450. From the Election to the Inauguration.—While the South, during the months between the election and the inauguration of Lincoln, was setting up its new government and preparing for war, the North could do nothing. President Buchanan, as we have already seen, scarcely lifted a finger to prevent the secession of the Southern states. There is even reason for thinking that he encouraged it,^[200] although in the main he was loyal. Howell Cobb of Georgia, Buchanan’s Secretary of the Treasury, John B. Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of War, as well as Secretary Thompson, actively and openly sympathized with the Southern leaders and gave them constant advice and assistance. Floyd even received Thomas F. Drayton, the agent of South Carolina, and negotiated with him for the sale of arms; and W. H. Trescott, the Assistant Secretary of State, was in constant correspondence with Governor Gist, of South Carolina, in regard to all plans for secession.^[201] This activity at the South gave great alarm to the North. Lincoln remained at Springfield until it was time to start for Washington for the inauguration, but he was beset with demands for an explanation of the policy which he would pursue. Though he wrote numerous private letters, he positively refused to give out a word for publication. His letters, since published, show that he never wavered from his purpose to defend the property of the United States government in the South. In the course of his journey to Washington, he made several speeches that showed remarkable firmness, united with a deep sense of responsibility. Hearing in Philadelphia, from two independent sources, of a plot to assassinate him in Baltimore, he reluctantly yielded to the urgent advice of his friends, and secretly boarded a special train in order to elude possible assassins by passing through Baltimore in the night.

451. Selection of the Cabinet, and the Inauguration.—Lincoln had the matter of choosing a Cabinet long under consideration, but its membership was not fully settled till the day before his inauguration. His chief rivals for the Presidency were given leading positions. The Secretary of State was W. H. Seward of New York; Salmon P. Chase of Ohio became Secretary of the Treasury; Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, Secretary of War; Gideon P. Welles of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy. In his inaugural address, the President spoke with a pathetic sense of his responsibility, but with great clearness of conviction as to the nature of his duty. He declared that he had “no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states” where it existed, and that there would be “no bloodshed or violence unless” it were “forced upon the national authority.” His purpose he defined by saying, “The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government and to collect the duties and imposts.” Appealing to his dissatisfied fellow countrymen, he said, “You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect, and defend it.”

452. The Fall of Sumter.—One after another, the military posts in the South were taken possession of by the local authorities. At Charleston, the Federal garrisons of two of the other forts withdrew to Fort Sumter, in order to defend it. But, even thus reËnforced, it was short of ammunition and provisions. Buchanan, in January, had ordered relief sent; but as we have seen (§ 442), the Star of the West was fired upon, and turned back to New York. Lincoln, in accordance with his firm but conciliatory policy, sent word to Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, that he had made provision to send supplies to Fort Sumter. The Governor decided at once to take the fort before the supplies could arrive, and, under his orders, General Beauregard opened fire upon it about four o’clock on the morning of the 12th of April. Two days later, the commander of the fort, Major Anderson, having exhausted food and ammunition, was obliged to take down his flag and withdraw from his post. No lives were lost on either side. This action of the South was a strategic blunder, for it enabled the North to enter upon the war with an enthusiasm which could otherwise hardly have been secured.

453. First Call for Troops.—The firing upon Sumter sent a thrill of patriotic determination throughout the North. On the 15th of April, Lincoln issued a proclamation, declaring that a combination against the Union had been formed, and calling for an enlistment of seventy-five thousand men for three months, “in order to suppress said combination and to cause the laws to be duly executed.” He also called upon all loyal citizens to aid and facilitate “this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union.” The response was immediate and overwhelming. Douglas, then upon his dying bed, dictated a letter, declaring that the only course left for patriotic men was to sustain the Union “against all assailants.” The course of Douglas unquestionably did much to unite all parties in the North. In every city and town mass meetings were instantly held and companies and regiments were formed. Senator Chandler telegraphed: “Michigan will send you fifty thousand men, if you desire.” Indiana, whose quota was five thousand, telegraphed that ten thousand were ready. So it was from every quarter of the North. Men came in such numbers that instead of seventy-five thousand, the War Department accepted more than ninety-one thousand. In the South, the people were likewise fired with enthusiasm and drawn nearer together. There was, at first, an opposition to secession in Virginia, but reluctance to allow troops to pass over her soil and the demand that she should furnish her quota against the South, turned the scale. Four of the border states, as they were then called,—North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas,—now passed Ordinances of Secession. Shortly after Virginia seceded, April 17, the capital of the Confederacy was transferred from Montgomery to Richmond.

