The case of Don Pacifico, which led to the following masterpiece of Lord Palmerston’s eloquence, is an example of how in the relations of states small matters may at a touch loom large and involve great issues. The collection of a bill of damages for household furniture, a mere entry in the vast budget of British governmental business, is seen to assume a serious, or, if one remembers the pedestrian character of the details, a tragi-comic import when it is known that on the event hung the chance of an European war.

Now the case, reduced to its bare details, is as follows: Don Pacifico, a Jew of Gibraltar, and a British subject, had taken up his residence at Athens, where, in the spring of 1847, he comes out of obscurity into momentary international fame, becomes with his petty affairs almost a casus belli between two great Powers, and then sinks to oblivion again. In the new kingdom of Greece, then only since a score of years galvanized into a nation by the protective agencies of France, Russia, and Great Britain, foreigners and their rights had met with no nice consideration at the hands of King Otho and his officials. Certain Ionian subjects of the Queen had suffered insult or damages; a midshipman of H.M.S. FantÔme, landing by night at Patras, had been forthwith arrested; and England had already reasonable right to complain, when the case of Don Pacifico permitted her, in Lord Palmerston’s opinion, no longer to hesitate.

On April 4, 1847, during the celebration of the Greek Easter, certain riotous Athenians, prohibited that year from indulging in one feature of the fÊte,—the hanging of Judas Iscariot in effigy,—and consequently enraged at Jews in general, made an attack upon the modest house of Don Pacifico. It was alleged at the time that sons of the Minister of War were among the mob; it is agreed that both house and furnishings were ruined. The establishment, we have said, was modest; but, although the Jew filed an extraordinary bill of claims (one bedstead he valued at £150), the principle involved was such that the incident could not be ignored by an English foreign secretary. Thus the matter at once became the subject of the most strenuous diplomatic correspondence; but Greece being like Turkey one of the countries of “To-morrow,” nearly three years dragged away without satisfaction for Don Pacifico, until at last, with patience exhausted, Lord Palmerston sent the following instructions to the British Minister at Athens:

“F.O., December 3, 1849.

“My dear Wyse:

“I have desired the Admiralty to instruct Sir William Parker to take Athens on his way back from the Dardanelles, and to support you in bringing at last to a satisfactory ending the settlement of our various claims upon the Greek Government. You will, of course, in conjunction with him, persevere in the suaviter in modo as long as is consistent with our dignity and honor, and I measure that time by days—perhaps by some very small number of hours. If, however, the Greek Government does not strike, Parker must do so.”

The fleet arrived at the PirÆus promptly, proclaimed a blockade, and seized some Greek vessels, both national and merchant. It was at this moment that the first element of danger entered into the incident. Of the already imperfect “Concert” which had installed the kingdom of Hellas, Russia became at once uneasy at the aggressive steps of Lord Palmerston; but France, the third party, aflame with jealousy and distrust, from now on almost made the Greek cause her own. Ostensibly, however, she came forward with proposals of arbitration; and England saw it her affair to accept the good offices, at the Greek Court, of Baron Gros. The arbiter nevertheless, soon finding the British and the Franco-Greek positions incompatible, gave up his task; the blockade, with seizure of vessels, was renewed; and it was in the minds of men that once more would England and France stand face to face. Meanwhile Greece seemed to have become flurried at her situation as the focus of events, and at last submitted to Palmerston’s pressure, under the following terms: a letter of apology to be presented for the FantÔme incident; an indemnity of 180,000 drachmai to be paid for damages to Don Pacifico and others; no compensation to be received by her for detention of vessels, which should then be released.

Thus, in the face of Greek delay and of probable French intrigue, Palmerston had gained his real point. But with it the second perilous moment arrived. In France the action of Greece was learned with a mixture of dismay and Chauvinisme; in England the Opposition saw its opening. The French Ambassador, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was actually recalled; and it did not seem that war could be averted. Under these circumstances, on June 17, 1850, Lord Stanley introduced in the House of Lords this resolution of censure:

“That while the House fully recognizes the right and duty of the Government to secure to her Majesty’s subjects residing in foreign states the full protection of the laws of these states, it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the table by her Majesty’s command, that various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other Powers.”

Which was carried by a majority of 37.

The Government’s answer was the counter-resolution introduced by Mr. Roebuck in the Commons, June 24th:

“That the principles on which the foreign policy of her Majesty’s Government have been regulated have been such as were calculated to maintain the honor and dignity of this country; and in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world.”

The debate that followed is described as having been one of the most brilliant of the century—covering a period of five nights and engaging the most vigorous speakers then in the House. On the second night, Lord Palmerston rose, about to deliver the remarkable effort of his life. Speaking for nearly five hours and without MS., he held the continuous attention of both parties. Other speeches followed; but it seems certain that this was the pronouncement that led the Commons, in division on the fifth night, to declare for the Palmerston policy by a majority of 46.

The effect on the country, on the foreign Powers, and on Lord Palmerston’s personal prestige was signal. Viewed internationally the whole affair between France and England had been a game of bluff; and, by the agency of Lord Palmerston, the English bluff had won. In due time France returned her Ambassador to St. James; and all was as before.

As to the speech, there is no doubt but that it must be regarded as one of the most emphatic expositions extant of the aggressive theory of foreign policy—of what many would call the Jingo idea. Contemporary opinion—even of the Opposition—we know to have been moved by such stalwart doctrines, so manfully laid down; for even Sir Robert Peel is quoted as saying, “It has made us all proud of him.” Palmerston himself writes to a friend: “The attack on our foreign policy has been rightly understood by everybody, as the shot fired by a foreign conspiracy, aided and abetted by a domestic intrigue; and the parties have so entirely failed in the purpose, that instead of expelling and overthrowing me with disgrace, as they intended and hoped to do, they have rendered me for the present the most popular minister that for a very long course of time has held my office.”

Strong words—but not overweening for one whose conduct of his country’s interests had won for him from Lord John Russell a title of which any Premier might be proud,—“Lord Palmerston, a Minister of England.”

Sir:

Anxious as many members are to deliver their sentiments upon this most important question, yet I am sure they will feel that it is due myself, that it is due to this House, that it is due to the country, that I should not permit the second night of this debate to close without having stated to the House my views upon the matters in question and my conduct, for which I have been called to account.

When I say that this is an important question, I say it in the fullest expression of the term. It is a matter which concerns not merely the tenure of office by one individual, or even by a government; it is a question that involves principles of national policy, and the deepest interests as well as the honor and dignity of England. I cannot think that the course which has been pursued, and by which this question has assumed its present shape, is becoming those by whose act it has been brought under the discussion of Parliament, or such as fitting the gravity and the importance of the matters which they have thus led this House and the other House of Parliament to discuss. For if that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough to carry the Government by storm, and take possession of the citadel of office; or if, without intending to measure their strength with that of their opponents, they conceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the conduct of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation of what has passed, I think that either in the one case or in the other, that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining the expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this House; or, at least, those who act with them in political co-operation here, should themselves have proposed to this House to come to a similar resolution. But, be the road what it may, we have come to the same end; and the House is substantially considering whether they will adopt the resolution of the House of Lords, or the resolution which has been submitted to them by my honorable and learned friend, the Member for Sheffield.

Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honor, and with the dignity of the country; and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all other civilized countries in the world. Even the person who moved it was obliged essentially to modify it in his speech. But none of the modifications contained in the speech were introduced in the resolution adopted by the other House. The country is told that British subjects in foreign lands are entitled—for that is the meaning of the resolution—to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. The country is told the British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the government and tribunals of the country in which they may be.

The House of Lords has not said that this proposition is limited to constitutional countries. The House of Lords has not said that the proposition is inapplicable, not only to arbitrary and despotic countries, but even to constitutional countries where the courts of justice are not free; although these limitations are stated in the speech. The country is simply informed by the resolution, as it was adopted, that, so far as foreign nations are concerned, the future rule of the Government of England is to be, that, in all cases, and under all circumstances, British subjects are to have the protection only which the law and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to be may give them.

No! I deny that proposition; and I say it is doctrine on which no British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England never will suffer any British Minister to act. Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the laws of the land in which they live? I mean no such thing; I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them, when that law is available for such a purpose. That is the opinion which the legal advisers of the Crown have given in numerous cases; and it is the opinion on which we have founded our replies to many applications for our interposition in favor of British subjects abroad.9

I say then, that if our subjects abroad have made complaints against individuals, or against the government of a foreign country, if the courts of law of that country can afford them redress, then, no doubt, to those courts of justice the British subject ought in the first instance to apply; and it is only on a denial of justice, or upon decisions manifestly unjust, that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them. It has been said, “We do not apply this rule to countries whose governments are arbitrary or despotic, because there the tribunals are under the control of the government, and justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is not meant to be applied to nominally constitutional governments where the tribunals are corrupt.” But who is to be the judge, in such a case, whether the tribunals are corrupt or not? The British Government, or the Government of the state from which you demand justice?

I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the tribunals of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country the constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where, not long ago, a decree was passed that any man who was found with concealed arms in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, and accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against him, and the next morning the man was shot.

Now what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British subject? And yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country.

I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had—and those cases are many—to confine a British subject to that remedy only, would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.

Then the question arises, how does this rule apply to the demands we have made upon Greece? And here I must shortly remind the House of the origin of our relations with Greece, and of the condition of Greece; because those circumstances are elements that must enter into the consideration of the course we have pursued.

It is well that Greece revolted from Turkey in 1820. In 1827, England, France, and Russia determined upon interposing, and ultimately, in 1828, they resolved to employ forcible means in order to bring Turkey to acknowledge the independence of Greece. Greece, by protocol in 1830, and by treaty in 1832, was erected into a separate and independent state. And whereas nearly from the year 1820 up to the time of that treaty of 1832, when its independence was finally acknowledged, Greece had been under a Republican form of government, with an Assembly and a President, the three Powers determined that Greece should thenceforth be a monarchy. But while England assented to that arrangement, and considered that it was better that Greece should assume a monarchical form of government, yet we attached to that assent an indispensable condition, that Greece should be a constitutional monarchy. The British Government could not consent to place the people of Greece, in their independent political existence, under as arbitrary a government as that from which they had revolted. Consequently, when the three Powers, in the exercise of that function which had been devolved upon them by the authority of the General Assembly of Greece, chose a sovereign for Greece, (for that choice was made in consequence of, and by virtue of the authority given to them by the General Assembly of Greece), and when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was chosen; the three Powers, on announcing the choice they had made, at the same time declared King Otho would, in concert with his people, give to Greece constitutional institutions.

