Frank H. Alfriend

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAR IN 1861—THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT PERIODS—MR. DAVIS’ CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY—THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES—FEDERAL PREPARATIONS—GENERAL SCOTT—DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES—DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR FORCES—THE CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 JUSTIFIED—DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES—PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN—GENERALS PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON—JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON—MANASSAS—PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE BATTLE-FIELD—HIS DISPATCH—HIS RETURN TO RICHMOND—A SPEECH NEVER PUBLISHED BEFORE—REFLECTIONS UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS—MR. DAVIS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABSENCE OF PURSUIT—STONEWALL JACKSON’S VIEWS—DAVIS IN FAVOR OF PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS—MISREPRESENTATIONS—MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS—THE “TRENT AFFAIR”—RESULTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

Whatever crudities may appear in the general plans of warfare, adopted by the American belligerents in 1861, when tested by the maxims which have obtained in other wars, waged upon different theatres of action, and for different purposes, at least there was not wanting a palpable and definitive shape. With remarkable rapidity and precision, the military situation was adjusted to the attainment of certain general objects, which continued, during the successive stages of the war, to be pursued, with varying fortune, by the respective contestants.

The incipient campaign of the war was peculiarly regulated and determined by the paramount aims which had impelled the respective parties to arms. Of necessity, the campaign, on the part of the North, must be offensive, while the South, in a defensive attitude, must prepare to parry the blows of her assailant. The pretext of the North was to assert the “national authority” over what it was pleased to term “rebellious” territory. The animus of the South was to repel an invasion which menaced her liberties and firesides. Whatever advantages may have belonged to the position of the South were not overlooked by those who were charged with her defense; and it may safely be claimed, in view of the immediate and overwhelming result in her favor, that whatever compensation, for obvious disadvantages, she had anticipated from the resources of skillful leadership, was fairly rendered.

The two Governments, at Washington and at Richmond, were then more directly chargeable with the actual results in the field than at subsequent periods. The army had then become less independent of the Government. Its organic structure was undeveloped, and it had not yet become identified with those commanders whose history was hereafter to be so interwoven with its own. In a general sense, it may be remarked, that the connection of President Davis with all the campaigns of the Confederate army, was that which the country designed it should be, when, in consequence of his military aptitude and experience, it placed him in charge of the public administration. Moreover, it was consistent with that inevitable responsibility which attached to the office of chief executive. Ignorant and intemperate partisans have labored to prove his responsibility for those casualties of war, which are utterly beyond human calculations, and to trace to his influence disasters of the battle-field, with which he could by no possibility have been connected. As is usual in such cases, these criticisms are made with a total forgetfulness of the unintentional tribute, which is accorded to Mr. Davis, in ascribing to him the chief responsibility for a military administration, which the world declares to have had few parallels in its history.

When President Davis reached Richmond, from Montgomery, the military situation had already assumed a well-defined shape. The plans of defense, adopted by the Virginian authorities, mainly under the direction of General Lee, and carried into partial execution before the alliance with the Confederacy had been formally consummated, were adhered to by the Confederate Government. President Davis, as we have seen, fully impressed with the demands of the exigency, immediately upon his arrival, addressed himself, with characteristic vigor and promptitude, to such measures as would secure a successful campaign. In the meantime, the preparations of the Federal Government were equally vigorous, and by no means indefinite in their aims.

Whatever may be the comparative merits, when placed in antithetical juxtaposition, of the plans of campaign adopted by the two Governments in 1861, or whatever may be alleged of the blunders and mishaps of the Federal scheme of warfare, there could be no question of the full comprehension of the necessities of the situation by the veteran commander of the Federal armies. We are not called upon here to give an opinion of General Scott in his personal or political relations, but that combination of sagacious military minds, upon which devolved the defense of Southern liberties, was not likely to commit the error of a disparaging estimate of his abilities.

General Scott, far in advance of the prevailing opinion at the North, dreamed of no holiday enterprise. He well knew that Southern valor, directed by leaders whose names were identified with the proudest prestige of America, and enlisted in the defense of principles which were the dearest convictions and traditions of the Southern heart, was not to be crushed in a “three-months’” wrestle of arms. Accordingly, his preparations were for war in its broadest and most terrible sense; a war between powerful nationalities; a war in which, though sustained by inexhaustible resources and popular enthusiasm, he had yet to contend with a race essentially military in its instincts, earnest in conviction, led by men whose capacities he had amply tested, and aided by defensive position, vast extent of territory, and by those numerous obstacles in the way of conquest, which must have been apparent to the eye of an experienced soldier.

