282. Jefferson’s Character and General Policy.—With the advent of the popular Jefferson as President, the aristocratic Federalists, especially those of New England, thought, as we have just seen, that anarchy would ensue. Jefferson was supposed to be an opponent of all social distinctions, of strong organized government, and even of religious institutions. As a matter of fact, he was a widely cultured country gentleman who had liberal political theories, a sympathy with the masses of the people, especially the agriculturists, and a profound belief in human capacity for progress. He was too suspicious, and he often lacked dignity; he had no great executive ability and preferred rather to manage than to command, but he understood the American people as perhaps no other man has done. Furthermore, he gave in his writings the most subtle and widely current exposition of general republican ideas that has ever been given. He corresponded with leading men throughout the country and by his letters molded public opinion. His accession to power, so far from overthrowing the government, gave it a popular support it could have received in no other way; and the successive elections of his pupils, Madison and Monroe, kept the South and West fairly in the Union until the central government became strong enough under Jackson to crush incipient efforts to divide the nation. None of these three Virginian Presidents was a commanding man, but all were influential, and their policies made for harmony. Hence the period of their administrations had an importance not at first perceived. They helped to hold the agricultural slave-holding South in line with the manufacturing and commercial North and East. They made mistakes, were embarrassed by foreign complications and domestic difficulties, and had to persuade instead of rule. But they represented both the Union and the section that was most masterful and restive of control, and thus their administrations formed a necessary stage in the nation’s evolution.

283. The Revolution of 1801.—Another point to be remembered about these Presidents is the fact that they were all representative of the educated upper classes, and yet were in full sympathy with the common people, who had just obtained political control of the country. If they had been demagogues or as ignorant of the principles of government as many of their supporters, they might indeed have precipitated the reign of anarchy the Federalists feared. On the contrary, they governed as well as their aristocratic opponents could have done, and so the Federalist party, which had succeeded so well in establishing the government, but had unwisely ignored the wishes of the people, sank into insignificance, without any serious detriment to the nation. The Revolution of 1801, as the Democratic-Republican victory has been called, was a beneficent one, chiefly because it took place under the direction and control of trained statesmen.

284. Leading Public Men.—Jefferson made a good beginning by delivering a conciliatory inaugural address^[115] and by not making a wholesale removal of Federalist officeholders. Where commissions had not been delivered to Adams’s late appointees, he withheld them, and he removed obnoxious partisans, but on the whole his attitude toward the civil service was fairly conservative. His Cabinet appointments were good, and throughout his two terms he had the cordial support of his subordinates. Madison, who was much under his influence, was a prudent and able statesman, and made a dignified Secretary of State. Albert Gallatin^[116] of Pennsylvania, as Secretary of the Treasury, proved himself second only to Hamilton as a financier. Gallatin was by birth a Swiss, and is a striking example of what a foreign-born citizen of integrity and talents can accomplish in free America. The leading man in the House of Representatives was the Virginian, John Randolph of Roanoke, one of the most brilliant and interesting figures in our history. He was too independent and one-sided, however, to work long in harmony with the administration, and became in course of time the most bitter and effective of its opponents. Another Virginian, in the judiciary department, was a formidable opponent of Jefferson. This was John Marshall,^[117] whom Adams, shortly before he left office, had made Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Marshall was a Federalist, and in favor of giving the general government broader powers than Jefferson and his party thought either right or expedient. The President and the great jurist came often into conflict, as, for example, in the Burr trial (§ 290); but on the whole the advantage rested with Marshall, since he remained in office until his death, in 1835, and since his decisions steadily helped to build up the power of the government.

MEASURES AND EVENTS.

285. Financial Affairs and War with the Barbary States.—One of the first matters that occupied the new administration was the reduction of taxes and the decrease of the public debt, which had grown rapidly in consequence of the preparations for war with France. The army was greatly reduced,^[118] and much less was spent on the navy—a branch of the service which had grown under Adams, but with which Jefferson, as an agriculturist, had little sympathy. He endeavored to economize in other ways, especially by doing away with internal taxes and with the unnecessary judges added by the Federalists, but he naturally found that the demands of a growing country had to be met. Still, the next ten years were distinctly a period of retrenchment, in spite of the cost of Louisiana and of the small war waged against the piratical Barbary States (1801–1806). These “pests of Christendom” had become too impudent in their demands for tribute in return for promised immunity of American shipping in the Mediterranean, and they had to be brought to their senses by the bombardment of Tripoli. The war furnished training to our sailors, and gave Lieutenant Stephen Decatur^[119] great fame for his exploit in burning one of our frigates, so that she could be of no use to the enemy.^[120]

