377. The Issues Involved.—As a Mexican state, Texas had extended on the south and west to the river Nueces; but her inhabitants and the United States insisted on holding to boundaries based on the Louisiana Purchase and on claiming the “country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande.” The Mexicans resisted this claim; and when Polk ordered General Taylor to cross the Nueces, and later to advance to the Rio Grande, they attacked and defeated a small body of the American troops (April 24, 1846). Polk at once sent a message to Congress, in which he declared that war existed, “through the act of Mexico herself.” This statement was, on the whole, unwarranted, although a technical defense was easily made for it. It was really a case of a strong nation’s bullying a weak one; and, as we have seen (§ 353), the bullying had begun under Jackson and had been steadily carried on. But Congress, and a considerable portion of the people, especially in the South, accepted Polk’s proposition, and the war was effectively prosecuted. Its results were probably beneficial, in the main, since the territory was sure to become American some day; but its origin is not a pleasant topic for the patriotic American to dwell upon. Nor is it by any means certain that the Civil War was not in large part precipitated by that against Mexico. The latter contest gave the South a taste for fighting that was not altogether a warrant for the future calm of that section; and the additional territory acquired by the Union opened a new and disastrous phase of the slavery question (§§ 388, 411).

378. Conduct of the Administration.—Senator Benton was probably right when he claimed, in his Thirty Years’ View, that there never was a less warlike administration than that of Polk. Polk was thoroughly upright and pious, but was scarcely broad-minded. He took his seat with the intention of carrying out a programme the main feature of which was the acquisition of California. This programme he carried out to the letter, partly because it was a popular one, partly because he had considerable administrative skill. Owing in the main to the discretion of Great Britain, war was averted with that power (§ 376), and Polk could point to a very valuable addition of territory in the extreme Northwest, into which population was already pouring. Tyler had forestalled him with regard to annexing Texas; but Polk could at least see to it that Texas reached the Rio Grande, and that the United States thus recovered territory which some persons believed to have been imprudently abandoned by Monroe in his negotiations with Spain (§ 324). Yet to extend the bounds of Texas and, what was more important, to acquire Upper California, would necessitate a war with Mexico, and for this Polk and his well-chosen Cabinet were prepared. They wanted only a short war, however, and trusted to diplomacy and money to secure them the territory that would give the United States a clear sweep to the Pacific. Hence much of Polk’s warlike attitude was hollow. His main purpose was to obtain money from Congress with which to buy territory, and by diplomatic means to induce Mexico to sell. He actually restored to his native land the exiled Mexican general, Santa Anna, hoping that the latter would, in gratitude, make a speedy peace. But the sly adventurer induced his countrymen to fight the harder; and although California and New Mexico were taken by the Americans without a real struggle, peace with Mexico, and her acquiescence in the results of the war, could be obtained only after long and costly campaigns. Moreover, these campaigns entailed a political result discouraging to Polk and the Democrats.

379. Ambitions of Scott and Taylor.—The leading soldier in the United States was General Winfield Scott, the hero of Lundy’s Lane (§ 309). Military success in a republic generally brings civil honors; and Scott was a Whig, with his eyes already on the Presidency. A Democratic administration could not bring itself to give Scott a chance to distinguish himself, and for some time he was detained at Washington; but his subordinate, General Zachary Taylor,^[173] who was at first given command (§ 377), was also Whig in his sympathies. Such being the case, various expedients were suggested; it was even intended to give Senator Benton supreme command, he being a good Democrat and a colonel of the War of 1812. But all schemes failed. Scott was finally sent to the front, and Taylor (§ 389) captured the Whig nomination for the Presidency (1848). Such are some of the intrigues that the historian finds behind the Mexican War. It is little wonder that the Whigs—including old statesmen like Webster, and new statesmen like Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, who was serving his only term as congressman—should have denounced the contest as wrong in itself and as prosecuted in the interests of the slaveholders and land grabbers of the country. It is little wonder, too, as we have seen, that the Mexican War does not live in popular imagination as a heroic struggle (§ 377).

THE CONDUCT AND RESULTS OF THE WAR.

380. Taylor’s Victories.—Whatever we may think of the causes of the Mexican War and of the conduct of the American authorities, there can be but one opinion as to the valor with which officers and troops conducted themselves after hostilities had begun. Taylor received notice from the Mexican general, Arista, on April 24, 1846, that his occupation of the northern branch of the Rio Grande meant war. On the same day the first American blood was shed. It was avenged shortly; for, on May 8, Taylor met about six thousand Mexicans at Palo Alto, and defeated them severely with his own small force of about two thousand. The next day he won another complete victory at Resaca de la Palma, and drove the enemy across the Rio Grande. The news of these victories aroused the country and made Taylor a popular hero. He was already much loved by his soldiers, who gave him the nickname of “Rough and Ready,” because of his carelessness of dress and other details and his thorough capability as a commander.

381. Taylor’s Advance toward Mexico.—War was formally declared by the United States on May 13, Congress authorizing the President to call out fifty thousand volunteers and voting ten million dollars for expenses. On May 18, Taylor occupied Matamoras, halting there until September. He then advanced upon Monterey, other officers, military and naval, having meanwhile been occupying New Mexico and Upper California. Monterey fell, after a short siege, on September 24. But Mexico would not yield, although Colonel Doniphan, after a long, hard march, had taken Chihuahua and gained control of the important surrounding region, and although victory had crowned every effort of the Americans.

382. Capture of Vera Cruz.—As a speedy peace was much desired by the administration, it now seemed necessary to send General Scott^[174] to the front. It was determined that his forces should sail early in the spring to Vera Cruz, and from that place begin a march to the City of Mexico. He landed at Vera Cruz on March 9, 1847, and after a bombardment took the town twenty days later.

