298. Madison’s Perplexities.—Just before Madison’s accession to the Presidency the Embargo was supplanted by a non-intercourse law which permitted trade with nations not controlled by France or Great Britain. This legitimate trade and the large amount of fraudulent shipping that went on brought temporary wealth to American shipowners, and there even seemed to be a prospect of a treaty with Great Britain. People began to say that Madison was a better President than his predecessor, who continued to advise him. As a matter of fact, he was a weaker man, had a poorer Cabinet, and was soon involved in greater difficulties than those encountered by Jefferson. For British statesmanship was at that time at a very low ebb; the concessions agreed to by Erskine, the British envoy, were disavowed at home, and a new envoy actually ventured to insult Madison by accusing him of deception in negotiations relating to the prospective treaty. Yet party politics were at a still lower ebb in this country, as is shown by the fact that the Federalists showered social attentions on James Jackson, the envoy who had so grossly insulted the President. Nevertheless Congress, tired of legislation that seemed to produce no effect either on England or on France, did away with non-intercourse, with the proviso that if one of the two contending powers annulled its vexatious decrees and the other did not, non-intercourse should be maintained with the nation still holding out (“Macon’s Bill,” No. 2, May 1, 1810). Napoleon took advantage of this proviso, although really showing America very little favor. He showed enough, however, to make Great Britain appear most in the wrong, and on November 1, 1810, Madison issued a proclamation declaring trade suspended with that power. This was a sorry commentary on the proclamation of the preceding April renewing trade with Great Britain; for the sole result of the diplomacy of the year had been to let loose more American ships to be captured by the British or confiscated by the French.

299. War Advocated.—Madison, who was prudent like Jefferson, and who was more of a student of politics than a vigorous man of affairs, did not desire war with either Great Britain or France any more than Jefferson had done, but he was forced into hostilities with the former power before the close of his first administration. The temper of the American people had been sorely tried by the Embargo and the non-intercourse policy as well as by British arrogance throughout the whole controversy. British statesmen spoke ill of Americans when they should have tried to enlist their sympathies in the war Great Britain was waging against despotism personified in Napoleon. The British were also thought to have stirred up the Western Indians, who were crushed on Tippecanoe River by General William Henry Harrison in 1811. The Western people were thus greatly embittered against Great Britain, and Henry Clay of Kentucky represented their feelings when, as Speaker of the new House of Representatives, he helped to force Madison into consenting to war. With Clay were joined many young, high-spirited men, some of whom, like John C. Calhoun^[126] of South Carolina, while adhering to the Jefferson-Madison school of politics, were inclined to be impatient with their more cautious elders. It is said that they threatened Madison with loss of a second term if he would not agree to war with Great Britain.^[127] Their policy eventually proved beneficial to the country, since it strengthened the national spirit and showed that the new generation contained men too strong to be bound by the traditions of the Revolutionary period; but it was tardy and lacking in cosmopolitan breadth of view.

300. Outlook for the War of 1812.—Not only was the War of 1812 a political blunder in so far as it helped Napoleon by harassing Great Britain, but also owing to the condition of America at the time of its inception. The national finances were by no means adequate to its cost, and the incompetence of Gallatin’s successor in the Treasury Department made the borrowing that had to be undertaken especially burdensome. The army, too, was small and poorly officered at the first. The volunteers were brave and in the West were very anxious to serve, but they and their leaders absurdly overrated the ease with which Canada could be conquered. Henry Clay actually boasted that his Kentucky constituents could accomplish this exploit without assistance. Besides, the political discontent of New England, where the Federalists were English sympathizers, and where much capital was invested in shipping which would be cooped up during the war, made it difficult to secure militia from the very portion of the country nearest the chief seat of operations. Volunteers were indeed obtained from New England, and after a while both officers and men made a better showing in the field. But when all is said, the land operations of the war, except in the splendid instance of the battle of New Orleans, afford little cause for patriotic gratification. A prediction to this effect might have been made about the navy, for the less than two score American vessels seemed but a bagatelle in comparison with the British navy, which contained about fifty times as many.^[128] But in the end the exploits of our seamen formed almost the sole bright spot in an exceedingly gloomy period.

301. Opening of the War.—War was formally declared on June 18, 1812, the majority in neither house being overwhelming. Two days previously the obnoxious Orders in Council had been revoked. Although the news was received on this side of the ocean before hostilities had fairly begun, the government adhered to its tardy determination to fight. This course seemed justifiable since the impressment trouble and the blockade of the coasts still called for redress, and the temper of at least a part of the nation had been inflamed.