The choice and that announcement were ratified by the King of Bavaria in the name, and on the behalf of his son. It was, however, understood, that during the minority of King Otho, the establishment of the constitution should be suspended; but that when he came of age, he should enter into communication with his people, and, together with them, arrange the form of constitution to be adopted. King Otho came of age, but no constitution was given. There was a disinclination on the part of his advisers to counsel him to fulfil that engagement. The Government of England expressed an opinion, through various channels, that that engagement ought to be fulfilled. But opinions of a different kind reached the royal ear from other quarters. Other governments, naturally—I say it without implying any imputation—are attached to their own forms. Each government thinks its own form and nature the best, and wishes to see that form, if possible, extended elsewhere. Therefore, I do not mention this with any intention of casting the least reproach upon Russia, or Prussia, or Austria. Those three governments at that time were despotic. Their advice was given and their influence was exerted to prevent the King of Greece from granting a constitution to his people. We thought, however, that in France we might find sympathy with our political opinions, and support in the advice which we wished to give. But we were unfortunate. The then Government of France, not at all undervaluing constitutional institutions, thought that the time was not yet come when Greece could be ripe for representative government. The King of Bavaria leaned also to the same side. Therefore, from the time when the King came of age, and for several years afterward, the English Government stood in this position in Greece with regard to its government—that we alone were anxious for the fulfilment of the engagement of the King, while all the other Powers who were represented at Athens were averse to its being made good, or at least were not equally desirous of urging it upon the King of Greece. This necessarily placed us in a situation, to say the least of it, of disfavor on the part of the agents of those Powers, and on the part of the Government of Greece. I was sorry for it; at the same time, I don’t think the people of this country will be of opinion that we ought, for the sake of obtaining the mere good-will of the Greek Government, to have departed from the principle which we had laid down from the beginning. But it was so; and when people talk of the antagonistic influences which were in conflict at the Greek Court; and when people say, as I have heard it said, that our Ministers, and the Ministers of foreign governments, were disputing about the appointment of mirarchs and nomarchs, and God knows what petty officers of the state, I say that, as far as our Minister was concerned, that is a statement entirely at variance with the fact. Our Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, never, during the whole time he was in Greece, asked any favor of any sort or kind, for himself, or for any friend. No conduct of that mean and low and petty description was carried on by any person connected with the English Government. It was known that we wished the Greek nation should have representative institutions, while, on the other hand, other influences were exerted the other way; and that, and that only, was the ground of the differences which existed.

One of the evils of the absence of constitutional institutions was that the whole system of government grew to be full of every kind of abuse. Justice could not be expected where judges of the tribunals were at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown. The finances could not be in any order where there was no public responsibility on the part of those who were to collect or to spend the revenue. Every sort of abuse was practised.

In all times in Greece, as is well known, there has prevailed, from the daring habits of the people, a system of compulsory appropriation—forcible appropriation by one man of that which belonged to another; which, of course, is very disagreeable to those who are the victims of the system, and exceedingly injurious to the social condition, improvement, and prosperity of the country. In short, what foreigners call brigandage, which prevailed under the Turkish rule, has not, I am sorry to say, diminished under the Greek sovereignty. Moreover, the police of the Greek Government have practised abuses of the grossest description; and if I wanted evidence on that subject, I could appeal to the honorable gentleman who has just sat down, who, in a pamphlet, which all must have read, or ought to read, has detailed the instances of barbarity of the most revolting kind practised by the police. I have here depositions of persons who have been subjected to the most abominable tortures which human ingenuity could devise—tortures, inflicted upon both sexes, most revolting and disgusting. One of the officers, a man of the name of Tzino, at the head of the police, was himself in the habit of inflicting the most diabolical tortures upon Greeks and upon foreigners, Turks, and others. This man Tzino, instead of being punished as he ought to have been, and as he deserved to be, not only by the laws of nature, but by the laws of Greece—this person, I am sorry to say, is held in great favor in quarters where he ought to have received nothing but marks of indignation.

Well, this being the state of things in Greece, there have always been in every town in Greece, a great number of persons whom we are bound to protect—Maltese, Ionians, and a certain number of British subjects. It became the practice of this Greek police to make no distinction between the Maltese and Ionians, and their fellow-subjects. We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of the country are liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts, and police officers to dance upon them; if they are liable to have their own heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives, and have no business to complain if the same things are practised upon them. We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I believe it is the opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that in considering the case of the Ionians, for whom we demand reparation, the House must look at and consider what was the state of things in this respect in Greece; they must consider the practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed more than nominal in some cases; but the granting of which would be an acknowledgement that such things should not be done toward us in the future.

In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere in a spirit and in a tone which I think was neither befitting the persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the persons before whom the discussion took place. It is often more convenient to treat matters with ridicule than with grave argument; and we have had serious things treated jocosely; and grave men kept in a roar of laughter, for an hour together, at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of another; at the nationality of one injured man, or at the religion of another; as if because a man was poor he might be bastinadoed and tortured with impunity; as if a man who was born in Scotland might be robbed without redressal, or because a man is of the Jewish persuasion, he is fair game for any outrage.10 It is a true saying and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is another truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind ought to bring to the task generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and noble and elevated thoughts.

Now, sir, with regard to these cases, I would take first that which I think would first present itself to the mind of an Englishman—I mean the insult offered by the arrest of the boat’s crew of her Majesty’s ship FantÔme. The time has been when a man aspiring to a public situation would have thought it his duty to vindicate the honor of the British navy. Times are changed. It is said that in this case there were only a few sailors taken out of a boat by some armed men—that they were carried to the guardhouse, but were soon set at liberty again—and why should we trouble our heads about so small a matter? But did we ask anything extraordinary or unreasonable on account of this insult? What we asked was an apology. I really did not expect to live to see the day, when public men in England could think that in requiring an apology for the arbitrary and unjustifiable arrest of a British officer and British seamen in the performance of their duty, we were making a demand “doubtful in its nature, and exaggerated in its amount.” Now, what is the history of this case? For circumstances have been referred to, in connection with it, which do not appear from the statement of the case itself. The son of the Vice-Consul, who had dined on board the FantÔme, was taken ashore in the evening by the coxswain and a boat’s crew, and landed on the beach. The coxswain accompanied the young gentleman to his father’s house, and on returning to the boat was taken prisoner by the Greek guard. The guard went down to the boat, and, finding the seamen in it were without arms, began thumping them with the butt-ends of their muskets, and wounded one man in the hand by a thrust of a bayonet. The guard then took the seamen prisoners, and carried them to the guardhouse; where after a certain time they were released through the interposition of the Vice-Consul, and they returned to their ship. Excuses were given for this proceeding, and the gist of them was this—that the guard thought the boat belonged to the Spitfire, and that it had been seen landing rebels, one of whom had escaped;—this supposed rebel being a boy of fourteen years old, who had returned quietly to his father’s house.

The matter to which these excuses related occurred a little while before, in consequence of the disorganized state of Greece—a disorganization, by the by, which arises entirely from the acts of the Government: because it has been, and still is, the practice of the Government, instead of punishing brigands, to give amnesty to and pardon them; and, indeed, it is even supposed that the officers of the police sometimes go shares in the plunder. That, however, is a matter of opinion; but it is a fact that the robbers are almost always pardoned; and such is the encouragement thereby given to the system of plunder that the robbers go about armed, in bands, and sometimes actually attack and occupy towns.

An instance of this kind happened at Patras. Merenditi, the leader of a band of robbers, attacked Patras; the governor had an armed force under his orders; but, whether from a determination to follow the example set by the government of showing deference to the robbers, or because he thought that discretion is the better part of valor, he fled, and left the town to the mercy of the banditti. The inhabitants, finding themselves deserted by their natural defenders, threw themselves on the protection of the foreign consular body, and begged and intreated that the Consuls would intercede for them, and make some arrangement with the robbers. Our Consul accordingly, at the intercession and with the authority of the principal inhabitants of Patras, entered into an arrangement with the leader of the robbers, by which that leader consented to forego the plunder of the town, on condition that he should receive a certain sum of money and be conveyed away from the town in safety by one of the British ships of war. The people of Patras were thankful. The money required by the robbers, which was reduced by negotiation to one half of their original demand, was collected and deposited in the hands of the Vice-Consul. Merenditi marched down to the quay to embark; when the governor, who had run away from danger, now advanced boldly with his men, and endeavored to attack the robbers’ rear-guard, and to take some of them prisoners before they could embark. Our officers, however, said, “No. There is not only honor amongst thieves, but honor to be observed towards thieves. We were asked to make an arrangement, and to give our guarantee—we will abide by that guarantee, and protect this man and his band.” Accordingly he was protected, and went off with the ransom paid by the inhabitants of the town. This was the matter which was alluded to, when the Greek authorities said that the guard supposed the boat’s crew, whom they had made prisoners, had been landing rebels from the Spitfire—they pretended to suppose that the boat had landed some of Merenditi’s band. Surely no defence is necessary for having demanded an apology for an insult offered the British navy. I am induced to believe that the governments of other countries would have taken more severe measures under similar circumstances.

I now come to the case of the Ionians who were plundered in the custom-house at Salcina. These men were passing by in boats; they were summoned to go in by the officer in command, and, when in, they were robbed. The men who robbed them were dressed like soldiers, but were said to be banditti. The customs officer alleged that he was beaten by the robbers, and compelled by them to order the Ionians to enter the custom-house. It must be remembered, however, that a Greek vessel lying in the custom-house was not plundered; while the Ionians were plundered, stripped of their clothes, and severely beaten. It is absurd to compare a case of this kind with that of travellers attacked by robbers in passing through a country.

If the government officer was not acting in connivance with the robbers, still, when foreigners were decoyed into a Greek custom-house by one of its officers, and were there beaten and plundered, the Greek Government must be held responsible for what was done. This, however, is said to be a case in which the unhappy Ionian boatmen ought to have gone to law. I should like to know whom they could have prosecuted? In this instance, our demand was moderate; we asked nothing for the indignity and injury the men suffered, but simply the amount of which they had been robbed.