MILITARY AND FINANCIAL STRENGTH OF THE COMBATANTS.

454. Comparative Numerical Strength.—As we have seen (§ 447), the population of the seceded states was a little less than nine millions, of whom about five and one-half millions were whites; while the population of the other states was about twenty-two millions. At the beginning of the war a large proportion of the white adult males in the South was brought into action through public opinion, and a little later, a rigid conscription law, including all able-bodied men between fifteen and fifty, was rigorously enforced. Old men, women, boys, and slaves were left at home to furnish the necessary supplies. Thus the South put forth almost its entire strength early in the war, and the capture of territory and prisoners continually lessened its resources; while the very opposite was the case with the North. While the war was going on, the productive industries of the Union states never flagged, and the population continued to increase so that it was possible to have a larger army at the end of the war than at the beginning. However, all figures comparing the armies and the numbers present in individual battles are somewhat misleading, from the fact that in the Southern army teamsters and laborers on the supply trains were generally slaves, not enumerated. Slaves were also employed in the trenches. In the Northern armies, on the other hand, these forms of service were generally rendered by enlisted men.

455. Comparative Industries.—The South was essentially an agricultural region, depending for its income chiefly upon its exports of cotton and tobacco. If a blockade could be stringently enforced, this source of revenue must necessarily be cut off. But that was not all. The supplies which the South had been in the habit of importing could not now be procured except at enormous prices and in very small quantities. A few facts will show the significance of this condition. In 1860, the exports of cotton amounted in value to about two hundred millions of dollars, but before the end of the war, the annual income from that source was not more than four million dollars. The inducement to run the blockade may be inferred from the fact that the best cotton could be bought in Charleston at four or five cents a pound, while in Liverpool, where the American supply had been cut off, the price per pound was no less than two dollars and a half. Prospect of profit led to the most daring risks. Insurance on blockade running vessels rose nearly a thousand per cent, and the wages of sea captains plying between Nassau and Southern ports increased from thirty to one thousand pounds sterling per month. As we shall hereafter see, prices rose enormously in the South, and the suffering on the part of many became almost intolerable. This condition of affairs might have been prevented, if the South before the war had given itself to the development of varied industries. But, with all the able-bodied men in the field, the sudden establishment of industrial activity was plainly out of the question. In the North, on the other hand, the conditions were very different. At the beginning of the war, a high protective tariff was established, partly to provide an increased revenue, and partly to encourage the rapid spread of home industries. The consequence was great industrial activity throughout the entire period of the war. As the Northern ports were all open, intercourse with foreign markets was easy, and the rise of prices was not so great anywhere as to cause considerable inconvenience. In fact, the North grew steadily in wealth during the war.

456. Financial Methods in the North.—The cost of a great war is always so enormous that all the resources of taxation and credit must be resorted to. The necessities of the North were peculiarly stringent in 1861, owing to the fact that during Buchanan’s administration the Treasury was nearly bankrupt (§ 423). As soon as the war began, the financial pressure was felt throughout the country, and before the end of 1861, the banks everywhere were obliged to suspend specie payment. A few months later, Congress authorized an issue of $150,000,000 of paper currency, and made it legal tender for the payment of all debts. In 1863, the amount of such notes was increased to $450,000,000; and from the color of the ink used, they came to be known as “greenbacks.” As they were not redeemable in gold at any specific time, the price of gold began to rise as soon as the first issue was made, and increased as the war progressed, until, in 1864, the premium on gold reached its highest point,—two hundred and eighty-five per cent. Of course, this premium was not an increase in the value of gold, but a decrease in the value of paper currency. As the current money became cheap, the prices of commodities naturally rose. It has been ascertained that the average increase in the prices of real estate, rents, and goods was about ninety per cent, while the increase in the price of labor was only about sixty per cent. Thus it is evident that the men of means profited most, or suffered least, by the inflation, while the laborer suffered most. Another source of income was the issue of government bonds at a high rate of interest. These amounted before the end of the war to $2,850,000,000. As during the first years of the contest the success of the North, and consequently the ability of the government to pay, appeared uncertain, it was difficult to sell the bonds except at a considerable discount.