302. Hull’s Surrender.—It was easy to perceive from the outset that the theater of the war on land would be much the same as in the French and Indian War—that is, it would stretch along our northern boundary from Maine to Lake Michigan. The main attacks by the Americans would be made through Lakes Ontario and Champlain. At first, bodies of troops were moved over the border from Detroit and Buffalo. General William Hull, the governor of Michigan Territory, who led the first advance with over two thousand troops, mainly volunteers from Ohio, was ignominiously repulsed by the Canadians and surrendered Detroit in a cowardly manner (August 16, 1812), for which he was afterward court-martialed and found guilty. Hull had issued a very boastful proclamation on his entry into Canada, and his surrender of an important fortress without firing a gun was almost unpardonable, in view of such high-flown pretensions. Altogether, the Canadians under Isaac Brock, the able governor of Upper Canada, with their allies, the Indians under Tecumseh, a famous warrior and the inveterate foe of the Americans, had outmaneuvered their opponents, and proved conclusively that the volunteers, rapidly gathering in Ohio and Kentucky, would have to be well led in order to secure any success. To get such leaders was not easy, but Madison finally selected the right man in General William Henry Harrison, the victor at Tippecanoe (§ 299). It was late in the year, however, and the country was a very difficult one to penetrate. The impatient public had therefore to wait quietly for the success that was to retrieve the early losses, among which may be mentioned the capture of Fort Dearborn, on the site of the present city of Chicago.

303. Other Defeats.—Meanwhile General Van Rensselaer, of the New York militia, had gathered about six thousand eager men, and on October 13 was forced, by the general impatience for a victory, prematurely to cross the Niagara River from Lewiston to Queenstown. Hull’s surrender had left Brock free to manage the Canadian defense. The American regulars fought well, but the militia crossed only in part, and the result was another surrender. Yet the enemy also suffered heavily, for the brave Brock fell defending the heights of Queenstown, where his tall monument may now be seen. Van Rensselaer, for his part, resigned, and was succeeded by the still less capable General Alexander Smyth, who imitated Hull in bragging and in ineffectiveness, but who dismissed his volunteers to their homes instead of surrendering them. Equally futile were the attempts to reach Canada by way of Lake Champlain; and the year would have ended in complete gloom, so far as land operations were concerned, had not the Americans, in their turn, repulsed an invading force at Ogdensburg. In the latter fight Jacob Brown, a Quaker farmer of New York, showed that he was the coming general for the war in the northeast, if that war were to be carried on seriously and not with manifestoes and ill-directed sallies of raw troops. Another soldier of merit was also discovered in the person of Lieutenant Colonel Winfield Scott, a young Virginian who fought finely at Queenstown Heights.

EXPLOITS OF THE NAVY.

304. The War at Sea.—On the sea, events took a different turn from the first, although the government’s main intention was to use its few ships^[129] in guarding the chief ports. On August 19, 1812, Captain Isaac Hull^[130] of the frigate Constitution^[131] (44 guns), which had previously been chased into Boston by a British squadron, met in the Gulf of St. Lawrence the enemy’s GuerriÈre (38 guns), which had made an unsavory reputation for itself by searching American vessels. The American ship was somewhat the stronger, but no one could have foreseen that she would overcome her adversary within half an hour. About two months later (October 18), in a very similar contest, the American sloop of war Wasp (18 guns), under Captain Jacob Jones, took the British brig Frolic (20 guns). In consequence of these unexpected victories Great Britain’s naval prestige was greatly shaken and American pride correspondingly stimulated. Analysis has shown that the results were mainly due to the better gunnery of the Americans. Equally fortunate for the younger nation were the fights between the frigate United States (44 guns), under Captain Decatur (§ 285, note 1), and the British frigate Macedonian (38 guns); and between the Constitution, then under Captain Bainbridge, and the British Java. The former contest took place near the Madeiras, on October 25; the latter, off the coast of Brazil, on December 29, 1812. Congress immediately authorized the building of new ships, and while the British were able to sweep American commerce from the seas, the people consoled themselves with the thought of the superb victories of their ships and of the damage American privateers were doing English shipping on every ocean and sea—even within Dublin Bay itself. At last, however, reverses came, when, in 1813, the Chesapeake^[132] was captured by the British Shannon, and when our ships were blockaded in our chief harbors. But the privateers continued their exploits until they raised British rates of insurance on trading vessels to a very high percentage.

