Note1, p.24.—This is not quite a correct representation of Mr. Erskine’s declaration. He had not said that all discussion was rendered “impossible,” but that the treatment of the French minister by the English Government was “so harsh and irritating as to defeat all the objects of negotiation.” As a matter of fact, informal communications continued to pass between the two governments. But the agents of France were not accredited, and this fact threw upon England, in the judgment of the French, the responsibilities of the war. See “Parliamentary History,” xxxiv., 1289.

Note2, p.30.—By the Treaty of Westphalia, which in 1648 established the international relations of modern Europe, the river Scheldt was closed to general commerce out of consideration for Holland. It remained thus closed till 1792, when after the battle of Jemappes, in which the French defeated the Austrians and Prussians, a passage was forced by the French down to the sea. As England was the especial protector of Holland it was but natural that Pitt should protest against the act, not only as a national affront, but also as an expression of willingness on the part of France to set aside at her convenience the provisions of the great Treaty of Westphalia.

Note3, p.31.—The cause of this incorporating of Savoy was the famous meeting at Mantua in May of 1791. The Count d’Artois, brother of Louis XVI., the Emperor of Austria, the King of Spain, and the King of Sardinia, had secured an agreement from those monarchs to send 100,000 men to the borders of France in the hope that the French, terrified by the alliance and by such an army, would seek peace by submitting to the Bourbon king, and asking for mediation. Though the plan was rejected by Louis, it none the less showed the animus of the allies. The details may be seen in Mignet, 101, and in Alison, tenth ed., ii., 412. On the 27th of November, 1792, the National Convention annexed Savoy and erected it into a department of France in direct opposition to the Constitution of the Republic, which declared that there should be no extension of the territory.

Note4, p.32.—By the decree alluded to, the National Convention declared that they would “grant fraternity and assistance to all those peoples who wish to procure liberty.” They also charged their generals to give assistance to such peoples, and to defend all citizens that have suffered or are now suffering in the cause of liberty. Within ten days after the passage of this decree an English society sent delegates to Paris, who presented at the bar of the Convention a congratulatory address on “the glorious triumph of liberty on the 10th of August.” The President of the Convention replied in a grandiloquent speech, in which among other things he said: “The shades of Hampden and Sydney hover over your heads, and the moment without doubt approaches when the French will bring congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain. Generous Republicans! your appearance among us prepares a subject for history!” By nonsense of this kind the French were constantly deceived in regard to the attitude of England.

Note5, p.35.—This was not the language of exaggeration. The decree of December 15, 1792, required the French generals wherever they marched, to proclaim “the abolition of all existing feudal and manorial rights, together with all imposts, contributions, and tithes”; to declare “the sovereignty of the people and the suppression of all existing authorities”; to convoke the people “for the establishment of a provisional government”; to place “all property of the prince and his adherents, and the property of all public bodies, both civil and religious, under the guardianship of the French Republic”; to provide, as soon as possible, “for the organization of a free and popular form of government.” This was literally a declaration of war against all governments then existing in Europe. The decree is given in the Ann. Reg., xxxiv., 155.

Note6, p.39.—The orator then proceeds to explain certain causes of misunderstanding which are of no general interest, and therefore are omitted. To this explanation he also attaches further proofs of the hostile purpose of France, and of the fact that England had no connection with Austria and Prussia at the time of their first attack. The passage seems to be an unnecessary elaboration of what has gone before, and therefore is also omitted.

Note7, p.41.—This province, which, from 1305 to 1377, was the residence of the popes, continued till the French Revolution to belong to the papal government. It was seized in 1790, and the next year was incorporated into France, where it has since remained.

Note8, p.41.—This is not quite accurate. The meeting at Mantua had been held, and the monarchs of Austria, Spain, and Sardinia had made the agreement already described above. That the army of 100,000 did not march against France, was not from any lack of purpose on their part, but from the irresolution of Louis XVI.

