CHAPTER XVIII. the administration of john quincy adams, 1825--1829. FAILURES OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
335. Character of Adams’s Administration.—Adams was a statesman of great ability and experience and of high integrity, but he represented ideas of strong government not pleasing to the masses. He seemed to be a Federalist veneered with Democracy. He did not have the faculty of winning and holding friends. He could not be easy in his manners, and, on the other hand, his dignity lacked grace. Besides, his election had been disputed, his opponents were factious, and events favored him almost as little as they had done his father. The strongest man in his Cabinet, Clay, was really a source of weakness to him, for Jackson’s friends continued to pretend to believe in the corrupt bargain.[148] Adams’s administration was, therefore, on the whole, a failure.
336. Foreign Affairs.—Even in foreign affairs, where, being a trained diplomatist, he had been previously successful, things went against Adams. He secured a number of good commercial treaties, but lost the important trade with the British West Indian ports through the failure to comply in time with certain demands of Great Britain. Perhaps if he had used the tact afterward displayed by Jackson, he would have secured the trade without trouble. But, as it was, the fault lay mainly with Congress, which took delight in humiliating the President.
337. The Panama Congress.—Adams fared as badly or worse when he indorsed the scheme of General Bolivar, the South American patriot hero, for holding at Panama a convention, or congress, of all the American republics. Both Adams and Clay, the latter of whom had long taken interest in South American affairs, believed that through such a congress the influence of the United States would be extended and the Monroe Doctrine be more firmly established. But although commissioners were finally sent to Panama, they arrived too late to participate in the conference, owing to the protracted debates in Congress on the propriety of sending them. Although Adams’s opponents would under any circumstances have delighted to harass him, these debates were mainly due to the fact that Hayti, a republic of revolted negro slaves, was to be represented at Panama. Southern congressmen disliked the social and political recognition involved, and feared that the subject of slavery might come up for discussion. As a matter of course, Adams’s opponents made him bear the brunt of the fiasco.
338. Internal Improvements.—In domestic affairs the President’s policy was still more unsuccessful. In his tactless way he favored internal improvements to an extent unwarranted at the time. He knew of the general prejudice against the government’s undertaking what the states preferred to do themselves, and he should have known also that the vetoes of his two predecessors had carried great weight. Besides, it was almost amusing to counsel the American people, as he did, to build observatories, when they were more interested in finances, public and private, than in astronomy. Some money had indeed been spent on improvements, especially upon the Cumberland Road, a highway running through Maryland, West Virginia, and Ohio, and designed to connect East and West. More money was spent during Adams’s term; but much opposition was aroused, particularly in the South, even Calhoun being now dubious of the constitutionality of such expenditure of the public funds.
339. Georgia and the Indians.—Still more humiliating than anything described yet was Adams’s failure to protect from the aggressions of the governor and legislature of Georgia, the Creeks and Cherokees, who lived in a half-civilized condition within the boundaries of that state. Both tribes had treaty relations with the United States, and neither owed allegiance to Georgia. Yet the state proceeded to survey the lands of the Creeks under a treaty of 1825, before the general government had had time to investigate the matter. When Adams interfered, feeling that the Indians were being imposed upon, Governor Troup used imprudent language, which he reiterated in 1827 under similar circumstances. On the latter occasion he actually called out state militia to meet the United States troops. This was pushing the doctrine of state sovereignty to a very dangerous extreme. As the President got little support from Congress, he had to brook the insult in spite of a splendid speech in his behalf by Daniel Webster. A few years later, as we shall soon see, another state, South Carolina, stood out against another President, Andrew Jackson, with far less impunity, Jackson being a more commanding man than Adams, and his opponents less determined. It must be remembered, too, that although the rash conduct of Georgia’s legislature and governor deserves partial censure, the people of the state were acting but naturally, when they endeavored to supplant by white settlers the Indians within their borders. An Indian state within a commonwealth was not to be tolerated, and the United States had in 1802 promised to get the Indians away as soon as possible.