The attitude of the Confederate Government was necessarily defensive. History would be searched in vain for examples justifying an invasion by a people entirely agricultural in habits and resources, weak in numbers, and with a government not yet organized three months, of a powerful manufacturing and commercial nation, of dense population, and great wealth and resources. Without supplies, equipment and transportation, and without the time or opportunity to obtain them, successful invasion of the North, however attractive to the popular imagination, was clearly impossible. Viewed from the more educated stand-point, furnished by the later developments of the war, the crude ideas, from which arose the popular aspiration of at once “carrying the war into Africa,” are ludicrous in the extreme. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the defensive, subjected to such modifications as the casualties of war render proper and necessary in all plans, whether offensive or defensive, was at all times the true policy of the South. Certain it is, that, upon two occasions, essaying the offensive under the most favorable circumstances, and under their greatest commander, the Confederates were overtaken by disaster. There can be no just criterion, furnished by European wars, by which to test the Confederate military policy in the main. Parallels between the American civil war and those waged by Frederick the Great and Napoleon are inadmissable. Not only were circumstances entirely dissimilar, but able military critics have indicated physical peculiarities, forbidding the unexceptional application to American warfare, of maxims which, elsewhere, are undisputed.

Nevertheless, war as a science must be worse than useless, unless its underlying principles have universal application. Nor is it maintained that there were no circumstances which would have justified a departure from the usually defensive policy of the Confederates. Upon two occasions the main army of the South, having successfully encountered upon its own soil the most prodigious efforts of the enemy’s strength, sought to follow him in the moment of his recoil. The Confederate invasion of 1862, culminating at Antietam, and that of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, were undertaken with the purpose of destroying, upon his own soil, an enemy already defeated. Each of these endeavors was based upon sound principles; and there is no little palliation for the disaster, in either case, in reflecting how great would have been the results of success. Much of the philosophy of the war in Virginia is to be explained by the fact of the thoroughly aggressive character, as soldiers, of President Davis and General Lee. These two directing minds, by whose combined genius and will, the fortunes of the Confederacy were so long upheld, in full and cordial coÖperation during the entire war, were in nothing more harmonious, than in the desire for an aggressive campaign, whenever it could be undertaken with a reasonable promise of success. Hence, the history of the army of Northern Virginia develops, throughout, that military policy which is known as the “defensive with offensive returns.”

After the conclusion of the alliance between Virginia and the Confederate States, which placed all “military operations, offensive and defensive, in Virginia,” under the control of the Confederate President, troops from the other Southern States had been thrown northward with astonishing rapidity. As rapidly as they arrived, regiments were sent to the various localities where it had been thought expedient to establish a defensive force. These posts were distributed with a view to their strategic bearing upon particular sections of territory, which it was deemed necessary to defend, and also with reference to their strategic connection with each other, and with the chain of combinations making the general plan of defense.

In the early summer, the distribution of the Southern forces in Virginia was as follows: At Manassas Junction, thirty-five miles south-west from Washington, and the point of intersection of the lines of railroad running southward to Richmond, and to the Shenandoah Valley, was a force, to the command of which General Beauregard was transferred from the charge of the defenses of Charleston. Manassas Junction was obviously a strategic point of the first importance, as the centre of the railroad system of Northern Virginia, and as a base of operations threatening Washington, and immediately across the path of any overland expedition against Richmond. The favorable estimate of General Beauregard’s abilities entertained by the President, added to the popularity which followed his services at Charleston, occasioned his assignment to what was obviously to be the most important theatre of operations.

Auxiliary to the command of Beauregard, but operating independently of that officer, was a force at Harper’s Ferry, on the Potomac, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, an officer of reputed skill, who had earned honorable distinction in Mexico, and enjoyed high rank and reputation in the Federal service. This force had a mission second in value only to that of the army at Manassas. It was charged with the defense of the rich and populous Shenandoah Valley, teeming with supplies, and inhabited by a hardy and patriotic population. Its position was intermediate between the forces operating in Western Virginia, and those in front of Washington, and threatening to the enemy’s line of communication westward via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

In Western Virginia were the commands of Generals Wise and Garnett, respectively, in the Kanawha Valley, and upon the main line of communication between the sections east and west of the Alleghany mountains. The forces of Wise and Garnett were designed for the double purpose of defending the sections of territory in which they were respectively located, and for the aid and encouragement of the patriotic portion of the population, then under the joint domination of the Union men and Federal soldiers.

Under Magruder, promoted for his victory at Bethel, was a comparatively small force, holding the peninsula of James and York Rivers, the direct route to Richmond from the coast; and at Norfolk were several thousand men, under command of General Huger.