457. National Banks.—An ingenious method of disposing of a large part of the bonds was devised. A law was enacted in February, 1863, authorizing any five persons to organize a National Bank on easy conditions. Except in very small places, such a bank was required to have a capital of at least one hundred thousand dollars and to deposit, with the Treasury at Washington, bonds to the amount of one-third of its capital. The government would then issue notes to the bank to the amount of ninety per cent of such deposit, such notes to be used by the bank for the purposes of circulating currency, and to be redeemable by the government in greenbacks. The response was at first slow; but in 1864 a new impulse was given to the movement by an act levying a tax of ten per cent on the circulation of state banks—a law designed to compel state banks to become national. By these measures, a safe and abundant currency was provided. In addition to these devices, a high internal revenue was levied, an income tax was provided, and tariff duties, as the war went on, were greatly increased.

458. Finances in the South.—No such fertile devices were possible in the South. Bonds were issued, but, as there was little or no capital seeking investment, no market at home could be found, and foreign capitalists would not run great risks till the issue of the war could be predicted with some confidence. The government then issued notes payable six months after the close of the war. With the diminishing prospects of the South, these notes rapidly declined in value, till they became practically worthless. Then the Confederate Congress authorized the army to seize provisions and supplies wherever they could find them, and to offer in payment bonds or notes at prices to be fixed every ninety days. Under this financial rÉgime, prices rose enormously, and the consequent suffering of those who did not occupy their own estates or were not in the army or the service of the government, was well-nigh indescribable.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SEAT OF WAR.

459. General Features of the War.—Without some knowledge of the physical characteristics of the country, it will not be easy to understand why the war progressed so slowly as it did in the East and so rapidly in the West. As the South had broken away from the Union, and the North was trying to bring the seceded states back under national authority, the North was, necessarily, the attacking party, while the South had merely to act on the defensive. Though two important efforts were made by the South to transfer the field of operations to the North, these were both unsuccessful, and therefore the war, in all its larger features, was fought in the South. This fact makes it necessary to look for a moment at the physiographic features of the field of action.

460. Physical Features in the East.—The Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River divided the Confederacy into three somewhat distinct parts. The eastern portion, which lies between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, is characterized by a succession of rivers that rise in the mountains and flow in a southeasterly direction nearly parallel with the Potomac and James. To advance through Virginia to Richmond, it was possible for the Union forces to go by water to the mouth of the James and then ascend along the river, or to cross the Rappahannock, the Rapidan, the York, and the Chickahominy, besides a large number of smaller streams which were sometimes swollen to the volume of navigable rivers. Much of the intervening region, moreover, was swampy, and at times almost impassable. East of the Alleghanies, the subordinate range known as the Blue Ridge provides a fertile, intervening valley, through which the Shenandoah flows northward into the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry. This Valley of Virginia, however, near the northern end, is subdivided by a low range of mountains in such a way as to enable an army driven down one side to retreat up the other. Across the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap, a railroad connects the Valley with the eastern portion of Virginia and makes it possible to transfer troops rapidly from one side to the other. At Manassas, this railroad crosses an important Southern line which runs from Washington to Richmond and Lynchburg, and to the far South. This crossing, therefore, was of the first strategic importance in the war, and was naturally the first point of collision.