286. The Louisiana Purchase.—This purchase was the most important feature of either of Jefferson’s administrations. The colony of Louisiana, which comprised a vast stretch of territory west of the Mississippi, had, as we have seen, been ceded by France to Spain in 1763 (§ 115). In 1800 Spain ceded it back to France. As the latter country was far more powerful and dangerous than the former, and as the ambitious Napoleon then ruled France, great alarm was felt in America at the prospect of having a rival nation grow up across the Mississippi. Affairs were made still more serious by the denial of the right of depositing their goods at the port of New Orleans to the inhabitants of our Western country. These citizens were thus unable to transfer their merchandise from river boats to ocean vessels, and were cut off from profitable markets. Even the pacific Jefferson took the alarm,^[121] and James Monroe of Virginia was dispatched to France to try to buy a strip of territory including New Orleans. Because of the impending war between Great Britain and France, and the consequent necessity of defending Louisiana, and for other reasons, Napoleon just before Monroe’s arrival made the regular American Minister, R. R. Livingston, an offer to sell the whole Louisiana region. His offer was accepted, and the price was set at fifteen million dollars, less certain claims against the French.

287. Controversy over the Purchase.—Jefferson declared, consistently with his own principles, that no power to acquire territory was allowed the general government by the Constitution, and that therefore an amendment must be made to that document in order that the purchase might be valid. But an amendment would take time, and unless the bargain were closed at once the new territory might be lost forever, especially as Spain was indignant on account of Napoleon’s action. So the treaty was ratified, and a strict constructionist President furnished a weighty precedent to his political opponents. The latter, however, did not perceive the value of Louisiana to the Union, and would have been better pleased had Jefferson clung to his principles. Yet it is clear that he was right, and the Federalists wrong. The contiguity of the territory made it necessary that it should belong to the United States, and it was better to buy it than to fight for it at some future day. It is true that the boundaries of the region were unsettled, and were sure to cause trouble, and that a spread of slavery was also involved. But the people were wise when they indorsed Jefferson’s action by reËlecting him in 1804 by an overwhelming majority. Jefferson himself was wise in not speculating whether or not the states formed west of the Mississippi would adhere to the Union,—the Federalists feared they would not,—and in having the new region explored by Lewis and Clark and Lieutenant Pike. So great was the opposition of New England to this acquisition of territory by the nation, that some Federalist leaders actually thought that they might persuade the Eastern states to detach themselves from the Union. Their schemes were abortive, but were destined soon to bear bitter fruit (§§ 313-315).

288. The Election of 1804.—The election of 1804 was held under the Twelfth Amendment (§ 281). Burr, who had endeavored to secure the Presidency through Federalist help, and who was besides, as we have seen, a suspicious character, was not available for reËlection to the Vice Presidency. Jefferson was therefore given George Clinton, of New York, as a colleague. The two Federalist candidates, C. C. Pinckney and Rufus King of New York, received but fourteen electoral votes, so complete was the demoralization of the party.

289. Burr’s Conspiracy.—Burr ran as an independent candidate for the governorship of New York, but was defeated, again chiefly through the instrumentality of Hamilton. In consequence, he picked a quarrel with the latter, which led to a duel. Hamilton was killed at the first shot, and the death of so brilliant a man in such a manner aroused the indignation of the entire country.^[122] Burr became almost an outcast. As he was an ambitious schemer, he undertook in 1806 to induce a secession of the Western states from the Union. He seems also to have dreamed of playing the part of Napoleon in the New World, and of establishing an empire in Texas or Mexico. He gained the support of a well-to-do Irish gentleman named Blennerhassett, who helped to gather arms and men in Ohio and Kentucky, and as a consequence ruined himself and family. Burr also tampered with other leading citizens of the West, particularly with General Wilkinson, the American commander at New Orleans, who reported his schemes to Jefferson. After some delay, the President made use of local militia, and Burr’s expedition was reduced to a fiasco, only about one hundred men descending the Mississippi with him. He finally abandoned these, and after some wandering in the almost uninhabited territory that lay to the south of Tennessee, he was captured and sent to Richmond, Virginia, for trial (1807).

290. Burr’s Trial.—Jefferson showed great interest in the case, and almost seemed pitted against Chief Justice Marshall. The latter ordered the President to appear as a witness, but the Executive very properly refused to do anything beyond sending papers. Marshall declared that an overt act of treason must be proved, but as Burr had not yet levied war against the United States or adhered to their enemies,—actions constituting treason according to the Constitution,—and as his mustering of men had not taken place in Virginia, there was little or nothing for the prosecuting attorneys to proceed on, and the case came to an abrupt close. Marshall’s decision has probably done good in making trials for treason practically unknown in the United States. But he can hardly be acquitted of having allowed his feelings against Jefferson to get the better of him. On the other hand, Jefferson had, in his easy-going way, allowed Burr to go too far before interfering with his plans. Burr himself went to England, then returned to New York, and soon passed from public notice.

