320. Monroe’s Counselors.—Monroe^[139] was fortunate not only in having to preside over a united people, but in being able to secure good advisers. For Secretary of State he chose John Quincy Adams, son of the former President and a diplomatist of tried ability, who had done good work for the country as Minister to Russia and commissioner at Ghent (§ 312). The fact that the son of the great Federalist leader should be serving in the Cabinet of a Republican President was a signal proof of the utter demoralization of the old Federalist party. In the Treasury, Monroe placed William H. Crawford of Georgia, an able though rather intriguing man whose subsequent defeat for the Presidency and withdrawal from national life caused regret to many people. Crawford was more of a politician than a statesman, and his success showed that public leaders were undergoing a change of type. The Cabinet was made preponderatingly Southern by the appointment of Calhoun as Secretary of War and of William Wirt as Attorney-General. Its strength, however, was not decreased, for both made excellent officials, although Wirt was more an advocate and literary man than a statesman.

321. The Era of Good Feeling.—Monroe’s name is chiefly connected to-day with matters of foreign policy, and his administrations have been termed “The Era of Good Feeling,” because domestic affairs wore on the whole so quiet an aspect. Yet, as we shall soon see, the debates on the subject of slavery connected with the admission of Missouri as a state showed that the country was in reality far from united; and the tariff legislation of 1824 brought out the fact still more clearly in a few years. Harmony was also far from the minds of the politicians, however united politically the people might appear to be. Intrigues for the succession to the Presidency occupied the leading statesmen, and in the combinations formed by them a careful observer might have perceived the beginnings of a division into two parties not radically dissimilar to the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans of the preceding generation.

322. The Character of Monroe as President.—Monroe has generally been regarded as the weakest of the early Presidents, although his popularity was widespread. This view is plausible, but hardly just. He certainly behaved with great dignity toward the intriguing politicians who were aiming to succeed him; he showed discretion in adopting from his advisers the foreign policy that bears his name; and he preserved a strict impartiality and adherence to the cause of the Union in the sectional disputes that disturbed his administrations. He was not a commanding man, yet he deserves to be remembered as a statesman who outgrew early rashness, and he was fully entitled to the confidence given him by the masses. For his second term (1821–1825), indeed, he had no opposition. But a solitary vote was cast against him, in order, as the story goes, that Washington should be the only President unanimously chosen.

DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENTS.

323. The Oregon Region.—Two boundary disputes with Great Britain and Spain early occupied the attention of Monroe and his advisers. The first was mainly concerned with the so-called Oregon region beyond the Rockies, drained by the Columbia River, which the United States claimed through the discovery of this great stream by Captain Robert Gray in 1792, and through explorations made by Lewis and Clark (§ 287), whom Jefferson had sent out soon after the purchase of Louisiana (1805). In this region the British Hudson Bay Company had, however, established trading posts, and Monroe found that the best thing he could do was to agree upon the forty-ninth parallel as a northern boundary as far as the Rockies and upon joint occupancy for ten years of the disputed territory beyond.

324. The Acquisition of Florida.—Diplomacy with Spain was more definitely successful. Ever since the purchase of Louisiana the United States had claimed that it was entitled to the strip of land along the Gulf known as West Florida; but Spain had refused to admit this, or to sell the territory, in spite of persistent offers to purchase made by Jefferson. In 1810 Madison took possession of the region by proclamation, although it now seems certain that the nation had better claims on Texas. His action, and the invasion of Florida by General Andrew Jackson while he was in pursuit of Indians convinced Spain, however, that she would do well to sell while she could the outlying peninsula of East Florida. Accordingly, on February 22, 1819, Adams negotiated a treaty by which the Floridas were ceded,^[140] and the western boundary of Louisiana was settled along the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas rivers to the forty-second parallel, and then along that to the Pacific. This treaty strengthened American claims to the Oregon region, and also helped to settle various Indian and slave troubles connected with East Florida, which had served as a place of refuge for runaway negroes and other bad characters. So much disturbance had indeed been caused by these marauders and by the Seminole Indians, that in 1818 General Andrew Jackson had had to invade Florida, and had actually taken two towns and done other rather high-handed acts which nearly led to his being court-martialed.^[141] Spain for two years delayed ratifying the treaty, but finally yielded to the inevitable.

