INDICATIONS OF POPULAR FEELING AT THE BEGINNING OF 1864—APATHY AND DESPONDENCY OF THE NORTH—IMPROVED FEELING IN THE CONFEDERACY—THE PROBLEM OF ENDURANCE—PREPARATIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT—MILITARY SUCCESS THE GREAT DESIDERATUM—A SERIES OF SUCCESSES—FINNEGAN’S VICTORY IN FLORIDA—SHERMAN’S EXPEDITION—FORREST’S VICTORY—THE RAID OF DAHLGREN—TAYLOR DEFEATS BANKS—FORREST’S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN—HOKE’S VICTORY—THE VALUE OF THESE MINOR VICTORIES—CONCENTRATION FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLES IN VIRGINIA AND GEORGIA—FEDERAL PREPARATIONS—GENERAL GRANT—HIS THEORY OF WAR—HIS PLANS—THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA—SHERMAN—FEEBLE RESOURCES OF THE CONFEDERACY—THE “ON TO RICHMOND” AND “ON TO ATLANTA”—GENERAL GRANT BAFFLED—HE NARROWLY ESCAPES RUIN—HIS OVERLAND MOVEMENT A TOTAL FAILURE—SHERIDAN THREATENS RICHMOND—DEATH OF STUART—BUTLER’S ADVANCE UPON RICHMOND—THE CITY IN GREAT PERIL—BEAUREGARD’S PLAN OF OPERATIONS—VIEWS OF MR. DAVIS—DEFEAT OF BUTLER, AND HIS CONFINEMENT IN A “CUL DE SAC”—FAILURE OF GRANT’S COMBINATIONS—CONSTANTLY BAFFLED BY LEE—TERRIBLE LOSSES OF THE FEDERAL ARMY—GRANT CROSSES THE JAMES—HIS FAILURES REPEATED—HIS NEW COMBINATIONS—EARLY’S OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY AND ACROSS THE POTOMAC—THE FEDERAL COMBINATIONS AGAIN BROKEN DOWN—FAVORABLE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA—THE MISSION OF MESSRS. CLAY, THOMPSON, AND HOLCOMBE—CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN—THE ARROGANT AND MOCKING REPLY OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT.

Despite the solid advantages obtained by the North in the campaign just ended, the close of the winter developed the existence of great apprehension at Washington, and a correspondingly improved feeling in the South. It was indeed remarkable that the conviction entertained by both sides, that the struggle was now about to assume its latest and decisive phase, should have evoked such different manifestations of feeling at Washington and Richmond.

At the North was seen a singular apathy, which temporarily checked overwrought displays of popular exultation, and a mutual distrust of the Government and the public, not at all encouraging of success in designs demanding zealous coÖperation. The thoughtful observer of Northern sentiment readily detected the presence of depression and suspicion—a general apprehension that the restoration of the Union was an enterprise developing new and unseen obstacles at each step, and a confusion of views as to the management of the war. But, in the violent exhibitions of party spirit, the North realized its chief cause of alarm. The peace party increased in numbers and influence with the prolongation of the war, and the preservation of power by the Government party was clearly dependent upon such military results, as should foreshadow the speedy “collapse of the rebellion.” In short, the North saw that the culmination of the momentous struggle was to be reached, while it was in the throes of an embittered Presidential contest.

There was another explanation of the altered feeling in the two sections developed during the winter. Throughout the war, the Northern mind was singularly accessible to the influence of sensation and “clap-trap;” hence were always to be expected periodical galvanic excitements, followed by revulsion of feeling. The conservative instincts of the South sought repose rather than excitement; and the crippled condition of the enemy, after his achievements of the summer and fall, gave the South a sufficient respite for the recovery of much of its lost confidence. Nor was the transition of the Southern mind, within a few weeks, from depression to something like hopeful anticipation, based upon a mere presentiment of prosperous fortune. The lessons of the war, not less than the teachings of previous history, encouraged reanimation. It was contended that the conquest of a territory so extensive, and the subjection of a people numerically as strong and as courageous as those of the South, was physically impossible. It was urged that the Federal successes of the preceding summer had only placed the enemy upon the threshold of his enterprise, and that, in surmounting the resolute resistance which had almost defeated his earliest movements, he had vainly wasted the spirit and the strength which were now needed for his further progress.

From such a condition of feeling, the logical conclusion was that the war had now become a question of endurance, and that the Confederacy must now depend upon its capacity to resist until the North should abandon the war in sheer disgust. The Richmond journals pithily stated the problem as one of “Southern fortitude and endurance against Yankee perseverance.”

