were made use of, ranging from the high-handed to the shameless. Under the name of donativos (gifts) the government resorted to forced loans, or even trickery, to exact money from the nobles and churchmen; confiscations of goods for offences against religion and for other delinquencies were frequently ordered; and most disgusting of all was the limosna al rey (alms for the king), which was collected by gentlemen of the court, each accompanied by a parish priest and a friar, in a house to house canvass of the citizens, who were asked to give what they could spare. If the kings and their favorites thought of the most obvious way to accumulate funds, economy in expenditures, they at least did not try to put it into practice; the court fiestas were held, even if the king’s gentlemen had to beg the money and the nation had to starve.

The above refers to taxes collected in Castile, but the other dominions of Spain, peninsula and otherwise, produced considerable amounts for the state. Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia yielded much less than Castile. The Low Countries were profitable for a time; Charles I procured 450,000 ducats a year (nearly $7,000,000) at the outset of his reign. Under Philip II, however, they were the scene of heavy expenditures. The Americas have often been considered as the principal financial resort of the Spanish kings, and although this is not certain and may even be doubtful they did yield vast sums. Prior to the conquest of Mexico the annual revenues were only some 70,000 ducats (about $1,000,000), but the conquests of CortÉs, followed soon by those of Pizarro in Peru, resulted in an enormous increase. Under Philip II they amounted annually to about 1,200,000 ($18,000,000) according to some writers, and to as much as 2,000,000 ($30,000,000) in the opinion of others. Castilian taxes were applied in the new world, together with certain others arising out of the special circumstances of colonial affairs, such as the royal fifth on precious metals from the mines and the poll tax collected from the Indians. Data are not at hand for an accurate estimate of the entire revenues of Spain, but it seems clear that they increased enormously in the period. They may have reached their highest point under Philip III, when it was estimated that they were some 24,000,000 ducats ($360,000,000) a year, of which not more than half reached the Spanish treasury. An estimate made toward the close of the century gave the revenues as about 17,750,000 ($270,000,000), of which only a third was actually available.

Despite these relatively great sums the national debt was a constant factor, and advanced greatly in amount under Philip II, who is said to have left a debt of 100,000,000 ducats ($1,500,000,000). This was reduced in later reigns, but was still 70,000,000 (well over $1,000,000,000) in 1690,—a huge sum as national debts went then, even though creditors were frequently scaled down or not paid at all. One of the important elements in the debt was that of the loans made by Flemish, German, and Italian bankers, especially those of Genoa. The frequency with which these loans were sought and the high rate of interest required have caused Spain to be characterized, with accuracy, as a mere bridge over which the wealth of the Americas (and, to be sure, that of the peninsula itself) passed to other nations as interest and part payment of the nation’s debts. In 1539 this form of indebtedness amounted to about 1,000,000 ducats ($15,000,000), and in 1560, some 7,000,000 (over $100,000,000). When the Spanish kings were unable to pay a note that had become due, as much as 33-1/3 per cent might be charged for its renewal; indeed, the ordinary rate of interest ranged from 15 to 30 per cent. The inability of Philip II to meet his obligations caused all but the Genoese bankers to refuse him credit, and they joined with the others when he suspended the payment of interest on their notes. Unable to get funds in any other way, Philip surrendered to the Genoese, who exacted as part payment for fresh loans a share in various revenues of the Spanish state, such as in that of the salt monopoly and in certain of the taxes collected from the church,—thus belying the original object for which the latter had been imposed. The Cortes, though it had declined in other respects, was perhaps the most important organ of public finance. It not only voted subsidies but also collected them, a function which it had exercised in previous eras. It had charge of several other taxes as well, such as the productive alcabala and the millones. For these purposes special committees of the Cortes were formed. Nevertheless, the Consejo de Hacienda, founded in 1593, grew rapidly in functions and in power, and by the close of the seventeenth century is said to have had over 60,000 employes. This vast number was due in part to the variety in the origin and character of the various tributes. Without taking into consideration the inevitable accompaniment of graft, such a horde of officials involved the state in a heavy cost for the collection and administration of the revenues.

