Frank H. Alfriend

MOTIVE OF MR. DAVIS’ ARREST—AN AFTER-THOUGHT OF STANTON AND THE BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE—THE EMBARRASSMENT PRODUCED BY HIS CAPTURE—THE INFAMOUS CHARGES AGAINST HIM—WHY MR. DAVIS WAS TREATED WITH EXCEPTIONAL CRUELTY—THE OUTRAGES AND INDIGNITIES OFFERED HIM—HIS PATIENT AND HEROIC ENDURANCE OF PERSECUTION—HIS RELEASE FROM FORTRESS MONROE—BAILED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AT RICHMOND—JOY OF THE COMMUNITY—IN CANADA—RE-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL COURT—HIS TRIAL AGAIN POSTPONED—CONCLUSION.

All doubt has long since been dispelled as to the motive of the pursuit and arrest of Mr. Davis. His arrest and imprisonment were the after-thought of the saturnine Secretary of War, and his associate inquisitors of the Bureau of Military Justice, at Washington. The details given by Mr. Mallory, of the circumstances of Mr. Davis’ progress through North Carolina, South Carolina, and a part of Georgia, added to facts which are yet fresh in the public memory, fully justify the conclusion that the Federal authorities connived at his supposed purpose to escape the country. The reputation of Mr. Lincoln among his countrymen, for humanity as well as good sense, renders it extremely probable that such would have been his method of avoiding the perplexity which must arise from the capture of Mr. Davis.

Well understanding that the inflamed public sentiment of the North, regarding Mr. Davis as a political offender of the worst possible character, would not tolerate his immediate release, the Federal Government would have served the ends of humanity and sound policy by encouraging his escape. On the other hand the laws of the United States tolerate prolonged imprisonment only after trial and sentence. Hence the arrest of Mr. Davis must open an endless perspective of embarrassments. He could not be tried simply as an individual, nor could his punishment for any alleged crime of his own, be the sole object to be sought. His arraignment before a judicial tribunal, would be the arraignment of the principle of State Sovereignty, of the States which had sought to put that principle in practice, of the five millions of American citizens who had supported it, and who had cheerfully risked their lives and earthly possessions for its maintenance.

Nay, more, the trial of Jefferson Davis, upon a charge of treason, meant the trial of the North also. Should all efforts to convict the South in the person of Mr. Davis, of treason, fail, the recoil might well be dreaded by those who instigated the war upon the rights and existence of the States. It was not to be safely assumed that the legal decision of a constitutional question, which divided the framers of the Federal Constitution, would necessarily affirm the party and sectional dogmas upon which the North waged the war. Should secession be legally justified, what justification could the North claim, that is rightfully denied to Russia in her conduct towards Poland? What plea should England need for her outrages upon Ireland? With Jefferson Davis acquitted of treason, what could the conduct of the North for four years have been, but a revelry in blood—the wanton perpetration of a monstrous crime?

In this dilemma the industry of the Bureau of Military Justice, which afterwards achieved an immortality of infamy, by its record of judicial murders, aided by the ingenuity of Stanton, devised a scheme for the arrest of Mr. Davis, upon charges designed to cover him and the cause which he represented, with everlasting obloquy. Not content with having triumphed by superior numbers, in a war of political opinions, which in the beginning was declared not to be waged for social or political subversion; not content with having settled a grave constitutional question, by brute force, in a government founded upon the idea of popular consent, the Federal authorities were now made a party to infamous falsehoods, the circumstances and results of which have fixed a stigma upon the American name.

Contemporary with the announcement of events, which proclaimed the irretrievable downfall of the Confederacy, were the calumnies of the Northern press, under the alleged inspiration of Stanton, representing that Mr. Davis was escaping with wagons filled with plunder, and with the gold of the Richmond banks; and that he had endeavored to escape in the concealment of female apparel. No one knew better than those who promulgated this paltry defamation, its utter falsity, and we would not insult Mr. Davis and the Southern people by bestowing consideration upon such palpable calumnies. It was not calculated that such a portraiture of one, whose personal honor, courage, and manhood had triumphantly endured every test, would be accepted by the intelligence even of the North. But it nevertheless had an obvious purpose, which was well answered. It imposed upon the weak and credulous. The besotted and cowardly mobs of the Northern cities, who filled the air with clamor for the “blood of traitors,” while the men who had conquered the South, were touched with sympathy for the misfortunes of foes whom they respected, of course eagerly accepted any caricature of Mr. Davis agreeable to their own vulgar imaginations. In this manner was consummated the first step in the object of delaying the feeling of personal respect, and of sympathy for misfortunes, which eventually assert themselves in the masses, for a fallen foe, whom it was already resolved to persecute with oppression and cruelty previously unknown under the American political system.

Next came the atrocious proclamation charging Mr. Davis with complicity in the assassination of President Lincoln. It is safe to say that incidents hitherto prominent by their infamy, will be forgotten by history, in comparison with the dastardly criminal intent which instigated that document. Circumstances warrant the belief that not one of the conspirators against the life and honor of Mr. Davis, believed either then or now, that the charge had one atom of truth. Had the charge been honestly made, it would have been disavowed, when its falsity became apparent. But this would not have subserved the end of the conspirators, and the poison was permitted to circulate and rankle, long after the calumny had been exploded during the investigations of the military commission, in the cases of Mrs. Surratt and Captain Wirz. At length justice was vindicated by the publication of the confidential correspondence between Holt and Conover, which disclosed the unparalleled subornation and perjury upon which the conspirators relied. Well has it been said that the world will yet wonder “how it was that a people, passing for civilized and Christian, should have consigned Jefferson Davis to a cell, while they tolerated Edwin M. Stanton as a Cabinet Minister.”We have no desire to dwell upon the details of Mr. Davis’ long and cruel imprisonment. The story is one over which the South has wept tears of agony, at whose recital the civilized world revolted, and which, in years to come, will mantle with shame the cheek of every American citizen who values the good name of his country. In a time of profound peace, when the last vestige of resistance to Federal authority had disappeared in the South, Mr. Davis, wrecked in fortune and in health, in violation of every fundamental principle of American liberty, of justice and humanity, was detained for two years, without trial, in close confinement, and, during a large portion of this period, treated with all the rigor of a sentenced convict.