Note9, p.42.—In this statement, too, Pitt was not correct. The Declaration of Pilnitz did not leave “the internal state of France to be decided by the king restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of the kingdom;” but asked that the other powers would not refuse to employ jointly with their Majesties the most efficacious means, in proportion to their forces, to place the King of France “in a state to settle in the most perfect liberty the foundations of a monarchical government, equally suitable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French.” They made no allusion to the “states of the kingdom”; but did indicate a purpose to settle the foundations of the government in accordance with the rights of sovereigns—that is to say, their own rights. Fox’s statement, given in the speech that follows, was far better. He said: “It was a declaration of an intention on the part of the great powers of Germany to interfere in the internal affairs of France, for the purpose of regulating the government against the opinion of the people.” The Declaration of Pilnitz was made by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, in consequence of their belief that “the situation of the King of France was a matter of common interest to all the European sovereigns.” The Declaration is given at length in Alison, 10th ed., ii., 415.

Note10, p.47.—Mr. Pitt then entered into a criticism of some expressions uttered by Erskine, not only in his speech, but also in a pamphlet on the subject of the war. The criticism brought out a reply and a rejoinder which are of little interest and are therefore omitted.

Note11, p.50.—Reference is here made to the fact that when in 1797 America demanded redress from France for her wanton attacks on American commerce, the officers of the French Government hinted that the payment of £50,000 by the Americans to the French officials would, perhaps, secure immunity. The letters proposing the payment of bribes, known as the “X.Y.Z. Correspondence,” were ordered published by Congress, in April of 1798. The English sent them everywhere throughout Europe to excite feeling against France. In America the indignation aroused by the suggestion of bribes gave rise to the cry: “Millions for defence, not a cent for tribute.”

Note12, p.51.—When Bonaparte landed in Egypt in December, 1798, he issued a proclamation in which, among other things, he exhorted the teachers in the mosques to assure the people he had come in fulfilment of prophecy: “Since the world has existed it has been written, that after having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and destroyed the cross, I should come, etc.” This proclamation was published in the Annual Register, (xi., 265,) and not unnaturally made considerable sensation in England and in Europe.

Note13, p.52.—The French in Pondicherry sent emissaries throughout India to organize societies for the propagation of their doctrines. The members were bound by a series of oaths to do what they could for the destruction of all kings and sovereigns. Hyder Ali and his son, Tippoo Saib, were the agents and allies of the French in accomplishing this work. These designs of the French in India were brought to an end by the victories of Lord Cornwallis.—Green’s “English People,” Eng. ed., iv., 332.

Note14, p.65.—The treaty of Campo Formio was not negotiated by the accredited ministers of the Directory, but by Napoleon on his own responsibility. In explaining his haste, he gave as one of his reasons the necessity of being free to act directly against England. In one of his confidential letters he said: “It is indispensable for our government to destroy the English monarchy”; and again: “Let us concentrate all our activity on the marine and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our feet.”—Confidential letter to the Directory, Oct. 18, 1797. Alison, 10th ed., iv., 347.

Note15, p.94.—The orator in this connection then proceeds to give at some length his reasons for attempting negotiations in 1796–97. These, as having no direct bearing on the subject discussed, are omitted.

Note16, p.113.—For an explanation of what was done at Mantua, see Note 3, p. 31. On the Declaration of Pilnitz, see Note 9, p. 42.

Note17, p.116.—See notes4and 5above.

Note18, p.119.—Reference is here made to the Treaty of September 26, 1786. Mr. Fox argued this question at greater length in a letter to his Westminster constituents. Pitt maintained that England in 1800 was not bound by that treaty inasmuch as the French Government which had made the treaty had been destroyed by the Revolution. In reply Fox declared that if the Revolution had swept away the obligation to obey that treaty, it must have also swept away the obligation to obey all others. But Pitt had often acknowledged the binding force of obligations entered into before the Revolution. Hence the treaty of 1786 was still in force; and according to it the dismissal of M. Chauvelin was equivalent to a declaration of war.

Note19, p.121.—When the Duke of Brunswick invaded France in July of 1792 at the head of the Austrian and Prussian forces he published a manifesto which did every thing possible to put his masters in the wrong. The burden of the proclamation was that the French had usurped the reins of administration in France, had disturbed order, and had overturned the legitimate government. He declared that the allied armies were advancing “to put an end to anarchy in France, to arrest the attacks made on the altar and the throne, and to restore to the king the security and liberty he was deprived of.” The manifesto furthermore said that the “inhabitants of towns who dared to stand on the defensive would instantly be punished as rebels with the rigors of war, and their houses demolished and burned.” This proclamation not only showed that the principal object of the war was an interference with the domestic policy of France, but it greatly inflamed the animosities of the French against the foreign powers. See Mignet, “Fr. Rev.,” 143; v. Sybel, ii., 29.