No very acute analysis is required to penetrate the motives of this distribution of forces in the face of the plain necessities of the situation. Yet a vast amount of conceit has been expended in glittering verbiage, aiming to exhibit the early partiality of President Davis for the weak policy of dispersion, and that aversion to the “concentration” of troops, for overwhelming victories, to be followed by decisive results, which, it is alleged, adhered to his military policy to the last. To this cant about “concentration,” a sufficient answer relative to this disposition of troops is, that it has the sanction of Lee’s great name, to say nothing of the complete success that followed it. There was no phase of the situation, either then or for months afterward, which could have justified for any result, then attainable by “concentration,” the surrendering to the enemy of vast sections of country, which, then and subsequently, fed the army and supplied thousands of soldiers. Popular confidence, so indispensable to a government under such circumstances, was not to be won by such a policy, at the very incipiency of the contest. Were the patriots of Western Virginia, thousands of whom made heroic sacrifices, to be abandoned without an effort for their rescue? Magruder and Huger, too, had duties of no insignificant character to perform. Fortress Monroe, commanding the tributaries of the Chesapeake—the avenues leading to the very heart of Virginia, to the doors of Richmond, and the rear of the armies upon the northern borders—presented, during the entire war, an insuperable difficulty in the defense of Virginia. More than once it was the impregnable asylum for discomfited Federal hosts; and as a base of operations for the enemy, there was no period of the war when it did not challenge a vigilant observation from Richmond. To the efficient, bold, and skillful defense of the peninsula, by Magruder, the Confederate capital owed its safety for twelve months, not less than to the successful defense made upon the Potomac border. Dependent upon the command of Huger was the defense, not only of Norfolk and Portsmouth, but of an extensive back country, besides the naval defenses then in preparation at Gosport.

But in addition to these important objects, is to be remembered the inexperience of both officers and men, totally disqualifying them for those prompt and vigorous movements for which they were subsequently distinguished. Discipline and organization were yet to be supplied. The army at Manassas in July, 1861, at Centreville, in the ensuing autumn, or even in front of Richmond, in the summer of 1862, was altogether a different instrument from that compact force, which the genius of Lee had welded, when he threw it, with crushing impetus, upon the columns of Hooker at Chancellorsville. But, after all, as will be abundantly exhibited hereafter, concentration was preËminently the characteristic of the Confederate military policy. Especially did the present campaign, in all its parts, hinge upon the successful execution of this principle.

Confronting the command of Beauregard, at Manassas, was a considerable Federal army, under General McDowell, covering Washington, and threatening an advance along the line of the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central Railroads. Under General Patterson another large Federal force confronted General Johnston, and threatened the Shenandoah Valley. General McClellan, with a force greatly outnumbering the small commands opposed to him, operated in Western Virginia—the common name of the section of country embraced between the Ohio and Cheat Rivers, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Great Kanawha and Gauley Rivers. A heavy force at Fortress Monroe, threatening, with incursions, the entire tide-water section of the State, sufficiently occupied the commands of Magruder and Huger.

The Confederate plan of campaign, approved in the early summer, in its leading features was adhered to with pertinacity and success. This plan, jointly approved by the Government and the two commanders upon whom its execution devolved, contemplated defensive operations, and the union, at the critical moment, of the forces of Beauregard and Johnston, for the destruction of McDowell’s command, whenever it should begin its march southward. President Davis and General Lee, at Richmond, were in regular communication with the two commanders in the field, and all operations were directed with a view to the destruction of the main body of the enemy.

General Scott, upon the Federal side, also looked to the coÖperation of Patterson with McDowell, and expected him either to defeat Johnston, or to so employ him as to prevent his reinforcement of Beauregard, when the latter should be assailed by the overwhelming force of McDowell. The remoteness of Magruder and Huger, and the impossibility of sufficient secrecy in the transfer of any portion of their commands to the theatre of operations, placed them outside of the calculation. The same may be said of the Confederate forces in Western Virginia. Apprehension of danger from the command of McClellan was experienced by the Confederate authorities, especially after the disastrous defeat of General Garnett. There can be little doubt, however, that the Government and people of the North considered their army, immediately upon the ground, ample for the contemplated work, and did not feel the necessity of looking elsewhere for reinforcements.The small force at Manassas, when General Beauregard assumed command, was increased by subsequent accessions, until, by the middle of July, it numbered about twenty thousand men. His duties were a vigilant observation of the enemy and such defensive preparations as were necessary. The pivot of the campaign was elsewhere. If Patterson could successfully occupy Johnston until the crisis at Manassas was passed, the result was doubtful, at least; but if Johnston, at the required moment, could elude his adversary, and reinforce Beauregard, the probabilities were most promising to the Confederates. In the sequel, this proved a result far more easily attained than had been hoped for. The campaign thus became a series of maneuvres, with the Confederates in possession of the decided advantage of an interior line.