305. Victories of Perry and Harrison.—Meanwhile the war was not popular in Great Britain or in New England. The South and West still favored it, however, and Congress helped Madison by allowing him to use twenty new regiments of regulars in place of volunteers. A new Secretary of War, General Armstrong, late minister to France, took the place of Eustis, who was unfitted to cope with the difficulties of the position. But the year was to witness few signal successes beyond an important victory on Lake Erie that led to the retaking of Detroit. Captain Oliver H. Perry^[133] had a flotilla constructed at Presque Isle (now Erie), and on September 10 met and defeated the British flotilla under Captain Barclay. The British had more guns, but the Americans, after Perry had been obliged to abandon his flagship, gained a complete victory through their courage and skill. Perry, who was coÖperating with Harrison, wrote the latter on the back of an old letter, “We have met the enemy and they are ours.” Harrison’s army, helped by the American ships, then passed to Detroit and afterward landed in Canada, where, at the battle of the Thames River, the British, under Colonel Proctor and their Indian allies, were completely routed (October 5). Tecumseh fell in this fight, and a portion of Upper Canada passed under American control, Michigan having been, of course, regained.^[134]

REVERSES AND SUCCESSES.

306. American Failures.—A great invasion of Canada and the seizure of Montreal had been planned for 1813, but it was partly abandoned, General Dearborn seizing only a few places, including York (now Toronto), which was unnecessarily burned. Brown, Scott, and others showed that American soldiers could be brave, but the campaign was on the whole a failure. General Wilkinson then succeeded Dearborn, but, like the latter, was too old for the work, and was besides at loggerheads with Secretary Armstrong and with his second in command, General Wade Hampton of South Carolina. An attack on Montreal or else on Kingston was planned, but Armstrong mixed matters up by assuming the command. Hampton failed to coÖperate with Wilkinson, who had had a hard time descending the St. Lawrence, and the latter general was obliged to put his troops into winter quarters with nothing accomplished. Meanwhile the force on the weakened Niagara frontier had recrossed the river after burning the town of Newark. The British retaliated in kind and with their Indian allies did much damage on the American side of the river.

307. Jackson and the Indians.—While these events had been taking place in the North, the Southwest had not been quiet. British and Spanish emissaries were stirring up the Southern Indians to attack the Americans. The Creeks had also been excited by Tecumseh, who used a comet and an earthquake to work upon their superstitious fears. The savages massacred the white settlers at Fort Mims, Alabama, on August 30, 1813, slaying or roasting to death four hundred persons. Retaliation came swiftly. The Tennesseean volunteers under General Andrew Jackson invaded the Creek country, and with the help of troops from Mississippi completely defeated the Indians at the battle of the Horseshoe, or Tohopeka (March 27, 1814).

308. Outlook for 1814.—The year 1814 opened gloomily in spite of Harrison’s and Perry’s victories. There was still much improvement needed in the methods of raising troops, the War Department was badly managed, and the finances were in a wretched condition. Worst of all, good leaders were lacking. Besides, the British navy was beginning to ravage the Atlantic coast, and Napoleon’s power being on the wane, the strength of the United Kingdom could be more fully employed against America. Russia, however, had proffered her good services as a mediator, and Gallatin and James A. Bayard were sent to St. Petersburg to join John Quincy Adams, minister at that court, in securing this powerful influence. The British government discouraged the Czar’s offers, but as it had great European interests to settle, it was not so much inclined to fight to a finish with the United States as it might otherwise have been.

309. The Canadian Campaign of 1814.—Several incompetent generals having been got out of the way for one cause or another, the command on the Canadian frontier fell to the capable Brown. A mistake was made with regard to the scene of operations, but when the fighting began near Niagara Falls, Brown gave a good account of himself. At Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane (July 5 and 25), leaders like Winfield Scott distinguished themselves, and the American troops showed themselves the equals of British regulars, and won honor, if no substantial military gains. Commodore Thomas Macdonough^[135] also repeated Perry’s exploit of destroying a British flotilla—this time off Plattsburg on Lake Champlain (September 11). The result of all this fighting was little,—each side practically holding its ground,—but the Americans gained prestige.

