351. The Spoils System.—Jackson’s inauguration was a signal for crowds of his active supporters to hasten to Washington for their rewards. At the reception at the White House they displayed the rudeness of a mob, and furnished a sharp contrast with the stately levees held by Washington in New York. But worse things were to follow. Through a Tenure of Office Act, due to Crawford (1820), many positions fell vacant every four years. These vacancies enabled the President’s advisers partly to satisfy the demands made upon him, but the politicians also induced him to use his power of removal. In a few months over five times as many changes were made in the civil service as had been made by all Jackson’s predecessors. As a matter of course these wholesale removals from office brought many incompetent men into positions of trust, but it is quite clear that Jackson did not realize what he was doing. He thought he was rewarding faithful friends instead of inflicting a disgrace and an incalculable injury upon his country. He was a kind-hearted man, but some of the official changes that he made on the advice of his political managers could scarcely have been more cruel if he had been really merciless.

352. Jackson’s Cabinet.—Jackson’s Cabinet was chosen upon the basis of friendship or service and was mediocre in character. Van Buren,^[153] who was made Secretary of State, had ability, it is true, and showed it conspicuously in the way he humored Jackson in order to secure the Presidential succession. Two Secretaries were friends of Calhoun, the Vice President, who had thus far supported Jackson. Within three years, however, the Cabinet was, with one exception, reconstituted. This very unusual and autocratic procedure of Jackson’s was owing partly to the alienation from Calhoun which followed Jackson’s discovery that the South Carolinian had wished to have him punished for his high-handed conduct in Florida (§ 324, note 2), and partly to the unwillingness of the wives of the other Secretaries to call upon the wife of the Secretary of War. This change in the personnel of the Cabinet but slightly affected the character of the administration, since Jackson rarely consulted his constitutional advisers, but preferred to take the advice of a small group of friends known as the “Kitchen Cabinet.” These men, chief among whom were William B. Lewis, an old Tennessee neighbor, and Amos Kendall, later Postmaster-General, acted as “coaches” to the old warrior. But the daring and energy needed for carrying out certain of his policies were furnished by himself.

353. Jackson’s Autocratic Reign.—Jackson, in spite of his theories about the duty of an executive to do the people’s will, was too much accustomed to command to be able to play the part of a constitutional President with any grace. When he had made up his mind to do a thing there was no stopping him. Of all our Presidents he, the most typically democratic, with the exception of Andrew Johnson, was the most typical autocrat. Opponents called him “King Andrew” and his two administrations are often spoken of as the “Reign of Andrew Jackson.” Yet to his credit be it said, that when he was not persuaded to act spitefully, he always acted fairly and for what he believed to be the interests of the nation. He bullied Mexico, but he would not be bullied by South Carolina. He insulted Chief Justice Marshall, was unforgiving to Calhoun, but was loyal to Van Buren. He was stern when his resolution to act was kindled; yet at times he was remarkably gentle. Almost the only time his will was successfully crossed was when the women of Washington refused to receive Secretary Eaton’s wife. But in describing him thus we are evidently dealing with a real man, not with a mere personification of the nation’s dignity. The history of Jackson’s administrations is the biography of Jackson himself—a fact which shows us that republican governments are sometimes as much affected by personal influences as monarchies are. The parallel between his career and that of a typical autocratic ruler is drawn still closer when we remember that an attempt was made to assassinate him. But this parallel must not be pushed too far. No man ever more truly wished to serve the people that elected him than Andrew Jackson.

354. Jackson as an Administrator.—Jackson’s administrations form a turning point in our history and are important from almost every point of view. Only their leading features can be treated here, but it may be well to say that whenever he could,—as in the matter of internal improvements,—Jackson played the part of a strict constructionist. When it was agreeable to him, he favored state sovereignty, as when he refused to support Chief Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court in their decisions against Georgia, which state continued to act toward the Cherokees as badly as it had done toward the Creeks. Georgia officials treated Marshall with contempt, and Jackson is reported to have said, “John Marshall has made his law, now let him enforce it.” Such a divorce between the executive and the judiciary, if long continued, would mean anarchy; but it must be remembered that Jackson, an old backwoodsman, would of course sympathize with the white men of Georgia.^[154] But he would tolerate no violation of national laws which he thought it right to defend, and he considered the voice of the people sufficient authority for some very loose constructions of the Constitution.