In the meantime, the enforced quiet of the enemy was diligently improved by the Government. Probably at no period of the war did the Confederate administration exhibit more energy and skill in the employment of its limited resources, than in its preparations for the campaign of 1864. The vigorous measures of the President were, in the main, seconded by Congress, though this session was not wanting in those displays of demagogism which, throughout the war, diminished the influence and efficiency of that body. In the sequel, the expedients adopted did not realize the large results anticipated. The financial legislation of Congress did not improve the value of the currency, nor did the various expedients resorted to for strengthening the army obtain the desired numbers. It was calculated that the Confederate armies would aggregate, by the opening of spring, something like four hundred thousand men, of which the repeal of the substitute law alone was expected to furnish seventy thousand. The real strength of all the Confederate armies, however, did not exceed two hundred thousand men when the campaign was entered upon. The execution of the conscription law was a subject of sore perplexity to the administration, and, though President Davis made strenuous exertions to remedy the difficulty, the system continued defective until the end.

The army was, nevertheless, strengthened both in numbers and material, while its spirit, as shown in the alacrity and unanimity of reËnlistment, was never surpassed. Military success was now the end to which the Government devoted its whole energies, as the real and only solution of its difficulties. In time of war military success is the sole nepenthe for national afflictions. Without victories the Confederacy would seek in vain a restoration of its finances through the expedients of legislation. Equally necessary were victories for relief of the difficulty as to food. Should the spring campaign be successful, the Confederacy would recover the country upon which it had been mainly dependent for supplies, and such additional territory as was required to put at rest the alarming difficulty of scarcity.

The expectation of the South was much encouraged by a series of successes upon minor theatres of the war, during the suspension of operations by the main armies. A signal victory was won late in February, by General Finnegan, at Ocean Pond, Florida, the important event of which was the decisive failure of a Federal design to possess that State.The most serious demonstration by the enemy, during the winter months, was the expedition of Sherman across the State of Mississippi. This movement, undertaken with all the vigor and daring of that commander, was designed to capture Mobile and to secure the Federal occupation of nearly the whole of Alabama and Mississippi. It was the second experiment, undertaken by Federal commanders, during the war, of leaving a regular base of operations, and seeking the conquest of a large section of territory, by penetrating boldly into the interior. The first similar attempt was made by Grant, from Memphis into the interior of Mississippi. It is notable that both these expeditions were marked by shameful failure. They signally illustrated the military principle of the impossibility of successful penetration of hostile territory, even when held by a greatly inferior force, and, moreover, clearly indicate the fate that would inevitably have overtaken Sherman, in his “march to the sea,” had there been an opposing army to meet him. When Van Dorn captured Grant’s supplies at Holly Springs, in the autumn of 1862, the Federal commander had no alternative but to make a rapid retreat to his base. A similar experience awaited Sherman, who, leaving Vicksburg with thirty thousand men, marched without opposition through Mississippi—General Polk, with his corps of ten thousand men, falling back before him. CoÖperating with Sherman was a large cavalry force, which, leaving North Mississippi, was to unite with him at Meridian, and upon this junction of forces depended the success of the entire expedition. But General Forrest, a remarkably skillful and energetic cavalry leader, attacked the Federal column, utterly routing and dispersing it, though not having more than one-third the force of the enemy. This necessitated the retreat of Sherman, with many circumstances indicating demoralization among his troops. His expedition terminated with no results sufficient to give it more dignity, than properly belonged to at least a dozen other plundering and incendiary enterprises, undertaken by Federal officers who are comparatively without reputation. The exploits of Sherman in Mississippi gave him a “bad eminence,” which he afterwards well sustained by the burning of Rome and Atlanta, the sack of Columbia, and his career of pillage and incendiarism in the Carolinas.

A notable event of the winter was the raid of Dahlgren, an expedition marked by every dastardly and atrocious feature imaginable. When this expedition of “picked” Federal cavalry had been put to ignominious flight by the departmental clerks at Richmond, its retreat was harassed by local and temporary organizations of farmers, school-boys, and furloughed men from Lee’s army. Not until its leader was killed, however, was revealed the fiendish errand which he had undertaken. Upon his person was found ample documentary evidence of the objects of the expedition, viz.: to burn and sack the city of Richmond, and to assassinate President Davis and his cabinet.[72] Yet this man, killed in honorable combat, after his cut-throat mission had failed, was apotheosized by the North as a “hero,” who had been “assassinated” while on an errand of patriotism and philanthropy. The shocking details of this diabolical scheme, substantiated by every necessary proof of authenticity, were published in the Richmond journals, and instead of provoking the condemnation of the hypocritical “humanity” of the North, with characteristic effrontery were ridiculed as “rebel forgeries.”

The Trans-Mississippi region was, in the early spring, the scene of brilliant and important Confederate successes. About the middle of March, the famous “Red River Expedition” of General Banks, contemplating the complete subjugation of Louisiana, and the occupation of Western Texas, was undertaken. The result was, perhaps, the most ignominious failure of the war. Defeated by General Taylor, in a decisive engagement at Mansfield, General Banks, with great difficulty, effected his retreat down Red River, and abandoned the enterprise, which he had undertaken with such extravagant anticipations of fame and wealth.