The principal element in the Spanish army was the volunteer soldiery in the king’s pay. Foreign mercenaries were obtained for stated lengths of time or for specific campaigns, but Spaniards enlisted for indefinite service, and thus became the veterans of the army. Military life was popular during the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth, and the army abounded in hidalgos and others of yet higher rank who did not disdain to serve as privates. Later the number of Spanish recruits grew less, when the state began to fail in its regularity of payments, and their withdrawal marked the era when defeats became frequent. Among the noteworthy changes in tactics was the appearance of the regiment. Firearms had now come into general use, and cannon were greatly improved, but it was the pikemen of the Spanish infantry who formed the principal branch of the army until near the close of the period. Because of the inferiority of their weapons the troops with firearms were regarded as a mere auxiliary to the pikemen. Armies were small; 20,000 to 40,000 men was perhaps the usual rule. Even in the century of Spain’s greatness many lands were left without garrison, as occurred nearly always in the case of the Americas; one report of the period of Charles I stated that there was not a port in the colonies which could resist an attack of three hundred men. The worst evils in connection with the army were those of bad administration and a lack of regularity in paying the troops and in remitting funds for munitions and other supplies. Fraud and graft accounted for a great deal of the money which the state did apply to the army. These factors contributed to a lack of military discipline; it was not unusual for ragged and starving soldiers to beg from door to door, and it is not to be wondered at that the troops occasionally took the matter of the collection of their wages into their own hands. It was customary for women of bad repute to accompany the armies, and it sounds strange today that one of the military manuals of the time recommended that there should be eight women, who should be common to all, for every hundred soldiers. Nevertheless, the Spanish infantry, for more than a century, enjoyed the reputation of being the most capable military unit in Europe.

Despite the frequency of naval warfare and the necessity of maintaining communications with the Americas, comparatively little attention was paid to the marine establishment, and properly speaking there was no official navy in the entire period. The principal method employed to assemble a fleet was by renting ships, whether from Spaniards or foreigners. In addition a few were built by the state, or purchased, and in times of stress merchant vessels were pressed into service, but this proved ruinous to commerce and ship-building alike. So long as other powers used the same methods Spain was not greatly handicapped, but with the development of national navies in England, France, and the Protestant Netherlands, she was placed at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, considerable fleets were often assembled. In 1643 a special fleet called the Armada de Barlovento (fleet of the Barlovento, modern Windward, Islands) was organized at colonial expense for the defence of the Americas. It was soon withdrawn,—but the tax remained. The fleet of the Catalonian deputation was maintained for a while, but disappeared early in the seventeenth century. There were also a number of private fleets, engaged principally in reprisals against the Moslems, a kind of piracy. While privateering of this sort was forbidden by law the kings frequently granted dispensations which enabled the traffic to be carried on almost continuously. Greater strictness was employed in the Americas lest the privateers should fail to resist the temptation to pick up Spanish merchantmen, but the prohibition there was at length removed, and the Spanish boats rendered great service against pirates and national enemies. During the sixteenth century Spanish fleets were manned by volunteer forces, but this was changed in the seventeenth to compulsory service of the fishermen of the coasts. The heavier work, especially the rowing of the galleys, was done by captives in war and by criminals, who served terms in the galleys rather than in prison. During most of the period the galley, with three banks of oars, was the principal type of vessel. In ocean warfare, the nao, or light sailing-vessel, soon came into use, and this was gradually supplanted by heavier ships, until late in the era there developed the fragata, or frigate, of over two thousand tons, capable of carrying as many as 120 cannon. While the artillery was the principal arm of the fleet, Spanish tactics were at fault in depending on getting close to the enemy and boarding him, making a military action out of the combat and paying little attention to the use of cannon of long range. The same evils which have been described in connection with the army—graft, irregularity of payments, and laxity of discipline—obtained also in the navy; in the expedition of Charles I against Tunis, room on board was found for four thousand enamoradas (sweethearts!) of the soldiers and sailors.