THE TARIFF QUESTION.
340. The Tariff of 1828.—Thus far Adams’s conduct had been above reproach, however much he had failed in carrying out his various policies. It is less easy to defend his course in not vetoing the tariff bill of 1828—known in history as the “Tariff of Abominations.” It is natural that men who have once tasted the bounty of government should desire more of it; hence we are not surprised at finding the manufacturers of the country soon demanding more protection. The most clamorous advocates of higher duties were the growers and manufacturers of wool, since English woolens were again being sold in American markets. A bill for the aid of the manufacturers of woolens was defeated in 1827 only by the vote of Vice President Calhoun, who again showed the growth of his anti-protection views. Then followed a convention of protectionists at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which advocated very high duties (1827). The adherents of Jackson, whose candidacy was kept shrewdly before the public throughout Adams’s term, now conceived a very subtle plan for helping their hero and still further discrediting Adams. They proposed to levy exorbitant duties on raw products,—a policy which would secure the favor of the Western farmers and sheep-raisers, but would outrage the New England manufacturers. The latter, it was thought, would then join the Southerners in defeating the bill and would owe no gratitude to Adams. Jackson would in consequence keep his Southern votes, yet would also seem friendly to the West and to the protectionists generally. The schemes of Jackson’s partisans to increase his chances of election were unnecessary, since he was already a sufficiently popular candidate. The bill actually passed laid high duties which protected both growers of raw products[149] and manufacturers. Although the gains of the manufacturers were thus neutralized, they thought it best to take their chances under the increased duties. Accordingly the congressmen who represented them voted for the bill, and Adams signed it May 24, 1828. The South was greatly outraged in consequence, although some of her own leaders had with sinister purpose forced the rates up.
341. South Carolina’s Discontent.—South Carolina was especially excited. Her feelings and ideas were well expressed in a document—the celebrated “Exposition and Protest”—drawn up by Calhoun. In this manifesto the Vice President, following the lead of his predecessor Jefferson, pushed the doctrine of state protest, as outlined in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, to the extreme of a separate state veto and nullification of an obnoxious law (§ 279). He went farther than Jefferson, however, his views being derived partly from his own philosophical speculations, partly from the teachings of John Randolph and of other Southern leaders. The consequences of the adoption of his theory were plainly very dangerous, but matters stood still for a while, since all parties were waiting to see what stand the new administration to be inaugurated in 1829 would take with regard to the tariff.
342. Election of 1828.—As might have been foreseen, Adams was defeated in the election of 1828. He had come nearer success than was expected; for the votes of New York and Pennsylvania would have turned the scale. But his opponents, with their scandalous stories, their unnecessary congressional investigations, their general unscrupulousness, had been too much for him. Clay had not been efficient in directing the campaign; while Jackson had secured in his favor what he had not had in the campaign of 1824,—the support of the skillful group of New York politicians known as the “Albany Regency,” at the head of which was the astute Martin Van Buren. Besides, Jackson’s views on disputed questions were a mystery, so that he could be claimed by any faction, while his sympathies and qualities were plainly democratic and thus acceptable to the masses. On the other hand, Adams’s views were so pronounced that he was sure to alienate votes, and his sympathies and qualities were plainly aristocratic.[150] Finally, Jackson was a typical Westerner, and the West then held the balance of power. It is no wonder, therefore, that in the popular vote he distanced his rival.
References.—General Works: W. Macdonald, Select Documents of United States History, 1776–1781; J. Schouler, History of the United States (6 vols.); J. Winsor, The Narrative and Critical History of America (8 vols.); G. Tucker, The History of the United States (4 vols., Winsor and Tucker extend to 1840); H. Von Holst, The Constitutional History of the United States (8 vols.); Bryant and Gay, A Popular History of the United States (4 vols.); T. H. Benton, Thirty Years’ View (2 vols.); E. Ingle, Southern Side Lights; Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion (“Epochs of American History”).
Special Works: same as for Chapter XVII.