In the month of April, Forrest executed a brilliant campaign among the Federal garrisons in Tennessee, capturing several thousand prisoners and adding large numbers of recruits to his forces. With a force mainly organized within three months, this dashing officer penetrated the interior of Tennessee, which the enemy had already declared “conquered,” capturing garrisons and stores, and concluded his campaign by penetrating to the Mississippi River, and successfully storming Fort Pillow.[73] The most encouraging event of the spring was the capture of Plymouth, North Carolina, by General Hoke. This enterprise, executed with great gallantry and skill, had the tangible reward of a large number of prisoners, many cannon, and an important position with reference to the question of supplies.[74]

The aggregate of these Confederate successes was not inconsiderable. Expectation was strengthened by them at the South, and proportionately disappointed at the North. It was chiefly in their influence upon public feeling that these minor victories were valuable, as they in no way affected the main current of the war, and were speedily overlooked at the first sound of the mighty shock of arms along the Rapidan and in Northern Georgia. Indeed, the actors in these preliminary events were, in most instances, themselves shifted to these two main theatres, upon which the concentrated power of each contestant was preparing its most desperate exertions. Troops on both sides were recalled from South Carolina, and even Florida, to participate in the great wrestle for the Confederate capital, and the impending struggle in Georgia absorbed nearly all the forces hitherto operating west of the Alleghanies and east of the Mississippi.

However discouraged may have been the public mind of the North at the beginning of the year, the preparations of the Federal Government, for the spring campaign, indicated no abatement of energy or determination. Well aware of the diminished resources of the South, and of the political necessities which imperatively demanded speedy and decisive successes, the Federal administration prepared a more vigorous use of its great means than had yet been attempted. The draft was energetically enforced, and volunteering was stimulated by high bounties. At no period of the war were the Federal armies so numerous, so well equipped and provided with every means that tends to make war successful. Their morale was better than at the outset of any previous campaign. The Federal armies were now inured to war, composed mainly of seasoned veterans, and commanded by officers whose capacity had been amply tested in battle.

The agents selected by the Federal Government, to carry out its designs, were men whose previous career justified their selection. The sagacity of the North had, at length, realized the one essential object, to the accomplishment of which all its efforts must contribute. This object was the destruction of Lee’s army. Virginia was justly declared the “backbone” of Confederate power; Lee’s army was the pedestal of the edifice. It was in the clearer appreciation of this object, and in the determination to subordinate every concern of the war to its accomplishment, that Northern sentiment made a step forward, that was, of itself, no insignificant auxiliary to ultimate success. The blows which Sherman prepared to deliver upon the distant fields of Georgia, were aimed at Lee’s army, not less than were those of Grant. While the latter “hammered away continuously” in Virginia, to pulverize, as it were, the column from which so many Federal endeavors had been forced to recoil, Sherman was expected to pierce the very centre of the Confederacy, and seize or destroy every remaining source of sustenance.

The presence in Virginia of the General commanding all the Federal forces, was sufficiently indicative of his recognition of the supreme object of the campaign. The successful career of this officer was the recommendation which secured for him the high position of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Union. He was the most fortunate officer produced by the war—fortunate not less in having won nearly every victory which could promote the successful conclusion of the war, but fortunate in having won victories where defeat was the result to be logically expected.

It is not at all necessary to weigh, in detail, the merits of General Grant as a soldier. With the overwhelming argument of results in his favor, there would be little encouragement, even if there could be strict justice, in denying superior ability to Grant. His campaigns have contributed nothing to military science, in its correct sense, and the military student will find in his operations few incidents that illustrate the art or economy of war. In discarding the formulas of the schools, and condemning the theories upon which the best of his predecessors had conducted the war, Grant, by no means, proved that he was not a good soldier. But his independence in this respect did not establish his claim to genius, since his contempt for military rules and theories was not followed by the display of any original features of true generalship. His name was coupled with a great disaster at Shiloh, where he was rescued from absolute destruction by the energy of Buell, and the delay of his adversary. At Donelson, at Vicksburg, and at Missionary Ridge, he had succeeded by mere weight of numbers; and, indeed, in no instance had he exhibited any other quality of worth, than boldness and perseverance. But his success was a sufficient recommendation to the material mind of the North, which did not once pause to consider how far Grant’s victories were due to his military merit.

But whatever the defects of Grant in the higher qualities of generalship, he was preËminently the man for the present emergency. If the Federal Government saw the necessity of vigorous warfare, looking to speedy and final results, General Grant knew how to conduct the campaign upon that idea, provided the Government would give him unlimited means, and the Northern people would consent to the unstinted sacrifice. Grant knew no other than an aggressive system of warfare, and contemplated no other method of destroying the Confederacy, than by the momentum of superior weight—by heavy, simultaneous and continuous blows. The plans of Grant were remarkable for their simplicity, and contemplated merely the employment of the maximum of force against the two main armies of the Confederacy, keeping the entire force of the South in constant and unrelieved strain. By “continuous hammering” he thus hoped eventually to destroy or exhaust it.