But if indeed Mr. Davis was thus to be prejudged as the “traitor” and “conspirator” which the Stantons, and Holts, and Forneys declared him to be, why should he be selected from the millions of his advisers and followers, voluntary participants in his assumed “treason,” as the single victim of cruelty, outrage, and indignity? What is there in his antecedents inconsistent with the character of a patriotic statesman devoted to the promotion of union, fraternity, harmony, and faithful allegiance to the Constitution and laws of his country? We have endeavored faithfully to trace his distinguished career as a statesman and soldier, and at no stage of his life is there to be found, either in his conduct or declared opinions, the evidence of infidelity to the Union as its character and objects were revealed to his understanding. Nor is there to be found in his personal character any support of that moral turpitude which a thousand oracles of falsehood have declared to have peculiarly characterized his commission of “treason.”

No tongue and pen were more eloquent than his in describing the grandeur, glory, and blessings of the Union, and in invoking for its perpetuation the aspirations and prayers of his fellow-citizens. In the midst of passion and tumult, in 1861, he was conspicuous by his zeal for compromise, and for a pacific solution of difficulties. No Southern Senator abandoned his seat with so pathetic and regretful an announcement of the necessity which compelled the step. The sorrowful tone of his valedictory moistened the eye of every listener, and convinced even political adversaries of the sincerity and purity of his motives. His elevation to the Presidency of the Confederacy was not dictated by the recognition of any supposed title to leadership in the secession movement. His election was indeed a triumph over the extreme sentiment of the South, and was declared by those who opposed it to involve a compromise of the exclusive sectionalism which was the basis of the new government. His administration of the Confederate Government exhibited the same unswerving loyalty to duty, to justice and humanity, which his previous life so nobly exemplified. The people of the South alone know how steadfastly he opposed the indulgence of vengeance; how he strove, until the last moments of the struggle, to restrain the rancor and bitterness so naturally engendered under the circumstances. Yet, when Jefferson Davis lay a helpless prisoner in the strongest fortress of the Union, with “broad patches of skin abraded” by the irons upon his limbs, men were practically pardoned who had devoted years of labor to the purpose of disunion, and had reproached him for not unfurling the “black flag.” Is not the inference, then, justified that all of these tortures and indignities were aimed at the people and the cause which his dignity, purity, and genius had so exalted in the eyes of mankind?But how impotent are falsehood and malignity to obstruct the illumination of truth! As subornation and perjury proved unavailing to convict him of atrocious guilt, so equally has persecution failed to accomplish its purpose. To all that shameful picture of barbarous violence and gratuitous insult; of insolent espionage and vulgar curiosity; of the illustrious leader of a brave people, whose whole life does not exhibit one act of meanness or shame, or one word of untruth, crushed by disaster, and prostrate with disease, fettered as if he were a desperate felon; restricted in his diet, and not even permitted a change of linen, except by the authority of a military jailer; an object of unrelaxed scrutiny, often driven to his cell by the peering curiosity of vulgar men and unsexed women—to all this there was but one relief—the patient and constant heroism of the sufferer, giving heart to his despairing countrymen, and ennobling his own captivity. History furnishes no similar instance of patient and dignified endurance of adversity and persecution.

The incidents of Mr. Davis’ history since his release from Fortress Monroe, do not require detailed narration. For the most part they are confined to that domain of privacy which decency holds to be inviolable. When two years—wanting a few days—from the date of his incarceration had elapsed, Mr. Davis was transferred by the military authorities to the custody of the Federal civil authorities at Richmond. Here, amid the congratulations of friends, and the rejoicings of the community, which loves him as it loves but one other—his constant friend and compeer in fame—he was released from custody under circumstances which are well known. The interval between his release in May, 1867, and his re-appearance before the Federal court, at Richmond, in the ensuing November, was passed by Mr. Davis in Canada. There he was the recipient of the respect and sympathy which his character and his sufferings might have been expected to elicit from a humane people. At the November term of the Federal court, Mr. Davis was again present, with his eminent counsel, awaiting trial, and was again released upon recognizance to appear on the 25th March, 1868.

In the face of the close proximity of the event, it would be unprofitable to speculate as to the sequel of this third appearance of Jefferson Davis before a judicial tribunal, to answer the charge of treason. Nor do we propose to add to the brief consideration, which has already been given in this volume, of the legal and historical question involved in the case of Mr. Davis. The subject has been exhausted. The masterly expositions by Mr. Davis of the theory of the Federal Government (some of which we have given), are at once the complete vindications of himself and his countrymen, and the sufficient monuments of his fame.

But are the issues of the war to be subjected to candid and impartial legal adjudication? Will the North approve this raising of a doubt as to its own justification, merely in the hope of vengeance upon one who is powerless for injury? But if there is to be admitted another jurisdiction than that of War; if the arbitrament of battle is to be carried to the higher tribunal of Law and Public Opinion; if there is to be a trial and not a judicial farce, with a foregone conclusion and a prejudged sentence, the South and its late leader will not shrink from the verdict. Of this, the world requires no more emphatic iteration than that furnished by past events.

But the decision of this question, whatever it may be, can not recover the wager which the South gallantly staked and irretrievably lost. Time will show, however, the amount of truth in the prophecy of Jefferson Davis, made in reply to the remark that the cause of the Confederacy was lost: “It appears so. But the principle for which we contended is bound to re-assert itself, though it may be at another time and in another form.”

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Footnotes:

[1] A pertinent remark of Macaulay is, “It is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original principles. During many years, a generation of Whigs, whom Sydney would have spurned as slaves, continued to wage war with a generation of Tories whom Jeffries would have hanged.”

[2] Mr. Gladstone.

[3] Mr. Davis has, since his withdrawal from the army until the breaking out of the war, resided on his plantation in Warren County, a few miles from Vicksburg.

[4] Dr. Craven relates the following incident, which is an impressive illustration of the depth and intensity of Mr. Davis’ veneration for the character of Mr. Calhoun:

“General Miles observed, interrogatively, that it was reported that John C. Calhoun had made much money by speculations, or favoring the speculations of his friends, connected with this work (the Rip-Raps, near Fortress Monroe).