General Patterson, apparently imbecile or bewildered, committed a series of blunders, to be accounted for upon no possible hypothesis accrediting to him even ordinary acquaintance with the palpable principles of the science of war. What his repeated advances, retreats, and flank movements could have been designed to accomplish, it is difficult to imagine, as his situation plainly prevented his escape from Johnston and reinforcement of McDowell, before Johnston could reach Beauregard. General Patterson’s failure to attack Johnston preordained the disaster to McDowell on the 21st of July. Johnston, aided by the vigilance and daring of the “indefatigable” Stuart, was fully apprised of every movement of his adversary. With comparatively little difficulty he escaped from his front, and, in accordance with the plan previously indicated, reinforced Beauregard with the greater portion of his force.

With the details of the overwhelming disaster to the Federal arms, at Manassas, on the 21st of July, we are not here interested. Our aim has been to glance briefly at the relations sustained by President Davis to the preliminary campaign which culminated in success so brilliant and valuable. In accordance with his preconceived purpose to be present, if possible, at the consummation of plans in which he felt so profound an interest, President Davis left Richmond on Sunday morning, July 21st, for the scene of the expected battle. Reaching the battle-field while the struggle was still in progress, it was his privilege to witness the flight, in utter confusion and dismay, of the Federal hosts in their first serious conflict with the patriot army. His presence upon the field was the inspiration of unbounded enthusiasm among the troops, to whom his name and bearing were the symbols of victory. His dispatch from the battle-field, on Sunday night, will long be remembered by those who gathered from it their first intelligence of the great victory:

“Manassas Junction, Sunday Night.

“Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The enemy were routed, and precipitately fled, abandoning a large amount of arms, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground was strewn for miles with those killed, and the farmhouses and ground around were filled with the wounded. Pursuit was continued along several routes towards Leesburg and Centreville, until darkness covered the fugitives. We have captured many field batteries and stands of arms, and one of the United States flags. Many prisoners have been taken. Too high praise can not be bestowed, whether for the skill of the principal officers, or the gallantry of all our troops. The battle was mainly fought on our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy estimated at 35,000.

“Jeff’n Davis.”

He remained at Manassas, in consultation with Generals Beauregard and Johnston, until the morning of Tuesday, July 23d. The return of the President to Richmond was the occasion of renewed patriotic rejoicings. An immense crowd awaited at the railroad depot, in expectancy of his arrival, and both there and at his hotel occurred most enthusiastic demonstrations of popular delight at the success of the army, and of public regard for himself.[38] At night Mr. Davis addressed, with thrilling effect, an immense audience, from a window of the Spottswood Hotel, recounting some of the incidents of the battle, which he declared to be a decisive victory, if followed by energetic measures, and counseled moderation and forbearance in victory, with unrelaxed preparations for future trials. It was upon this occasion that he uttered the memorable injunction, “Never be haughty to the humble, or humble to the haughty.”

The immediate and palpable consequence of the victory of Manassas was the rescue of the Confederacy from the peril by which, for weeks, it had been threatened. The South was now plainly a power, capable of fighting ably and vigorously, and with greatly improved prospects of success, for the independence which it had asserted. Time was to develop a far greater value in this wonderful success than was then made available. A few days only were required to exhibit, what at first appeared merely a thorough repulse of the Federal army, as an overwhelming rout, capable of being followed to such results as might have changed even the fate of a nation. Not many weeks sufficed to convince the Southern people of the fact which must ever dwell among their saddest associations, that an opportunity, inestimable in value, and almost unparalleled in its flattering inducements to a people situated as they were, had been utterly unappreciated and irrevocably lost.

In the numerous accounts which have been written, representing all shades of opinion from different stand-points on both sides, and from the wide discussion which has resulted, history can be at no loss for material upon which to base an intelligent estimate of this battle, and of the extent to which the victors reaped the advantages of success. Differences of opinion have prevailed, and will, in all probability, continue to prevail, respecting the purely military questions involved in the discussion of the absence of such a vigorous, pertinacious, and unrelenting pursuit by the Confederates as was necessary to secure the fruits of a decisive victory. But the stubborn conviction, nevertheless, remains, and will never be eradicated from the Southern mind—that, barring the immediate security to the Confederate capital, Manassas was but a barren victory, where results of a most decisive character were within easy reach. Nor is this popular impression unsustained by such competent military authority, as will command respect for its judgment, upon those aspects of the question, upon which a military judgment is alone valuable.