General Grant was again fortunate in having the unlimited confidence of his Government, which placed at his disposal a million of soldiers, and was prepared to accede to his every demand. To the most trusted of his lieutenants—Sherman—Grant intrusted the conduct of operations against the centre of the Confederacy, reserving for himself the control of the campaign against Richmond, and Lee’s army. His plan of operation was to destroy, not to defeat, an army which he knew could not be conquered, so long as its vitality remained. The military talent of the North had been already exhausted against Lee, and its largest army too often baffled by the Army of Northern Virginia, to admit the hope of defeating it in battle. To outgeneral Lee, Grant well knew required a greater master of the art of war than himself. To conquer the Army of Northern Virginia, he, not less than his army, knew to be impossible. His calculation was to wear it out by the “attrition” of successive and remorseless blows. This theory was based upon the plain calculation that the North could furnish a greater mass of humanity for the shambles, (as was afterward calculated it could spare a greater mass for the prisons,) than the South, and that thus when the latter should be exhausted, the former would still have left abundant material for an army. Such was Grant’s theory of the war. Whatever may be thought of it as a military conception, the theory was one that must succeed in the end, provided the perseverance of the North should hold out.

General Grant determined upon a direct advance with the Army of the Potomac against Richmond, by the overland route from the Rapidan. The frame-work of his plan, however, embraced coÖperating movements in other quarters, which should, at the same time, occupy every man that might be available for the reËnforcement of Lee. Grant was embarrassed by no lack of the men who were needed to make each one of these movements formidable. The most important of these was that designed to occupy the southern communications of Richmond, thus at once making the Confederate capital untenable, and cutting off the retreat of Lee. This operation was intrusted to General Butler, who, with thirty thousand men, was to ascend James River, establish himself in a fortified position near City Point, and invest Richmond on its south side. The other auxiliary movements were designed against the westward communications of Richmond, and were to be undertaken by Generals Sigel and Crook—the former, with seven thousand men, moving up the Shenandoah Valley, and the latter, with ten thousand, moving against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The force immediately under General Grant was one hundred and forty thousand men of all arms. Thus the grand aggregate of the Federal armies now threatening Richmond reached the neighborhood of one hundred and ninety thousand men. In addition to these was a force at Washington, equal in strength to the whole of Lee’s army.

The Federal Government was hardly less lavish in the distribution of its enormous resources to Sherman than to Grant. Sherman had proven himself an officer of much enterprise. Intellectually he was the superior of Grant, but not less than other Federal commanders he relied upon superior numbers to overcome the skill and valor of the Confederate armies. Physical momentum was needed to overwhelm Johnston, and was amply supplied. Sherman demanded one hundred thousand men to capture Atlanta, and, by the consolidation of the various armies which had hitherto operated independently in the West, his force attained within a few hundreds of that number.In painful contrast with this enormous outlay of forces, were the feeble means of the Confederacy. When the season favorable for military operations opened, General Lee confronted Grant upon the Rapidan, and General Johnston faced Sherman near Dalton, in Northern Georgia. Neither of these armies reached fifty thousand men. The undaunted aspect and mien of firm resistance, with which both awaited the perilous onset of the enemy, were, however, assuring of the steady determination which still defended the Confederacy. Critical as was the emergency, the Government and the country yet believed the strength of these two armies equal to the great test of endurance, at least beyond the perils of the present campaign. To hold its own was the primary hope of the Confederacy. If autumn could be reached without decisive victories by the North, and the great Federal sacrifices of spring and summer should then have proven in vain, there was ample ground for hope of those dissensions among the enemy, which, throughout the struggle, constituted so large a share of Confederate expectation.

On the 3d of May, 1864, General Grant initiated the campaign in Virginia, by crossing the Rapidan with his advanced forces; on the 5th, the correspondent movement of Sherman, a thousand miles away, was begun. By the morning of the 5th, one hundred thousand Federal soldiers were across the Rapidan, and on the same day, the first round of the great wrestle occurred. Entertaining no doubt of his capacity to destroy Lee, Grant imagined that his adversary would seek to escape. Having, in advance, proclaimed his contempt for “maneuvres,” he was solicitous only for an opportunity to strike the Confederate army before it should elude his grasp. But Hooker had made the same calculation a year before, and was disappointed, and a like disappointment was now in store for Grant.