325. The Occasion of the Monroe Doctrine.—A few years later relations with Spain again became important. Revolutionary principles had spread in the Spanish colonies to the south, and by 1822 Spain had lost all her provinces on the mainland. But the so-called “Holy Alliance,” formed by the principal sovereigns of continental Europe after the fall of Napoleon, had for its chief object the repression of revolutionary doctrines and outbreaks, and it seemed not unlikely that a concerted effort might be made by Europe, not to restore her colonies to Spain, but to distribute them among the great powers. This was naturally not to the liking of a people who had themselves revolted, nor was Great Britain anxious to allow the Alliance to gain too much headway. Besides, Russia was endeavoring to establish a colony on the North Pacific, and she and other powers might easily find pretexts to seize upon territory nearer to the United States—perhaps upon California. Hence, while overtures for a joint protest, made by the British statesman, George Canning, to our Minister to England, Richard Rush, were declined, the administration soon found it necessary to take a stand in the matter.

326. The Monroe Doctrine.—Accordingly, Monroe sent in a message to Congress in December, 1823, in which he outlined the policy since known as the “Monroe Doctrine.” This doctrine was none the less important from the fact that it was addressed to Congress instead of to the European powers. Its gist was contained in two assertions: first, that the American continents were not henceforth to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power; second, that efforts to coerce the newly established governments would be regarded as proofs of “an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” These firm utterances, for which Monroe was indebted chiefly to John Quincy Adams, but also to the policy of Washington and other statesmen and to the advice of Jefferson, put an end to all fear of European aggression and rendered Russia reasonable with regard to Alaska. The policy thus outlined has since been effectively maintained, and it may now be regarded as beyond the reach of party action. In fact, it has been extended so as to include more of a guardianship over other American powers than was contemplated by Monroe. It is plain from John Quincy Adams’s attitude in the matter of the Panama Congress (§ 337), that the original “Doctrine” contemplated that each power should guard by its own means against European aggressions.

SLAVERY COMES TO THE FRONT.

327. The Slavery Question.—Turning now to domestic matters, we find that during Monroe’s two terms, Chief Justice Marshall delivered many of his most celebrated opinions restraining the powers of the states in favor of the general government. But there was one subject which not even a Marshall could have handled effectively—this was slavery. Slavery had occupied the attention of the first Congress, which had been petitioned by anti-slavery societies to abate the evils of the system. In 1793 an act for restoring slaves who had fled from one state to another was passed. The slave trade had been prohibited in 1808, as soon as the Constitution allowed, and a great effort had been made by the American Colonization Society in 1816, to begin the work of exporting the negroes to Africa; but the invention of the cotton gin, in 1793, had rendered slavery too profitable to the far Southern states to make it probable that they would peaceably consent to the abolishment of the institution. On the other hand, the number of people who thought slavery morally wrong had increased in the North and Northwest, and the way in which new slaveholding and non-slaveholding states had been admitted into the Union by pairs, so as not to disturb the balance of power in the Senate, showed that many Southerners were alive to the dangers of the situation. Yet, after all, so great was the general desire for internal harmony that most persons were startled when the debates concerning the admission of Missouri revealed the fact that the existence of slavery was a menace to the Union.

328. The Missouri Controversy.—The inevitable struggle between slavery and freedom was precipitated by the endeavor to bring in Arkansas as a territory and Missouri as a state. Both were to be carved out of that part of the Louisiana Cession in which slavery had already gained a footing. Northern members of Congress objected to the spread of the institution into the vast territory still to be occupied, while Southern members felt that any limitation of slavery was an infringement on their property rights. If a man could carry his other chattels when he removed to the new region, why, they asked, could he not carry those human chattels known as slaves. Finally Arkansas was organized without mention of slavery, but a stand was made on Missouri. James Tallmadge, a New York representative, offered an amendment to the act admitting Missouri, to the effect that further introduction of slaves into the proposed state should be prohibited, and that the children of slaves born after the state’s admission to the Union should be considered free at the age of twenty-five. The Senate refusing to concur, the matter went over.

329. The First Missouri Compromise.—The close of the year 1819 saw a renewal of the contest in the new Congress, which assembled after the matter had been much discussed in state legislatures and throughout the country. Alabama was admitted to balance Illinois; then bills passed the House admitting Maine^[142] and Missouri, but with the anti-slavery proviso made applicable to the latter. The Senate would admit Maine only if Missouri were admitted as a slave state. The House refused to yield, but finally a compromise was effected. A line was drawn across the Louisiana Territory at 36° 30', i.e. along the northern boundary of Arkansas, and it was agreed that north of this line slavery should not exist save in Missouri. This famous arrangement, which went into effect in March, 1820, became known as the “Missouri Compromise” and was effective until new territory was added to the Union as a result of the Mexican War.

