CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON AND QUARRIES—INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PÉLISSIER

The next combined action of the allied forces took place against the Mamelon, the ouvrages blancs, and the quarries in front of the Redan. As the capture of these important outworks involved not only a partial re-armament of the siege batteries and a renewal of their munitions, but also a careful consideration of engineer arrangements, some short delay necessarily followed before decisive action could be taken. Towards the end of May a meeting was arranged to take place at the French head quarters between the senior artillery and engineer officers of the two armies, with a view to discuss the various details. As General Dacres was temporarily absent, owing to illness, and had gone for a few days to Constantinople, Lord Raglan directed me to accompany General Harry Jones, the Commanding Engineer. The meeting took place in a hut, at 6 A.M. To my surprise General PÉlissier came in and presided; and, instead of the conference being limited to officers of the special arms, the following were present: French Generals Martimprey, Niel, Bosquet, Trochu, Frossard, Beuret, and Thiry, and one or two more; General Jones and myself being the only English officers at the meeting. Major Claremont and Prince Polignac were also in the room, to act as interpreters if required.

General PÉlissier, in opening the proceedings, said it was decided that in a few days the French were to attack the Mamelon and other adjacent positions, whilst the English would seize the quarries in front of the Redan; and he invited those present to offer any remarks on details. A plan of Sebastopol was lying on the table for reference. General Niel began the discussion, stating that on an important occasion like the present it was necessary to take a general survey of the allied position and of the trenches, and he would begin with the left attack. PÉlissier stopped him at once, and declined to enter into any such general considerations, saying that all he wanted was assistance as to details. He then took a ruler, laid it across the left attack, and said: 'L'attaque gauche n'existe plus.' General Niel under these circumstances abstained from taking any further part in the discussion.

General Bosquet having made a few remarks as to the troops to be detailed for the assault of the Mamelon, in which the Zouaves were to occupy a conspicuous place, PÉlissier objected to the arrangement, contending that the Zouaves were not the best troops—'Pourquoi toujours les Zouaves?' he added. He went on to say that these, however, were small questions of detail to be settled afterwards. He was evidently determined to assert his position as Commander-in-Chief, and told us that there were persons in France of the highest position (evidently alluding to the Emperor) who read history and studied campaigns, and then sent him out their ideas as to what should be done. He told us that he had written respectfully to the Minister for War that, so long as he commanded the French army in the field, he declined to carry out any plans except such as were arranged and concerted between Lord Raglan and himself. A few other officers offered some observations, and then PÉlissier turned to General Harry Jones. Apparently he had some difficulty in pronouncing his name, and approximately addressed him as General Hairy-Joze.[32] The General—who, I found afterwards, was considerably ruffled by PÉlissier's arbitrary language—speaking in somewhat moderate French, said that when the French were ready to take the Mamelon the British troops were prepared to storm and capture the quarries in front of the Redan, and then sat down. PÉlissier at once expressed his pleasure at hearing the statement of General Hairy-Joze. The English, he added, were evidently waiting for their allies, and with that 'soliditÉ' which so distinguished them would no doubt succeed in what they undertook. The day and hour of the attack were known only to Lord Raglan and himself, but they should not have long to wait. PÉlissier ended by stating that the discussion had been very interesting (no one having practically spoken except himself), and then he wished us all good morning.

Lord Raglan was much interested and amused when he heard of the interview, saying that had he known General PÉlissier would be present he would have gone himself to listen to his lecture. It was known at the time that considerable differences existed between PÉlissier and Niel. Years afterwards, in Kinglake's 'History of the Crimea,'[33] he quotes extracts of letters written at this time by General Niel to the Emperor Napoleon, and which evidently refer to the conference I have just described. In one General Niel says: 'At a meeting which took place yesterday he, General PÉlissier, ordered me to be silent with a harshness not to be characterised.... We were in the presence of English officers.' Again, he writes to the Minister for War: 'Knowing nothing of what is going on, I abstain from all reflections. I asked leave to offer some observations on the state of the siege, and was told that it was not the time....'

It must be borne in mind that the active measures which had been carried out by the allied generals during the latter part of May were by no means approved of in Paris, so much so that on June 5 Napoleon telegraphed to PÉlissier as follows:[34] 'Je vous donne l'ordre positif, de ne point vous acharner au siÈge, avant d'avoir investi la place.' General PÉlissier, however, entirely ignoring the veto, simply replied that he was in perfect accord with Lord Raglan, and was making final dispositions for the assault of the white redoubts, the Mamelon, and the quarries; and adds, that he should commence on the 7th and push on with the utmost vigour. And so he did.