Lee had no power either to prevent the Federal crossing of the Rapidan, nor to prevent the turning of his right. Instead of retreating, he immediately assumed the aggressive, and dealt the assailant one of the most effective blows ever aimed by that powerful arm. Three days sufficed to reveal to the Federal commander his miscalculations of his adversary’s designs, and, baffled in all his operations, he already indicated distrust of his system of warfare, and was compelled to attempt by “maneuvre,” what he had failed to effect by brute force. The events of the 5th and 6th of May clearly demonstrated that strategy could not yet be dispensed with in warfare. Indeed, nothing but Lee’s extreme weakness and the untoward wounding of Longstreet, in just such a crisis, and in exactly the same manner as marked the fall of Jackson, prevented the defeat of the Federal campaign in its incipiency. But for these circumstances the Federal Agamemnon would have been completely unhorsed on the 6th of May, and would have added another name to the list of decapitated commanders whom Lee had successively brought to grief. But the luck of Grant did not forsake him, and he still had numbers sufficient to attempt the “hammering” process again. Grant’s first attempt at “maneuvre” was a movement upon Spottsylvania Court-house, a point south-east of the late battle-fields, by which he sought to throw his army between Lee and Richmond. Again he was to be disappointed, and again did the Confederate commander prove himself the master of his antagonist, in every thing that constitutes generalship. The Confederate forces were already at Spottsylvania, when the Federal column reached the neighborhood, and Lee, so cautious in his words, announced to his Government that the enemy had been “repulsed with heavy slaughter.”

But Lee had done far more than foil Grant. He had secured an impregnable position upon the Spottsylvania heights, against which Grant remorselessly, but vainly, dashed his huge columns for twelve days. At the end of that period Lee’s lines were still intact, his mien of resistance still preserved, and the “hammering” generalship of Grant had cost the North nearly fifty thousand veteran soldiers. Men already began to ask the question, to which history will find a ready answer: “What would be the result if the resources of the two commanders were reversed?” Not even the North could fail to see how entirely barren of advantage was all this horrible slaughter. The “shambles of the Wilderness” became the popular phrase descriptive of Grant’s operations, and the Northern public was rapidly reaching the conclusion that the “hammer would itself break on the anvil.”

While the dead-lock at Spottsylvania continued, and Lee held Grant at bay, Richmond was seriously threatened by coÖperating movements of the enemy. General Grant had organized a powerful cavalry force under Sheridan, for operations against the Confederate communications. Sheridan struck out boldly in the direction of Richmond, followed closely by the Confederate cavalry. For several days he hovered in the neighborhood of the city, unable to penetrate the line of fortifications, and eventually retired in the direction of James River.

A melancholy incident of this raid of Sheridan was the death, in an engagement near Richmond, of General J. E. B. Stuart, the renowned cavalry leader of the Army of Northern Virginia. This was a severe bereavement to the South, and a serious loss to the army. Stuart’s exploits fill a brilliant chapter of the war in Virginia, and he was probably the ablest cavalry chieftain in the Confederate army. President Davis, who was constantly on the field during the presence of Sheridan near Richmond, deeply deplored the loss of Stuart. The President, not less than General Lee, reposed great confidence in Stuart’s capacity for cavalry command, and the noble character and gallant bearing of Stuart enlisted the warm personal regard of Mr. Davis—a feeling which was heartily reciprocated. Upon the day of his death, Mr. Davis visited the bedside of the dying chief, and remained with him some time. In reply to the question of Mr. Davis, “General, how do you feel?” Stuart replied: “Easy, but willing to die, if God and my country think I have fulfilled my destiny and done my duty.”

The important correspondent movement of Butler upon the south side of James River, began early in May. Ascending the river with numerous transports, Butler landed at Bermuda Hundreds, and advanced against the southern communications of Richmond. The force near the city was altogether inadequate to check the army of Butler, and almost without opposition he laid hold of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and advanced within a few miles of Drewry’s Bluff, the fortifications of which commanded the passage of the river to the Confederate capital. Troops were rapidly thrown forward from the South, and by the 14th May, General Beauregard had reached the neighborhood of Richmond, from Charleston.

Probably at no previous moment of the war was Richmond so seriously threatened, as pending the arrival of Beauregard’s forces. Mr. Davis was, however, resolved to hold the city to the last extremity. Though much indisposed at the time, he was every morning to be seen, accompanied by his staff, riding in the direction of the military lines. Superintending, to a large extent, the disposition of the small force defending the city, he was fully aware of the extreme peril of the situation, but nevertheless determined to share the dangers of the hour. When Beauregard reached the scene the crisis had by no means passed. Unless Butler should be dislodged, not only was Richmond untenable, but it was impossible to maintain Lee’s army north of James River. Yet the force available seemed very inadequate to any thing like a decisive defeat of the enemy. The aggregate of commands from the Carolinas, added to the force previously at Richmond, did not exceed fifteen thousand men, while Butler, with thirty thousand, held a strongly intrenched position.