“In a moment Mr. Davis started to his feet, betraying much indignation by his excited manner and flushed cheek. It was a transfiguration of friendly emotion. The feeble and wasted invalid and prisoner, suddenly forgetting his bonds—forgetting his debility, and ablaze with eloquent anger against this injustice to the memory of one he loved and reverenced. Mr. Calhoun, he said, lived a whole atmosphere above any sordid or dishonest thought—was of a nature to which even a mean act was impossible. It was said in every Northern paper that he (Mr. Davis) had carried with him five millions in gold when quitting Richmond—money pilfered from the treasury of the Confederate States; and that there was just as much truth in that as in these imputations against Calhoun.... Calhoun was a statesman, a philosopher, in the true sense of that grossly-abused term—an enthusiast of perfect liberty in representative and governmental action.”—Prison Life of Jefferson Davis. Library edition, pages 206, 207.

[5] Massachusetts even refused military honors to the remains of a gallant son of her own soil, (Captain Lincoln,) and a descendant of one of her most eminent families, who was killed at Buena Vista. Her fanatical intolerance would not forget that he had fallen in a war which she did not approve.

[6] “Our Living Representative Men,” by Mr. John Savage.

[7] Lieutenant-Colonel A. K. McClung.

[8] For this spirited account of the operations of the Mississippi regiment at Monterey, the author is indebted to a sketch of Mr. Davis in Mr. John Savage’s “Living Representative Men,” which was published a year or two prior to the war. Though having several other accounts, possibly more complete, I have selected this as the most graphic. The author readily acknowledges the assistance which he has derived from the work of Mr. Savage.

[9] This Constitutional question was again raised by Mr. Davis, while President of the Confederacy, and his action with reference to similar legislation by the Confederate Congress, was in entire accordance with the reason assigned for declining Mr. Polk’s appointment.

[10] Henry Clay, Jr., a graduate of West Point, and at the time of his death, Lieutenant-Colonel of volunteers. He fell at Buena Vista.

[11] The repeal of the Missouri Compromise has been commonly alluded to as the special and leading measure of the Pierce administration. It was, in reality, not an administration measure. The well-known cordiality of Mr. Davis’ relations with President Pierce induced a number of Senators to call upon Mr. Davis, on the Sunday morning previous to the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and ask his aid in securing them the pledge of the President’s approval. They represented the measure as contemplating merely the assertion of the rights of property, slavery included, in the Territories. Mr. Davis objected, at first, to an interruption of the President, on the Sabbath, for such a purpose, but finally yielded. The President promptly signified his approbation of a measure contemplating such a purpose. It is not necessary to say that the legislation of Congress embraced a far greater scope than that indicated. The administration indorsed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in full, because the principle was correct, though its assertion then was wholly unnecessary, unprofitable, and likely to lead to mischievous results. This was the real connection of the Pierce administration with a measure for whose consequences the ambition of Judge Douglas was almost solely responsible.

[12] Governor Wise, of Virginia, characterized “squatter sovereignty” as a “short cut to all the ends of Black Republicanism.”

[13] To be found at the conclusion of this chapter.

[14] William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an able lawyer and constitutional expounder. Mr. Buchanan, in his history of his own administration, thus mentions him: “The right of secession found advocates afterwards in men of distinguished abilities and unquestioned patriotism. In 1825, it was maintained by Mr. William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an eminent and universally-respected lawyer.... His biographer says that, ‘in 1791, he was appointed District Attorney of the United States,’ and ‘the situation of Attorney General was more than once tendered to him by Washington, but as often declined,’ for domestic reasons.”

[15] Hon. C. C. Clay, of Alabama.

[16] It is not to be understood that Mr. Davis approved Mr. Buchanan’s policy in the winter of 1861. The message of the President disappointed the South, and was offensive to many of his most attached supporters, in consequence of its denial of the right of secession. Denying the right of secession, Mr. Buchanan yet denied, also, the power of coercing the States, but subsequently lent himself to the latter policy. Mr. Davis freely testified his disappointment at certain positions taken in the Message, and criticised them with emphasis, but great courtesy. Mr. Buchanan indicates the special message of January, 1861, as the occasion of the termination of all friendly relations between himself and those whom he terms the “secession Senators.”

[17] It is a notable fact that, years ago, the strong and avowed attachment of Mr. Davis for the Union, was habitually sneered at by some Southern men, who are now seeking to gratify their lust for place by “crooking the pregnant hinges of the knee,” to those who persecute him and his countrymen.

[18] Mr. Crittenden, whose supreme devotion to the Union, can not be called in question, since he continued to cling to the shadow long after the substance had departed, and in the midst of actual war continued to hope for a final pacific settlement, was greatly incensed at the unpatriotic course of the Republican Senators. His gray hairs, his eloquence, his unquestioned Unionism, were all unavailing. He was frequently hotly denunciatory, of what, equally with Mr. Davis, he regarded a purpose to prevent any adjustment which could have a pacifying effect upon the country.

[19] Statement of Hon. S. S. Cox.

[20] Acts of secession were adopted by the various States as follows:

South Carolina, December 20, 1860.

Florida, January 7, 1861.

Mississippi, January 9, 1861.

Alabama, January 11, 1861.

Georgia, January 20, 1861.

Louisiana, January 26, 1861.

Texas, February 1, 1861.

[21] Extract from President Davis’ address before the Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862.

[22] By the steamer “Star of the West,” which was driven back by the South Carolina batteries.

[23] It was not until the 8th of April that the commissioners obtained a reply to their official communication of March 12th. From this reply, it appeared that “during the whole interval while the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever; to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations.”—President Davis’ Message, April 29th, 1861.

[24] Message to Confederate Congress.

[25] This expedition, ostensibly “for the relief of a starving garrison,” consisted of eleven vessels, with two hundred and eighty-five guns and twenty-four hundred men.

[26] Before instructing General Beauregard to fire upon the fort, President Davis made another effort to prevent hostilities, which he thus explains: “Even then” (after Beauregard had applied for instructions), “under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our commissioners, and the treacherous course of the Government of the United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from directing our fire at Fort Sumter, if he would promise not to open fire on our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused. The conclusion was, that the design of the United States was to place the besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet and fort. The fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was executed by General Beauregard with skill and success.”—Message, 29th April, 1861.