A few days later, in writing to Paris, he speaks of himself as being at the paralysing extremity of an electric wire.[35] Lord Panmure, the Minister for War, however, about this time informed Lord Raglan that the English and French Governments had arranged that no orders should be sent out as to operations, without mutual consent,[36] and it seems curious that so obvious and common-sense a plan had not been in force throughout.

On the afternoon of June 6 the third great bombardment of Sebastopol commenced. My brother, Captain Mortimer Adye, R.A., was in command of an advanced battery in the trenches, and, the weather being hot, was fighting his guns in his shirt sleeves, when a shell from the enemy burst in the battery, exploding some loose gunpowder which was lying there, and burned him and two sergeants seriously; in fact, nearly blew them away. His face, neck, and arms were scorched, blackened, and blistered, and his flannel shirt smouldering. Some infantry soldiers, seeing his condition, threw some water over him, and he was then conveyed to camp; but some weeks elapsed before he was able to resume his duties.

The fire of the allied batteries soon obtained a mastery, and the Mamelon especially was in ruins. Todleben, speaking of the bombardment, said that more terrific than all else was the fire of the English.[37] It was arranged that the assault of the Russian advanced works should take place shortly before sunset, and during the afternoon of the 7th the French columns, in the highest spirits, marched under cover and unobserved down the ravines in readiness. The signal was given about half-past six, and the French first attacked and occupied the ouvrages blancs, near the Careening Bay ravine, taking several hundred prisoners. They then assaulted the Mamelon, took it with great rapidity and comparative ease, and hoisted their flag on the work; but, led away by success, they impetuously, and contrary to the intention, followed the enemy even up to the glacis of the Malakoff. The Russians, however, came out in great force, and not only drove back the French columns, but followed them into the Mamelon and recaptured it, the French retreating down the slopes in disorder and with great loss. It was a critical moment, but PÉlissier was equal to the occasion. Having large reserves in the adjoining ravine, he at once sent them forward and for a second time occupied the great outwork; and, darkness coming on, its entrenchments were turned during the night and the position firmly held. At the same time, whilst these serious battles were taking place, the English troops, consisting of part of the Light and Second Divisions, stormed the quarries in front of the Redan in the most brilliant manner; and although they were furiously attacked several times during the night by sorties from the Russian adjacent works, and suffered great loss, they resisted all efforts to dislodge them, and the next morning found them firmly established in comparatively close proximity to the Redan.

The great energy and activity of the allies during the fortnight since PÉlissier had been in command of the French army and in full accord with Lord Raglan had thus been attended with important results, not only on the Chernaya and at Kertch, but also in depriving the enemy of the outworks in front of the city which they had established during the previous winter. Within a day or two of the successful actions of June 7, another meeting took place of the senior artillery and engineer officers of the two armies, at which I was present with General Dacres. The subject considered had reference to the arrangements in the trenches necessary for the further prosecution of the siege. Opinions rather differed, some considering that in view of the recent success, and its moral effect on the Russians, a general assault should speedily follow. Colonel Frossard, a distinguished engineer of the French army, however, urged that as we were still at a distance of some hundred yards from the Malakoff and Redan we should continue to advance cautiously by means of sap and trench as heretofore. He pointed out that an assault from our present position would involve the carrying of scaling ladders and woolbags to fill the ditches, for a considerable distance in the open under heavy fire, and that under all the circumstances we might be liable to defeat in assaulting prematurely. General Dacres entirely concurred in the views of Colonel Frossard, and the event proved that their misgivings were justified.

Some days passed away, during which time the batteries in the trenches were augmented and again prepared for a fresh effort, and it was finally decided that a general assault should be made on the Malakoff and Redan on June 18, to be preceded by a vigorous bombardment at daylight for two or three hours, so as to smash and silence the enemy's batteries and open a road for the attacking columns. It is important, however, to bear in mind that General PÉlissier declined to make a simultaneous movement against the Bastion du MÂt. A heavy fire was opened at daylight on June 17 from the English and French trenches, and continued throughout the day. In the evening Lord Raglan sent for me, and directed orders to be issued at once to all the batteries, that the renewed bombardment at daylight the next morning was not to be carried out. I ventured to remark that every preparation had been made, and that it would not only be a great disappointment to the navy and artillery, but it seemed to me that a concentrated fire for two or three hours on the points to be assaulted would produce a great effect. Lord Raglan replied that he entirely agreed with me, but, he added, it was useless to argue the question, as he had just received a message from General PÉlissier altering previous arrangements, and saying that the French columns would attack at daylight.[38] The necessary orders were, of course, given.

[32] Soon afterwards, when he was knighted, he called him 'Sairey-Joze'! (Sir Harry Jones).