330. The Second Missouri Compromise.—Missouri was not, indeed, admitted until 1821, on account of a provision in its Constitution against allowing free colored men to enter its borders. This obstacle was overcome by the address and dexterity of Henry Clay^[143] who, as a Virginian by birth and a Kentuckian by residence, was in every way admirably suited to act as mediator between the two sections. He did not like slavery, and had been president of the Colonization Society; but he understood how thoroughly in earnest the Southern men were to defend the institution. He used all the tact and personal charm for which he was conspicuous among his contemporaries, and succeeded in making the people of Missouri agree not to deprive citizens of other states of their rights.

331. General View of the Compromises.—The Second Compromise was distinctly ambiguous and meant little; the First was a sacrifice of principle which, however, was regarded as necessary at the time. Both sides were in earnest, and the extreme adherents of each stood out to the end for their respective principles. On the whole, the responsibility for the settlement rested largely on the moderate Southerners and on their Northern and Western sympathizers, who were very influential in some states,—for example, in Illinois. Few men saw with John Randolph^[144] that the day of settlement was only postponed. Whether it would have been best to fight the question out then and there, will always be a mooted point. Compromise on matters of principle is incapable of satisfying men’s consciences for long; but it is equally true that principles cannot be uncompromisingly maintained with success at all times and seasons. Fighting unyieldingly for them at the wrong time may postpone their final triumph indefinitely. Hence it was, perhaps, best that the forces of freedom were given time to grow strong and that the Union was not hazarded at so early a juncture.

FACTIONAL POLITICS.

332. Political Factions and the Tariff of 1824.—The fight over Missouri was not the only indication that the Era of Good Feeling was to be of short duration. Politics throughout the country were becoming personal in character and therefore more or less petty. The influence of the Revolutionary statesmen was waning, in spite of the prestige of survivors like John Adams and Jefferson. The right to vote no longer depended in the main upon the possession of property, as had been the case when the Union was formed, but was being extended to all male citizens of the age of twenty-one. This extension of the franchise was largely due to the example set by the new Western states, which were naturally far more democratic than the older commonwealths. As a result, political tricksters were fast controlling the vote of the masses. Offices were being given for political services, and congressional caucuses and state cliques were dictating nominations. The nominating convention, with its opportunities for “wire-pulling” and its aptitude for selecting compromise candidates, was also coming into vogue in state politics, and political clubs, like the “Tammany Society” of New York, were beginning their sinister work. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that, as the tariff of 1816 was not sufficient for their purposes, the manufacturers of the Middle states and New England should have endeavored to obtain legislation of a more decidedly protective character. Aided by the West, which believed with Clay in creating “a home market” and thus adhering to a truly “American policy,” they succeeded, in 1824, against the wishes of the South, in passing a tariff act with higher duties, especially on wool, woolens, cotton goods, iron, and hemp. They had nearly succeeded in 1820 in carrying their point. Now, on the eve of an election, the politicians who were supporting the various Presidential candidates were afraid to risk votes by opposing such strong financial interests, and three sections^[145] were in any case stronger than one. But the passage of such an act under such circumstances was sure to give trouble, for although in theory designed for the good of the nation, protection really involved financial loss to one section, the South, which, as a whole, did not yet realize the fact, but was beginning to do so.

333. The Presidential Election of 1824.—Meanwhile, the choice of Monroe’s successor seemed more important than the tariff. Each of the candidates was a Democratic-Republican, a fact which perhaps made their struggle all the fiercer. John Quincy Adams,^[146] as Secretary of State, had precedents in his favor,—Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe having served in that capacity,—and he had also the support of New England; but his lack of magnetism counted greatly against him. Calhoun, who was still strong in the North on account of his nationalistic views, which, however, he was fast abandoning, soon contented himself with receiving assurance of the Vice Presidency. Crawford, whose health was very poor at the time, was nominated by the regular party caucus of congressmen; but as caucus nominations had grown in disfavor, this fact hurt his chances. Clay had the support of the West, and was popular elsewhere. Andrew Jackson, then a senator, was popular on account of his military record, represented the democratic masses more nearly than any other candidate, and had astute political managers. At the election of 1824, Jackson led with ninety-nine electoral votes; Adams had eighty-four; Crawford, forty-one; and Clay, thirty-seven. The election thus went to the House of Representatives, which had to choose from the three highest names.

334. Choice of John Quincy Adams.—In February, 1825, the House, voting by states, chose Adams, for whom, as the best fitted of the candidates, Clay had used his influence. As Adams subsequently made Clay Secretary of State, a corrupt bargain between them was charged, but upon no real grounds. Some of Jackson’s friends claimed that, as he had received most votes, the House should have respected the popular will and chosen him; yet this was equivalent to maintaining that the Constitution, which had left the House of Representatives full liberty in the matter, had not been properly framed. But, although there was no good reason for the discontent expressed, it remained clear that the Era of Good Feeling was over, and that Adams would find little comfort in the high office he had attained.^[147]