Note20, p.128.—It is an interesting fact that in the early part of 1792 Louis XVI. sent to the King of England, through Chauvelin and Talleyrand, asking the English Government to intercede to prevent military action on the part of Austria and Prussia. Louis appears to have seen that war on the part of the German powers, though intended to restore Louis himself to his former influence and authority, could only result in evil. Louis said: “I consider the success of the alliance, in which I wish you to concur with as much zeal as I do, as of the highest importance; I consider it as necessary to the stability of the respective constitutions of our two kingdoms; and I will add that our union ought to command peace to Europe.” The proposal was rejected, and a few weeks later Louis made a second attempt. He now asked the King to interpose, and by his wisdom and influence, “avert, while there is yet time, the progress of the confederacy formed against France, and which threatens the peace, the liberties, and the happiness of Europe.” This proposition, too, was rejected July 8, 1792, and before the end of the month France was invaded by the allied armies under Brunswick.

Note21, p.134.—General Suwarroff, one of the most extraordinary men of his time, had begun his career in the days of Frederick the Great, and had contributed much to the fame of the Russians for bravery at the terrible battle of Kunnersdorf. Though now nearly seventy years of age he showed an energy that made his name a terror wherever he went. The campaign against Praga is described in Alison, 10th ed., iii., 517 seq. For his far more remarkable campaign in Italy, see vol. v., 45 seq.

Note22, p.142.—The allusion here is to the Treaty of Campo Formio, signed Oct. 17, 1797, by which a large part of the Venetian territory was turned over to Austria in consideration of the annexation of Belgium and Lombardy to France. The machinations by which this transaction was brought about were among the most perfidious in the whole career of Napoleon. In regard to the alleged reason of giving up Venice Napoleon wrote to the Directory: “I have purposely devised this sort of rupture, in case you may wish to obtain five or six millions from Venice.” See Lanfrey’s “History of Napoleon,” 1, 100; and Adams’ “Democracy and Monarchy in France,” 162.

Note23, p.143.—The Emperor Paul I., father of Alexander I. and of Nicholas, was probably already insane at the time Fox was speaking. He had long shown a meddlesome disposition, and had interfered with the internal concerns of nearly all the countries on the Baltic as well as with those of Spain. Pitt on a former occasion had said of him: “There is no reason, no ground, to fear that this magnanimous prince will ever desert a cause in which he is so sincerely engaged.” But in spite of this prediction he did desert the allies and make peace with France. In view of these facts Fox’s ironical use of the word “magnanimous” was a peculiarly forcible hit.

Note24, p.151.—In this conjecture Fox was not far from the language subsequently used by Napoleon. He said: “I then had need of war; a treaty of peace which should have derogated from that of Campo Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination.” He then went on to say that Pitt’s answer was what he desired, that “it could not have been more favorable,” and that “with such impassioned antagonists he would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies.”—“Memoirs,” i., 33.

Note25, p.151.—In a speech some months before, Pitt had defended his action in regard to Holland by saying that “from his knowledge of human nature” he knew that it must be successful. It proved a lamentable failure, hence the irony of Fox’s emphasis.

Note26, p.154.—Virgil (Æneid, xi., 313): “Valor has done its utmost; we have fought with the embodied force of all the realm.”

Pitt on a former occasion had said that the contest ought never to be abandoned till the people of England could adopt those words as their own.

Note27, p.167. References to Washington were made from the fact that news of his death, which occurred December 14, 1799, had just been received in England. In the passage that follows, Fox alludes to the time Dundas was a member of North’s Government, and when it was the fashion of his party to denounce Washington.

Note28, p.170.—The facts as stated by Fox were only too true, and the British officer alluded to was none other than Lord Nelson. The insurgents had capitulated, on condition that persons and property should be guaranteed, and the articles had been signed by the Cardinal, the Russian commander, and even by Captain Foote, the commander of the British force. Nelson arrived with his fleet about thirty-six hours afterward, and at once ordered that the terms of the treaty be annulled. The garrison were taken out under the pretence of carrying the treaty into effect, and then were turned over as rebels to the vengeance of the Sicilian Court. Southey in his “Life of Nelson” (vi., 177) calls this deplorable event “A stain upon the memory of Nelson and the honor of England. To palliate it would be in vain; to justify it would be wicked; there is no alternative for one who will not make himself a participator in guilt, but to record the disgraceful story with sorrow and with shame.” Lady Hamilton, with whom Nelson was infatuated and who was the favorite of the Queen of Naples, was the one who led Nelson into committing the outrage.

Note29, p.253.—The following portion of Mackintosh’s argument has been universally admired. It was the common impression in England that if the prosecution of Peltier was not energetically carried on by the government, Napoleon would make the fact a pretext for declaring war. The advocate probably supposed that the jury shared that belief. He did not deem it wise to allude to it directly, but he proceeds with great ingenuity and force to dwell on the advantages of peace, and then having established a coincidence of feeling between himself and the jury, he leads them to see that peace can in no way be so effectually promoted as by sustaining the cause of justice throughout Europe, and that in no way can justice be so surely maintained as by substantial freedom of the press.

Note30, p.205.—Reference is made to the boastful question of Cicero, in the second oration against Anthony: “How has it happened, Conscript Fathers, that no one has come out as an enemy of the Republic, for these last twenty years, who did not at the same time declare war against me?”

Note31, p.207.—Mackintosh was wise enough to see that war was inevitable. It came sooner, perhaps, than he anticipated. Only a few days after the conclusion of the trial, the King sent a message to Parliament that war could not be avoided, and hostilities broke out May 18, 1803. Under the circumstances the impressive passage that follows on “the public spirit of a people” was peculiarly suggestive.

Note32, p.219.—The passage on the inherent characteristics of the French Revolution is peculiarly interesting, as showing how completely Mackintosh had changed his opinion since he wrote the Reply to Burke. Probably he is the more explicit, because his pamphlet was so universally known.

Note33, p.223.—This passage and what follows on the rule of the Jacobins is the one of which Madame de StaËl wrote in her “Ten Years of Exile”: “It was during this stormy period of my existence that I received the speech of Mr. Mackintosh; and there read his description of a Jacobin, who had made himself an object of terror during the Revolution to children, women, and old men, and who was now bending himself double under the rod of the Corsican, who tears from him, even to the last atom, that liberty for which he pretended to have taken arms. This morceau of the finest eloquence touched me to my very soul; it is the privilege of superior writers sometimes unwittingly to solace the unfortunate in all countries and at all times. France was in a state of such complete silence around me, that this voice, which suddenly responded to my soul, seemed to me to come down from heaven—it came from a land of liberty.”

Note34, p.236.—Allusion is made to the fact, humiliating to every Englishman, that Charles II. and James II. both received pensions from Louis XIV.

Note35, p.252.—Aloys Reding, the Burgomaster of Schweitz, in 1798, put himself at the head of a few followers and attacked the invading French with so much energy that he broke their ranks and repelled them. Afterward, however, he was overpowered and taken prisoner. After being held in prison for a time he was driven into exile.

Note36, p.296.—At the conclusion of the trial, the jury without hesitation found a verdict of “guilty.” But the subsequent history of the case is one of peculiar interest. The judges decided that the defendant Williams should suffer one year’s imprisonment at hard labor. But before sentence was to be pronounced, Erskine declined to go forward with the case and returned his retainer. The reason was never made public till Erskine himself explained the matter in a letter written in February of 1819 to the editor of Howell’s “State Trials.” He was one day walking in a narrow lane in London when he felt something pulling him by the coat, and, turning around, he saw a woman in tears and emaciated with disease and sorrow. The woman pulled him forward into a miserable hovel where in a room not more than ten or twelve feet square were two children with confluent small-pox and the wretched man whom he had just convicted. The man was engaged in sewing up little, religious tracts, which had been his principal employment in his trade. Erskine was convinced that Williams had been urged to the publication of Paine by his extreme poverty and not by his will. The advocate was so deeply affected by what he saw and heard that he believed the cause for which he had pleaded would best be subserved by the policy of mercy. He wrote to the Society in whose behalf he had been retained by the crown urging such a course. His advice, after due consideration, was rejected, whereupon Erskine abandoned the case and returned the fees he had received. The incident is an admirable illustration of the great advocate’s high ideal of professional ethics. Erskine’s letter is given in Howell’s “State Trials,” xxvi., 714; and, in part, in Erskine’s “Works,” i., 592.