291. The Impeachment of Justice Chase.—Two years previous to the miscarriage of justice in Burr’s case, another trial of a different nature had failed almost as signally. This was the trial, before the Senate, of Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court. Chase was a violent Federalist, who had been impeached by the Democratic-Republican House of Representatives for partisan conduct on the bench. He was ably defended, while John Randolph, who led the prosecution, completely mismanaged his case. The result was a failure to convict (1805).

292. Troubles with Great Britain and France.—More serious matters now confronted Jefferson. Since the signing of Jay’s Treaty, American shipping had flourished, owing to the fact that being a neutral nation, the United States could convey to France and Spain the produce of their West Indian colonies, the ships of the two European countries not being serviceable on account of the war with Great Britain, whose fleets swept the ocean. By 1805, however, the jealousy of British shipowners had been aroused and the Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, applied to American vessels what was known as the “Rule of 1756.” This prevented a neutral from enjoying, in time of war, trading privileges not allowed in time of peace. British men-of-war, therefore, began to seize American ships, and the old impressment abuses were increased. Meanwhile, Jay’s Treaty expired, and a new treaty, signed by Monroe and William Pinkney, a brilliant Maryland lawyer and orator, was not honorable to us and was not even laid before the Senate. One provision of it ran, that Great Britain would not be bound by it unless the United States undertook to resist Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806. This was a paper blockade of the British Isles, in retaliation for the British blockade of the Continent. In other words, Napoleon, who by that time had humbled most of the sovereigns of Europe, had declared Continental ports closed to British ships, although he had no effective means of keeping them out. Great Britain wished to force America to take sides against France. An Order in Council of November, 1807, actually authorized the seizure of any neutral vessel on a voyage to closed ports, unless it had previously touched at a British port. To this order Napoleon replied by the Milan Decree (December, 1807), authorizing the capture of any vessel that had entered a British port. Thus American neutral trade was practically an impossibility, and an important portion of our population was seriously affected.

293. The Embargo.—Under these harassing circumstances, Jefferson was forced to adopt a more energetic foreign policy than at all suited his pacific disposition. Diplomatic efforts were wasted on headstrong opponents, who despised a weak, young nation. So the Non-intercourse Act, forbidding the importation of goods from Great Britain or her colonies, was passed in the spring of 1806, but did not go into effect for nearly two years; by 1808 it had been determined that mere non-importation was not a sufficiently drastic remedy, and that an embargo, forbidding all American vessels to leave for foreign ports, was necessary. In the interim, relations with Great Britain had been strained to the point of breaking, through the fact that on June 27, 1807, the British ship Leopard, acting under the orders of an admiral at Halifax, fired on the American frigate Chesapeake, and took from the latter four sailors, three of whom were American citizens.^[123] Jefferson at once ordered British warships out of American waters and tried to bring the impressment controversy to an issue, but the British merely disavowed the action of their admiral. This conduct, together with the Order in Council of November, 1807, precipitated the Embargo.

294. Nature and Object of the Embargo.—The Embargo was partly intended to save the lives and property of the Americans—who were, nevertheless, willing to risk both on account of the great profits accruing from trade with Europe—by preventing ships from leaving port and running the risk of being captured by British men-of-war, or of being confiscated in Continental ports. Jefferson, however, had another object in view. He believed that both England and Europe would suffer so much from the loss of the American trade that the combatants would be forced to abandon their repressive measures against the ships of neutrals. He miscalculated the stubbornness and malignity of both parties, and both Non-intercourse and Embargo, instead of proving coercive, proved irritating and mischievous. Nevertheless, there was precedent in favor of the experiment, and from the point of view of general human welfare Jefferson was justified in trying it. From the point of view of politics, the experiment was disastrous, but the fact that he induced Congress to adopt it is a conclusive proof of Jefferson’s capacity to control men.

295. Difficulty of Enforcing the Embargo.—It proved very difficult, however, to enforce such legislation, for the Federalists made capital out of it, while Jefferson’s Southern supporters upheld it against their wills. New England ships rotted at their wharves, and in Virginia the staple tobacco remained unsold. Jefferson was overwhelmed with petitions to change his policy, but held out persistently. The British government also held to its former course and Napoleon to his. Before Jefferson’s second term had expired, it was quite clear that new measures must be tried in order to assert the nation’s dignity abroad and to secure civil peace at home. The pupil Madison, who became President in 1809, had to undo in part, at least, the work of the master.

CHARACTER OF JEFFERSON’S STATESMANSHIP.

Eli Whitney.