I next come to the case of the two Ionians who, very innocently, as they imagined, on a national festival, according to the custom of their own country, ornamented their little booths, in which they sold trifling articles, with flags. The police interfered and took down the flags. Some discussion arose about indignity offered to the British flag. The matter was not satisfactorily explained, but we let it drop. We did not insist on that; and, if that had been all, nothing further would have been said. But the Ionians were arrested, manacled and thumbscrewed; and in that state paraded through the town, and put in prison. It was said, “How could they go to prison except through the streets?” True; but there was no necessity for taking them through streets which did not lie in their way. They were paraded, by way of insult, through the streets of Patras, and dismissed next day, because no charge could be maintained against them. Then it was said that the application of the thumbscrew had not maimed them for life. Had that indeed been the case, the men would have been entitled to compensation; but for a very little thumbscrewing, applied during an evening walk, no compensation ought to have been required. I am of a different opinion. Thumbscrews are not as easy to wear as gloves, which can be put on and pulled off at pleasure. We therefore felt it necessary to require, in this case, the moderate compensation of £20 each, for the men who had been ill treated; and the more so, because of the habitual infliction of torture by the police.

Then came the case of two men, whose houses being infested by disagreeable insects, thought proper in hot weather to sleep in the streets. They were taken up by the police, carried before an officer, and severely flogged with a whip in the sight of persons who deposed to the fact. What right had the Greek authorities to flog these men? They had committed no offence; there had been no trial, no condemnation, no sentence. In this case, also, compensation was demanded, as a token that persons under British protection cannot be ill treated with impunity.

Then I come to the case of Mr. Finlay.11 It is said that he is a “cannie Scot”; that he speculated in land, buying in the cheapest, and wishing to sell in the dearest market. His land was taken by the King of Greece, for purposes of private enjoyment. Nobody will deny that it is fitting the Sovereign of Greece should have a palace; and, if it was necessary to take Mr. Finlay’s ground for site, or for the garden attached to it—Mr. Finlay himself made no objection to that. All that Mr. Finlay wanted was to be paid for his land at a very cheap rate. That was a matter with which the Greek Government had nothing to do; they had only to pay Mr. Finlay what was the value of the land at the time when they took it from him.

The conduct of the Greek Government in Mr. Finlay’s case was very different from that of Frederick the Great in a similar case towards one of his subjects, a man of humble rank. This man refused to sell his sovereign a little bit of ground on which a windmill stood, the ground being necessary for the completion of a magnificent plan of residence for the monarch. The conduct of the King of Prussia was very different from that of the King of Greece. The King of Prussia, though a conqueror in the field and the absolute monarch of a great country, respected the rights of a subject however humble; and not only left the monument of the independence of his subject, standing in the midst of his ornamented grounds, but used to point to it with pride, feeling that it was proof that though he was great and powerful, he knew how to respect the rights of the meanest. For fourteen long years Mr. Finlay was driven from pillar to post, put off with every sort of shuffling and evasive excuse, and deprived of compensation for his land, unless he would take what was wholly inadequate.

In 1843 came a revolution. Till 1843 the Greek Government had continued arbitrary; the King declining, under the circumstances I have mentioned, to grant a constitution. In 1843 the patience of the Greeks was exhausted. They rose in Athens, and extorted by force that which had been refused to reason. When the constitution was granted, courts of justice were established, which were not indeed independent, because the judges were liable, not only to be removed from one court to another, but to be entirely dismissed at the will of the sovereign; still in 1843 there were courts to which Mr. Finlay might, as it has been stated, have applied. But they were of no competence with respect to events which had happened before their creation. Mr. Finlay, therefore, had no remedy. But I have heard it most triumphantly, distinctly, positively asserted, that this case exhibits the bad faith of the English Government; for that at the time when Mr. Wyse made his demands on the Greek Government, we and he knew the case of Mr. Finlay was absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. No such thing. That is an assertion absolutely, finally, and conclusively at variance with the truth.

There had been an agreement made for arbitration in this case; and a most curious sample it affords of the manner in which things are carried on in Greece. Mr. Finlay said, “I will submit my claim to arbitration.” “By all means,” was the reply of the Greek Government; “you shall have one arbiter and we another.” But Mr. Finlay has been described as a “cannie Scot,” and looking far into the future, he foresaw a possibility, which might have struck a man even not so far north, that the two arbiters might differ; and he suggested that an umpire be appointed. The Greek Government said, “You are quite right.” But Mr. Finlay, being a sensible man, did not like to submit his case to a tribunal where there would be two to one against him, and so he declined the arbitration. The Greek Government then gave up this unreasonable proposal, which they had made just as if it had been quite a matter of course, and a commission of arbitration was agreed upon, consisting of two respectable people, and an umpire properly appointed. If that arbitration had gone on, and the money awarded by it had been paid, Mr. Finlay’s case would have been absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. But by the law of Greece, arbiters so appointed must pronounce an award within three months, or, if they don’t, then the arbitration falls and drops to the ground. The commissioners could not make their award without certain documents, which could only be furnished by an officer of the Greek Government. This officer, by some unfortunate accident, did not furnish them, and the arbitration fell to the ground by efflux of time.

Therefore, when Baron Gros came to inquire into the matter, he found this case just as it had been when Mr. Finlay first made his complaint. Baron Gros said to Mr. Finlay, “Why, your claim is settled.” “Settled? No,” said Mr. Finlay. “Why, have you not received your money?” “Not a farthing; and I don’t know what amount I am to receive.” In short, his case was exactly in the same state in which it was before the arbitration had been agreed to.

That was a case in which we made no specific demand. The only specific demand was, that Mr. Finlay should receive whatever the value of his land should be found to be. We fixed no sum: we were unable to fix any; and the sum he received afterward was the amount which the two arbiters, one named by Mr. Finlay, the other by the Greek Government, were prepared to award, splitting the difference between their respective estimates. I don’t think that in that case, the claim was either doubtful in justice, or exaggerated in amount.

Then we came to the claim of M. Pacifico—a claim which has been the subject of much unworthy comment. Stories have been told, involving imputations on the character of M. Pacifico; I know nothing of the truth or falsehood of these stories. All I know is that M. Pacifico, after the time to which those stories relate, was appointed Portuguese Consul, first to Morocco and afterward to Athens. It is not likely that the Portuguese Government would select for appointments of that kind, a person whose character they did not believe to be above reproach. But I say, with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject, that I don’t care what M. Pacifico’s character is. I do not, and cannot admit, that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion, and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redress to a man, because in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable. Punish him if you will—punish him if he is guilty, but don’t pursue him as a Pariah through life.

What happened in this case? In the middle of the town of Athens, in a house which I must be allowed to say is not a wretched hovel, as some people have described it;—but it does not matter what it is, for whether a man’s home be a palace, or a cabin, the owner has a right to be there safe from injury—well, in a house which is not a wretched hovel, but which in the early days of King Otho was, I am told, the residence of the Count Armansperg, the Chief of the Regency—a house as good as the generality of those which existed in Athens before the sovereign ascended the throne—M. Pacifico, living in this house within forty yards of the great street, within a few minutes’ walk of a guardhouse where soldiers were stationed, was attacked by a mob. Fearing injury, when the mob began to assemble, he sent an intimation to the British Minister, who immediately informed the authorities. Application was made to the Greek Government for protection. No protection was afforded. The mob, in which were soldiers and gens d’armes, who, even if officers were not with them, ought, from a sense of duty, to have interfered and to have prevented plunder—the mob headed by the sons of the Minister of War, not children eight or ten years old, but older—that mob, for nearly two hours, employed themselves in gutting the house of an unoffending man, carrying away or destroying every single thing the house contained, and left it a perfect wreck.

Is not that a case in which a man is entitled to redress from somebody? I venture to think it is. I think that there is not a civilised country where a man subject to such grievous wrong, not to speak of the insults and injuries to the members of his family, would not justly expect redress from some quarter or other. Where was he to apply for redress at Athens? The Greek Government neglected its duty, and did not pursue judicial inquiries, or institute legal prosecutions as it might have done for the purpose of finding out and punishing some of the culprits. The sons of the Minister of War were pointed out to the Government as actors in the outrage. The Greek Government were told to “search a particular house; and that some part of M. Pacifico’s jewels would be found there.” They declined to prosecute the Minister’s sons, or to search the house. But, it is said, M. Pacifico should have applied to a court of law for redress. What was he to do? Was he to prosecute a mob of five hundred persons? Was he to prosecute them criminally, or in order to make them pay the value of his loss? Where was he to find his witnesses? Why, he and his family were hiding or flying, during the pillage, to avoid the personal outrages with which they were threatened. He states that his own life was saved by the help of an English friend. It was impossible, if he could have identified the leaders, to have prosecuted them with success.

But what satisfaction would it have been to M. Pacifico, to have succeeded in a criminal prosecution against the ringleaders of the assault? Would that have restored to him his property? He wanted redress, not revenge. A criminal prosecution was out of the question, to say nothing of the chances, if not the certainty, of failure, in a country where the tribunals are at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown, the judges being liable to be removed, and being often actually removed upon grounds of private and personal feeling. Was he to prosecute for damages? His action would have lain against individuals, and not, as in this country, against the hundred.12 Suppose he had been able to prove that one particular man carried off one particular thing, or destroyed one particular article of furniture; what redress could he anticipate by a lawsuit, which, as his legal advisers told him, it would be vain for him to undertake? M. Pacifico truly said, “If the man I prosecute is rich, he is sure to be acquitted; if he is poor, he has nothing out of which to afford compensation if he is condemned.”

The Greek Government having neglected to give protection they were bound to extend, and having abstained from taking means to afford redress, this was a case in which we were justified in calling on the Greek Government for compensation for the losses, whatever they might be, which M. Pacifico had suffered. I think that claim was founded in justice. The amount we did not pretend to fix. If the Greek Government had admitted the principle of the claim, and had objected to the account sent in by M. Pacifico—if they had said, “This is too much, and we think a less sum sufficient,” that would have been a question open to discussion, and which our Ministers, Sir E. Lyons at first, or Mr. Wyse afterwards, would have been ready to have gone into, and no doubt some satisfactory arrangement might thus have been effected by the Greek Government. But the Greek Government denied altogether the principle of the claim. Therefore, when Mr. Wyse came to make the claim, he could not but demand that the claim should be settled, or be placed in train of settlement, and that within a definite period, as he fixed it, of twenty-four hours.