So emphatic became the public condemnation of the inactivity of the army, and especially when, by subsequent information, was revealed the real condition of the enemy after his overwhelming disaster, that inquiry was naturally made as to the authorship of such an erroneous policy. The presence of President Davis, both during a portion of the battle and during the day following, was promptly seized upon as affording a clue to the mystery. For months he rested under the suspicion of having, by peremptory order, stopped the pursuit of the enemy, in the face of the protestations of his generals, who would have pressed it to the extent of attainable results.

How such an impression—so utterly in conflict with the facts—could have obtained, by whom, or for what purpose it was disseminated, it is now needless to inquire. The slander was, at length, after having been circulated to the injury of Mr. Davis throughout the country, so conclusively answered as to receive not even the pretense of belief, save from an unscrupulous partisanship, at all times deaf to facts which could not be perverted injuriously to the President. It nevertheless had served a purpose, in preparing the popular mind for those constantly iterated charges of “executive interference,” in the plans and dispositions of the armies of the Confederacy, which followed at subsequent stages of the war.

It may be asked, Why did Mr. Davis suffer this suspicion, when the proof of its injustice might have been so easily adduced? This inquiry would indicate an imperfect acquaintance with that devoted patriotism and knightly magnanimity which belong to his character. Any explanation acquitting himself, must have thrown the responsibility upon Generals Johnston and Beauregard, and he preferred rather to suffer an undeserved reproach, than to excite distrust of two officers, then enjoying the largest degree of popular confidence. With him, selfish considerations were never permitted to outweigh the interests of the country. Actuated by this impulse, he, in more than one instance, where the names of men high in public favor were used in his disparagement, refused, even in self-defense, that retaliation, which must have hurt the cause in proportion as it diminished confidence in its prominent representatives. Mr. Davis, with that decorum which has equally illustrated his public and private life, recognized the special propriety of a denial of these injurious rumors from other sources, fully apprized of their falsity, and from which such an acquittal of himself would have come with becoming candor and grace.

Justice, proverbially slow, has been tardy indeed in its awards to Mr. Davis; but in this instance, as it must inevitably in others, it has come time enough for his historical vindication. The reader, uninformed as to the merits of this question, will be content with a limited statement from the mass of testimony, which has ultimately acquitted Mr. Davis of having prevented the pursuit of the Federal army after its overthrow upon the field of Manasses. In a publication, presenting an elaborate indictment against Mr. Davis, as the main instrument of the downfall of the Confederacy, written since the war, is found the following admission: “As is known, he (President Davis) was at Manasses the evening of the 21st July, 1861. Until a late hour that night he was engaged with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, at the quarters of the latter, in discussing the momentous achievements of the day, the extent of which was not as yet recognized at all by him or his generals. Much gratified with known results, his bearing was eminently proper. He certainly expressed no opposition to any forward movement; nor at the time displayed a disposition to interpose his opinion or authority touching operations and plans of campaign.”[39]

General Johnston, in a communication published since the war, assumes the responsibility of the failure to pursue, and, with the advantage of retrospect, defends that course with cogent reasoning and an interesting statement of facts. Says General Johnston: “‘The substantial fruit’ of this victory was the preservation of the Confederacy. No more could have been hoped for. The pursuit of the enemy was not continued because our cavalry (a very small force) was driven back by the ‘solid resistance’ of the United States infantry. Its rearguard was an entire division, which had not been engaged, and was twelve or fifteen times more numerous than our two little bodies of cavalry. The infantry was not required to continue the pursuit, because it would have been harassing it to no purpose. It is well known that infantry, unencumbered by baggage trains, can easily escape pursuing cavalry.”

That no farther results were to be hoped for than the arrest of the Federal advance toward Richmond, he endeavors to demonstrate as follows: “A movement upon Washington was out of the question. We could not have carried the intrenchments by assault, and had none of the means to besiege them. Our assault would have been repulsed, and the enemy, then become the victorious party, would have resumed their march to Richmond; but if we had captured the intrenchments, a river, a mile wide, lay between them and Washington, commanded by the guns of a Federal fleet. If we had taken Alexandria, which stands on low and level ground, those guns would have driven us out in a few hours, at the same time killing our friends, the inhabitants. We could not cross the Potomac, and therefore it was impracticable to conquer the hostile capital, or emancipate oppressed Maryland.”

But these statements, ample, as far as they go, in the vindication of Mr. Davis, only partially tell the story of Manassas. They do not fully describe his real relation to the question, though we are far from imputing to General Johnston an intentional omission. A statement of Mr. Davis’ views was not necessarily germane to General Johnston’s explanation of his own conduct. His purpose is to establish the reasons which induced him to decline pursuit of the enemy, or rather, which, in his judgment, made pursuit impracticable. Nor is it germane to our purpose to discuss these reasons; to attempt either a demonstration of their fallacy or an argument in their support. They have not been accepted as conclusive either by the public, or by unanimous military judgment.