461. Physical Features of the West.—West of the Alleghanies the water courses, in some respects, were of even more importance than in the East. The Cumberland River, which rises in the mountains of the same name, flows southwest, and then, turning sharply to the north, empties into the Ohio some miles above Cairo. The Tennessee flows in the same general direction, but bends so far south as to reach Alabama and Mississippi, and then, turning northward and flowing through Tennessee and Kentucky in a course nearly parallel with the Mississippi, though in an opposite direction, discharges its waters into the Ohio. As railroads were few and other roads were poor, these navigable waters were of the utmost importance to the side that should be able to command them. Both antagonists recognized this fact, and, therefore, the first contest in this region was for command of these rivers. Soon after the war began, the Unionists took Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio, and the Confederates constructed Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, at points not far from the Ohio, where the rivers were so near each other that either fort could easily reËnforce the other. In this way each side hoped to gain command of the rivers for purposes of transportation. The Mississippi also was strongly fortified by the Confederates at Memphis, at Island Number 10, at Vicksburg, and at other points of less importance. West of the Mississippi, the physical features of the country were of less military consequence.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMPLICATIONS.

462. First Bloodshed.—Among those in the North who had foreseen the conflict, one of the foremost was Governor John A. Andrew, of Massachusetts. Inaugurated early in January, 1861, he had set about preparing for hostilities by organizing the state militia and by purchasing arms in Europe. Only four days after the call for troops, therefore, the 6th Massachusetts Regiment was ready to move to Washington. While passing through Baltimore, the regiment was attacked by a mob and several men were killed. This was the first bloodshed of the war. The road through Baltimore was closed, and all trains with men and supplies were for several months obliged to pass around the city by way of Annapolis. But this was not the worst. The railroad from Annapolis to Washington was torn up and every telegraph line from Washington to the North was cut. Exit from the capital in any direction was, for a time, made impossible. With the news that Virginia had seceded, came the rumor that a large Southern force was on the march to take Washington. General Winfield Scott, then in command as general in chief of the United States armies, placed barricades about all the public buildings, and distributed the few guns he had at the various approaches to the city. There were only twenty-five hundred troops at his disposal. But officers and men in the departments were brought into service, and many citizens enlisted. The women and children were ordered out of town. During all this terrible excitement and anxiety, a committee from Baltimore appeared before the President and protested that the soil of Maryland should not be “polluted” by troops designed to invade the South. Lincoln replied, “We must have troops, and, as they can neither crawl under Maryland nor fly over it, they must come across it.” The alarming rumor proved to have no foundation. The South was not ready for an attack upon the capital.

463. The Border States.—The great fears naturally felt with regard to the secession of other border states besides Virginia were gradually relieved. This was caused partly by the wise management of Lincoln, partly by the unexpected enthusiasm throughout the North in responding to the call for troops, and partly by the firmness of the Union sympathizers in those states. Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri did not secede; but while these states thus remained in the Union, the people were divided in their sympathies, some going into one army, and some into the other. Though Tennessee seceded and joined the Confederacy, many of her people, especially in the Cumberland Mountains, were stanch supporters of the Union throughout the war. On the other hand, in southern Indiana and Illinois there were many sympathizers with the South, and nothing but the ability and the energy of the governors of those states and the intense loyalty of the Unionists kept up the full quota of their troops. In Virginia, while the people in the eastern part of the state were generally Secessionists, a majority of those west of the mountains were adherents of the Union. When, therefore, Virginia withdrew, the people of the western portion voted to break away from the rest of the state, and on December 31, 1862, Congress, with apparently more regard to necessity than to the Constitution, admitted the region to the Union as West Virginia.

464. Foreign Recognition.—On May 13, 1861, Great Britain issued a “Proclamation of Neutrality,” which, in effect, recognized the Confederates as belligerents, and this example was soon imitated by the other European states. Thus the Confederates obtained the right to have war vessels, and to take refuge for repairs and needed supplies in foreign harbors. The consular agents of the United States reported that Southern agents were buying arms wherever they could be obtained in Europe.

465. Equipment and Further Preparation.—In the beginning of the war, though enlistments were rapid, preparations for an advance were necessarily slow. The Southern ports were declared blockaded, but the North had not enough ships on hand with which to make the blockade effective. Coasting vessels of all kinds were rapidly brought into the service, supplies had to be collected, and troops had to be equipped and drilled. The Confederates were more rapidly organized, because their preparations for war had been much more advanced when the war began, although they, too, were short of arms and powder. Before the North was ready to move, the Confederacy had formed a strong line across Virginia from Harper’s Ferry to Norfolk. It had also placed strong fortifications along the Mississippi River, the Mexican border, and about the Atlantic ports. A little later the construction of Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, protected the northern frontiers. Thus the Confederacy was nearly surrounded with a line of defenses. Early in May, when the Northern troops reached the line of action, skirmishing began, but no important engagement occurred before July. On the 4th of July, Congress met in special session. Lincoln, in his message, after reviewing the situation, said: “This issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes.” Congress at once authorized the President, at his discretion, to call out five hundred thousand volunteers, and gave him all the powers necessary to carry on the war.

MILITARY MOVEMENTS OF 1861.

466. Movements in West Virginia.—Early in the summer of 1861, General George B. McClellan advanced from Ohio into western Virginia, and in less than a month succeeded in driving the Confederates out of that mountainous region. A little later, General Robert E. Lee, in command of an insufficient Confederate force, and in an inclement season, attempted to recover the ground lost, but he was successfully resisted by General Rosecrans, and the district remained in the hands of the Union.

467. The Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.—Largely in consequence of McClellan’s successes in West Virginia, there was a great popular outcry in the North for an advance. “On to Richmond!” was the watchword of many of the influential newspapers. General Scott at length reluctantly consented to a forward movement. About thirty-five miles south of Washington, the railroad from the Shenandoah Valley, passing through the mountains, crosses the road which runs from Richmond to Washington. The point, therefore, was one of such strategic importance that it enabled the army holding it to move rapidly to the East or West, as well as to the North or South. It was here, at Manassas Junction, that the Confederate force was concentrated under Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard.^[202] The Union army, under General McDowell, on July 21, crossed Bull Run, a small stream near Manassas, and advanced to an attack. At the beginning of the battle, McDowell had some success; but, in the afternoon, the Union army, made up chiefly of raw recruits, was thrown into a panic, owing to a reËnforcement of the Confederates, and fled in great disorder towards Washington. About eighteen thousand men were engaged on each side. The Confederates lost about two thousand, while the loss of the Unionists was nearly three thousand.^[203] Both armies were temporarily disorganized by the battle. On the following day, McClellan was called from West Virginia and put in command of all the forces from the mountains to the sea. In November, General Scott was compelled by age to give up his post, and McClellan succeeded him as general in chief of all the Union forces. Neither army was yet in condition to make an advance.

468. Ball’s Bluff.—The Confederates, however, strengthened their line in the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry, and in October a Union force of about two thousand men was defeated at Ball’s Bluff, and its commander, the brilliant Colonel Baker of Oregon, was killed. Before the end of the season the Union army was increased by additional enlistments to nearly two hundred thousand men, and the autumn and winter months were passed in fortifying the lines, drilling the recruits, and bringing together supplies.

469. Lincoln’s Strategic Plans.—Lincoln said at the very beginning of the war that four things were essential to ultimate success, and all his plans were directed accordingly. First, the army must defend Washington, and, if possible, press on and take Richmond. Second, the border states must, at all hazards, be prevented from seceding. Third, the Mississippi River must be opened, in order to give the West communication with the sea and to cut off the Confederates from western supplies. And fourth, the blockade must be made as effective as possible, to prevent European supplies from reaching the South.