Whether M. Pacifico’s statement of his claim was exaggerated or not, the demand was not for any particular amount of money. An investigation might have been instituted, which those who acted for us were prepared to enter into, fairly, dispassionately, and justly.

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim. “Oh! but,” it is said, “what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a power!” Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts? Is it held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, plunder, in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them when they apply for redress, that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be, that the weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to obtain redress. “No,” it is said, “generosity is to be the rule.” We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it.

Well, then, was there anything so uncourteous in sending, to back our demands, a force which should make it manifest to all the world that resistance was out of the question? Why, it seems to me, on the contrary, that it was more consistent with the honor and dignity of the Government on whom we made those demands, that there should be placed before their eyes a force, which it would be vain to resist, and before which it would be no indignity to yield. If we had sent merely a frigate and a sloop of war, or any force with which it was possible their forces might have matched, we should have placed them in a more undignified position by asking them to yield to so small a demonstration. Therefore, so far from thinking that the amount of the force which happened to be on the spot was any aggravation of what was called the indignity of our demand, it seems to me that the Greek Government, on the contrary, ought rather to have considered it as diminishing the humiliation, whatever it might be, of being obliged to give at last to compulsion, that which had been so long refused to entreaty.

Well, then, however, did we, in the application of that force, either depart from established usage, or do anything that was unnecessarily pressing on the innocent and unoffending population of Greece? I say the innocent and unoffending population, because it was against the Government, and not against the nation, that our claim for redress was directed. The courses that may be pursued in cases where wrong is done by one Government towards the subjects of another are various. One is what is commonly called “reprisals”; that is, the seizing something of value, and holding it in deposit until your demands are complied with; or, if you fail in that and don’t choose to resort to other methods, applying that which you have seized, as a compensation for the wrong sustained. That is one method. Another is the modified application of war—such as a blockade—a measure frequently adopted by the governments of maritime states when they demand redress for injuries. Last come actual hostilities. Many instances of such measures have been quoted in this debate as having been adopted by the governments of other countries, especially by the French Government, when they have had a demand to make for injuries sustained by their subjects; and, by the by, when people complain of the peremptory manner in which our demand was made, and the shortness of the time allowed for consideration, I wish to call to the recollection of the Honorable Gentlemen what was done by the French squadron no longer ago than 1848.

There was an insurrection at Naples, in May, 1848. The great street of the town was filled with barricades, and the troops had to force those barricades. To do that, they were obliged to occupy the houses right and left, in order to turn those defences; and as they forced one house after another, and passed on from house to house, they neglected to leave any guards behind them. They were followed by the Lazzaroni,13 and the houses were plundered. Some French people whose shops were thus rifled, complained to the French Minister, and to the French Admiral—there being then a French squadron before the port at Naples. The French Admiral, Admiral Baudin, quite cut out Sir W. Parker, and being applied to by those French citizens, he sails up the bay, lays his ships broadside to, in front of the palace, and writes a note to the Government to say, that he has been called on by his countrymen to protect them; and he adds—that letter being dated half-past one on the 17th of May—that unless by three o’clock of that very day he obtains a satisfactory assurance—a satisfactory assurance that his countrymen shall be efficiently protected, reserving, he says, for future discussion their claims for compensation—but—

“Unless in one hour and a half I get, on board this ship, a satisfactory assurance that they shall be efficiently protected, I shall land the crews of my fleet, and will take care of them myself.” Well, then, I say that Sir W. Parker acted with the greatest moderation in enforcing our demands. He began with reprisals, not with a blockade, wishing to avoid all unnecessary interruption to the commerce of other countries. But he made reprisals in a way which I believe has not often been adopted. The Government was the offending party, and he took possession of vessels belonging to the Government. Now, that is not the usual plan, and for very good reasons.

Vessels belonging to governments are armed. They may feel it to be their duty to defend themselves. To seize armed vessels would probably lead to bloodshed; and reprisals are generally effected by seizing merchant vessels belonging to the country on whom the demand is made. But, the disparity of force being so great on this occasion, Sir W. Parker began by seizing the few armed vessels belonging to the state. He then gave the Government time to reflect upon that demonstration. It was not attended to. Even then he did not immediately proceed to make reprisals upon merchant vessels. He first laid an embargo upon them. He gave notice that he had placed a lien upon them, and that they must not quit their ports. That failed; then he took merchant vessels, but only a limited number, and placed them under the custody of his fleet, avoiding to subject commerce in general to any greater degree of restraint than was unavoidably necessary for the execution of his instructions. It has been said, that we seized upon fishing-boats, and interrupted the coasting trade. I don’t believe that. On the contrary, I believe that the embargo did not extend to fishing-boats, or to vessels of small tonnage employed in the coasting trade of the country.

Well, sir, in that state of things, the French Government offered us their good offices and mediation. We readily and cheerfully accepted their good offices. We accepted them by a note of the 12th of February, which has been laid on the table, and in which we distinctly stated the grounds and conditions on which, and the extent to which, those good offices were accepted.

There could be no mistake between the English and French Governments upon that point. We took as our precedent the course that was pursued in the sulphur questions at Naples, when M. Thiers was Minister. In that case, we stated that reprisals would be suspended the moment any French Minister on the spot declared himself authorized to negotiate. In the said present case we went further, and said, that the moment the good offices of France were officially offered and officially accepted, we would send out instructions that the further making of reprisals should be suspended. In both cases we said we could not release the ships that had been detained, because by so doing we should give up the security which we held in our hands against the offending Government.

It has been stated that a misunderstanding arose between the Governments of France and England, in the course of the mediation, good offices, or whatever it may be called. I cannot say that there was any misunderstanding between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, because it will be seen from his own despatches laid before the French Chamber, that he clearly understood the conditions on which the good offices of France were accepted. He repeatedly states that England gives up none of her demands—that is to say, that she gives up none of the principles of her demands; and that the only questions which the French negotiator is competent to discuss are those which did not involve the negation of the principles of our demands. Well, what were those questions? They were only the amount of money to be given to Mr. Finlay and to M. Pacifico, but not the question whether those gentlemen were to receive anything or nothing.

Then the question arose between us, what were the circumstances under which the good offices were to cease, and coercive measures were to be resumed; and it was distinctly understood on my part, as well as on that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Mr. Wyse was not to take upon himself to determine when Baron Gros’s mission had failed; and that it was only when Baron Gros should have announced that his mission had ceased, that Mr. Wyse was to resume coercive measures. It was further agreed between us, and especially on the 9th of April, that if a difference of opinion arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, on those points which Baron Gros was competent to discuss, Mr. Wyse was not to stand absolutely on his difference, and that if he did not find it possible to give way, he was, instead of saying, “Now, Baron Gros, your mission is at an end,” to refer home for further instructions. It is said that it was wrong of me not to have sent out to Mr. Wyse information of that understanding, come to on the 9th of April with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Well, but in the first place I had already sent to Mr. Wyse, on the 25th of March, instructions which, if acted on in the spirit in which they were written, would render such a reference home altogether unnecessary. And they did render such reference home altogether unnecessary; because at last, when Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse came to the point of difference as to the amount of money to be paid, and Baron Gros said, “I would counsel the Government of Greece to pay 150,000 drachmas,” while Mr. Wyse said he was ready to accept 180,000 drachmas, Mr. Wyse at last, much more prudently than if he had referred this difference home, and had exposed Greek commerce to the restraint to which a continuance of the status quo would have subjected it for a whole month, said, “I will, if other things are agreed to, come down to your amount—I will waive my opinion, and accept the sum you are willing to recommend the Greek Government to give.” Therefore, practically, I say, and in the result, the case did not arise to which those instructions could have applied.

Those instructions, if they had reached Mr. Wyse, would not have applied to the difference which did arise between him and Baron Gros; for that difference was this—it turned upon the claims of M. Pacifico. Baron Gros, on the 16th of April, was willing to recommend to the Greek Government to take an engagement to investigate the claims of M. Pacifico, in regard to the destruction of his Portuguese documents; and to pay him whatever might be the amount which, upon investigation, he might prove to be entitled to on that account; and to make a deposit of 150,000 drachmas as a pledge for the good faith with which they would execute that engagement. The only difference between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse upon that occasion was, that Baron Gros proposed that the deposit, which they had both agreed should consist of shares of the Bank of Athens, should be left in the Bank of Athens; whereas Mr. Wyse required that it should be deposited either in the Bank of England, or, if the Greek Government preferred it, in the Bank of France. That seemed to be a difference that might be easily settled. But, on the 22d of April, Baron Gros altered his opinion. He retracted his opinion upon that point, and stated that later information from Portugal had convinced him, that M. Pacifico’s claim, in reference to the destruction of his Portuguese documents, was wholly unfounded. Baron Gros said he would no longer consent to recommend the Greek Government to enter into any engagement to pay anything to M. Pacifico on that account. He would agree to an investigation, but only provided that Portugal, and not the Greek Government should pay what might turn out to be due. But this was a point which Baron Gros was not competent to discuss. This new view of his would have been a negation of the principle upon which one of our claims rested; and, there being a difference of that kind between Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros, Mr. Wyse had no occasion to refer for fresh instructions—for he had received detailed instructions from me in a despatch, dated the 25th of March, sufficient to guide his conduct upon that point.

Baron Gros then withdrew from the negotiation, and that withdrawal was officially communicated, not only to Mr. Wyse, but to the Greek Government also. On the 24th, however, he received a despatch from General Lahitte, giving an account of the conversation which had passed between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the 9th; an account, by the way, which was not quite accurate, because it made me say that if any difference arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, Mr. Wyse should refer home for instructions; whereas all that I agreed to was, that such reference should be made in the case of irreconcilable difference between them, as to the amount of money to be paid by the Greek Government for those claims in regard to which we had not specified fixed sums; that is to say, for Mr. Finlay’s land and for M. Pacifico’s losses of furniture and goods at Athens. Baron Gros then proposed to withdraw the note, by which he announced officially the cessation of his functions, and he asked that his draft of arrangement, together with Mr. Wyse’s draft, should be referred to London for decision.