The great name of Stonewall Jackson, himself an actor in the most thrilling scenes of that wonderful triumph of Southern valor, and dating from that day his record upon the “bead-roll of fame,” is authoritatively given in opposition to the policy which General Johnston approves. In this connection, we can not forbear to quote the biographer of that illustrious man, in passages showing that wondrous intuition of great soldiership, more distinctive, perhaps, of Jackson, than of any commander of the present century, excepting only Napoleon. Professor Dabney says: “Jackson, describing the manifest rout of the enemy, remarked to the physicians, that he believed ‘with ten thousand fresh men he could go into the city of Washington.’” Again, after a most graphic picture of the condition of the Federal army, its demoralization, panic, and utter incapacity to meet an attack by the victorious Confederates, and an able statement of the inducements to a vigorous pursuit, the biographer of General Jackson makes this impressive statement: “With these views of the campaign, General Jackson earnestly concurred. His sense of official propriety sealed his lips; and when the more impatient spirits inquired, day after day, why they were not led after the enemy, his only answer was to say: ‘That is the affair of the commanding generals.’ But to his confidential friends he afterward declared, when no longer under the orders of those officers, that their inaction was a deplorable blunder; and this opinion he was subsequently accustomed to assert with a warmth and emphasis unusual in his guarded manner.”[40]

Mr. Davis was far from approving the inaction which followed Manassas. He confidently expected a different use of the victory. When called away by the pressing nature of his official duties at Richmond, he left the army with a heart elastic with hope, at what he considered the certainty of even more glorious and valuable achievements. His speech at the depot in Richmond, which we have given elsewhere, is evidence of his exultant anticipations. The speech at the Spottswood, entering more into details, still better authenticates his hopes of an immediate and successful advance.[41] There could be no misinterpretation of the ardor with which, in glowing sentences, he predicted the immediate and consecutive triumphs of what he proudly termed the “gallant little army.”

Indeed, before leaving Manassas, President Davis favored the most vigorous pursuit practicable. On the evening of the battle, while the victory was assured, but by no means complete, he urged that the enemy, still on the field, (Heintzelman’s troops, as subsequently appeared,) be warmly pressed, as was successfully done. During the night following the engagement he made a disposition of a portion of the troops, with a view to an advance in the morning. These troops were removed, but not by himself, to meet an apprehended attack upon the head-quarters of the army. An advance on Monday, the 22d July, was out of the question, in consequence of the heavy rain.

It is not to be understood that President Davis fully appreciated, on Sunday night, the 21st, the overwhelming rout of the Federal army, nor that he advocated, as practicable, an immediate movement in pursuit, by the entire army. No one could have anticipated the utter disorganization attending the flight of the Federals. He had, too, positive evidence of the confusion prevailing among portions of the Southern troops. Summoned by a message from a youthful connection, who was mortally wounded, Mr. Davis rode over a large portion of the field, in a vain search for the regiment to which the young man was attached. Upon his return, he accidentally met an officer who directed him to the locality of the regiment, where he found the corpse of his relative. The evidences of disorganization, upon which General Johnston dwells with so much force and emphasis, were indeed palpable, but Mr. Davis confidently believed that an efficient pursuit might be made by such commands as were in comparatively good condition. Such were his impressions then, and that he contemplated immediate activity as the sequel of Manassas, is a matter of indisputable record.

That Mr. Davis did not insist upon the undeferred execution of his own views, is proof less of his approval of the course pursued, than of an absence of that pragmatic disposition with which he was afterwards so persistently charged. His subsequent hearty tributes to Beauregard and Johnston, and prompt recognition of their services, show how far he was elevated above that mean intolerance, which would have made him incapable of according merit to the opinions and actions of others, when averse to his own conclusions.

This determined spirit of misrepresentation of the motives and conduct of the President, beginning thus early—respecting the origin of which we shall have more to say hereafter—was to prove productive of the most serious embarrassments to the Confederate cause. The first great success in arms achieved by the South, was to originate questions tending to excite distrust in the capacity of the Executive, and subsequently distrust of his treatment of those who were under his authority. Misrepresentation was not to cease with the attempt already mentioned to impair public confidence in Mr. Davis. A pragmatic interference with the plans of his generals was persistently charged upon him. The almost uninterrupted inactivity of the main army in Virginia, following the battle of Manassas, by which the enemy was permitted, without molestation, to organize a new army—a subject of constant and exasperated censure by the public—was falsely attributed to Mr. Davis’ interference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard. It is a sad evidence of the license characteristic of a purely partisan criticism, that this falsely alleged interference has even been ascribed to the instigations of a mean envy of the popularity of those officers.

The purely personal differences of public men are not the proper subject-matter of historical discussion. In the prosecution of our endeavor to give an intelligent and candid narrative of the events of the war, in so far as President Davis was connected with them, we shall have occasion to dwell upon those differences between himself and others respecting important questions of policy which are known to have existed. We do not see that the personal relations of President Davis with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, are here a subject of appropriate inquiry. Nor are those minor questions of detail as to the organization of the army, which arose between them, of such significance as to justify elaborate discussion here. That President Davis chose to exercise those plain privileges with which the Constitution invested him; that he should have consulted that military knowledge which his education and service had taught him; that he should make available his valuable experience as Minister of War; and that he should have failed to interpret the acts of Congress agreeably to the tastes of generals in the field, rather than according to his own judgment, is certainly singular evidence upon which to base charges of “pragmatism,” “persecution,” and “envy” of those generals.[42]While the main struggle in Virginia was yet undecided, the Confederate force, under General Garnett, in Western Virginia, had been disastrously defeated by the Federal army of General McClellan. The Confederate commander, a brave and promising officer, was killed, in a gallant endeavor to protect the retreat of his command. This achievement of General McClellan, though attributable mainly to his vastly superior force, was attended by evidences of skill, which indicated him as a prominent figure in the events of the immediate future. In the midst of the gloom and disappointment consequent upon the disaster at Manassas, General McClellan appeared to the Northern Government and masses to be an officer specially recommended, by his late success, for the important charge of the army designed to protect the capital. He was immediately summoned to Washington, and placed in charge of its defenses. With rare capacity for general military administration, and with especial aptitude for organization, General McClellan addressed himself with vigor and success to the work assigned him. Under his direction, the defenses of Washington were speedily put in admirable condition, and within a few months, he had created an army which, in discipline, organization, and equipment, would have compared favorably with the best armies of the world.

General McClellan was too sagacious and prudent a commander to repeat the errors of his predecessor. He was evidently determined not to undertake an aggressive campaign until his preparations were completed. During the progress of those preparations, he endeavored also to provide against those aggressive movements which he evidently anticipated from his adversaries. But the autumn and winter were to pass away without any serious demonstration by the Confederate commanders, and with but one important movement of the enemy.

In the early fall, Generals Johnston and Beauregard advanced to a position in close proximity to the Federal capital. Unable, however, to provoke an engagement with the Federal commander, whose present purposes were purely defensive and preparatory, the Confederate army withdrew from the front of Washington, and retired within its former lines about Manassas and Centreville.

In the latter part of October, an engagement of some importance occurred near Leesburg, occasioned by an attempt of General McClellan to throw a force across the Potomac, doubtless with the view of an advance on the Confederate left wing. The numbers engaged in this engagement were comparatively small, which rendered more remarkable its sanguinary character. Nearly the entire Federal force, though outnumbering more than two to one the Confederate force, was captured or destroyed. There was good reason to regard this movement as preliminary to a general advance of the Federal army. The battle of Leesburg was very dispiriting in its effects upon the North, and equally re-assuring to the Southern Government and people. No other operations of note occurred during the autumn and winter upon the lines of the Lower Potomac.

General Jackson, who by a circumstance which is now well known to the world, had acquired at Manassas the sobriquet of “Stonewall,” in September, 1861, was made a Major-General. Late in December, in charge of a considerable force, he executed, with indifferent success, a movement against detachments of the enemy in the neighborhood of Romney, and other points along the Upper Potomac.The disasters sustained by the Confederates in Western Virginia, in the early summer, were not repaired by the transfer of General Lee to that quarter. A large and valuable section of country remained as the enemy’s trophy, almost undisputed at the termination of the campaign. The reputation of General Lee suffered severely from the absence of that success which was anticipated from his presence in command. It is a noteworthy circumstance that when, a few months afterward, the President placed Lee in command of the main army of Virginia, his ill-success in Western Virginia was alleged as conclusive evidence of his unfitness for the position to which “executive partiality” had assigned him.

In the meantime, upon the distant theatre of Missouri, the war had assumed a most interesting phase. Many months before the legally-elected legislature of that State adopted an ordinance of secession, Missouri was contributing valuable aid to the struggling Confederacy. Driven by the oppressive course of the Federal Government into resistance, in spite of their efforts to save their State from the destructive presence of war, the Southern men of Missouri organized under the leadership of General Sterling Price and Governor Jackson. Accessions of men from all portions of the State were constantly made to the patriot forces, and, within a few weeks, a large force was upon the southern border, animated by an enthusiastic desire to undertake the redemption of their homes.