310. Capture of Washington.—Meanwhile British ships ravaged the Atlantic coast, and by midsummer a large fleet under Admirals Cockburn and Cochrane was collected in Chesapeake Bay. On board was General Ross with several thousand troops. Washington, Virginia, and Maryland were evidently in danger and great efforts were made to meet the invaders—unfortunately to little purpose, on account of the incapacity of Secretary Armstrong. The British landed and began their march to Washington, easily putting the undisciplined American militia to flight at Bladensburg, Maryland (August 24). Our troops evacuated Washington, and the British entered. They retaliated for the burning of York by setting fire to the White House, the unfinished Capitol, and other buildings. It was an act of vandalism that cannot be defended; but fortunately the next city attacked repulsed the invaders courageously. This was Baltimore, before which the British troops were driven back, General Ross being slain, and from which the British fleet retired after a vain bombardment of Fort McHenry (September 12 and 13). The song of “The Star Spangled Banner,” by Francis S. Key, commemorates this American victory.

END OF THE WAR.

311. The Battle of New Orleans.—It soon became apparent that the attacks on Washington and Baltimore had been of secondary importance, and that the real object of the British fleet was to capture New Orleans, and snatch the newly acquired Louisiana from the United States. James Monroe, who had succeeded Armstrong as Secretary of War, at once called upon the ablest soldier in the Southwest, Andrew Jackson.^[136] The latter gathered his forces, and although he first tried an expedition into Florida against the British and Indians, he set to work at the defenses of New Orleans in good season. The large British fleet effected a landing safely, and by December 23 the troops were only a few miles from the city. The main battle occurred on January 8, 1815, and the backwoodsmen behind their works destroyed the flower of the British army who had the hardihood to make a front attack. Sir Edward Pakenham, the British commander, was killed, after having been for days outgeneralled by Jackson; and at least two thousand veterans, many of whom had followed Wellington in the Spanish Peninsula, lay dead or wounded on the field. The American loss, on the other hand, was almost incredibly slight—about twenty men all told.

312. The Treaty of Ghent.—If those had been the days of the telegraph, the battle of New Orleans would not have been fought, and the American people would have had no great land victory to salve the pride that had been touched to the quick by the capture of Washington, Hull’s surrender, and other disgraceful events of the war. On December 24, 1814, American and British commissioners had signed a treaty of peace at Ghent. Adams, Gallatin, and Bayard, who were already abroad, had been joined by Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell; and the five had defended American interests very well. Gallatin was the most influential member and succeeded in curbing the zeal of Clay and Adams, who wished to press matters like the British right to navigate the Mississippi and the fisheries question, in which the people of the West and of New England took a great interest. Curiously enough, the treaty did not touch the impressment abuse, or the right of searching vessels, for the sake of which, in the main, the war had been waged. Still, after her naval victories, America was not likely to suffer in the future from such abuses. Each side restored the territory of the other that it occupied, and both felt relieved that the anomalous war was over.

THE DISAFFECTION OF NEW ENGLAND.

313. Political Events.—Political events in Madison’s second administration were naturally overshadowed by the war or else connected with it. As we have seen, the finances were badly managed, nor were the affairs of the War Department on a better footing. Congress was scarcely more efficient, especially when its Speaker, Henry Clay, was absent with the commissioners at Ghent. But the disaffection of the New England Federalists was the most serious element in the political problem. With the waning of their party and the assured success of the Democratic-Republicans, they naturally grew more rancorous. They coquetted with the British before and during the war, and they had little or no sympathy with the idea that the United States was a nation. In the debate in 1811 on the admission of Louisiana as a state, one of their leaders, Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, actually declared that the passage of the bill would be a virtual dissolution of the Union, and that it would be the duty of some of the states, “to prepare for a separation amicably” if they could, “violently if they must.”

314. Reasons for New England’s Attitude.—This attitude seems at first wholly indefensible, but we must remember both at this juncture and in dealing later with the secession of the South, that the idea of national unison was one of very slow growth, and that threats of secession or of violent resistance to the Union had been heard already from Southern, Western, and Middle states. States were still jealous of their prestige, and the language of the Constitution lent itself to interpretations that reduced the power of the nation to a minimum. Besides, New England had suffered greatly from the enforced idleness of its shipping during the Embargo and from the captures made by the British. Consequently, just as men are always inclined to do, they held the national government responsible for matters that often lay beyond its control. Their pro-British sympathies, although certainly carried beyond the bounds of decency, may be partly extenuated for these reasons. When they went farther, and refused to put the state militia at the service of the Union, they took a dangerous step, but one not entirely indefensible on strict constructionist grounds. It was a sure precursor, however, of more determined and less defensible opposition.

315. The Hartford Convention.—Success in state elections gave the political solidarity that was needed, and the increasing pressure of hostilities in the year 1814 gave the needed stimulus, for effective opposition to the war on the part of New England. After speeches and resolutions as strenuous as those that nerved Virginia and Kentucky to their resistance of the Alien and Sedition laws, passed half a generation before by the Federalists themselves, a call was issued by Massachusetts for a convention of the New England States. This met at Hartford, Connecticut, on December 15, 1814. After a few weeks of secret debate its members issued a remarkable report. This document asserted the doctrine of states’ rights in its most naked form, suggested amendments to the Constitution of the United States looking to the protection of the interests of minorities, and demanded for the states the right to claim the customs duties collected within their own borders. This last provision would have been of itself enough to destroy the power of the Union, but fortunately there was no need even to discuss it. The commissioners sent to Washington to propose it to Congress found that peace had been declared and that their chief ground of grievance had been removed. They had, therefore, nothing to do but to hasten home in chagrin. The Federalist party did not survive their last attack upon the general government, and for several years after 1815 there was practically only one party in the country. This fact is not surprising when we remember that accession to power had rendered the leading Republicans as desirous of maintaining a fairly strong government as the moderate Federalists were.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR.

316. Some Results of the War.—With the decline of Federalism came a natural increase of national democratic spirit and a lessening of the dependence on either Great Britain or France, which, as we have before seen, had characterized the generation that grew up just after the Revolution. This was a clear gain from the war. On the other hand, the interests of the sections began more sharply to diverge. The North, during the trouble with England, had taken to manufacturing, and now began to demand a really protective tariff for its “infant industries.” This policy, though encouraged by the West for the sake of certain products like hemp, was soon seen to bear hard on the South. Previous legislation on the subject (§ 266) had paved the way for an effective tariff, and the influx of British goods brought into the country after the close of the war showed that the newly developed industries, especially that of cotton manufacture, which had increased greatly since 1810, would find it hard to subsist without support. So the tariff act of 1816 was passed, in spite of the opposition of Daniel Webster, who represented New England shipping interests, and of John Randolph, who represented the agricultural South and the stricter forms of Republicanism. The rate (about twenty-five per cent), placed on imported cotton and woolen goods, was found practically prohibitive by Southern planters, who needed coarse clothes for their slaves. Thus the Southerners began to be alienated from the Democratic-Republican party, although not a few of them helped to pass the act of 1816. Among these was John C. Calhoun, whose leanings toward a strong government were still pronounced.

317. The National Bank and Internal Improvements.—The year 1816 also saw the passage of another financial measure destined to cause division later. This was the reËstablishment of a national bank, Hamilton’s bank (§ 266) having failed to secure a second charter in 1811. The financial burdens of the war had fallen in consequence upon the state banks, which had not been managed well. Hence the new bank scheme was favored even by cautious Republicans like Madison. Its establishment for twenty years, with a largely increased capital, enabled the country practically to resume a specie basis in less than a year.^[137] A fund of a million and a half dollars was paid by it to the government for the privileges granted by the charter, and the problem how to employ this sum to the best advantage brought forward still another question involving conflicting interests.

318. The Question of Internal Improvements.—At first the individual states had attended to their internal needs and had spent considerable sums, especially in improving their water-ways, but a great scheme for a system of national canals had, before the war, attracted leading Republicans. Now Calhoun proposed to use for a similar purpose the money turned in by the bank. His bill passed Congress, but Madison vetoed it, on the ground that although such improvements were desirable, a specific amendment to the Constitution was needed if the general government was to undertake them.

319. The Succession of Monroe.—This veto of Madison’s, which led the people of New York, in default of national aid, to construct their own Erie Canal, through which New York City was enabled soon to outstrip its rivals,^[138] was one of his last official acts and showed that he was still faithful to the political creed of Jefferson. He was shortly after (March 4, 1817) succeeded by his Secretary of State, James Monroe, who had proved his claim to the succession by developing the nationalistic ideas that had made Jefferson and Madison safe leaders in a very critical period. Monroe had also rendered very efficient service as temporary Secretary of War, and had endeared himself to the people of every section.

References.—General Works: same as for Chapter XIII.

Special Works: same in the main as for Chapter XV., with the addition of: Henry Adams, History of the United States (1800–1817, 9 vols.); D. C. Gilman, James Monroe (“American Statesmen”); W. G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson (“American Statesmen”); C. Schurz, Henry Clay (2 vols. “American Statesmen”); B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the War of 1812; C. J. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch of the Second War; T. Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812; J. Fenimore Cooper, History of the Navy of the United States, chaps. xiii.–xlix.; E. S. Maclay, History of the United States Navy, Vol. I., 305-577; H. C. Adams, Public Debts, Part II., chap. i.; H. C. Lodge, George Cabot, chaps. x.–xiii.