[27] Mr. Lincoln’s proclamation was dated April 15, 1861.

[28] On the day of the surrender of Fort Sumter, Mr. Lincoln protested to the Virginia commissioners the pacific purposes of his government. When giving these assurances to Virginia he had heard of the surrender of the fort, and knew that for two days Beauregard had been firing upon the “sacred flag.”

[29] April 24, 1861. Virginia joined the Confederacy as a member May 6, 1861.

[30] “East Tennessee” was a perpetual “fire in the rear” to the Confederacy.

[31] President Davis appreciated the immense value to the South of privateering. The Federal Government employed all the naval force at their command to blockade the South, recalled the squadrons stationed in foreign waters, and made extensive purchases of vessels for purposes of war. The South, of course, had no navy, since there had been no time to prepare or purchase one within the brief space between the organization of the Confederate Government and the beginning of hostilities. Under these circumstances there remained only the resort to private armed ships, under letters of marque, to assault the floating commerce of the enemy, and, to some extent, neutralize the blockade. Doubting the constitutional power of the executive in the premises, he, with characteristic regard for law, determined not to commission privateers until duly authorized by the legislation of Congress. The authority to issue commissions, and letters of marque and general reprisal, to privateers, was given by act of Congress, passed 6th of May.

[32] A recent work (Richmond During the War) thus mentions the arrival of Mr. Davis in Richmond:

“He was received with an outburst of enthusiasm. A suite of handsome apartments had been provided for him at the Spotswood Hotel, until arrangements could be made for supplying him with more elegant and suitable accommodations. Over the hotel, and from the various windows of the guests, waved numerous Confederate flags, and the rooms destined for his use were gorgeously draped in the Confederate colors. In honor of his arrival, almost every house in the city was decorated with the ‘Stars and Bars.’

“An elegant residence for the use of Mr. Davis was soon procured. It was situated in the western part of the city, on a hill, overlooking a landscape of romantic beauty. This establishment was luxuriantly furnished, and there Mr. and Mrs. Davis dispensed the elegant hospitalities for which they were ever distinguished. Mrs. Davis is a tall, commanding figure, with dark hair, eyes and complexion, and strongly-marked expression, which lies chiefly in the mouth. With firmly-set yet flexible lips, there is indicated much energy of purpose and will, but beautifully softened by the usually sad expression of her dark, earnest eyes. Her manners are kind, graceful, easy, and affable, and her receptions were characterized by the dignity and suavity which should very properly distinguish the drawing room entertainments of the Chief Magistrate of a Republic.”

[33] We intentionally waive the discussion of this question as to the extent of the preparation made by the States, severally, for actual war. It is not incumbent upon us here to examine the action of the individual States. We do not desire to be understood, however, as assenting to the proposition that all the States were inadequately prepared. It is a singular commentary upon the wisdom and sagacity of the leaders of secession in its earlier stages (by the various States), that Virginia and North Carolina were each better able to arm their troops than were some of the Cotton States. The latter may have made as much preparation as was possible under the circumstances. When Mr. Davis reached Mississippi, after his withdrawal from the Senate, the Legislature had appropriated $150,000 for military purposes. As Major-General commanding the forces of the State, he was consulted as to additional appropriations. He immediately recommended an appropriation of three millions of dollars. It is needless to say that such a recommendation, at that period, was deemed little less than extravagant folly.

[34] It should be observed that Mr. Lincoln did not call upon the Federal Congress to assemble until July 4th, two months after the meeting of the Confederate Congress.

[35] In this connection, we quote from a remarkably faithful and careful chronicle of events during a portion of the war: “On the morning of the 29th of May, President Davis arrived in Richmond.... He found the military preparations in a state requiring instant energy, and, within a few hours after his arrival, he telegraphed and wrote messages to every State in the South, urging that troops should be sent forward with increased speed.”—Howison’s History of the War.

[36] General Von Molkte, who planned the Prussian campaign in Bohemia.

[37] General Jubal A. Early.

[38] The speech made by Mr. Davis at the depot of the Virginia Central Railroad was not reported in the newspapers. The writer, in company with two friends, was in the crowd which greeted the return of Mr. Davis to the capital, and such was the effect of the scene and the glowing words of the speaker, that neither can ever be forgotten. A few hours subsequently to the scene at the depot, the words, as given below, were repeated, in the presence of several persons who heard Mr. Davis, and were pronounced by them the identical language used by him. They were preserved in writing, and are now published for the first time. Apart from its historical interest, the speech is a remarkable specimen of spontaneous, sententious eloquence, eminently appropriate to the occasion:

“Fellow-citizens of the Confederate States:

“I rejoice with you, this evening, in those better and happier feelings which we all experience, as compared with the anxiety of three days ago. Your little army—derided for its want of numbers—derided for its want of arms—derided for its lack of all the essential material of war—has met the grand army of the enemy, routed it at every point, and it now flies, in inglorious retreat, before our victorious columns. We have taught them a lesson in their invasion of the sacred soil of Virginia; we have taught them that the grand old mother of Washington still nurtures a band of heroes; and a yet bloodier and far more fatal lesson awaits them, unless they speedily acknowledge that freedom to which you were born.”

[39] The Harper’s Magazine article of General Jordan.

[40] The Federal official reports are overwhelmingly in confirmation of these views of General Jackson. General McClellan stated that “in no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer resistance to a respectable body of the enemy.”

[41] The writer heard this speech of Mr. Davis, and his recollection is positive of the encouragement extended by the President to the hope of an immediate forward movement. The recollection of the author of “The Diary of a Rebel War Clerk” seems to be substantially the same.

[42] One evidence of this “persecution” would appear to consist in the fact that the President, having reluctantly commissioned Generals Lovell and G. W. Smith, upon the recommendations of Generals Beauregard and Johnston, chose also to commission, at the same time, with a similar rank, General Van Dorn, giving the latter a senior commission. Smith and Lovell had but recently come to the South, both being residents of New York, before the war, while Van Dorn had promptly sought service in the Confederate army before hostilities commenced, had done excellent service, and been constantly in front of the enemy. Another proof of “persecution” is that the President refused to permit such an organization of the army as he believed to be in conflict with the laws of Congress.