But the Missourians, though sufficiently numerous to constitute an effective army, were confronted by difficulties which would have appalled men of less heroic purpose, or enlisted in an inferior cause. Hostilities had been precipitated upon them while they were entirely unprepared—wanting arms, ammunition, and other indispensable material of war. The remoteness of Missouri from the seat of government, and the inadequate transportation, prevented that prompt and efficient aid by the Confederate authorities which it was equally their interest and inclination to afford. Nevertheless, with almost miraculous rapidity, the army of General Price was organized, and supplied with such material as he could obtain.

The Federal commander, in his march southward from St. Louis, pursued, with considerable vigor, the various detachments of the patriots who were hastening to the standards of Price. After several minor engagements, in which the Missourians displayed the most devoted heroism, a considerable battle was fought, early in August, near Springfield, in the south-western corner of the State, in which the Federal army was disastrously defeated, and its commander killed. In this battle, the Missouri forces were aided by a Confederate force, under General McCulloch, which had advanced northward from Arkansas. Later in the year, General Price advanced through the central portion of the State, receiving large additions to his army, and captured the largest garrison of Federal troops in Northern Missouri. Having accomplished these valuable aims, he, with great skill and daring, effected a safe retreat to the south-western frontier. President Davis, in a message to Congress, echoed the hearty appreciation of the Southern people, in a special tribute to the valor and devotion of the southern population of Missouri.

Kentucky also had become the theatre of hostilities. The Federal Government, recognizing the neutrality of Kentucky so long as was necessary to mature their plans for her subjugation, finally insisted upon making her a party to the war, and invaded her territory with a view to operations against the Confederacy. President Davis thus stated the motives of the policy adopted by the Confederate Government respecting Kentucky:

Not long after the occupation of various points in Kentucky, by the respective armies, an engagement occurred at Belmont, on the Missouri shore, near Columbus, resulting in the defeat of the Federal force engaged. The Confederate forces engaged were a portion of the command of General Polk, and the defeated Federal commander was General U. S. Grant.

Before the first year of the war terminated, the Confederates experienced reverses resulting from the naval superiority of the enemy. Expeditions were undertaken against the Carolina coast, and were successful to the extent of securing a permanent lodgment of the Federal forces.

In the month of November the forcible seizure, by a Federal naval officer, of the persons of Messrs. John Slidell and James M. Mason, commissioners, respectively, from the Confederate States to France and England, and, at the time, passengers on an English steamer, excited strong hope of those complications between the United States and European powers which were reasonably anticipated by the South. This act was a palpable outrage and violation alike of international law and comity. It was, nevertheless, indorsed by public sentiment at the North, in manifold forms of expression.

In England, the intelligence of an outrage upon the national flag was received with outbursts of popular indignation, which compelled the Government to make a resentful demand upon the United States. The course of the English Government was characteristic of the nation which it represented. There was neither discussion nor parley, but a simple imperative demand for the surrender of the commissioners and their attachÈs.

Never was so deep a humiliation imposed upon a people as that imposed by the course of the Federal authorities upon the North. The prisoners, over whose capture the whole North had but recently exulted, as at the realization of the fruits of a brilliant victory, were surrendered immediately. Mr. Seward even declared that they were surrendered “cheerfully,” and in accordance with the “most cherished principles of American statesmanship,” and advanced an argument in favor of complying with the demands of the British Government, far more to have been expected from a British diplomatist, than from the leading statesman of a people who had promptly indorsed the outrage.

This concession of the Federal Government was the first of numerous disappointments in store for the Southern people, in the hope, so universally indulged, of foreign intervention. Expectation of immediate complications between England and the United States, received great encouragement from the earlier phase of the “Trent affair,” as was called the seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. Consequent upon the correspondence between the Governments of England and the United States, growing out of the “Trent affair,” were announcements in Parliament, which should have discouraged the anticipation of interference by England, at least with the cabinet then in power. Lord John Russell declared that the blockade of the Southern ports was effective, in spite of abundant evidence, and in spite, even, of the declarations of the British consul at Charleston to the contrary. This concession was intended, doubtless, as a salvo to the North for its deep humiliation, and was, indeed, rightly construed as an evidence of the real sympathies of the British cabinet in the American struggle. In this aspect, it was an assurance of no little significance.

At the election, in November, Mr. Davis, without opposition, was chosen the first President of the Confederacy, under the permanent government, which was soon to succeed the provisional organization. Mr. Stephens was reËlected Vice-President.

In his message to the provisional Congress, at the beginning of its last session, the President thus sketched the situation at the close of the first year of the war: