BATTLE OF CHARLEROI

Toward the end of the third week of August, 1914, the atmosphere of every European capital became tense with the realization that a momentous crisis was impending. It was known that the French-British armies confronted German armies of equal, if not of superior strength. In Paris and London the military critics wrote optimistically that the Germans were marching into a trap.

The British army had arrived at the front in splendid fighting trim. It was difficult to restrain the impetuous valor of the French soldiers. The skies were bright and there was confidence that the Germans would unquestionably meet with a crushing defeat. Let us glance at the line of the French and British armies stretched along the Belgian frontier. It ran from within touch of Namur up the right bank of the Sambre, through Charleroi to Binche and Mons, thence by way of the coal barge canal just within the French frontier to CondÉ. For the choice of a great battle ground there was nothing particularly attractive about it in a military sense.

There is evidence to show in an official communiquÉ from General Joffre published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be merely the left wing of a gigantic French battle offensive—on the adopted German plan—from CondÉ to Belfort. "An army," runs the communiquÉ, "advancing from the northern part of the Woevre and moving on NeufchÂteau is attacking the German forces which have been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank of the Samoy. Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse. It is supported by the English army from the region of Mons."

These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made plain in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier into Ligny and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels. This we have previously noted in another connection. The rout of the French army in Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand CondÉ-Belfort offensive.

Thus the Namur-CondÉ line became a main defensive position instead of an offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As such it was well enough—if its pivot on the fortress of Namur held secure. Liege had already proved its vulnerability, but it would seem that the French General Staff joined with General Michel, the Commander of Namur, in believing the Namur forts would give a better account. The French General Staff were informed of the approximate strength of the advancing armies of Von Kluck and Von BÜlow, and had nothing to fear from inferiority in numbers. The staff never gave out the strength of their forces, but there is reason for believing the great armies were nearly equally matched after mobilization—about 1,200,000 men.

Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the French right. It has been established that woods, particularly in summer, form the best cover from the observation or attacks of airmen. The spreading, leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate visually from a height of even a few hundred feet, at least to obtain accurate information of what is transpiring beneath.

French air scouts brought in correct information that they had seen the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and crown prince massed along the southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under the foliage there was another army unseen—that of General von Hausen. The French moved their Fifth Army up to position on the line of the Sambre. They advanced their Third Army, commanded by General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg, and their Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary across the River Semois to watch the Meuse left bank and gain touch with General Lanzerac. General de Cary came from Sedan, throwing out detachments upon the Meuse left bank. These operations were to confront the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and crown prince.

But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the army of General von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not distinguish it from the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and the crown prince, amid the forest of the Ardennes, or they did not observe it at all. To the army of General von Hausen there clings a good deal of mystery. When last noted by us, previous to the minor battle of Dinant, it had been formed by forces drawn from the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and crown prince. Ostensibly at that time, it was destined to support, as a separate field force, the armies of Von Kluck and von BÜlow.

Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold out. Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march on Central Belgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength seemed urgent. But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one after the other under the fire of the German siege guns. General von Hausen was released for action elsewhere. Thus we may assume, he was ordered to follow the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and crown prince down through the Ardennes to strike the Meuse south of Namur. By this time he had been substantially reenforced. Now under his command were the complete Twelfth and Nineteenth Corps, and the Eleventh Reserve Corps. Also a cavalry division of the Prussian Guard, with some other detachments of cavalry. His Eleventh Reserve Corps were Hessians, the Twelfth and Nineteenth Corps were Saxons. The latter two corps were regarded as among the best in the German army. In the Franco-Prussian War they fought with conspicuous bravery through every battle in which they were engaged. They won the battle for Prussia at Gravelotte by turning the French right and capturing St. Privat. They marched to Sedan under the crown prince—subsequently the Emperor Frederick—to occupy the first line in the hard fighting of the Givonne Valley. During the siege of Paris they occupied a part of the German northern line, finally to march in triumph into Paris. This infantry and cavalry of the Prussian Guard stiffened Von Hausen's force into an army of battle strength.

We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French defensive position at Charleroi—the resisting power of the Namur forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's army.

However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French General Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently General von BÜlow regarded them as little more than passing targets for his siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple mathematical calculation of almost the number of shells necessary to fire, and the hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts to masses of dÉbris.

We can picture General von BÜlow as he sat in the motor car with Marshal von der Goltz—the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned up to his nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion ran mainly upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and crown prince advancing away to their left upon the forces of the French Generals Ruffey and de Cary. But there was apparently a German gap here between Von BÜlow's army and the armies of the Duke of WÜrttemberg and crown prince, though we noticed previously Von BÜlow's army came in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy and Namur, when a detachment of Von BÜlow's left wing was thrown across the Meuse at Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right resting on the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the "trap" military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite likely the two German generals Von BÜlow and Von der Goltz, chatting in their motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch of imagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the old gentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name of Von Hausen was mentioned.

The German attack on the French right began early in the morning of Friday, August 21, 1914. A party of German hussars crossed the Meuse, rode through Charleroi, and trotted on toward the Sambre. At first they were mistaken for a British cavalry patrol. Probably the populace in Charleroi were not sufficiently familiar at that time with the British hussar uniform to distinguish it from the German. In all armies hussar uniforms bear a close resemblance. A French officer, however, presently detected the situation. After a skirmish the German hussars were driven off with the loss of a few killed and wounded. But the raid evidently came out of the gap as a surprise to the French. The citizens were promptly ordered to their homes. Barricades were raised in the streets, and mitrailleuses were placed in sweeping positions. An artillery engagement began at Jemappe, nine miles above Namur on the left bank of the Sambre, between Von BÜlow's vanguard and the main French right. Later in the day Von BÜlow's vanguard artillery had advanced to open fire on Charleroi and Thuin, seven miles beyond.

On Saturday, August 22, 1914, Von BÜlow attacked Charleroi in full strength. As we have seen, he had already practically settled with Namur. Their main assault on Saturday was delivered on the Sambre bridges at Chatelet and Thuin, below and above Charleroi, respectively. Sometime on Saturday they succeeded in crossing to turn Charleroi into one of the most frightful street battle grounds in history. The conflict raged for the possession of iron foundries, glass works, and other factories. The thoroughfares were swept by storms of machine-gun fire. Tall chimneys toppled over and crashed to the ground, burying defenders grouped near under piles of dÉbris. Desperate hand-to-hand encounters took place in workshops, electric-power stations, and manufacturing plants. The normal whir of machinery, now silent, was succeeded by the crack and spitting of continuous rifle fire.

The French-Turco and Zouave troops fought with savage ferocity, with gleaming eyes, using bayonets and knives to contest alleys and passageways. House doors were battered in to reach those firing from upper windows. Roofs and yard walls were scaled in chase of fleeing parties. The Germans were driven out of Charleroi several times, only to return in stronger force. Similarly with the French. With each change of victors, the losing side turned to bombard with a torrent of artillery shells the war-engulfed city.

At nightfall on August 22, 1914, Charleroi burst into flames. A dread and significant glow fell upon the sky. Absent were the usual intermittent flare of blast furnaces. The greater part of Charleroi had become a heap of ruins. Those of its citizens still alive cowered in holes or corners for shelter.

The battle of Charleroi went on throughout the night. Early on the morning of Sunday, August 23, 1914, Von Hausen swept down through the gap between the armies of Von BÜlow and the Duke of WÜrttemberg. He crossed the Meuse, drove from before him the French detachments watching it, and advanced to attack the rear of the French right.

Von Hausen took the French at Charleroi completely by surprise. At the moment they could comprehend neither where he came from nor the measure of his strength. But he was in army force.

The French were compelled to withdraw their right from Charleroi. Von Hausen seized the advantage to hurl his forces upon their rear, while Von BÜlow thundered in assault more vigorously than ever on the French front. A powerful force was hurled upon them from an unexpected direction. Presently the retreat of the French Fifth Army was threatened by the two Saxon corps of Von Hausen's army, pressing on the French right flank and rear. In this emergency the retirement of the French Fifth Army appears to have been undertaken with spontaneous realization of utmost danger. It gave way before the attacks of Von BÜlow and Von Hausen to move southward, leaving their British left wing without information of defeat.