470. The Contest in Missouri.—In the West special efforts were made by the Union forces to hold Missouri. Sentiment in the state was divided. General John C. FrÉmont (§ 417) was early appointed to the command of the Western Department. He entered upon his duties July 25, with headquarters at St. Louis; but great frauds were soon developed in his department, and he was unable to furnish the necessary supplies to the army. His department was further discredited by an unauthorized order freeing the slaves, which President Lincoln promptly rescinded. But notwithstanding the confusion at headquarters, General Nathaniel Lyon,^[204] one of the most promising of Union officers, conducted affairs in the field with great energy and skill. He pushed the Confederates out of the northern and central parts of the state; but near the southern line, they received reËnforcements from Arkansas and Texas, and advanced under General Price. The forces met, August 10, at Wilson’s Creek, near Springfield. Price had 10,175 men, with fifteen guns, while Lyon had 5400, with sixteen guns. Lyon’s left was commanded by General Franz Sigel,^[205] who passed around the right flank of the enemy and attacked in the rear. Lyon, at the head of the main army, led the advance with great gallantry, swinging his hat as he went. After being twice wounded, he still pressed on, but soon fell from a third wound, which proved mortal. Sigel’s force was cut off and routed. Lyon’s main army held its ground, but, in the night, the Union force was obliged to retire to Springfield. The Unionists lost about twelve hundred, the Confederates about a thousand.^[206] A major part of the Union force now retreated to Raleigh, where they remained for the winter. Meanwhile, early in September, the “Irish Brigade,” under Colonel J. A. Mulligan, distinguished itself at Lexington, with about 2780 men, against General Price, with a besieging army of about 18,000 men and sixteen cannon. Though Mulligan and his followers were obliged finally to surrender, it was not till after three days of most desperate fighting.

471. Halleck succeeds FrÉmont.—In October, Missouri was visited by the Secretary of War and the Adjutant General, for the purpose of investigating the condition of affairs, of which many complaints had reached Washington. Everything was found to be in dire confusion, owing to the inability of FrÉmont to administer successfully so large a field. General FrÉmont was consequently superseded by General Henry W. Halleck, who, before the end of the year, without fighting a battle, gained possession of the entire state.

INTERNATIONAL DIFFICULTIES.

472. The Trent Affair.—Toward the close of the year 1861, an event occurred which nearly involved the Union in a war with Great Britain. In November, Captain Wilkes, a United States officer, in command of the San Jacinto, boarded a British mail steamer, The Trent, and took from her James M. Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana, who were bound for Europe as Confederate commissioners. The right to stop and search the vessels of neutrals in time of war had long been maintained by Great Britain. The “Right of Search,” as we have seen, had been one of the causes of the War of 1812. Though often protested against, it had been generally maintained, but at the close of the Crimean War the Great Powers of Europe agreed, at the Peace of Paris, in 1856, to abandon it. To this agreement the United States, not being a member of the Congress, had not been a party, and was, therefore, not bound by it. The British government, however, insisted that the European agreement should be binding upon the United States, and immediately demanded the surrender of Mason and Slidell. Troops and vessels of war were at once sent over to Canada, and great excitement was the result. The officials of the United States replied that, although not a party to the agreement of 1856, their government had always been opposed to the “Right of Search,” and in accordance with its own principles would give up the prisoners.

473. Feeling engendered by the Trent Affair.—The incident left an angry feeling in the North toward Great Britain, for it was universally felt that the British government had shown an unmistakable partiality for the South. This feeling was further aggravated by the habitual attitude of that important newspaper, the London Times. Its offensive editorial utterances, which were generally thought to be inspired by Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, were the source of a vast amount of ill feeling for more than a generation.

474. Results of the First Year.—The outcome of the first year in the field was favorable to the Confederates. The Union side had lost Fort Sumter, Big Bethel, Bull Run, Ball’s Bluff, Carthage, Wilson’s Creek, and Belmont. With the exception of some small successes in West Virginia, there had been disasters in every quarter. To a superficial observer, therefore, success seemed to favor the South, and the attitude of England was easily accounted for. But there were other considerations to be taken into account. The tactful diplomacy of Lincoln and the irresistible energy of the Union sentiment had saved the states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and a part of Virginia from secession, and these results ought, perhaps, to be regarded as more than equivalent to the Confederate successes in the field. Not less important were the Union successes in closing the Confederate ports. The blockade was growing to be so complete as to prevent the exportation of cotton and tobacco, and thus to cut off the most important source of Confederate income. Meanwhile, there was great commercial activity between the Union states and Europe, and the government was easily and amply supplied with men and money.

For References, see end of Chapter XXV.