Immediately upon his arrival, General Beauregard suggested a plan of operations, by which he hoped to destroy Butler, and, without pausing, to inflict a decisive defeat upon Grant. The plan he proposed was that Lee should fall back to the defensive lines of the Chickahominy, even to the intermediate lines of Richmond, temporarily sending fifteen thousand men to the south side of the James, and with this accession of force he proposed to take the offensive against Butler. Pointing out the isolated situation of Butler, he urged the opportunity for his destruction by the concentration of a superior force. Under the circumstances General Beauregard thought the capture of Butler’s force inevitable, and the occupation of his depot of supplies at Bermuda Hundreds a necessary consequence. When these results should be accomplished, he proposed, at a concerted moment, to throw his whole force upon Grant’s flank, while Lee attacked in front. General Beauregard was confident of his ability to make the attack upon Butler, in two days after receiving the desired reËnforcements, and was equally confident of the result both against Butler and Grant. His proposition concluded with the declaration that Grant’s fate could not be doubtful if the proposed concentration should be made, and indicated the following gratifying results: “The destruction of Grant’s forces would open the way for the recovery of most of our lost territory.”

Whatever his views as to its feasibility, the President could not refuse a careful consideration of a plan, whose author, in advance, claimed such momentous results. Upon reflection President Davis declined the plan as involving too great a risk, not only of the safety of Richmond, but of the very existence of Lee’s army. The proposition of Beauregard was submitted on the 14th May. At that time the grapple between Grant and Lee was still unrelaxed. Twelve days of battle had cost Lee fifteen thousand men. Meanwhile he had not received a single additional musket, while Grant had nearly supplied his losses by reËnforcements from Washington. Thus, while Lee’s force did not reach forty thousand, Grant’s still approximated one hundred and thirty thousand. The President also knew that Grant was at that moment closely pressing Lee, moving toward his left, and seeking either to overlap or break in upon the right flank of Lee.

The proposed detachment of fifteen thousand men from Lee, leaving him not more than twenty-five thousand, in such a crisis, would have been simply madness. Butler, it is possible, might have been destroyed, but the end of the Confederacy would have been hastened twelve months. It is questionable whether, at any moment after Grant crossed the Rapidan, the overmatched army of Lee could have been diminished without fatal disaster. The timely arrival of Longstreet had prevented a serious reverse on the 6th May. Is it reasonable to suppose that Lee could have detached one-third of his army, without Grant’s knowledge, or that the energy of the Federal commander would have permitted an hour’s respite to his sorely-pressed adversary after the discovery? The case would have been altogether different, had Lee been already safe within his works at Richmond. Under the circumstances proposed, he had before him a perilous retrograde, followed by a force four times his own strength, and commanded by the most unrelenting and persistent of officers.

But there was another view of the proposition not to be overlooked by the President in his perilous responsibility. It is true Beauregard promised grand results—nothing less than the total destruction of nearly all the Federal forces in Virginia. In brief, his plan proposed to destroy two hundred thousand men with less than sixty thousand. Again it was true the enemy was to be destroyed in detail—Butler first, and Grant afterwards. There were precedents in history for such achievements. But it should be remembered that if Butler should be immediately destroyed, and if Lee should be guaranteed a safe retrograde, Beauregard would still be able to aid Lee to the extent of but little more than twenty thousand men. This would give Lee less than fifty thousand with which to take the offensive against more than twice that number. Against just such odds Lee had already tried the offensive, and failed because of his weakness. He had assailed Grant under the most favorable circumstances, effecting a complete surprise when the Federal commander believed him already retreating, but was unable to follow up his advantage. Was there reason to believe that any better result would follow from a repetition of the offensive?

Believing himself not justified in hazarding the safety of the Confederacy upon such a train of doubtful conditions, and agreeing with General Beauregard, that Butler could be dislodged from his advanced positions, so menacing to Richmond, Mr. Davis rejected a plan which, under different circumstances, he would have heartily and confidently adopted.

With remarkable promptitude, Beauregard conceived a brilliant plan of battle, and within twenty-four hours had already put it in virtual execution. With fifteen thousand men, he drove Butler from all his advanced works, and confined him securely in the cul de sac of Bermuda Hundreds, where, in a few months, ended the inglorious military career of a man who, in every possible manner, dishonored the sword which he wore, and disgraced the Government which he served. The brilliant conception of Beauregard merited even better results, which were prevented not less by untoward circumstances than by the weakness of his command.

While Beauregard thus effectually neutralized Butler, Grant’s combinations, elsewhere, were brought to signal discomfiture. The expedition from the Kanawha Valley had been, in a measure, successful in its designs against the communications of South-western Virginia, but did not obtain the coÖperation designed, by the column moving up the Shenandoah Valley. Sigel, in his advance up the Valley, was encountered at Newmarket by General Breckinridge, who signally defeated him, capturing artillery and stores, and inflicting a heavy loss upon the enemy. Sigel retreated hastily down the Valley.