In common with other European countries Spain developed a diplomatic service in this period. The sending of special embassies and the making of treaties had been customary since ancient times, but the practice of appointing ministers to reside at foreign courts and that of receiving those sent from abroad did not begin in Spain until the reign of Charles I. The initiative had come earlier from the Italian republics. From this time forward Spanish diplomacy, like that of other countries, took on a modern form, and ambassadors sent reports about the state of the countries to which they were accredited, strove to obtain advantages for Spain, endeavored to check the intrigues of the ambassadors of other nations, and made treaties. The use of spies as an auxiliary to ambassadorial work was general. For a time Spanish diplomacy enjoyed a high reputation for success, but in the later seventeenth century it was quite overshadowed by the French.

The absolutism of the monarchy, its bureaucratic character, and the instinct of the letrados for reducing everything to rules and regulations produced an abundance of legislation, much of which was exceedingly minute in detail and casual in subject-matter. It was natural therefore that there should be a desire for a fresh codification, and this at length took shape in a compilation by BartolomÉ de Arrieta in 1567 of the Nueva RecopilaciÓn (New Compendium, or Compilation), so-called with reference to the code of Montalvo, its predecessor, of the period of the Catholic Kings. The new collection, which was for Castile only, filled nine volumes, and amounted to little more than an elaboration of the Ordenanzas of Montalvo, with the addition of laws enacted since 1484. It contained the same defects, omitting many royal orders or petitions of the Cortes which had been granted, neglecting to eliminate obsolete laws, and failing to correct others whose text contained errors. Furthermore, in perpetuating the hierarchy of legal sources which had been established in the Leyes de Toro it failed to distinguish between laws in the so-called supplementary codes (such as the Partidas) which were indeed supplementary or obsolete and those which had in fact come to be in force as the principal law. As a result the Nueva RecopilaciÓn was generally discredited, and the Roman law of the Partidas, or even of the code of Justinian, was cited in preference. The force of government maintained the new code, however, and it ran through four more editions,—1581, 1592, 1598, and 1640,—and in each case added legislation since the preceding publication. The zeal for codification found expression also in Aragon, Catalonia, Vizcaya, and GuipÚzcoa, while the laws with regard to the Americas were gathered together, after various lesser publications had been made in earlier times, in the RecopilaciÓn de las Leyes de Indias, first issued in 1680. The tendency toward the legal unity of the peninsula was not systematically striven for by the kings, since the variety in private law did not greatly affect their political sovereignty. Nevertheless, something was accomplished along these lines, and within each separate unit a great deal was effected. Thus, in Castile many of the former privileges which made for a division into classes and for consequent differences in the law were done away with, and the same process, though on a smaller scale, made itself felt in the other kingdoms of the peninsula.

The submissiveness of the Spanish peoples under absolute rule has often been greatly exaggerated. In fact, neither then nor ever since were they loth to criticise the “mal gobierno” (bad government). Evidences are to be found on every hand of complaints against the bureaucratic organization which was absorbing a great part of the national wealth and of dissatisfaction with the system of government by favorites, the evils of which were only too apparent. Not a few went so far as to desire a republic. Nevertheless, as a general rule, people favored the principle of monarchy, and did not object to the reigning house, but they did desire a reform of the existing rÉgime. The ideal of limited monarchy found strong support among political thinkers, due in a measure to the resentment of Catholics over the enforced apostasy of the subjects of Protestant princes. On this account the Cortes had numerous defenders, some of whom urged its participation in legislation. Many treatises also pronounced against such practices as the sale of public offices or the grant of posts in perpetuity, and against others which have been described as current in this era. In fine, Spaniards were well aware of the evils of their political system and, though patient, were keenly desirous of reform,—despite which, little attention was paid to their wishes.