The commonly assigned origin of the difference between President Davis and General Beauregard, which gave rise to so much scandal and falsehood during the war, was the suppression of the preliminary portion of General B.’s report of the battle of Manassas. The correct version of that matter is now well known. President Davis did not suppress any portion of Beauregard’s report. He did object to certain preliminary statements of the report, and requested that they should be altered or omitted. When this was declined, the President sent the report to Congress, accompanied by an indorsement of his own, correcting what he conceived to be errors. General Beauregard’s friends in Congress, unwilling that these comments of the President should be published, suppressed both the objectionable passages and the executive indorsement. So that they, and not the President, occasioned that “suppression,” from which arose much gossip and mystery. A sufficient answer to these charges of personal antagonism by the President to these two officers, should be the fact that he retained them in command of the two largest armies of the Confederacy, until relinquished by them, in the one case, because of sickness, and in the other, in consequence of a wound which caused disability.

[43] The friends of Mr. Mallory, in illustration of this unreasoning prejudice, were accustomed to declare that, “were a Confederate vessel to sink in a storm, in the middle of the ocean, the Richmond Examiner and Mr. Foote would advocate the censure of the Secretary of the Navy, as responsible for her loss.”

[44] The careful reader will hardly have overlooked the passage, in the Message to Congress, in the preceding chapter, in which Mr. Davis thus alludes to this subject: “The active state of military preparation among the nations of Europe, in April last, the date when our agents first went abroad, interposed unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and the want of a navy has greatly impeded our efforts to obtain military supplies of all sorts.”

A few months later, he said, speaking with characteristic candor: “I was among those who, from the beginning, predicted war as the consequences of secession, although I must admit that the contest has assumed proportions more gigantic than I had anticipated. I predicted war, not because our right to secede and to form a government of our own was not indisputable and clearly defined in the spirit of that declaration, which rests the right to govern on the consent of the governed, but saw that the wickedness of the North would precipitate a war upon us.”—Address before Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862.

Mr. Davis here candidly admits that the “gigantic proportions” of the war exceeded his expectations, as they did also the expectations of the whole country and of the world. He did foresee a great war, and prepared for it; but he was not guilty of the foolish pretension that the war simply realized his expectations, when every statesman of Europe and America was deceived, both as to its duration and magnitude. Who believes that Napoleon the First, equally the unrivaled master of war and diplomacy, would pretend that he foresaw the extent and duration, or the results, of the wars of the empire? that he realized the inextinguishable nature of English hostility, or anticipated the numerous perfidies of Austria? Mr. Seward, who is likely to be remembered, with some distinction, in connection with the diplomacy and statesmanship of the late war, constantly predicted its termination in “ninety days.” No opinion can be truthfully ascribed to Mr. Davis indicating a light estimate of the struggle either before or during the war. Yet there is a retrospective statesmanship in the South which now claims that he should have been lifted to its own preternatural powers, and from the first have seen every phase and incident. How absurd must this pretension appear to the sober judgment of fifty years hence.

Mr. Davis was even accredited in Richmond, by an extravagant and unfounded popular report, with the prophecy that “children then (1862) unborn would be soldiers in the war between the North and South.” People in those days saw nothing in the action of the Government indicating its faith in a short war. Their only consolation was found in the editorials of Richmond newspapers predicting foreign intervention should McClellan be defeated.

[45] Inaugural Address, February 22, 1862.

[46] The order was in these terms:

[47] The fact is not generally known that the President was, upon two occasions, assailed with urgent petitions for the removal of Stonewall Jackson, which he peremptorily rejected on both occasions; first, after the campaign about Romney, in December, 1861, and again, after the battle of Kernstown. March, 1862.

[48] I am mainly indebted for these facts to a recent publication by Professor Bledsoe, late Assistant Secretary of War of the Confederate States.

[49] In this engagement General Benjamin McCulloch, of Texan fame, a brave and efficient soldier, was killed.

[50] When General Beauregard had eluded Halleck at Corinth, and brought his army to Tupelo, he turned over the command to General Bragg, and sought repose and recuperation at Bladon Springs, Alabama. Those who assume to be the friends and admirers of General Beauregard, but who are far more anxious to establish a mean malignity in the character of Mr. Davis, than to exalt their favorite, have laid great stress upon the fact, that the President then placed Bragg in command of the army for the ensuing campaign, thus placing Beauregard in retirement. There can be little difficulty in comprehending the commendable motives which prompted Mr. Davis to this course. The period of General Beauregard’s absence from his command (three weeks, it is understood) would protract the period of inactivity until midsummer. Time was precious. The Western army had done nothing but lose ground all the current year, and, meanwhile, Lee was preparing his part of the operations, by which the Government hoped to throw the enemy back upon the frontier. Was, then, the Western army to lie idle, awaiting the disposition and convenience of one man? With the approval of the army and the country, the President appointed to the vacated command, an able and devoted soldier, whose reputation and service justified the trust. The writer has seen nothing from General Beauregard approving the assaults of his pretended admirers upon Mr. Davis, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that he does not indorse them.

It is also urged that Mr. Davis, when pressed to remove Bragg and replace Beauregard, declared that he would not, though the whole world should unite in the petition. Very likely, and altogether proper that he should not remove an officer while in the actual execution of his plans of campaign. But there can be no better explanation than that given by Mr. Davis: “The President remarked, that so far as giving Beauregard command of Bragg’s army is concerned, that was out of the question. Bragg had arranged all his plans, and had co-intelligence with the Department, with Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall; and to put a new commander at the head of the army would be so prejudicial to the public interests, he would not do it if the whole world united in the petition.”

But President Davis never designed that General Beauregard should be without a command. With that just appreciation of the real merits of his generals, apart from the cheap applause or unmerited censure of the crowd, which distinguished most of his selections, he placed General Beauregard in charge of the coast defenses, where his reputation was certainly much enhanced. In this oft-repeated and unfounded charge of “injustice” and “persecution,” in the case of General Joseph E. Johnston, as in that of General Beauregard, there is no specification, more awkwardly sustained, than that which denies the abundant opportunity enjoyed by each of those officers, for the display of the superior genius asserted for them by their admirers. The slightest acquaintance with the history of the war will verify this statement.

[51] Much crimination and recrimination followed the fall of New Orleans. It is, at least, safe to say, that public opinion in the South was much divided, as to where the burden of censure for this dire and unexpected calamity should properly rest. The intelligence of the capture of the city was an appalling surprise, not only to the public in Richmond, but to the Government. President Davis declared that the event was totally unexpected by him. The fall of New Orleans was one of those instances, in which the Confederates had decided for them, in a most unsatisfactory manner, the long disputed question as to the efficiency of shore batteries against vessels of war. Precedents established, when sailing vessels were used in warfare, were overthrown by the experience of steam vessels, especially when iron-plated. Commodore Farragut, with perfect success and comparative ease, passed the forts below New Orleans, after the chief of the naval force had despaired of their reduction.

[52] These revelations of the designs of McClellan are derived from the admirable work of Mr. Swinton—the “History of the Army of the Potomac”—perhaps the ablest and most impartial contribution yet made to the history of the late war.

It is noteworthy that General Grant attempted nearly the same approach to Richmond and was signally foiled—a fact which he promptly recognized, by his change of plan, after his bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864.

[53] This dispatch was in substance: “Halt the army where it is.”

[54] The incidents of this trying period, when Richmond was doubly threatened by the hosts of McClellan, and the gunboats in the river, are “mementoes of heroism,” proudly illustrating the unconquerable spirit of that devoted city and its rulers. We give the resolution passed by the Legislature on the occasion referred to—May 14, 1862:

“Resolved by the General Assembly, That this General Assembly expresses its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last extremity, if such defense is in accordance with the views of the President of the Confederate States; and that the President be assured, that whatever destruction or loss of property, of the State, or individuals shall hereby result, will be cheerfully submitted to.”

Two days after, at a public meeting of the citizens of Richmond, Governor Letcher said, that under no circumstances would he approve the surrender of the city, and avowed his readiness to endure bombardment, if necessary. In the same stout spirit spoke Mayor Mayo:

“I say now—and I will abide by it—when the citizens of Richmond demand of me to surrender the capital of Virginia, and of the Confederacy, to the enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the mayoralty. And when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up the city, I hope I may have physical courage and strength enough left to shoulder a musket and go into the ranks.”

[55] It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations, similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not therefore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston’s ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely and intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to his aggressive qualities, though in this respect, results were not in his favor.

[56] Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this circumstance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing the army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted, was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The President, in company with General Magruder and other officers, was at a farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to open. General Lee, apprised of the President’s whereabouts, sent a courier to warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped without injury, just as the Federal battery opened fire.

[57] A serious disadvantage suffered by General Lee was the capture of his plan of battle by General McClellan. Completely informed as to his adversary’s movements, and with ninety thousand men against thirty-three thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confederate army. The means by which the enemy obtained this important paper was a subject of much gossip in the Confederacy.

[58] A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended neutrality of England was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary. Said he: “The impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Majesty’s Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more powerful of the two contending parties.”

[59] General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own as ten to three. Mr. Swinton states Hooker’s force at one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred guns. Lee’s effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand.

The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely indispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to meet the formidable Federal force in the neighborhood of Suffolk. An impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet’s detention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President eventually ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond.

[60] “Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness, and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all duties.... He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and holding the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even though the character of his campaigning imposed on them more hardships than on any other troops in the service. Good soldiers care not for their individual sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these General Jackson never lacked.... ‘For glory he lived long enough,’ continued Mr. Davis, with much emotion; ‘and if this result had to come, it was the Divine mercy that removed him. He fell like the eagle, his own feather on the shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his death, the Confederacy lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being that the final summons could have reached no soldier more prepared to accept it joyfully.’”—Craven’s Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 180, 181.

[61] Chiefly conscripts.

[62] It has been generally assumed that General Lee committed grave errors at Gettysburg. The following explanation by Lee shows the extreme caution with which such a judgment should be pronounced: “It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy’s main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the first day, and in view of the valuable results which would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.”

Mr. Swinton, who derived his information from General Longstreet, makes a statement which throws much light upon the theory with which this campaign was undertaken: “Indeed, in entering upon the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him.”—Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.

[63] Major John Esten Cooke justly says: “Gettysburg was the Waterloo—Cemetery Hill the Mount St. Jean of the war.... Not without good reason is the anniversary of this great battle celebrated at the North with addresses and rejoicings—with crowds, and brass bands, and congratulations. The American Waterloo is worth making that noise over; and the monument proposed there is a natural conception.”

[64] General Johnston, whether willingly or unwillingly, it is not necessary for us to inquire, was the favorite of the anti-administration faction. His name and opinions were, upon all occasions, quoted to aid in the disparagement of the administration. This faction was as blind in its zealotry in favor of Johnston, as in its prejudice against Davis. The motive of this zealous championship of Johnston was, however, to offset the well-known confidence of General Lee in the President.

[65] The President ordered a Court of Inquiry for investigation of the facts of the campaign in Mississippi. General Pemberton requested that the most searching inquiry should be made, and that the court be allowed to invite all attainable testimony against him.

[66] It is noteworthy that when trial vindicated the confidence of Mr. Davis in an officer, of whose capacity the critics were doubtful (as was the case in numberless instances), they made no acknowledgment of error. For example, the President was accused of the most unworthy nepotism in his appointment of General “Dick” Taylor, who was a brother of Mr. Davis’ first wife. Yet that appointment was insisted upon by Stonewall Jackson, in whose army Taylor commanded a brigade. The President made Taylor a Brigadier, because he thought him competent; and afterward a Major-General, because Jackson knew him to be worthy of it. Did Taylor’s subsequent career vindicate the President or the critics?

The case of the brave and efficient Early was another instance in which Mr. Davis was at variance with the newspaper and congressional censors, and in which, as usual, the President was sustained by Lee. It is needless to multiply examples.