General Grant, on the 11th of May, proclaimed to his Government his purpose “to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer,” yet, within a week afterwards, he was already meditating another plan of operations. Forty thousand of the bravest soldiers of the Federal army had been vainly sacrificed, and yet the Confederate line remained intact upon the impregnable hills of Spottsylvania. A week was consumed in fruitless search for a weak point in the breastplate of Lee. Grant was again driven to “maneuvre.” Foiled again and again by the great exemplar of strategy, with whom he contended, Grant at no point turned his face towards Richmond without finding Lee across his path. Moving constantly to the left, the 3d of June—exactly one month from the crossing of the Rapidan—found Grant near the Chickahominy, and Lee still facing him. The fortune of war again brought the belligerents upon the old battle-ground of the Peninsula. Just before Lee reached the defenses of Richmond, for the first time during the campaign, he received reËnforcements.[75] Grant also was strengthened, drawing sixteen thousand men from Butler at Bermuda Hundreds.

On the 3d of June occurred the second battle of Cold Harbor. It was the last experiment of the strictly “hammering” system, unaided by the resources of strategy. It cost Grant thirteen thousand men, and Lee a few hundred. Such was a fitting finale of a campaign avowedly undertaken upon the brutal principle of the mere consumption of life, and in contempt of every sound military precept. Cold Harbor terminated the overland movement of Grant, and he speedily abandoned the line upon which he had proposed “to fight all summer.” Not that he willingly abandoned his “hammering” principle after this additional sacrifice of lives, for he would still have dashed his army against the impregnable wall in his front, but his men recoiled, in the consciousness of an impotent endeavor. They had done all that troops could accomplish, and shrank from that which their own experience told them was impossible. And there should be no wonder that the Federal army was reluctant to be vainly led to slaughter again. For forty days its proven mettle had been subjected to a cruel test, such as even Napoleon, reckless of his men’s lives as he was, had never imposed upon an army. It is safe to say that no troops but Americans could have been held so long to such an enterprise as that attempted by Grant in May, 1864, and none but Americans could have withstood such desperate assaults as were sustained by Lee’s army.

In one month, from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, more than sixty thousand of the flower of the Federal army had been put hors du combat, and many of the best of its officers, men identified with its whole history, were lost forever. In one month Lee had inflicted a loss greater than the whole of the force which he commanded during the last year of the war! Yet this was the “generalship” of Grant, for which a meeting of twenty-five thousand men in New York returned the “thanks of the nation.” The world was invited, by the sensational press of the North, to admire the “strategy” which had carried the Federal army from the Rapidan to the James, a position which it might have reached by transports without the loss of a man.

For a brief season, hope, positive and well-defined, dawned upon the South. Thus far the problem of endurance was in favor of the Confederacy. Grant’s stupendous combinations against Richmond had broken down. The spirit of the North seemed to be yielding, and again the Federal Government encountered the danger of a collapse of the war.The battle of Cold Harbor convinced General Grant of the futility of operations against Richmond from the north side of James River. He therefore determined to transfer his army to the south side of the river, and seek to possess himself of the communications southward, and to employ coÖperative forces to destroy or occupy the communications of Richmond with Lynchburg and the Shenandoah Valley. This involved new combinations, and Grant still had abundant means to execute them. If successful, this plan would completely isolate Richmond, leaving no avenue of supplies except by the James River Canal, which also would be easily accessible.

Lee could not prevent the transfer of Grant’s army to the south side. Petersburg and Richmond were both to be defended, and his strength was too limited to be divided. Grant made a vigorous dash against Petersburg. He had anticipated an easy capture of that city by a coup de main, but in this he was disappointed. Petersburg was found to be well fortified, and the desperate assaults made by the Federal advanced forces were repulsed. In a few days Lee’s army again confronted Grant, and Richmond and Petersburg were safe.

Thus the system of rushing men upon fortifications failed on the south side not less signally than in the overland campaign. The Federal commander had no alternative but a formal siege of Petersburg. Driven by circumstances beyond his control, General Grant thus assumed a position which, in the end, proved fatal to the Confederacy, and the results of which have exalted him, in the view of millions, to rank among the illustrious generals of history. The south side of James River was always the real key to the possession of Richmond. Sooner or later the Confederate capital must fall, if assailed from that direction with pertinacity, and with such ample means as were given to Grant.

The new Federal combination was in process of execution by the middle of June. After the defeat of Sigel, a large force was organized in the lower valley, and intrusted to the direction of General Hunter, an officer distinguished by fanatical zeal against the section of which he was a native, and by the peculiar cruelty of a renegade. Breckinridge had been withdrawn from the Valley, to Lee’s lines, immediately after his defeat of Sigel, and Hunter without difficulty overwhelmed the small force left under General Jones. Forming a junction with Crook and Averill from North-western Virginia, at Staunton, Hunter advanced upon Lynchburg, meanwhile destroying public and private property indiscriminately, and practicing a system of incendiarism and petty oppression against which even Federal officers protested.

