THE unfortunate policies of Charles I and Philip II were continued during the seventeenth century in the reigns of Philip III, Philip IV, and Charles II, but Spain was no longer able to hold her front rank position in European affairs, especially after the buffets of fortune which fell to her lot in the reign of Philip IV. Not only that, but a decline also set in which affected Spanish civilization in all its phases. The impetus of Spain’s greatness in the sixteenth century carried her along to yet loftier heights in some manifestations of her inner life, notably in art and literature, but even in these characteristics the decline was rapid and almost complete by the end of the reign of Charles II. Italy, France, and the Low Countries continued to absorb Spanish effort, but now it was Spain’s turn to acknowledge defeat, while France, the great power of the century, took toll for the losses she had suffered at the hands of Charles I and Philip II. The unsuccessful Catalan revolt and the victorious war of the Portuguese for independence assisted to drain Spain of her resources, financial and otherwise, while the last-named event destroyed peninsula unity, carrying with it such of the Portuguese colonies as had not already been lost. Spain yielded the aggressive to her strongest opponent, and endeavored herself to maintain the defence. Nevertheless, great achievements were still the rule in the colonies, even if of a less showy type than formerly. Spain was still the conqueror and civilizer. On the other hand, the efforts of other nations to found colonies in lands claimed by Spain began to be successful, and this movement gathered force throughout the century, together with the direct annexation of some lands which were already Spanish.

Philip III (1598-1621) was the first of three sovereigns, each of whom was weaker than his predecessor. The fifteenth-century practice of government by favorites was restored. Philip III turned over the political management of his kingdom to the Duke of Lerma, while he himself indulged in wasteful extravagances, punctuated by an equal excess in religious devotions. He had inherited wars with England and the Protestant Netherlands, but the first of these was brought to an end in 1604, shortly after the accession of James I of England. The war in the Low Countries was characterized by the same features which had marked its progress in the previous reign. Philip II had endeavored to solve the problem by making an independent kingdom of that region, under his daughter and her husband as the rulers, with a proviso for a reversion to Spain in case of a failure of the line. This measure was practically without effect, for Spanish troops and Spanish moneys continued to be the basis for the wars against the Dutch, or Protestant, element. Before the end of Philip III’s reign the decision for a reversion to Spanish authority had already been made and accepted. There were two factors in the Dutch wars of the period worthy of mention. For one thing the Dutch became more bold on the seas, and began a remarkable career of maritime conquest which was to last well over half a century. As affecting Spain this new activity manifested itself mainly in piratical attacks on Spanish ships, or in descents upon Spanish coasts, but a number of Philip’s Portuguese colonies were picked up by the Dutch. The Dutch wars also produced a man who was both a great soldier (a not uncommon type in that day of Spanish military importance) and a great statesman, who sensed the evil course which Spain was following in her European relations and argued against it, all to no avail. This man was Ambrosio SpÍnola. SpÍnola won victory upon victory from the Dutch, but was often obliged to rely on his personal estate for the funds with which to carry on the campaigns; so when the Dutch asked for a truce he favored the idea, and on this occasion his views were allowed to prevail. A twelve-year truce was agreed upon in 1609, one condition of which was the recognition of the independence of the Protestant states. In 1618 the great conflict which has become known as the Thirty Years’ War broke out in Germany, having its beginnings in a dispute between the Hapsburg emperor, Ferdinand, and the Protestant elector of the Palatinate. Spain entered the war on the side of Ferdinand, largely because of family reasons, but also in support of Catholicism. SpÍnola was sent into the Palatinate with a Spanish army, where he swept everything before him. Thus casually did Spain enter a war which was to be a thirty-nine years’ conflict for her (1620-1659) and productive of her own undoing.