383. Battle of Buena Vista.—Meanwhile Santa Anna, in full command once more, hearing in January that Scott had taken ten thousand troops from Taylor, and believing that Vera Cruz could hold out for some time, determined to make a swift march northward and crush Taylor. It was a daring and probably a good plan, but it failed. Taylor, then some distance from Monterey, was not a whit daunted when, on February 20, he discovered about twelve thousand Mexicans in front of his own five thousand troops. He retired and took up a good position near Buena Vista, refusing Santa Anna’s demand for surrender three days later, and inflicting a severe defeat upon his enemy before the day closed (February 23, 1847). The American loss was about eight hundred, the Mexican over twice as many. The battle settled the fate of the territory that America craved, and, moreover, determined who should be the next President of the United States. Curiously enough, the future President of the Confederate States, who was Taylor’s own son-in-law, also won great distinction at Buena Vista. Jefferson Davis fought with conspicuous bravery, showed much tactical ingenuity, and was severely wounded in this remarkable battle.

384. Scott’s Great March.—If Taylor’s career had been brilliant, Scott’s was now to be more so. Unfortunately for the latter’s Presidential aspirations, however, Taylor had already caught the attention of the public. Besides, Scott, who was strict with regard to discipline and fond of display,—qualities that earned him the nickname of “Fuss and Feathers,”—was not the man to secure popularity. Before his brilliant campaign was over, he had several unpleasant difficulties with subordinate officers. But, as a general, he showed himself to be fully Taylor’s equal, perhaps his superior. Leaving Vera Cruz, he forced, on April 18, the mountain pass of Cerro Gordo, which had been fortified. It was defended by fifteen thousand Mexicans under Santa Anna, whose courage had not been lessened by his defeat at Buena Vista. Here again the Mexican losses far exceeded the American. Three thousand prisoners were captured, along with a great store of arms and artillery, and three towns were taken. At one of these, Puebla, the army halted for a rest of two months. At the beginning of August the march on the capital was renewed, about eleven thousand men moving forward. By August 18, they were within ten miles of the city, where the enemy made a determined stand. The next day and the day after saw three battles,—Contreras, San Antonio, and Churubusco,—all fought with splendid courage and great success against much larger forces of Mexicans, who fought quite as desperately, but with less skill.

385. The Capture of Mexico.—The Mexicans being dispersed, Scott might have entered the capital, but Polk wished to render negotiations easy, and an armistice was granted in order that terms of peace might be discussed. The American envoy, N. P. Trist, was instructed to ask for New Mexico, the Californias, and the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande; although he was authorized to drop the demand for Lower California if necessary, and also to offer money for the other territory. The Mexican commissioners would not agree to these proposals, and in their turn offered less than Polk desired. So the armistice was terminated. Then, on September 8, Scott won the brilliant victory of Molino del Rey (“Mill of the King”). Five days later, the heights of Chapultepec, as well as two of the city’s gates, were stormed with great gallantry. On the next day (September 14, 1847) a triumphal entry was made into the Mexican capital, in the defense of which so many gallant men had perished.

386. The Best Feature of the War.—The best feature of the Mexican War was not the splendid territorial booty obtained, nor the remarkable leadership displayed by Scott, Taylor, and their subordinates, but the superior morale of the American troops. As these were in the main volunteers, the conduct of the war was all the more a credit to the nation, especially to the Southern and Southwestern states, where the struggle had been popular. These brave volunteers wiped out whatever disgrace attached to the country from the shameful lack of efficiency shown by the troops of 1812. The war was also important for the training it furnished young officers who were destined to play important parts in the Civil War. “Stonewall” Jackson, McClellan, Grant, Lee, and other generals here first showed the stuff that was in them.

387. Results of the War.—The unequal contest was settled by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 2, 1848). Mexico had to agree to relinquish all her territory north of the Rio Grande and Gila rivers. In compensation for Upper California and New Mexico, the United States allowed her the sum of fifteen million dollars, and undertook to pay some of its own citizens who had claims against Mexico. The territory thus acquired soon threw the country into great political confusion; for certain Northern politicians were determined to prevent, if possible, any extension of slavery in the domain obtained by purchase, even though it lay south of 36° 30' (§ 329).

388. The Wilmot Proviso.—As early as 1846, Representative David A. Wilmot of Pennsylvania had proposed an amendment to a bill pending, stipulating that no money should be appropriated to purchase territory unless slavery were prohibited therein; and though this amendment, known as the Wilmot Proviso, had failed, the principle involved in it was made the chief feature of the campaign of 1848.

389. Election of 1848.—In this struggle five parties were engaged. Certain disaffected Democrats of New York, known as Barn-burners,^[175] a party known as the Free Soilers, and the old Liberty Party of the abolitionists,—all being opposed to the extension of slavery,—finally nominated Van Buren. The Democrats nominated Lewis Cass of Michigan, who advocated what was afterward famous as Popular or Squatter Sovereignty,—that is, the right of the people of each territory to choose whether they would have slavery or not. The Whigs nominated General Zachary Taylor of Louisiana, and placed on the ticket with him Millard Fillmore of New York. Their principles were not pronounced; but Taylor was a Southerner and carried a large part of his section with him, while Van Buren’s vote lost New York to the Democrats. Thus Taylor and Fillmore were elected; but the South soon regretted the fact, for the new President showed himself friendly to the anti-slavery men by urging the admission of California as a free state.

An uncomplimentary name given them by their opponents on account of their supposed revolutionary opinions on political matters.