An impression has gone abroad that on that occasion (the 24th), Baron Gros received, and communicated to Mr. Wyse, not merely an account of the conversation between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th of April, but an account of the essential basis and an announcement of the expected arrival of the draft of convention which had been proposed to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the first time on the 15th, discussed on the 16th, agreed to on the 18th, and sent off on the 19th; and Mr. Wyse is greatly blamed by many persons, both here and in France, upon the assumption that, whereas Baron Gros had informed him, on the 24th of April, that the English and French Governments had come to an agreement as to the essential bases of the convention to be signed between England and Greece, and had moreover told him that the convention itself would shortly be received at Athens—yet nevertheless, with this knowledge of the facts, he renewed coercive measures, and compelled the Greek Government to yield to his own demands. This assertion, so far as Mr. Wyse is concerned, is positively untrue. It is totally and wholly untrue. He received no communication from Baron Gros on the 24th, and none earlier than the 2d of May, relative to the draft of the convention agreed upon in London. Whether Baron Gros received the information or not on the 24th by the Vauban, I leave to be settled between him and his Government. The explanations of General Lahitte would indeed lead to the inference that he did not.

The statement to which I refer was made by “our own correspondent” of the Times. I may say, in passing that one person who has spoken on this subject elsewhere, has had the substance of his speech claimed publicly by the Morning Herald as a compilation from its leading articles; and another has obviously been more indebted to the Times than to the blue books for the statements on which he has founded his assertions. But the correspondent of the Times stated distinctly, and upon that statement public opinion in this country has been formed, that Baron Gros did inform Mr. Wise on the 24th, that he had received by the Vauban a statement announcing the London convention, and that, in spite of that information, Mr. Wyse resumed coercive measures. I understand that the French Government say that this is an entire mistake; that no information respecting the convention could have been communicated to Mr. Wyse on the 24th, because Baron Gros did not receive any by the Vauban, which arrived on that day. The complaint, therefore, against Mr. Wyse, come from what quarter it may, and I have no doubt it was sincerely believed at the moment it was made, that complaint can no longer be maintained, and is withdrawn.

With respect to the other complaint, that I did not write to Mr. Wyse an account of what had passed on the 9th of April, the simple reason why I did not was, that he was already in possession of instructions which were sufficient; that I could not have written till the 17th, and that on the 15th another arrangement was proposed, which provided an immediate settlement on the spot, and which therefore rendered any further reference to me by him out of the question. But it was said that if the French Government could have sent information to Baron Gros by the Vauban, why could not we have sent at the same time similar information to Mr. Wyse? Why, solely because we were in London, and the French Government was in Paris, and that if a steamer had been despatched by us from Portsmouth, it could not have got round to Athens so soon as a steamer despatched by the French Government from Marseilles or Toulon. But, as I have said, the convention of the 15th having been agreed to, all further reference to me by Mr. Wyse, was rendered unnecessary, because that convention was to be presented as an ultimatum to the Greek Government, by the British and French diplomatic agents.

And when it is said that those demands of ours on the Greek Government were so much repudiated by the Government of Russia and of France; and that by putting forward those claims we ran the risk of involving this country in a war with those Powers, I must be permitted to say, that, with respect to Russia, the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunow, of the 19th of February, totally negatives that assertation. In that despatch, Count Nesselrode admits that he was aware as long ago as 1847, that our patience might be exhausted, and that we might have recourse to coercive measures against Greece to enforce our claims; and he says, moreover, that if lately, when we determined to enforce our claims, we had asked Russia to give us her assistance, she would have endeavored to persuade the Greek Government to come to an amicable settlement with us; and if the efforts of Russia to that effect had been unsuccessful, Russia could not then have expected that we should indefinitely postpone coercive measures out of deference to her.

With respect to France, the much-talked-of convention of the 19th of April was to be recommended by France to Greece in a way which made its acceptance pretty certain; and in that convention there was at once full acknowledgment of the principle of all our demands, and of the amount which we thought it just and right to require. I am sorry that the convention did not arrive before the other settlement took place, but that was not the fault of our negotiator. It was not he who put an end to Baron Gros’ functions, but Baron Gros himself. Baron Gros formally and officially withdrew from the negotiation, and that by a written communication, not addressed to Mr. Wyse alone, but to the Greek Government also.

But it is said he was willing to retract it, and that on the 24th of April he wrote to Mr. Wyse to say: “Send me back my note, and I will give you back yours.” Now, to this Mr. Wyse said:

“I cannot exactly do what you wish, but I have another proposal to make to you. You ask me to refer to England, and to maintain the status quo till I get an answer; but to keep the Greek vessels in custody till that answer arrives would subject Greek commerce to great inconvenience. Instead of this, I propose that if the Greek Government will send me 180,000 drachmas with a letter that that sum is in satisfaction of all our claims excepting M. Pacifico’s claim on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents, I will——”

Do—what? Refer home? No. Continue the status quo? No.

“I will immediately release all the Greek merchant vessels. I will only retain the few Government vessels as a pledge, leaving the wording of the apology in the case of the FantÔme, and the compensation for the loss sustained by M. Pacifico by the destruction of his Portuguese documents, to be settled by future discussion.”

The effect of that arrangement would have been, that the points on which Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros differed would have been left open for future discussion; that coercive measures, as far as Greek commerce was concerned, would have been entirely suspended; the convention of London, of the 19th of April, would have arrived in time; but the Greek Government indeed would, by that convention, have had to pay probably a larger sum than the 180,000 drachmas. But what was Baron Gros’ answer to that? He said, on the 24th, “I have withdrawn from the negotiation, and I cannot therefore officially transmit to the Greek Government your proposal.” Therefore it was not merely by his official notes of the 22d April to Mr. Wyse and M. Londos, that Baron Gros withdrew from the negotiation, for he repeated his withdrawal, in answer to this proposition; but he intimated, in a private letter, that he had made it known to the Greek Government. “To-morrow the 25th,” he said, “I believe you will have, before five o’clock of the afternoon, your letter and your money.”

Now, was Mr. Wyse in a hurry to resume coercive measures? Did he catch at the first moment at which he might have been authorized to resume hostilities? Far from it. He waited from the 22d to the 24th, and from the 24th till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 25th, and it was not till after that hour had passed, at which Baron Gros had led him to expect that he would receive from the Greek Government an acceptance of his conciliatory proposal; it was not till that hour had passed without any communication arriving, that he announced, through the British Consul, that the embargo would again be established.

It is plain, therefore, that Mr. Wyse did not put an end to Baron Gros’ functions, or show any impatience to renew coercive measures. Baron Gros himself put an end to his own functions, in spite of Mr. Wyse’s repeated entreaties that he would not do so; and when Baron Gros had formally withdrawn, Mr. Wyse, instead of at once resuming coercive measures, made another and a very conciliatory proposal; but Baron Gros’ answer to this was a renewed declaration that he had withdrawn from the negotiation, and that his official functions had ceased.

Since then, negotiations have taken place between the Governments of England and France, which, I am happy to say, have been brought at last to a satisfactory conclusion. We are ready to accept such parts of the proposed convention as are still applicable to what remains to be done. Having received and distributed to the claimants the 180,000 drachmas, we don’t insist upon the difference between the sum and the sum that was to be required by the convention. The apology written by M. Londos is retained, and cannot be returned to him, in order that instead of it, he may send us the one proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The only thing, therefore, that remains to be settled, is the investigation of the claims of M. Pacifico on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents. With regard to these claims, by arrangement of the 27th of April, a material security was given in the shape of a pecuniary deposit. The convention, of which I have drawn up the details, contained on that point a diplomatic guarantee, instead of a substantial guarantee; for it was a convention to be ratified by two sovereigns, providing that a commission of arbitration which should be named by three Governments to investigate was to be made not by a commission, but by the British and Greek Governments jointly. We are perfectly ready to substitute the one arrangement for the other, if the Greek Government choose to adopt it; but we do not intend to urge it upon them, if they do not. If they prefer the arrangement of the convention, we are prepared to conclude a convention to that effect, superseding the corresponding part of the arrangement which was concluded at Athens.

There is, however, one point in Mr. Wyse’s arrangement which was not included in the draft of the convention, because it applies to circumstances of which we were not aware at the time when the convention of London was framed. Mr. Wyse exacted an engagement on the part of the Government of Greece that they should not put forward, or support, if put forward by others, any claims for compensation arising from losses or injuries consequent upon the coercive measures to which we had recourse. The motive of Mr. Wyse for requiring that engagement was, that he understood the Government of Greece had been collecting and beating up for claims of that kind, which they meant to put forward to a very large amount. We attach no value to that engagement as bearing in any manner whatever upon the validity of any such claims. Such claims can have no just foundations whatever; and if they were put forward by the Greek Government our answer could only be, “These claims have no foundation in right or reason, and we utterly and entirely reject them.” But the value of that arrangement was, that by shutting the door against such claims, it prevented the Greek Government from raising discussions which might interrupt the good understanding and friendly relations between the two countries. The British Government are willing, instead of that engagement, to accept the good offices of the French Government, whose good offices with the Government of Greece under existing circumstances have some value, and who will advise the King of Greece not to put forward any such unfounded claims, and with that advice we shall be content.

Thus terminates all difference between the Governments of England and France in regard to these matters; and I believe that if it had not been for discussions which are now taking place in the French Assembly, the distinguished individual who represents the French Government at this Court, might have been present to hear the debate of to-night. So much, then, with regard to the affairs of Greece, and the course which we have pursued in regard to them; but there still remains the question of the far-famed islands of Sapienza and Cervi.