Affairs with France were characterized by a bit of good fortune which postponed the evil day for Spain. Henry IV had reorganized the French kingdom until it reached a state of preparation which would have enabled it to take the offensive, a policy which Henry had in mind. The assassination of the French king, in 1610, prevented an outbreak of war between France and Spain at a time when the latter was almost certain to be defeated. Marie de Medici became regent in France, and chose to keep the peace. Italy was a constant source of trouble in this reign, due to the conflict of interests between the kings of Spain and the popes and princes of the Italian peninsula. There was a succession of petty wars or of the prospects of war, which meant that affairs were always in a disturbed condition. The Turks continued to be a peril to Europe, and their co-religionists and subjects in northern Africa were the terror of the seas. Spain rendered service to Europe by repulsing the attempts of the former to get a foothold in Italy, but could do nothing to check piratical ventures. The pirates of the Barbary Coast plied their trade both in the Mediterranean and along Spain’s Atlantic coasts to their limits in the Bay of Biscay, while English and Dutch ships were active in the same pursuits.

The storm broke in the reign of Philip IV (1621-1665). Philip IV was only sixteen at the time of his accession to the throne. He had good intentions, and tried to interest himself in matters of government, but was of a frivolous and dissolute nature, unable to give consideration for any length of time to serious affairs. The result was the rule of another favorite, the Count-Duke of Olivares. Olivares was possibly the worst man who could have been chosen, precisely because he had sufficient ability to attempt the execution of his mistaken ideas. He was energetic, intelligent, and well educated, but was stubborn, proud, irascible, boastful, and insulting. He was able to make plans on a gigantic scale, and had real discernment as to the strength of Spain’s enemies, but lacked the practical capacity to handle the details. The times were such as demanded a SpÍnola, but the counsels of Olivares prevailed, and their keynote was imperialism in Europe and a centralized absolutism in the peninsula.

The truce with the Dutch came to an end in 1621. SpÍnola urged that it be continued, but Olivares gave orders for the resumption of hostilities. No advantages of consequence were obtained by Spain, but the Dutch were again successful in their career on the seas. The Thirty Years’ War continued to involve Spain. France, though Catholic and virtually ruled by a Catholic cardinal, Richelieu, was more intent on the development of the French state than upon the religious question, and aided the Protestants against their enemies. Richelieu did not bring France into the war until 1635, but, in the meantime, through grants of money and skilful diplomacy, he was able to make trouble for Spain in Italy and in the Low Countries. When at length it seemed as if the Catholic states might win, due largely to the effectiveness of the Spanish infantry, France entered the war on the side of the Protestant princes. Spanish troops continued to win battles, without profiting greatly because of the incessant difficulties from lack of funds. In 1643 the French, under CondÉ, defeated the Spaniards at Rocroy. The moral effect of this victory was tremendous, like the surrender of the ancient Spartans at the Island of Sphacteria, for it was the first time in some two centuries that the Spanish infantry had been defeated in pitched battle under nearly equal conditions. Henceforth defeats were no novelty. The tide had turned; Rocroy spelled Spain’s doom as a great power. The treaties of Westphalia in 1648 affected Spain only so far as concerned the war with the Protestant Netherlands. Dutch independence was reaffirmed, and the colonies which the Dutch had won, mainly from the Portuguese in the East Indies, were formally granted to them. The Catholic Netherlands remained Spanish. The war with France went on until 1659. In 1652 Cromwell offered Spain an alliance against France, but the price demanded was high; one of the conditions was that Spain should permit Englishmen to trade with the Spanish colonies,—an entering wedge for an English commercial supremacy which might easily be converted into political acquisition. Spain declined and Cromwell joined France. The English conquest of Jamaica in the ensuing war was the first great break in the solidarity of the actually occupied Spanish domain, marking a turning point in colonial history, as Rocroy had done in that of Europe. By the treaty of 1659 Spain gave up the Roussillon and Cerdagne, thus accepting the Pyrenees as the boundary between herself and France. Spain also surrendered Sardinia and large parts both of the Catholic Netherlands and of her former Burgundian possessions. The most fruitful clause in the treaty was that providing for the marriage of the Spanish princess, MarÍa Teresa, with Louis XIV of France. The former was to renounce for herself and her heirs any rights she or they might otherwise have to the Spanish throne, while a considerable dowry was to be paid by Spain on her behalf. The results of this marriage will be mentioned presently.