It was necessary to detach a portion of the army from the lines of Richmond to check the demonstration of Hunter. Accordingly, General Early, who had acquired great reputation in the battles upon the Rapidan, was sent with eight thousand men to the Valley. Uniting his forces to those already on the ground, General Early made a vigorous pursuit of Hunter, whose flight was as dastardly as his conduct had been despicable. Retreating with great precipitation through the mountains of Western Virginia, Hunter’s force, for several weeks, bore no relation to operations in Virginia. With the Shenandoah Valley thus denuded of invaders, Early rapidly executed a movement of his forces down the Valley, with a view to a demonstration beyond the Potomac frontier, which was entirely uncovered by Hunter’s retreat. The movement of Early into Maryland caused, as was anticipated, a detachment from Grant’s forces, for the defense of the Federal capital. Advancing with extraordinary vigor, General Early pursued the retreating enemy, defeating them in an engagement near Frederick City, and arrived near Washington on the 10th of July. Warned of the approach of heavy reËnforcements from Grant, which must arrive before the works could be carried, Early abandoned his design of an attack upon Washington, and retired across the Potomac, with his extensive and valuable captures.

Signal failure attended the cavalry expeditions sent by Grant against the railroads. Sheridan, while moving northward against Gordonsville and Charlottesville, from which points, after inflicting all possible damage upon the railroads to Richmond, he was to join Hunter at Lynchburg, was intercepted by Wade Hampton, the worthy successor of Stuart, and compelled to abandon his part of the campaign. An extended raid, under Wilson and Kautz, on the south side, also terminated in disaster. The expedition of Burbridge against South-western Virginia was baffled by a counter-movement of Morgan with his cavalry, into Kentucky, the Federal forces following him into that State.

Thus again were all of General Grant’s plans disappointed, and by midsummer the situation in Virginia was altogether favorable to the Confederacy. There was indeed good reason for the evident apprehension of the North, that, after all, Grant’s mighty campaign was a failure. His mere proximity to the Confederate capital signified nothing. All his attempts against both Petersburg and Richmond, whether by strategy or coups de main, had ended in disaster; the Confederate lines were pronounced impregnable by the ablest Federal engineers, and after the ridiculous fiasco of “Burnside’s mine,” the capture of Richmond seemed as remote as ever. To increase public alarm at the North, was added the activity of Lee, his evident confidence in his ability to hold his own, with a diminished force, and even to threaten the enemy with invasion.

The Confederate Government, fully apprized of the momentous results, with which the present year was pregnant, and of the increased peril which assailed the Confederacy, in consequence of its diminished resources, depended upon other influences, than an exhibition of military strength, to promote its designs. The cause of the South could no longer be submitted, unaided, to the arbitrament of battle. At other periods, while freely avowing his desire for peace, and offering to the Federal authorities, opportunity for negotiation, President Davis had relied almost solely upon the sword, as the agency of Southern independence. The opening of the spring campaign of 1864 was deemed a favorable conjuncture for the employment of the resources of diplomacy. To approach the Federal Government directly would be in vain. Repeated efforts had already demonstrated its inflexible purpose not to negotiate with the Confederate authorities. Political developments at the North, however, favored the adoption of some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile section. The aspect of the peace party was especially encouraging, and it was evident that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential election, was the continuance or cessation of the war.

A commission of three gentlemen, eminent in position and intelligence, was accordingly appointed by Mr. Davis to visit Canada, with a view to negotiation with such persons in the North, as might be relied upon, to facilitate the attainment of peace. This commission was designed to facilitate such preliminary conditions, as might lead to formal negotiation between the two governments, and their intelligence was fully relied upon to make judicious use of any political opportunities that might be presented in the progress of military operations.

The Confederate commissioners, Messrs. Clay, of Alabama, Holcombe, of Virginia, and Thompson, of Mississippi, sailed from Wilmington at the incipiency of the campaign on the Rapidan. Within a few weeks thereafter they were upon the Canada frontier, in the execution of their mission. A correspondence with Horace Greeley commenced on the 12th of July. Through Mr. Greeley the commissioners sought a safe conduct to the Federal capital. For a few days Mr. Lincoln appeared to favor an interview with the commissioners, but finally rejected their application, on the ground that they were not authorized to treat for peace. In his final communication, addressed “To whom it may concern,” Mr. Lincoln offered safe conduct to any person or persons having authority to control the armies then at war with the United States, and authorized to treat upon the following basis of negotiation: “the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery.”

Upon this basis, negotiation was, of course, precluded, and peace impossible. Mr. Lincoln was perfectly aware that the commissioners had no control of the Confederate armies, and that the Confederate Government alone was empowered to negotiate. He therefore did not expect the acceptance of his passport, and added to the mockery an arrogant statement, in advance, of the conditions upon which he would consent to treat. Even if the commissioners had been empowered to treat, Mr. Lincoln’s terms dictated the surrender of every thing for which the South was fighting, and more than the North professed to demand at the outset. Abolition was now added to the conditions of re-admission to the Union. Mr. Lincoln’s proposition was a cruel mockery, an unworthy insult to the manhood of a people, whom his armies, at least, had learned to respect.