Now, with respect to these islands, my opinion is clear and decided. That opinion, as has been already stated this evening, is supported by the opinion of my predecessor in office, the Earl of Aberdeen, as appears by a despatch from him to Sir E. Lyons, which has been laid on the table. The case is simply this: There are certain islands on the coast of Greece, which originally belonged to Venice, and which, by the Treaty of 1800, between Russia and the Porte, were erected into a separate State.14 The seven great islands and all the other islands, great and small, inhabited and uninhabited on the coast of Albania and of the Morea, were placed under feudal relations to Turkey; and were secured by the guarantee of Russia; and it was declared that the constitution which that State might give to itself should be communicated to, and be sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers. At that time the Morea and the other parts of Greece belonged to Turkey. In 1803 these islands made their constitution, which, I presume, was communicated to, and sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers; and in 1804, in execution of that constitution they made a municipal distribution of the smaller islands, allotting them respectively to the seven larger islands; and in a public decree, which I cannot doubt must have been made known both to Turkey and Russia, Sapienza aggregated to Zante, and Cervi to Cerigo.

Now, can any man suppose that, if Cervi and Sapienza had been part of the Turkish territory at that time, the Sultan would have allowed his vassals of the Ionian State to appropriate to themselves what belonged to him? or that Russia, who was still more vigilant, and was under engagement, by guarantee, to defend and maintain the territory of this Ionian State, would have permitted a proceeding, which on such a supposition, would have thrown on her the duty of defending for the Ionian State islands which belonged to Turkey? But these islands have always been considered by the British Government, ever since the Septinsular Republic was placed under the protection of England, as belonging to the Ionian State; and it is well known that officers quartered at Cerigo have been in the habit of going to Cervi for purposes of amusement, and that that island has always been held to be part of the Ionian territory.

The boundaries of Greece were settled by the Protocol of February, 1830, with the exception of an improvement in the northern frontier, which was afterwards arranged between the Three Powers and the Porte, and in the settlement of which we were assisted by an honorable and gallant friend of mine, the Member for Portarlington, who was employed in surveying that improved line. A map was attached to the Protocol of February, 1830, and a red line, of which we have heard much, was drawn upon that map to mark part of the boundary which, was established by the Protocol; but that red line was mentioned in the Protocol only as marking the northern boundary of Greece, east and west from sea to sea, and it did not apply to the islands. The islands which were to form part of the Greek State, were enumerated by name in the Protocol, and neither Cervi nor Sapienza were included in that enumeration.

It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the public acts which constituted the Kingdom of Greece included either of these islands within its territory. If, then, the Greek Government has taken possession of either of these two islands, it is the Greek Government that has intruded upon the territory of the Ionian State; and the British Government has not, by demanding the evacuation of those islands, wanted to intrude upon the territory of the Kingdom of Greece. But this question did not form part of the demands made by Mr. Wyse on the 15th of January. It is a separate question, and remains open for fair discussion between the Governments of Greece and England, and of England, France, and Russia.

Our applications about these islands had remained unnoticed by the Greek Government for ten years. It may be asked, then, why did we renew them at this particular time? Because the Greek Government committed last year an act of aggression on the island of Cervi which they had never committed before. A boat going between Cerigo and Zante with convicts was driven by stress of weather upon Cervi, when the convicts were liberated, and other acts were committed as if the island had been Greek territory. It became necessary, therefore, to call for an answer to our application, and if no answer was given, to take possession of the islands—an operation which could be performed by a boat’s crew, without involving any greater employment of force. But, as has already been stated, the Greek Government hearing that these islands were to be taken possession of, at last broke their ten years’ silence, and made a reply; and a discussion being thus opened, the forcible occupation was suspended. With respect to the Government of Russia, that Government was made aware so long ago as the beginning of last October, of the instructions we had given for the occupation of those islands.

Having disposed of the matter of Greece, I now come to the wider range which was taken last night by the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon.15 That Right Honorable Baronet took, I think, a proper view of the question before the House, because the resolution which has been proposed is not confined to one particular act of her Majesty’s Government with regard to foreign affairs, but does fully involve and open the consideration of all the topics to which the Right Honorable Gentleman adverted. I agree, however, with those honorable gentlemen who have contended that the resolution does not imply an absolute and entire approval of every act that has been done by the Government; and, indeed, it would be unreasonable to propose such a vote to the House: because it could hardly be expected that so large a number of men, possessing different degrees of information, holding different views, and not knowing exactly in all cases what have been the grounds upon which the Government have acted, though they may approve of the general principles which have guided the conduct of the Government, should implicitly approve of everything we may have done.

The Right Honorable Baronet was justified in taking that larger range into which he expatiated last night; but I must be allowed to set him right as to the first point upon which he touched. He stated what was quite true, that when he was a member of Earl Grey’s administration, he concurred with me in many acts of foreign policy of which I was the organ, which involved very active interposition in the affairs of other countries. He instanced the negotiations in regard to Belgium, and its separation from Holland. He has done justice to the views which guarded the Government of that day, in their opinion that the independence of Belgium would be a measure advantageous to the peace, present and future, of Europe. But, then, he says, that case was different from the acts of the present Government, because every step in that affair was taken with the concurrence of all the five Powers who were parties to the negotiation, The Right Honorable Baronet said that there were, to be sure, some things which went beyond mere negotiation; there was the siege of Antwerp, and the embargo laid by us upon Dutch ships. He had concurred, he said, in both measures; but were those measures steps taken with the full consent of all five Powers? Were those acts measures of such description that they rendered it quite impossible that the friendly relations of this country with other Powers could be disturbed thereby? The Right Honorable Baronet must, I am sure, recollect that Austria, Russia, and Prussia dissented from those measures; that in consequence thereof they withdrew for a time from the conference, and that a Prussian army was collected near the banks of the Meuse, the presence of which rendered it necessary for the French to send a very large force to Antwerp, much more than was required for the mere siege of the citadel, and also to have a reserve ready in case of need. I know very well that when people are out of office their memory is not so quick and retentive as to things which happened while they were in power as it would have been if they had remained in; but on this point the Right Honorable Baronet made an important mistake, especially as bearing upon the particular question now before the House.

I agree with the Right Honorable Baronet that, in regard to the affairs of Belgium, the Government of England came to a wise determination. I think that the arrangement which in 1815 had been thought conducive to the peace of Europe, and by which, through the union of Belgium with Holland, a Power of some consideration was to be formed in that particular part of Europe, interposed between Germany on one side and France on the other—I think that that arrangement, which originally, by those who framed it, was, and not without reason, expected to prove advantageous to the peace of Europe, had, by the course of events, turned out to have a contrary tendency. The people of Belgium and of Holland evidently could not coalesce; and if certain Powers of Europe had combined at that moment to compel a reunion between these separated portions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I doubt whether the reunion could have been effected without the immediate explosion of a war in Europe of the greatest magnitude; and I am quite sure that if it had been effected, it could not have lasted, and the foundation must have been laid thereby of future and inevitable disturbance. We carried out our opinion upon that point to a practical result.

It is not to be disguised, at this time of day, that our opinion on that matter was not shared by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. They would much rather have seen the two countries reunited; and if that reunion was at that time impossible, they would have been glad of an arrangement which might have tended to render a reunion thereafter more easy. This was not breach of faith on their part; they acted, I am bound to say, with great good faith and honor in the whole transaction; but they had that opinion which differed from the opinion of England and France. Nevertheless, our arrangements prevailed; and was that, now, an instance of a policy which deserves the censure and condemnation of Parliament and of the country?

I remember of being taunted in this House by being told of my “little experimental Belgium monarchy.” It was predicted that the experiment would not succeed; it was said that there was no national feeling among the Belgians; that they would, on the first opportunity, throw themselves into the arms of their nearest neighbor; that we were only laying the foundation of another change; and that our arrangement was only “a transition state.” Why, if ever there was an experiment—call it so if you will—that fully and completely succeeded, the erection of Belgium into an independent State was that experiment. In times when almost all the other countries in Europe have been convulsed from top to bottom, Belgium has remained undisturbed. The people have shown the most admirable devotion and attachment to their sovereign; the sovereign the greatest confidence in, and love for, his people; the nation has made rapid advances in industry and in the arts, in everything which distinguishes a civilized state; all this reflects the greatest honor upon the Belgian people; and they have, moreover, acquired a spirit and sentiment of nationality which entitles them to the respect of every other country in the world. I say, then, that so far as we were concerned in effecting that arrangement, I think that is a case to which we can refer with pride and satisfaction, and in regard to which we can justly claim the approbation of Parliament and of the country. But it was not altogether without encountering difficulty, not only in other countries, but at home, that we were able to bring that long negotiation to a successful issue.16

Then the Right Honorable Baronet says, that he was also a party to another operation which differed in some degree from pure and mere diplomatic intervention—the interference of this country in the affairs of Portugal by the Quadruple Treaty of 1834.17

Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in others, is that they try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. If they want to oppose the policy of England, they say, “Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the organ of that policy.” Why, it is like shooting a policeman. As long as England is England, as long as the English people are animated by the feelings and spirit and opinions which they possess, you may knock down twenty foreign Ministers one after another, but depend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry is, “Oh, it’s all spite against this man, or that man, Count This, or Prince That, that makes you do this.” So the Right Honorable Baronet says our object in 1847 was merely to get rid of Costa Cabral; and, he adds, Costa Cabral being now in office, our purpose has been defeated. Now, as regards mere personal considerations, we did not care who was Minister of Portugal; but we felt that there was in that country much popular excitement, that party was arrayed against party, class against class, that there were bitter animosities ready to break out, and we knew perfectly well that if a member of the Cabral faction, was, at that particular time, made Minister there would be a renewal of civil war; we accordingly excluded, not forever, but merely for a time, and until the Cortes should decide who was to have their confidence, and who should be Minister, all men of the extreme parties, whether of the Cabral faction or of the Junta faction. I, therefore, cannot admit the triumph which the Right Honorable Baronet thinks he has obtained at my expense, by the fact that Costa Cabral, in spite of our proceedings in 1847, is now, in 1850, Minister of Portugal.