Intimately related to the wars just referred to was the Catalan revolt. The Catalans had long been a nation so far as separate language and institutions go, and their traditions compared well with those of Castile, which had now come to dominate in the Spanish state. The whole course of the revolt is illustrative of the difficulties under which Spain labored in this era of European wars. The Catalans had objected for centuries, even before the union with Castile, to the policy of centralization and absolutism of the kings, alleging their charter rights which were thus contravened. Such acts as the failure of the kings to call the Catalan Cortes, the increases in taxation, or the levying of taxes like those paid in Castile, and the introduction of the Castilian Inquisition had been unfavorably received in the past. Now came the monarchical designs of Olivares, coupled with the unavoidable exigencies of the wars, to heighten the discontent. Aside from the increased taxation there were two matters to which the Catalans were strenuously opposed on the ground that they were against their legal rights,—the maintenance of foreign troops (even Castilians and Aragonese being so regarded) in Catalonia and the enjoyment of public office by persons who were not Catalans. Furthermore they objected to the employment of Catalan troops in foreign countries, holding that their obligations were limited to defending Catalonia, and similarly they maintained that funds raised in Catalonia should not be used for wars outside that province. Philip IV tried to procure a subsidy from the Catalan Cortes in 1626, but the grant was denied. Another attempt was made in 1632, on which occasion Olivares imprudently followed the methods of Charles I at the time of the Cortes of Santiago-CoruÑa. He got the funds, but his action caused great dissatisfaction in the province. Meanwhile the danger of an invasion from France had led to the sending of troops to Catalonia, and constant friction followed their arrival. The imperfect military discipline of that age, together with the annoyances usually inseparable from the presence of armies, resulted in many abuses, which were resented even to the point of armed conflict; as early as 1629, eleven years before the outbreak, there was a bloody encounter between the citizens and the soldiery at Barcelona. The irksome requirement calling upon the towns to lodge the troops was also productive of ill feeling. By law the most that could be demanded was the use of a room, a bed, a table, fire, salt, vinegar, and service, while all else must be paid for. Lack of funds was such, however, that more than this was exacted. In addition to this there came an order from Madrid calling for the imposition of the quinto, or fifth, of the revenues of the municipalities. France took advantage of the situation to fan the flame of discontent and to win certain Catalan nobles of the frontier to her side. Nevertheless, when the French invaded the Roussillon in 1639 the Catalans rushed to arms and helped to expel them early in 1640.

The questions of lodging the soldiers and of procuring additional funds continued to provoke trouble. Olivares said in an open meeting of the Consejo Real that the Catalans ought to be made to contribute in proportion to their wealth. Later he ordered an enforced levy of Catalan troops for use in Italy, and stated in the decree so providing that it was necessary to proceed without paying attention to “provincial pettiness” (menudencias provinciales). The impulse for the outbreak proceeded, however, from the conflicts between the soldiers and the peasantry of the country districts, especially on account of the excesses of the retreating royal troops at the time of the French invasion of the Roussillon. Curiously enough, the peasantry acted very largely from religious motives. Many of the soldiers were utter foreigners to the Catalans,—such, for example, as the Italians and the Irish, both of which elements were present in considerable numbers. To the ignorant peasants these strange-mannered people, who were Catholics in fact, seemed most certainly heretics. Attacks on the soldiery began in the mountain districts early in 1640, and soon extended to the cities as well. In June a serious riot occurred in Barcelona, during which the hated royal viceroy was killed. That act marked the triumph of the revolution and the beginning of the war.