[67] One of the worst of these proceedings of the enemy, was the execution of Captains Corbin and McGraw. On hearing of their fate, the Confederate Government inquired of the Federal authorities the reason of their actions. The response was, that they were executed as spies. The record of their trial was then demanded. In answer to this request, the Federal Government furnished a copy of the charges and specifications against them, and of the sentence of the court which condemned them, but none of the evidence.

From the papers thus furnished, it appears that it was not true that they had been accused or tried as spies—that the sole charge against these unfortunate gentlemen was, that they had recruited soldiers for the Confederacy in Kentucky, a State embraced in our political system and represented regularly in the Confederate Congress by Senators and Representatives. Nor was the evidence of this charge supplied. Not a scintilla of proof appeared that these men were spies. The sole pretext for their execution was the technical one that these officers were recruiting in one of the States claimed by the enemy, as one of the United States, a principle which applies equally to Virginia or South Carolina, and which would, if carried out, sentence to the gallows every officer and private we had in our service.

[68] General D. H. Hill has given a most manly exhibition of feeling toward Mr. Davis, in an article published, some months since, in his magazine. We quote from General Hill, who alludes, at length, to the alleged rancor of Mr. Davis toward his opponents. General Hill prefaces his remarks with the declaration, that he “has never been among the personal friends of Mr. Davis;” that he was “at no time an admirer of his executive abilities;” and further declares himself to have been the recipient of an “unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable wrong,” at the hands of Mr. Davis. Says this gallant soldier:

“It was said of Mr. Davis that he could see no good in his enemies and no evil in his friends. I know of one instance, at least, of incorrectness of the former statement. I was present when a discussion took place in regard to the suppression of a newspaper because of the disloyal character of its articles, which were producing desertion in the army, and disaffection among the people at home. The editor had been converted to Unionism by the battle of Gettysburg and fall of Vicksburg, and, like all newborn proselytes, was fiery in his zeal. A cabinet officer present said: ‘This man is not more disloyal than ——’ (naming a well-known editor, whose assaults upon Mr. Davis at this time were very virulent.) ‘I don’t see how one paper can be suppressed without suppressing the other.’ To this a gentleman replied: ‘You are unjust. Mr. ——, though an enemy of the President, yet shows by his abuse of the Yankees that he has no love for them. The other editor betrays hatred of the President and of his own people.’ Mr. Davis immediately assented to this, saying: ‘You have exactly described the difference between the two men.’... But it is not true that he could see no good in his enemies, and that he pursued them with rancorous hate. I do not doubt that in the comparison with his supposed friends, they were in his estimation both intellectually weak and morally perverse. But, apart from this, he could be just and appreciative of their merits. I saw him several times during the session of a Confederate Congress in which he had been harshly assailed. Once he alluded incidentally to his troubles, but without the least resentment in language or manner. I think that there was no instance of the suppression of a newspaper, though several editors were notoriously disloyal to the Confederate cause, and still more of them intensely hostile to the Confederate President. Like Washington, Mr. Davis held ‘error to be the portion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that public character, to be the prerogative of a freeman.’”

[69] At the beginning of the war, the South had only fifty millions of coin, and had a paper circulation of about the same amount.

[70] My limited space has prevented the extended account of the Confederate Commissary Department, which was originally designed. The history of its commissariat is an important chapter in the history of the Confederacy. President Davis was much abused for his retention of Colonel Northrop, who has been charged, both during and since the war, with incompetency, corruption, and every conceivable abuse of his office. The amount of truth, in the charge of corruption against Colonel Northrop, may be estimated, when we state a fact known almost universally in Richmond, that few persons suffered the privations of the war more severely than he. Hundreds of the most respectable gentlemen in the South willingly testify to the unimpeachable patriotism and purity of Colonel Northrop. Equally false was the statement that Mr. Davis gratified merely his personal partiality in appointing Commissary-General a man who had given no previous evidence of fitness. Colonel Northrop, when in the regular Federal army, had seen extensive service in that department, where he was detailed, after having been disabled. His services were amply testified to by his superiors, who regarded him as having peculiar qualifications for the duties of the commissariat. Of these facts Mr. Davis had personal knowledge, though, when he placed Colonel Northrop at the head of the Confederate commissariat, they had not met for more than twenty years.

Again, when commissioned by Mr. Davis, Colonel Northrop was the Commissary-General of South Carolina—a position to which he would hardly have been invited, without at least some conviction, by the authorities of that State, of his fitness. It is well known, too, that a committee of the Confederate Congress investigated the affairs of the Commissary Department, and made a report which amply and honorably vindicated Colonel Northrop. Indeed, a member of that committee, one of the ablest men in Virginia, and not friendly to Mr. Davis, declared it to be the best managed department of the Confederate Government.

Editors perpetually clamored against Colonel Northrop for issuing half rations to the army, who daily issued half sheets to their subscribers—refusing to understand that in each case the cause was the same, viz., an exhaustion of supply, resulting from the depletion of the resources of the country.

[71] We present two resolutions of a series adopted by Federal prisoners of war:

These resolutions were adopted at a meeting of prisoners in Savannah, September 28, 1864, and sent to President Lincoln.

[72] Upon the person of Dahlgren was found the address, from which extracts relative to the purpose of the expedition are given. The portions which we omit are mainly exhortations to the courage of the men in a desperate enterprise:

We have not space for the indisputable testimony which has established the authenticity of the “Dahlgren Papers”—a subject upon which there is no longer room for doubt. The writer, at the time of this raid, had full descriptions of them from persons who saw the originals. They were found upon Dahlgren’s body by a school-boy thirteen years old, who could not write, and were immediately placed in the hands of his teacher. The soiled folds of the paper were plainly visible. The words referring to the murder of President Davis were a part of the regular text of the manuscript. Additional proof of the authenticity of the papers was furnished by the note-book, also found upon the person of Dahlgren, containing a rough draft of the address to the troops, and various memoranda. The address was written in pencil in the note-book, and differs very slightly from the copy, containing, however, the injunction that the Confederate authorities be “killed on the spot.” The statement of Mr. Halbach, who is still living, supported by the testimony of a number of persons, must be deemed conclusive of the genuineness of the documents published in the Richmond journals.

Hon. Stephen R. Mallory, late Confederate Secretary of the Navy, has recently made the following statement of Mr. Davis’ course concerning this matter:

[73] The “Fort Pillow massacre” was a fruitful theme for new chapters of “rebel barbarities.” Forrest was charged with indiscriminate slaughter of a captive garrison, when, in fact, he only continued to fight a garrison which had not surrendered. After the Confederates had forced their way into the fort, the flag was not taken down, nor did the garrison offer to surrender. The explanation obviously was that the enemy relied upon their gunboats in the river to destroy Forrest’s forces after they had entered the fort.

[74] In the last two years of the war, there were few more promising officers than General Hoke. Mr. Davis thought very highly of his capacity, and, upon one occasion, alluded to him as “that gallant North Carolinian, who always did his duty, and did it thoroughly.”

[75] At Hanover Junction, on the 23d of May, General Lee was joined by Breckinridge’s division, numbering less than three thousand muskets, and by Pickett’s division of perhaps three thousand five hundred muskets. General Lee was compelled, very shortly afterwards, to send Breckinridge’s division back to the Valley.

[76] This estimate includes Grant’s losses in his assaults upon the fortifications of Petersburg, immediately after his passage of the James River. I have seen his total losses from the Rapidan, until the siege of Petersburg was regularly begun, estimated by Northern writers, at over ninety thousand.

[77] President Davis regarded the security of Atlanta as an object of the utmost consequence, for which, if necessary, even great hazards must be run. His frequent declaration was that the Confederacy “had no vital points.” This theory was correct, as there was certainly no one point, the loss of which necessarily involved the loss of the cause. Yet it was obvious in the beginning that certain sections, either for strategic reasons, or as sources of supply, were of vast importance for the prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The value of Richmond and Virginia was obvious. Equally important was a secure foothold in the Mississippi Valley, and the possession of the great mountainous range from Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the “backbone region” of the South. Mr. Davis regarded each one of these three objects as justifying almost any hazard or sacrifice. Under no circumstances could he approve a military policy which contemplated the surrender of either of these objects, without a desperate struggle. He had wanted Vicksburg defended to the last extremity, and now desired equal tenacity as to Atlanta. This city was a great manufacturing centre; the centre of the system of railroads diverging in all directions through the Gulf States, and it was the last remaining outpost in the defense of the central section of the Confederacy.

[78] Yet the argument that General Hood’s errors establish the wisdom of General Johnston’s policy, can hardly be deemed fair by an intelligent and impartial judgment. A more competent commander than Hood might have more ably executed an offensive campaign, even after the fall of Atlanta; or, again, other tactics than those of Johnston, from Dalton to Atlanta, might have had better results.

After Johnston’s removal, the President received numerous letters from prominent individuals in the Cotton States, heartily applauding that step. The condemnation of the President, for the removal of Johnston, came only after Hood’s disasters; and it must be remembered that Hood’s later operations were not in accordance with Mr. Davis’ views.

The writer remembers a pithy summary of the Georgia campaign, made by a Confederate officer, shortly before the end of the war. Said he: “While Johnston was in command there were no results at all; when Hood took command, results came very rapidly.”

[79] It has been contended that the odds against the South in numbers and resources were compensated by the advantages of her defensive position, and by the strong incentives of a war for her homes and liberties. An ingenious argument in demonstration of the assumed defective administration of the Confederacy has been deduced from various historical examples of successful resistance against overwhelming odds. The most plausible citation has been the success of Frederick the Great, in his defense of Prussia against the coalition of Russia, Austria, and France. This illustration has no value, as it does not at all meet the case.

Waiving all consideration of the peculiar strategic difficulties of the South, Frederick first had the advantage of his English alliance. Frederick never fought odds greater than two to one, while the South fought three, four, sometimes five to one—but never equal numbers. Again, Prussia was inaccessible except by overland marches—not penetrated, like the South, in every direction by navigable rivers, and nearly surrounded by the sea. Frederick, too, was absolute in Prussia, and had the lives and property of all his subjects at his control. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, never could consolidate the resources of the South as he desired, being constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which could at all times be coerced by the press hostile to the administration, or influenced by the slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending to place the whole means of the country at the disposal of the President, Congress yet invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculating clauses providing exemptions and immunities of every description. President Davis was too sincere a republican, and had too much regard for the restraints of the Constitution to violently usurp ungranted powers.

It is to be remembered, too, that the South received no foreign aid, while Frederick was at last saved by the accession of Peter to the Russian throne, which event dissolved the coalition against Prussia.

[80] General Hood’s magnanimous acknowledgment is sufficient for the acquittal of Mr. Davis from any responsibility for this ill-starred movement. On taking leave of his army, in January, 1865, Hood said, speaking of the late campaign: “I am alone responsible for its conception, and strove hard to do my duty in its execution.”

But in addition to this, there was a correspondence, between Mr. Davis and a Confederate officer of high rank, which completely exculpated Mr. Davis. In accordance with Mr. Davis’ accustomed magnanimity and regard for the public welfare, this correspondence was never published. The facts in this matter conspicuously illustrate the persistent and reckless misrepresentation, which has not ceased with the termination of the war. With a class of writers, the facts regarding Mr. Davis are things least to be desired. In many instances, their attacks upon his fame are puerile, but in others, where facts are either distorted or wantonly disregarded, the object seems to be merely to gratify a wicked spirit of detraction.

[81] In the autumn of 1864, General Price advanced into Missouri, proclaiming his purpose to be a permanent occupation. The expedition ended in disaster. Defeated in an engagement on the Big Blue, Price retreated into Kansas, and finally into Southern Arkansas. The campaign did not affect the current of the war elsewhere, and was a failure.

[82] The author has seen an absurd statement, made without any inquiry into the facts, that Mr. Davis was seen to turn “ghastly white” at the moment of receiving the intelligence of the disaster at Petersburg. It is simply one of a thousand other reckless calumnies, with as little foundation as the rest.

We do not feel called upon here to relate the details of the evacuation of Richmond and the occupation of the city by the Federal army. They are, doubtless, known to every intelligent reader, and we are here specially concerned only in the movements of Mr. Davis.