THE DEBATE OVER THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

355. The Webster-Hayne Debate.—Probably the most striking event of Jackson’s first administration is the great debate of 1830 between Webster^[155] and Hayne. It grew out of some resolutions of Senator Foote of Connecticut with regard to the rapid sales of public lands. The cheapness of land drew population westward, and this raised the price of labor in the older states; hence the interest of New England seemed to lie in opposing the policy of granting portions of the public domain to newcomers on very easy terms. The resolutions were hotly opposed by Senator Thomas H. Benton^[156] of Missouri, a leading supporter of Jackson. Benton and all Westerners naturally thought the prevailing policy wise because it brought men and money to the new commonwealths. Senator Robert Y. Hayne^[157] of South Carolina came to the help of the Western men, since to most Southerners New England was now obnoxious on account of the Tariff of Abominations (§ 340), and since the West, being comparatively unsettled, might, they thought, possibly be won to slavery’s side. Webster replied to Hayne, and the latter returned to the attack, but on a different line. He discussed the nature of the general government and gave warning that if the South were not relieved of tariff burdens, the remedy of a state veto would have to be resorted to. In other words, he advanced Calhoun’s doctrine of nullification, which, as we have seen, was an extension of the principles enunciated by Virginia and Kentucky in 1798, and by the Hartford Convention in 1814 (§§ 279 and 315). Webster replied in his most famous speech, and as an orator certainly got the better of his opponent, although Hayne’s defense of his own position was masterly. Even Calhoun himself, who, as he was serving his second term as Vice President, could not join in the debate, would hardly have presented his own views more clearly. Whether Webster eclipsed Hayne as a political reasoner, is a point on which the North and the South have never been in perfect agreement. Webster denied Hayne’s postulate that the Union rested on a compact, and affirmed that the Constitution had established a general government with powers sufficient to enforce its rights even against the component states.

356. The Theoretical and the Historical View.—Few will now deny that Webster was right as a theoretical publicist, for a constitution which admitted the right of secession or of nullification would have framed a farcical government. But whether he was right from the point of view of the constitutional lawyer or of the historical annalist is quite a different matter. There were nationalists from the beginning, but it seems probable that most men in 1789 believed that the Constitution was a compact between the states. By 1830 the North, and much of the West, had been nationalized and had more or less forgotten or abandoned the compact theory. But the South, less changed, adhered to it, especially as on it a minority party could base a constitutional resistance to an obnoxious policy like the tariff. Hence it seems fair to conclude that Webster was right as a publicist, partly unsound as a lawyer and annalist; but that the future was with him, the past with Hayne. That the past was with Hayne is partly at least confirmed by the general historical fact that minority parties, needing all the support they can get, make a careful study of precedents and have every interest in not making mistakes in their procedure. Parties of progress, on the other hand, are rarely careful about their reasoning from precedents. It is to be noted further that much of the political strength the Southerners still possessed lay in the fact that they were on the defensive and could obstruct legislation by strictly construing the Constitution.

THE TARIFF AND NULLIFICATION.

357. Jackson and Calhoun.—Shortly after the debate it looked as if South Carolina at least would put Calhoun’s theory in operation. The tariff of 1828 had been reformed in 1830 and in 1832, but the protective idea was still dominant, and against this idea the Southerners were firmly set. They wished to resist in some way, but they soon found that they could not count on Jackson to help them as he had helped Georgia. That old warrior had answered their overtures, when attending a banquet given on Jefferson’s birthday, at which disunion sentiments were openly expressed, by giving, as his contribution to the entertainment, the toast, “Our Federal Union: it must be preserved.” They could count on Calhoun, however, with more certainty than ever, for his break with Jackson took place about this time; and, so far as logical exposition goes, no cause has ever had more remarkable support than Calhoun gave the nullifiers. Jackson, however, received a stronger support. He was reËlected in 1832 by a very large majority and believed that the people meant him to go ahead and preserve the Union, as well as to carry out other important policies.

358. Nullification.—Meanwhile those South Carolinians who thought as Calhoun did, in spite of considerable opposition from their fellow-citizens, caused a State Convention to be assembled in November, 1832. This body declared the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 null and void so far as South Carolina was concerned, and prohibited payment of duties under them after February 1, 1833. Jackson replied by a strong proclamation, which urged the necessity of every true patriot’s supporting the laws and officers of the Union. Unfortunately many good South Carolinians thought that a patriot ought to support the state first, and the Union afterward. Jackson, however, did not rely on a mere proclamation. He dispatched soldiers and vessels to Charleston, and asked Congress to pass a bill enlarging his powers so that he might legally crush the incipient revolution. Congress in reply passed what is known as the Force Bill, March 1, 1833. No force was needed, however. The other Southern states did not stand by South Carolina, for although most of them believed in the right of secession as a last resort, they had little sympathy with nullification. They did not see how a state could remain in the Union, and yet not obey the latter’s laws. The nullifiers, under their leaders,—Hayne, who was now Governor of South Carolina, and Calhoun, who had taken Hayne’s place in the Senate,—had hoped for concession rather than war, and, pending the action of Congress, suspended the nullification ordinance. The administration, too, while determined to assert itself, had no great interest in the protective system, the cause of the quarrel. At this juncture Clay again played the part of a compromiser, and a tariff act, providing for a gradual return in ten years to the mild duties of 1816, was made law, March 2, 1833, one day after the Force Bill was passed and a day before the obnoxious tariff of 1832 was to have gone into effect. On their side, the South Carolinians held another convention, and repealed their first nullifying ordinance, but nullified the Force Bill. Thus it was practically a drawn battle—neither side abandoning its principles, but both making concessions in a not altogether brave and creditable way. As was to be expected, both parties claimed a victory. In South Carolina Calhoun’s influence grew steadily stronger, and the militia of the state seems to have been kept up with the distinct idea that it might be available in another crisis with the general government. On the other hand, Jackson had maintained the dignity of the Union, and the tariff compromisers, following the Missouri compromisers, had succeeded in putting off the day of reckoning until the Free states were strong enough to crush slavery and still retain the Southern states in the Union.