It is possible that a policy of moderation might still have avoided the conflict, but such action was not taken. The war lasted nineteen years, and was fought bitterly until 1653. In 1640 the Catalans formed a republic, and made an alliance with France, putting themselves under the protection of the French monarchy. The republic was short-lived; in 1641 the monarchical form returned, with a recognition of the king of France as ruler. French troops aided the Catalans in many expeditions, but in this very fact lay the remedy for the grievances against Spain. The Catalans found that French officials and French soldiers committed the same abuses as those which they had objected to in the case of Castile. Coupled with a statement of Philip IV that he had never intended to interfere with the Catalan fueros, or charter rights (although Olivares certainly had so intended), this proved to be the turning point. Philip confirmed the charters in 1653, but the fighting went on in certain regions until 1659, when Catalonia was recognized as part of Spain in the treaty of peace with France. The war had one good result; it occasioned the dismissal of Olivares in 1643. Nevertheless, the evil had been done beyond repair, though the dispute had experienced a turn for the better, dating from Olivares’ deprivation from office.

Meanwhile, Olivares had involved Spain in another direction. From the time of the acquisition of Portugal by Philip II that region had been exceedingly well treated by the Spanish kings: no public offices were given to any but Portuguese; no military or naval forces and no taxes were required for purely Spanish objects; the Portuguese colonies were left to the Portuguese, and the route around Africa to the Far East was closed to Spaniards; Lisbon continued to be the centre of Portuguese colonial traffic, as Seville was for Spain; and even the members of the House of Braganza, despite their dangerous claim to the throne, were allowed to remain in Portugal, and were greatly favored. Furthermore, Philip II abolished customs houses between Portugal and Castile, made advantageous administrative improvements (among other things, reforming colonial management, on the Spanish model), and attempted something in the way of public works. The annexation weighed very lightly on the country. The king was represented by a viceroy; there were a few Spanish troops in Portugal; and some taxes were collected, though they were far from heavy in amount. Spain has been charged with the responsibility for the loss of many Portuguese colonies, on the ground that Portugal became involved in the wars against the Spanish kings, and therefore open to the attack of Spain’s enemies. There is reason for believing, however, that the connection served rather as a pretext than a cause; this was an age when the North European powers were engaging in colonial enterprises, and it is worthy of note that the Dutch, who were the principal successors to the Portuguese possessions, continued to make conquests from Portugal after they had formed an alliance with that country in the war of Portuguese independence from Spain. In fact, very little passed into foreign hands prior to the Portuguese separation from the Spanish crown as compared with what was lost afterward.

While the nobility and the wealthy classes favored the union with Spain, there were strong elements in the country of a contrary opinion, for whom leaders were to be found in the lower ranks of the secular clergy and especially among the Jesuits. The masses of the people still hated Spaniards; several generations were necessary before that traditional feeling could be appreciably lessened. A current of opposition manifested itself as early as the reign of Philip III, when the Duke of Lerma, the king’s favorite minister, proposed to raise the prohibition maintained against the Jews forbidding them to sell their goods when emigrating, and planned to grant them civil equality with Christians. This had coincided with a slight increase in taxation to produce discontent. It was natural that the imperialistic Olivares should wish to introduce a radical change in the relations of Spain and Portugal. He early addressed the king on the advisability of bringing about a veritable amalgamation of the two countries, and suggested that Portuguese individuals should be given some offices in Castile, and Castilians in like manner awarded posts in Portugal. When this purpose became known it was used as one of the principal means of stirring up opposition to Spain, on the ground that Portugal was to be deprived of her autonomy. The renewal of legislation such as that proposed by the Duke of Lerma with respect to the Jews and an increase in taxation added to the dissatisfaction in Portugal to such an extent that there were several riots. Spain’s financial difficulties arising from the European wars led Olivares to turn yet more insistently to Portugal, and in the year 1635 new and heavier taxes began to be imposed, together with the collection of certain ecclesiastical rents which had been granted to the king by the pope. This produced the first outbreak against the royal authority. A revolution was started at Évora in 1637 which soon spread to all parts of Portugal, but the nobles, the wealthy classes, and the Duke of Braganza were not in favor of the movement, and it was soon suppressed. The condition of affairs which had provoked it continued, however, and was accentuated by new burdens and fresh departures from the agreement of Philip II. Taxes became heavier still; Portuguese troops were required to serve in the Low Countries; and the Duke of Braganza, of whom Olivares was unreasonably suspicious, was appointed viceroy of Milan, with a view to getting him out of Portugal. It was this last measure which was to bring about a fresh and more determined uprising than that of 1637. The duke refused the appointment, whereupon Olivares completely changed front, possibly with a view to concealment of his real suspicions, and made Braganza military governor of Portugal, besides sending him funds with which to repair the fortifications of the kingdom. The duke would almost certainly have been satisfied with this arrangement, had it not been for his wife, whose ambitious character was not duly taken into account by Olivares. This lady was a Spaniard of the family of the dukes of Medina Sidonia, but she was desirous of being a queen, even though it should strike a blow at her native land. She conspired to bring about a Portuguese revolution headed by her husband, who should thus become king of Portugal. The Catalonian outbreak of 1640 furnished a pretext and the propitious occasion desired. The Duke of Braganza and the nobility generally were ordered to join the royal army in suppressing the Catalans. Instead, the nobles rebelled, and the revolution broke out on the first of December in the same year, 1640. Fortresses were seized, and the Duke of Braganza was proclaimed as JoÃo (or John) IV, king of Portugal.

The war lasted twenty-eight years, but, although it might well have been considered as more important than any of the problems of the time, other than the equally momentous Catalan revolt, it was not actively prosecuted by Spain. Spain was engaged in too many other wars, to which she gave perhaps an undue share of her attention, and was more than ever beset by her chronic difficulty of lack of funds. France, England, and the Protestant Netherlands gave help to Portugal at different times, whereby the last-named was able to maintain herself against the weak attacks of Spain. The decisive battle was fought at Villaviciosa in 1665, but it was not until 1668, in the reign of Charles II, that peace was made. Portugal was recognized as independent, retaining such of her former colonies as had not already been taken by the Dutch,—with one exception; the post of Ceuta, in northern Africa, remained Spanish,—the only reminder of Spain’s great opportunity to establish peninsula unity through the union with Portugal.

Still other difficulties arose in Italy and in Spain to harass the reign of Philip IV. There were revolts in Sicily in 1646-1647, and in Naples in 1647-1648, both of which were put down. An Aragonese plot was discovered, and there was no uprising. A similar plot in Andalusia was headed by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, captain general of the province and brother of the new queen of Portugal. This too was uncovered in time to prevent an outbreak. In Vizcaya there was a serious revolt, growing out of an alleged tampering with local privileges, but it was eventually put down. In fine, the reign had been one of disaster. Olivares had been the chief instrument to bring it about, but, after all, he only represented the prevailing opinion and traditional policies. The moment of reckoning had come.

The reign of Charles II (1665-1700) was a period of waiting for what seemed likely to be the end, unless fate should intervene to give a new turn to affairs. The king himself was doubly in need of a regent, for he was only four years old when he succeeded to the throne and was also weak and sick in mind and body. He was subject to epileptic fits, on which account he was termed Charles “the Bewitched” (el Hechizado), and many people believed that he was indeed possessed of a Devil. This disgusting, but pitiful, creature was expected to die at any moment, but he lived to rule, though little more than in name, for thirty-five years. The whole reign was one of plotting for the succession, since it early became clear that Charles II could have no heir. There was a pro-French party, a pro-Austrian party, and a very strong group which favored a Spaniard, Juan of Austria, illegitimate son of a Spanish king, as his predecessor of the same name had been. Juan of Austria became virtual ruler in 1677, but died in 1679, thus eliminating the only prominent claimant in Spain. France, at the height of her power under Louis XIV, was unwilling to wait for the death of Charles II before profiting by Spanish weakness, and therefore engaged in several wars of aggression, directed primarily against Spain’s possessions in the Low Countries and against the Protestant Netherlands. In many of these wars other powers fought on the side of Spain and the Dutch, notably the Holy Roman Emperor, many princes of Germany, and Sweden, while England and the pope joined the allies against the French military lord in the last war of the period. Four times Spain was forced into conflict, in 1667-1668, 1672-1678, 1681-1684, and 1689-1697. Province after province in northern Europe was wrested away, until, after the last war, when Louis XIV had achieved his greatest success, little would have remained, but for an unusual spirit of generosity on the part of the French king. Instead of taking further lands from Spain, he restored some which he had won in this and previous wars. The reason was that he now hoped to procure the entire dominions of Spain for his own family.

The leader of the party favoring the Hapsburg, or Austrian, succession in Spain was the queen-mother, MarÍa Ana, herself of the House of Austria. After many vicissitudes she at length seemed to have achieved a victory, when she brought about the marriage of Charles II to an Austrian princess in 1689, the same year in which the king’s former wife, a French princess, had died. The situation was all the more favorable in that Louis XIV declared war against Spain in that year for the fourth time in the reign. The very necessities of the war, added to the now chronic bad administration and the general state of misery in Spain, operated, however, to arouse discontent and to provoke opposition to the party in power. Thus the French succession was more popular, even during the war, than that of the allied House of Austria. After the war was over, the French propaganda was established on a solid basis, for it was evident, now, that Charles II could not long survive. Louis XIV put forward his grandson, Philip of Anjou, as a candidate, and the Holy Roman Emperor urged the claims of his son, the Archduke Charles. Not only did Philip have the weaker hereditary claim, but he also had the renunciation of his grandmother, MarÍa Teresa, wife of Louis XIV, against him. The last-named objection was easily overcome, since Spain had never paid the promised dowry of MarÍa Teresa, wherefore Louis XIV held that the renunciation was of no effect.

The fight, after all, was a political one, and not a mere determination of legal right, and in this respect Louis XIV and his candidate, Philip, had the advantage, through skilful diplomacy. The French party in Madrid was headed by Cardinal Portocarrero, a man of great influence, assisted by Harcourt, the French ambassador. The imperial ambassador, Harrach, and Stanhope, the representative of England, worked together; the union of France and Spain under Bourbon rulers, who would probably be French-controlled, represented a serious upsetting of the balance of power, wherefore England desired the succession of the Archduke Charles, who at that time was not a probable candidate for the imperial crown. For several years Madrid was the scene of one of the most fascinating diplomatic battles in European history. The feeble-minded king did not know what to do, and asked advice on all sides, but could not make up his mind about the succession. The Austrian party had his ear, however, through his Austrian wife, and through the king’s confessor, who was one of their group, but by a clever strike of Portocarrero’s the king was persuaded that his wife was plotting to kill him, and was induced to change confessors, this time accepting a member of the French party. To divide his opponents Louis XIV proposed the dismemberment of Spain and her possessions among the leading claimants, assigning Spain, Flanders, and the colonies to a third candidate, the Prince of Bavaria. The French king did not intend that any such division should take place, and in any event the Bavarian prince soon died, but through measures of this type Louis XIV eventually contrived to supplant in office and in influence nearly all who opposed the Bourbon succession. Meanwhile, the unfortunate king was stirred up and worried, although possibly without evil design, so that his health was more and more broken and his mentality disordered to the point of idiocy, hastening his death. Strange medicines and exorcisms were used in order to cast out the Devil with which he was told he was possessed, exciting the king to the point of frenzy. In 1700 Louis XIV abandoned his course of dissimulation to such an extent that it became clear that he would endeavor to procure all the Spanish dominions for Philip. Henceforth it was a struggle between the two principal claimants for exclusive rule. The wretched Spanish monarch was at length obliged to go to bed by what was clearly his last illness. Even then he was not left in peace, and the plotting continued almost to the very end. On October 3, Philip was named by the dying king as sole heir to all his dominions. On November 1, Charles II died, and with him passed the rule of the House of Austria.