Now come to Spain. It is perfectly true that the Right Honorable Baronet was not in office when the Additional Articles of 1835—additional to the Treaty of 1834—were concluded. But what was the Treaty of 1834—the Quadruple Treaty? It was a treaty to expel from the peninsula not Don Miguel only, but Don Carlos also, who was then at the head of the troops in Portugal; and, therefore, so far as the spirit and provisions of that Treaty of 1834 went, the Right Honorable Baronet cannot ride off by saying that it confined itself entirely to Portugal, and did not extend to interference with Spain. Don Carlos was at the time in Portugal, at the head of the troops, with the purpose of getting back into Spain; and, had Don Miguel been successful in Portugal, there is no doubt that Don Carlos would have availed himself of the circumstance to enforce his claims upon Spain. Don Carlos having been expelled from the Peninsula under the Treaty of 1834, came to London for a time, and then returned to Spain. Hostilities were resumed in Spain; and the Additional Articles of 1835 were then concluded, for the purpose of giving to the Queen of Spain assistance, to enable her to retain the Crown, and to expel Don Carlos from Spain.18

This was a case exactly similar to that of Portugal in the preceding year. We had no particular interest, in the abstract, in determining whether the Sovereign of Spain should be an infant princess, as Isabella then was, or a full-grown prince; the mere abstract question between Isabella and Carlos was one in regard to which we had nothing to stake, and which the then Government of England would probably not have thought it proper or useful to interfere with. Questions of succession to a Crown have, indeed, at all times been matters with which foreign Powers have concerned themselves; but it has only been when some distant interest has made it worth their while to do so. But in Spain, as in Portugal, the question was between arbitrary rule and constitutional and parliamentary government, and in relation to Spain, as well as to Portugal, we thought that the interests of England in every point of view, commercial and political, would be benefited by the establishment of constitutional government.

If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain, it is that Spain should be independent, that Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards, is the maxim upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain. Much evil must ever come to this country from the fact of Spain being under the dictation of other Powers. It is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on that account and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at war with Spain also. It is to our advantage that so long as we have given no offence to Spain, and she none to us, differences with other Powers should not involve us in war with her: and we considered that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a Government controlled by a representative and national Assembly, than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the members who might form the Administration. Therefore, on the grounds of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful. The Carlist cause failed; the cause of the constitution prevailed. But it is said by the Right Honorable Baronet that General Narvaez is Minister of Spain. I cannot see in that any defeat of the policy of England; General Narvaez, indeed, is Minister of Spain, but the constitution has of late been more strictly observed than it was at the period to which the Right Honorable Baronet referred.

The Right Honorable Baronet finds fault with a certain despatch which, in July, 1846 after the change of Ministry in this country, I wrote to Sir Henry, then Mr. Bulwer, at Madrid; and the Right Honorable Baronet says: “Here is an instance, not only of the interference of the noble Viscount, but of the manner and tone he uses.” Now, as to manner and tone, there have been certain communications made to other British Ministers by persons in whom the Right Honorable Baronet has confidence, which are certainly couched in terms which may possibly admit of the application of some of those phrases which the Right Honorable Baronet has applied to me. There was a certain despatch, for example, addressed by the Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons, our Minister at Athens, which has already been read elsewhere, and which I have got a copy of here, and which I think is a very curious specimen of the manner in which the most mild and uninterfering of Foreign Ministers can, when he so likes, deal with the internal arrangement of other Governments.

Everybody knows who Sir Richard Church is; a most distinguished soldier, who fought nobly in the cause of Greek independence, and for a long time was properly respected and honored by the Greek Government. But, in 1843, he was supposed to sympathize with the party who extorted the constitution from the King. I believe that what he then did, was a great service to the King; and that he was very instrumental in saving King Otho from dangers to which he would otherwise have been exposed; but, however, in 1844, he incurred the displeasure of the King, and he was removed from the appointment of Inspector-General of the Greek forces, which he had held; and he was succeeded by General Grivas, a person whose conduct, as it appears from the despatch in question, had not been altogether free from imputations of disloyalty. Well, here are the instructions given on the subject to Sir Edmund Lyons, by the Minister who never interfered with the internal affairs of other countries, and especially with their purely domestic matters:

“Sir—Her Majesty’s Government have learned with deep concern the dismissal of Sir Richard Church from the post of Inspector-General of the Greek Army, which post he had so honorably and successfully filled for many years.”

Perhaps so far it was natural for the English Government to regret the dismissal of a meritorious English officer.

“Their regret is increased by finding that General Grivas, who so recently engaged in open rebellion against the Throne, has been appointed to succeed him.”

As to this point, one would have thought the King of Greece was himself the best judge.

“Her Majesty’s Government do not propose to interfere in the matter; since, however unjust the deprivation of General Church may have been, and however injudicious the elevation of his successor, these acts were certainly within the competence of the Greek Government.”

This is very handsome and candid.

“But,” continues the non-interfering Minister, “though her Majesty’s Government abstain from interfering, they deem it an imperative duty on their part—considering the position in which Great Britain stands with regard to Greece, as a creating and guaranteeing Power, to express—”

They do not interfere— “to express in the strongest terms their sense of the injustice done to Sir Richard Church, one of the best, most disinterested, and most efficient supporters of Greek independence, by an abrupt and ungracious dismissal, unaccompanied by any word of commendation or acknowledgment of his great services to Greece, and also their sense of the excess of imprudence and impolicy exhibited in the appointment to one of the most responsible offices under the Crown of a man whose recent conduct has shown him to be an enemy to the Throne, and a deliberate perverter of order and discipline.”

This was written by the Minister who never interfered with the internal arrangements of other Powers.

“Her Majesty’s Government,” continues this mild despatch, “consider themselves fully warranted by the overt acts of General Grivas himself, in instructing you to make known these sentiments distinctly in their name to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as to the King himself—as well as to the King himself, should a favorable opportunity present itself and at the same time to warn His Majesty seriously—seriously and solemnly of the danger to which he will expose his country and his Throne by a perseverance in so fatal a line of policy as that which he has lately pursued.”

The writer of this despatch condemns me for my despatch of the 19th of July, 1846, addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer—a despatch which was not to be communicated to the Sovereign; and the concluding paragraph of which the Right Honorable Baronet might as well have read, when he read the other portion of it, because after stating to Sir Henry Bulwer that, having just come into office, we thought it was essential that we should explain to him the views we entertained as to the position of Spain, and as to the conduct of the Spanish Government, the despatch concluded with the following passage:

“It was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation to a grinding tyranny, that Great Britain entered into the engagements of the quadruple alliance of 1835, and gave, in pursuance of the stipulations of that treaty, that active assistance, which contributed so materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. But her Majesty’s Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of independent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Ministers on these matters. But, though you will, of course, take care to express on no occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I have thus explained to you; and although you will be careful not to express those sentiments in any manner or upon any occasion so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not conceal from any of those persons who may have the power of remedying the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the British Government.”

Now let the House, after comparing these two despatches, say whether it is from that quarter that we deserve the condemnation that has been passed upon us? “If I am worthy to be so treated I do not deserve to be so treated by you.”

But it is said, nevertheless, to me:

“You cannot be commonly courteous or civil, even in your reconciliations; your strong language led to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain, and, when matters have been arranged again, you have spoiled the grace and courtesy of the reconciliation by your manner of accepting an apology.”

I am told:

“You mentioned Sir Henry Bulwer, in your note, in reply to the apology of the Spanish Government, as the person whom you would have preferred to send to Madrid; and that was enough to disgust the Spanish Government and the Spanish people.”

No, at the time when the conduct of Sir Henry Bulwer became the subject of discussion in this House, there was not a man of any side who did not do him justice; and no one expressed himself more handsomely in regard to Sir Henry Bulwer than did the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Tamworth. Sir, it is not always fitting to tell diplomatic secrets to the House of Commons. Yet I am obliged, in vindication of myself, to do so on this occasion; and to tell the House, but of course in strict confidence, that those two notes—namely, the note of apology from the Spanish Government, and our note of answer, were mutually communicated to and approved by each Government beforehand. Yes, those notes were communicated confidentially and were agreed to by both Governments before they were officially interchanged.

However, sir, the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the greatest importance, as regards another country, namely, France. He says, that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages, there arose differences between England and France, which led to no slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the French monarchy. This is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and national question to the smallness of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew his administration, and with it the throne of France! Why, sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of the sense of their own dignity and honor—what will they say when they hear it stated that it was in the power of a British Minister to overthrow their Government, and their monarchy? Why, sir, it is a calumny on the French nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy had been formed against one of their Ministers—I say, that if the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were caballing against one of their Ministers, and caballing for no other reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his own country; and if they had thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land, why, I say that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the intrigues of such cabal, and would have clung the closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot had been made. If, then the French people had thought that I, or any other Foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever, in the post which he occupied. No, Sir, the French Minister and the French monarchy were overthrown by far different causes. And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would have done well to have read a better lesson from the events which then took place.

We had, indeed, a difference with the Government of France relative to the Spanish marriages.19 I do not wish to open again questions that are gone by, or to remind the House or the country of the grounds of complaint which we had then, as I think, justly, against those who are no longer in power. But since I am pressed upon this matter, and as it is one count of the long indictment preferred against me, I must say, in my own defence, that the dissatisfaction which we felt was not groundless. I must say, too, that I formed my judgment from communications made to me by the noble Lord, (the Earl of Aberdeen), whom I succeeded in the office I hold—from statements from his own mouth, made to me in that interview which always take place between the Foreign Minister who goes out, and the Minister who comes in. I learned from that source, that promises had been made in regard to these marriages—not only by a Minister to a Minister, but between far higher personages—promises, the like of which, so far as I am aware of, have never before in the history of Europe been broken; and yet those promises were deliberately broken. If we felt dissatisfaction then at those marriages, that dissatisfaction was just and well-founded; and upon every ground of national interest and honor, we were entitled, nay, bound, to express it.

Before I quit this subject, I must say that in my opinion the policy which we have pursued in regard to France has been consistent with the interests of this country, and has been characterized by an observance of the principles which the honorable and learned gentleman whose resolution we are discussing, thinks ought to govern our foreign policy, and which are calculated to preserve, as they have preserved, the peace of Europe. Our prompt acknowledgment in 1848 of the Government established in France, and the kindly relations which we have maintained with the successive chiefs of administration in that country, sufficiently show that we have been animated by a kindly feeling towards the French nation; and that in our opinion the maintenance of friendly relations with that country is not only consistent with our interests and our dignity, but also forms a firm foundation for the peace of Europe.

The Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, has insinuated that the Marquess of Normandy, in the period immediately preceding the events of February, 1848, had been in too intimate connection with some of the persons whom he describes as the parties who overthrew the throne of France. I know not whom he means, but this I know, that the person with whom the Marquess of Normandy was perhaps in the most frequent communication, because he was an old and intimate friend, was Count Mole; and I have yet to learn that he is a man who was likely to do anything to overthrow, either intentionally or unintentionally, the monarchy of France. But, if that insinuation was meant to convey an imputation that the Marquess of Normandy had done anything, or had held any intercourse inconsistent with his position as the ambassador of a friendly Power, then I say that imputation is totally and entirely unfounded.

Well, sir, I leave the sunny plains of Castile, and the gay vineyards of France, and now I am taken to the mountains of Switzerland, as the place where I am to render a stricter account.20

With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the charges that have been brought against us of having been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement to be run at as the fomenters of revolution. It is the easiest mode of putting them down; it is the received formula. It is the established practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say, “Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with them; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer; he is such a plausible man; the only way of getting rid of him is to set the world at him by calling him a revolutionist.”

Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. In the first place there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men, who fly to arms, who overthrow established governments, and who recklessly without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the revolutionists of one class. But there are revolutionists of another kind; blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human improvement, until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent breaks down the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the earth those very institutions which a timely application of renovating means would have rendered strong and lasting. Such revolutionists as these are the men who call us revolutionists. It was not to make revolutions that the Earl of Minto21 went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation between contending parties.

With respect to the questions which arose last Autumn about Turkey, no blame has been imputed to her Majesty’s Government for the course which we pursued on that occasion in answer to the appeal made by Turkey, to this country and to France, for moral and material assistance. On that point all parties agreed. It is a proud and honorable recollection which Englishmen may treasure up, that on any occasion like that, all party differences were merged in high and generous national feeling; and that men of all sides concurred in thinking, that the Government of the Queen would not have been justified in rejecting an appeal so made, on such a subject.

But it has been said that we ought to have confined our interference, at first, to sending a despatch, and that we should not have sent our fleet until we knew whether our despatches would produce the desired effect. That would have been a very imprudent and unwise course of proceeding. The agents of the two Imperial Governments at Constantinople had used most menacing language to the Porte; had demanded the surrender of the refugees in the most peremptory manner; and said, that if they did not receive a categorical answer within a limited time they would suspend diplomatic relations. In short, they intimated that a refusal of their demands might lead to war. We had no means at the time of knowing whether this violent and peremptory language was or was not authorized by the Courts of Russia and Austria, and whether those Governments were prepared to enforce by actual hostilities the threat so held out. It was impossible to say what might occur in the interval between the 6th and the 26th of October; between the day when the despatches of the British Government were sent off to St. Petersburgh and Vienna, and the day when, if it were necessary on the receipt of those answers to send a fleet, that fleet, sent only after the answers were received, could reach the place where its services might be required. The Government did what men of prudence would do, who mean to do that which they profess.22

But it has been said that the sending of this fleet was a threat against Russia and Austria. I utterly deny that the sending of the fleet was a threat against either one or the other. A fleet at the Dardanelles was not a threat against Austria. If it had been in the Adriatic, it might have been so regarded. A fleet in the Mediterranean was not a threat against Russia. Had it forced its way through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and had gone up to the Black Sea, and had anchored off Sebastopol, it might have been so considered. But a fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles could be a threat against nobody; it must be manifest to the world that it could only be a symbol and source of support to the Sultan. It was a measure purely of defence and not a measure of offence.

But then we are told that our fleet by anchoring within the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles, violated, not the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, as was said by mistake, but the Treaty of London, concluded in July, 1841, between the five Powers and Turkey, with respect to the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. The British Government are accused of violating that treaty by ordering Sir W. Parker to enter the Dardanelles.

Now, by the Treaty of 1809, between England and Turkey, England bound herself to respect the rule of the Turkish Empire, by which, while Turkey is at peace, the Straits of Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus are closed against the ships of war of foreign Powers. But it was not till the Treaty of 1841 that the same engagement was also taken by all the other four Powers. I concur entirely with the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, in thinking that this was a wise and politic arrangement, eminently advantageous to Turkey, and conducive to the peace of Europe. Because when it is considered how easy it would be, if these narrow straits were open to the armed ships of other countries in times of peace, for any maritime Power when she had a discussion of any kind with the Turkish Government, to support the friendly representations of her Minister at Constantinople by the of course, accidental visit of a large fleet off the Seraglio Point—whether the fleet came from the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, it appears essential for the maintenance of the independence of the Porte, that no armed vessel of other Powers should, when the Porte is at peace, be allowed to enter either of those straits.

By the Treaty of July, 1841, Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, all bound themselves to respect that regulation of the Porte. It so happens, however, that that treaty did not specify precisely what those straits are, whether they comprise the whole distance between the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmora, and the whole distance between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, or whether they consist only of such portion of those channels as are technically called the Straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. At the entrance of the Dardanelles from the Mediterranean, there is a broad bay between the outer and the inner castles, and it is from the inner castles to the Sea of Marmora that the channel continues narrow. At the inner castles reside the Consuls; and it is there that tolls are taken from vessels passing; and there the firmans are delivered to allow vessels to pass up. In regulations established by the Porte in 1843, it was stated in general terms, that foreign ships of war and merchantmen should be admitted to this bay, between the outer and inner castles, for safe anchorage, and to wait there to know whether they would be allowed to go further. When the fleet under Sir W. Parker arrived at Besica Bay, which is on the coast of Asia Minor, the Turkish Government, who expressed great gratitude to Sir Stratford Canning for the arrival of our fleet, stated an apprehension that the anchorage in Besica Bay in certain states of wind and weather was not safe for large ships and they offered to send an authority to admit the fleet under Sir W. Parker, and not only it, but the French fleet also, into the outer anchorage of the Dardanelles, at times when it would be dangerous for them to remain at Besica Bay. That was communicated to the British Consul at the Dardanelles, and to the Turkish Pasha in command there.

A week or ten days after Sir W. Parker had arrived at Besica Bay, the wind coming on to blow from the quarter from which it made that open anchorage insecure, Sir W. Parker went with his squadron to Barber’s Bay, the outer anchorage of the Dardanelles. But I had written to Sir Stratford Canning specially to desire that in order to avoid all cavil and discussions, the fleet should not enter into the Dardanelles, unless wanted at Constantinople for the purposes for which it was sent. Sir Stratford Canning accordingly communicated with Sir W. Parker, and after the squadron had remained a week or ten days in Barber’s Bay to refit, it left that anchorage and returned to Besica Bay with the understanding that if stress of weather should again drive it thence, it should not return to Barber’s Bay, but should seek shelter elsewhere.

The Russian and Austrian Governments afterwards made representations both to the Porte and to her Majesty’s Government on this matter; stating that they considered the entrance of the British fleet into Barber’s Bay as a contravention of the Treaty of July, 1841. It might have been contended that the presence of the British fleet in the outer bay was not a violation of what was intended by the treaty; because the treaty bound the five Powers to conform to the regulations of the Porte in regard to the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; and the standing regulations of the Porte admitted ships of war, as well as merchantmen, to enter into and remain in Barber’s Bay, and to wait there for a decision whether they could be allowed to go farther up or not. But the Government did not think it wise, right, or proper to take their stand on so narrow a ground. Having desired that the Treaty of July, 1841, should be concluded, they thought it better to adopt the strictest interpretation of that treaty, the interpretation put upon it by Russia, that the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be held to mean the whole distance between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora on the one side, and between the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmora on the other; so that if British ships of war should not enter the bay between the inner and outer castles of the Dardanelles on the one side, Russian ships of war should not on the other hand be allowed to anchor at Buyukdere in the Bosphorus, where merchant ships from the Black Sea are in the custom of stopping. It is needless to mention that this prohibition does not apply to light ships, such as corvettes and steamers, employed for the missions at Constantinople; the firman of the Porte being first obtained for their passing.

I believe I have now gone through all the heads of the charges which have been brought against me in this debate. I think I have shown that the foreign policy of the Government in all transactions with respect to which its conduct has been impugned, has throughout been guided by those principles which, according to the resolution of the honorable and learned gentleman, the Member for Sheffield, ought to regulate the conduct of the Government of England in the management of our foreign affairs. I believe that the principles on which we have acted are those which are held by the great mass of the people of this country. I am convinced that these principles are calculated, so far as the influence of England may be properly exercised with respect to the destinies of other countries, to conduce to the maintenance of peace, to the advancement of civilization, to the welfare and happiness of mankind.

I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made these matters the means of attack upon her Majesty’s Ministers. The Government of a great country like this is undoubtedly an object of fair and legitimate ambition to men of all shades of opinion. It is a noble thing to be allowed to guide the policy and to influence the destinies of such a country; and, if ever it was an object of honorable ambition, more than ever must it be so at the moment of which I am speaking. For while we have seen as stated by the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side—while we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled; institutions overthrown and destroyed—while in almost every country of Europe the conflict of civil war has deluged the land with blood; from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean this country has presented a spectacle honorable to the people of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind.

We have shown that liberty is compatible with order; that individual freedom is reconcilable with obedience to law; we have shown the example of a nation, in which every class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it; while at the same time every individual of each class is constantly striving to raise himself in the social scale—not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality—but by persevering good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual faculties with which his Creator has endowed him. To govern such a people as this, is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the noblest man who lives in the land; and therefore I find no fault with those who may think the opportunity a fair one, for endeavoring to place themselves in so distinguished and honorable a position. But I contend that we have not in our foreign policy done anything to forfeit the confidence of the country. We may not, perhaps, in this matter or in that, have acted precisely up to the opinion of one person or another—and hard indeed it is, as we all know by our individual and private experience, to find any number of men agreeing entirely in any matter, on which they may not be equally possessed of the details of the facts, and circumstances, and reasons, and conditions which led to action. But, making allowance for those differences of opinion which may fairly and honorably arise among those who concur in general views, I maintain that the principles which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, as representing a political, a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question now brought before it: whether the principles on which the foreign policy of her Majesty’s Government has been conducted, and the sense of duty which has led us ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow-subjects abroad, are proper and fitting guides for those who are charged with the Government of England; and whether, as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus sum; so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong.